Williams v. Miller
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER by Judge John E Dowdell ; setting/resetting deadline(s)/hearing(s): ( Miscellaneous Deadline set for 1/11/2016); denying 12 Motion to Dismiss (lml, Dpty Clk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOHN EDGAR WILLIAMS, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
DENNIS MILLER;
TULSA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendants.
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Case No. 15-CV-00028-JED-FHM
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action commenced by Plaintiff, John Edgar Williams,
III, a prisoner appearing pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis, see Doc. 3. By Order filed
February 9, 2015 (Doc. 6), the Court dismissed Defendant Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office. On May
29, 2015, Defendant Miller filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 12).
Defendant also filed a Special Report (Doc. 13), as directed by the Court. Plaintiff filed a response
to Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 15). For the reasons discussed below, Count III shall be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In addition, Defendant’s motion to dismiss shall be denied and Defendant shall
file a motion for summary judgment addressing Counts I and II.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff alleges that, on May 17, 2014, he was subjected to an
excessive use of force while in custody at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center, the facility
serving as the Tulsa County Jail, when Defendant Miller stunned him with a Taser. Plaintiff claims
he was walking from his pod to the medical unit unescorted when Defendant ordered him to return
to his pod. Id. at 6. Defendant, followed by two other officers, escorted Plaintiff back to his pod
and told Plaintiff that he would have to wait for an escort to take him to the medical unit. Id.
Plaintiff states that “[b]efore the slider shut, I tossed my inhaler to the floor. The