Longoria v. Khachatryan et al
Filing
122
OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge T Lane Wilson ; denying 55 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 62 Joinder in Motion (crp, Dpty Clk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DANIEL LONGORIA, JR.,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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ARTUR KHACHATRYAN, an
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individual; SENTRY INSURANCE
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COMPANY, a foreign insurance
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company; HUSSAIN ABDULRLIDHA
ALBANAWI, an individual; and BIG RIG )
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AUTO TRANSPORT, INC., a foreign
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corporation;
Case No. 14-cv-70-TLW
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is defendant Artur Khachatryan’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. (Dkt. 55).
This case involves alleged injuries from a multi-vehicle accident. (Dkt. 19). Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint alleges that two of the defendants – Khachatryan and Hussain Abdulrlidha
Albanawi – failed “to operate their respective semi-truck [sic] at a speed safe for the road and
weather conditions” and that this failure constituted “reckless disregard” for plaintiff’s safety. Id.
Khachatryan’s motion asks the Court, on a pre-trial basis, to rule that plaintiff cannot seek
punitive damages, arguing that “no evidence has been or can be presented to support the
imposition of punitive damages against Khachatryan in this matter.” Id. Defendants Albanawi
and Big Rig Auto Transport, Inc.1 have asked to join Khachatryan’s motion. (Dkt. 62). Plaintiff
1
In its Answer, Big Rig admitted that Albanawi was an employee of Big Rig acting within the
scope of his employment at the time of the accident that is the subject of this litigation. (Dkt. 27).
has filed a response to both the motion for partial summary judgment and the motion for joinder.
(R. 80, 82). Defendants Khachatryan and Albanawi/Big Rig have filed replies. (R. 86, 91).
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Kendall v.
Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1993). “Summary judgment procedure is properly
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal
Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action.’” Id. at 327.
“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(a), its opponent must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 252. In essence, the inquiry for the Court is “whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 250.
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In its review, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. See Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998).
Joinder
Plaintiff argues that Albanawi and Big Rig’s joinder is untimely. (Dkt. 82). Plaintiff cites
the Amended Scheduling Order (dkt. 52), which set the dispositive motion deadline on
December 30, 2015. Albanawi and Big Rig filed their motion to join Khachatryan’s motion for
summary judgment on January 13, 2016. (Dkt. 62). Although the motion to join was untimely,
the Court will exercise its discretion and grant the motion. See Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145
F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing a district court’s broad discretion to manage the
litigation process).
Punitive Damages
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint bases its claim for punitive damages on allegations that
defendants were driving their semi-trucks at speeds that evinced “reckless disregard” for
plaintiff’s safety. (Dkt. 19). Plaintiff’s specific allegation is that defendants were “driving at an
unsafe speed during rain” and that their speeds violated “state and federal motor carrier
regulations.” Id.
Oklahoma’s punitive damages statute provides that punitive damages may be awarded in
three situations. See Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9.1. Each category sets forth the amount of damages
available based, in part, on the intent of the defendant. See id. In this case, the allegations of
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint place this case into Category I, which permits recovery of
punitive damages “[w]here the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . [t]he
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defendant has been guilty of reckless disregard for the rights of others.”2 Okla. Stat. tit. 23, §
9.1(B).
Oklahoma law provides that “[a] plea for punitive damages is generally considered to be
an element of recovery of the underlying cause of action; it does not constitute a separate cause
of action.” Rodebush By and Through Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d
1241, 1247 (Okla. 1993). In the context of a summary judgment motion, a claim for punitive
damages fails if the underlying claim fails. See Bennett v. McKibben, 915 P.2d 400, 405 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1996). It is not clear, however, whether the converse – that a claim for punitive
damages always survives when summary judgment is denied on the underlying claim – is always
true.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has held that summary judgment on the issue of
punitive damages was premature where summary judgment on a libel claim was not proper. See
Nelson v. American Hometown Publishing, Inc., 333 P.3d 962, 974-75 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014).
In Nelson, the court did not examine the quality of the evidence that would support punitive
damages in remanding to allow the lower court to consider the issue. See id. Instead, the court set
out the proper burden of proof for establishing punitive damages and stated that “[t]he issue of
punitive damages must be addressed if Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to meet the standard
for their recovery.” Id. at 975.
In addition, two decisions from other judges in this Court (both involving multi-vehicle
semi-truck accidents like the one at issue in this case) indicate that where a genuine issue of
2
Category II requires a finding of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “acted
intentionally and with malice towards others.” Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9.1(C). Category III also
requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “acted intentionally and with malice
towards others” and imposes an additional requirement – that the “court finds that there is
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted intentionally and with malice and
engaged in conduct life-threatening to humans.” Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9.1(D).
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material fact exists on the underlying claim, summary judgment on the question of punitive
damages is not appropriate. See Laney v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 2011 WL 1667434 (N.D.
Okla. May 3, 2011) (unpublished); Cummings v. ConGlobal Indus., Inc., 2008 WL 4613817
(N.D. Okla. October 14, 2008) (unpublished). The Court notes, however, that in both Laney and
Cummings, the plaintiffs had pled and presented evidence of bad behavior that, in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, could rise to the level of reckless disregard. In Laney, there
was evidence that the truck driver was speeding, was fatigued, had doctored his drivers’ log, and
was using his cell phone at the time of the accident. See 2011 WL 1667434 at *2, 3. In
Cummings, there was evidence that the driver of the semi-truck was sleep deprived, had doctored
his drivers’ log, and had other, recent citations for traffic violations. See 2011 WL 4613817 at
*2. These allegations are important, as they demonstrate behavior that could be considered
reckless and should be contrasted with plaintiff’s allegations, discussed infra.
Conversely, a judge in the Western District of Oklahoma, applying Oklahoma law, held
that summary judgment on punitive damages is appropriate where the underlying facts were
“barely sufficient to survive summary judgment on the substantive [] claim.”3 LeBlanc v.
Travelers Home and Marine Ins. Co., 2011 WL 2748616 (W.D. Okla. July 13, 2011)
(unpublished).
Accordingly, whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the question of
punitive damages appears to be dependent on the facts of the case.
Genuine Issue of Material Fact on the Issue of Reckless Disregard - Khachatryan
In his motion for summary judgment, Khachatryan argues that he is entitled to summary
judgment on the question of punitive damages because there is no evidence of reckless disregard
3
Here, defendants have not moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s underlying claim.
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that “has been or can be presented.” (Dkt. 55). Khachatryan argues that plaintiff must present this
evidence now and cannot “hope that something may turn up at trial to support such conduct.” Id.
In support of his motion, Khachatryan submitted his deposition testimony that he was stopped at
the time of the accident and was struck from behind by another semi-truck. (Dkt. 19-2). To
support his contention that plaintiff could not present evidence to support the allegation of
reckless disregard, Khachatryan also attached plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he did not see
how the accident occurred. (Dkt. 19-1).
Assuming summary judgment may be granted on the issue of punitive damages, in
opposing Khachatryan’s motion, plaintiff “must set forth specific facts showing the presence of a
genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the
allegations.” Burnette v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986)). Plaintiff submitted the following evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material
fact exists on the question of reckless disregard:
1. It was raining and there was standing water on the roadway. (Albanawi
Deposition, dkt. 80-1). These conditions would increase stopping distance.
(Khachatryan Deposition, dkt. 55-2).
2. Visibility was somewhere between 500 to 700 feet. (Albanawi Deposition, dkt.
80-1; Khachatryan Deposition, dkt. 55-2)
3. Albanawi testified at his deposition that he was driving in the left lane and was
pulling up to pass alongside Khachatryan when Khachatryan put on his blinker
and moved into the left lane in front of Albanawi. (Albanawi Deposition, dkt. 801). Albanawi testified that Khachatryan applied his brakes and stopped
approximately twenty-five seconds after changing lanes. Id. Albanawi stated that
he did not see brake lights but noted that Khachatryan had stopped when he was
half a truck-length away. Id. Albanawi applied his brakes but could not avoid
hitting Khachatryan. Id. Albanawi’s testimony also indicates that he estimated
Khachatryan was traveling at 48-49 miles per hour when he changed lanes and
that 45-55 miles per hour was a reasonable speed given the conditions. Id.
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4. Additional testimony from Khachatryan’s deposition indicates that after he
changed lanes, he slowed to 20-25 miles per hour to try to avoid striking
plaintiff’s semi-truck because “I couldn’t just stop suddenly.” (Khachatryan
Deposition, dkt. 55-2). Khachatryan stated that he put on his flashing lights as
well. Id.
5. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was pulling a refrigerated trailer containing
a load of juice, which would also increase his stopping distance. Id.
6. The California Commercial Driver Handbook, which Khachatryan studied
when he obtained his license, states that wet roads “can double stopping distance”
and recommends reducing speed by one-third of the posted speed limit when
roads are wet. (Khachatryan Deposition, dkt. 80-1; dkt. 80-4). The Handbook also
states that rain can impact stopping distance. (Dkt. 80-4).
7. The OHP accident report includes an observation from the officer that there
were no skid marks indicating that the trucks tried to stop. (Dkt. 80-5).
Based on these facts, plaintiff argues that improper speed “along with other circumstances”
qualifies as substantial evidence to instruct a jury on the issue of punitive damages. Id. Plaintiff
cites Morgan v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486, 488 (Okla. 1964), in which punitive damages were awarded
based on evidence that a defendant was driving “ninety miles per hour, on a curve, after dark,
trying to go around the second car ahead of him.”
The case plaintiff cites is inapposite. In Morgan, the defendant’s excessive speed in
combination with the lighting and the presence of a curve was indicative of reckless disregard. In
this case, when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence indicates that
Khachatryan was driving under the speed limit when he changed lanes, that he changed lanes
leaving less than optimal distance between his vehicle and Albanawi’s (who was behind him),
that he came upon plaintiff’s truck, which was stopped in the road due to an earlier accident, and
that he either did not see plaintiff’s truck or underestimated the required stopping distance.4 Such
evidence supports the notion that Khachatryan was either not paying attention or misjudged his
4
Pursuant to the accident report, submitted as part of plaintiff’s response to the motion for
summary judgment, the speed limit on the turnpike is 75 m.p.h. (Dkt. 80-5).
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stopping distance, either of which could support a finding of negligence. But this evidence also
indicates that Khachatryan had at least considered the weather conditions and slowed his speed
as a result.
The only evidence presented by plaintiff regarding Khachatryan’s speed is the
Handbook,5 which recommends reducing speed by one-third. But even this evidence does not
support recklessness in the context of this case. The speed limit was 75 m.p.h. The only evidence
before the Court is that Khachatryan was driving at between 48 and 49 m.p.h. According to the
Handbook, a proper speed would have been 49.5 m.p.h., indicating that Khachatryan’s speed was
not reckless.
The evidence is less clear on the issue of whether Khachatryan’s decision to change
lanes, by itself or in conjunction with his speed, evidences reckless disregard. Albanawi’s
deposition testimony indicates that Khachatryan had to begin braking less than thirty seconds
after changing lanes in front of Albanawi, potentially leaving Albanawi with little warning that
Khachatryan would be stopping, but still leaving him with sufficient time to slow his vehicle to
provide the distance necessary when Khachatryan did stop. This evidence, thus, remains
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding reckless disregard.
However, the issue remains as to whether or not punitive damages is an appropriate
subject for a summary judgment motion in the first instance. In this regard, the evidence is not
“barely sufficient to survive summary judgment on the substantive [] claim[,]” as it was in
LeBlanc. But the evidence of reckless disregard is also not present, as it was for the district court
in Laney and Cummings.
5
This analysis presumes, however, that the Handbook would be accepted as a treatise under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18), and plaintiff makes no argument in support of that
proposition.
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The Oklahoma courts, which have considered this issue, have not clearly indicated that
partial summary judgment under the facts in this case would be appropriate. Further, there is
little danger of prejudice in waiting for the facts to be presented to the jury. A decision regarding
a punitive damages instruction can be made at that time.
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Khachatryan’s motion for summary judgment
but cautions the plaintiff that, without additional evidence that moves the evidentiary scale
substantially in the direction of reckless behavior on the part of Khachatryan, the Court will not
likely give a jury instruction on the issue of punitive damages.
Genuine Issue of Material Fact on the Issue of Reckless Disregard – Albanawi and Big Rig
With respect to defendants Albanawi and Big Rig, they have presented no evidence in
support of their joinder in the motion for summary judgment, relying instead on Khachatryan’s
evidence. (Dkt. 62). The evidence attached to Khachatryan’s motion for summary judgment
addresses only his behavior and does not include any evidence of Albanawi’s actions at the time
of the accident. Accordingly, Albanawi and Big Rig have presented no evidence and have failed
to meet their burden to establish that Albanawi’s actions were not reckless. However, based on
the evidence presented by plaintiff, the Court is equally dubious of any punitive damages claim
against Albanawi and Big Rig, and at trial the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to warrant
a punitive damages instruction will be on plaintiff. As with Khachatryan, in the absence of
additional evidence which establishes reckless behavior on the part of Albanawi and Big Rig, the
Court is not likely to instruct the jury on the issue of punitive damages.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Khachatryan’s motion for partial summary
judgment. (Dkt. 55). The Court also DENIES Albanawi’s and Big Rig’s motion for partial
summary judgment. (Dkt. 62).
SO ORDERED this 26th day of September, 2016.
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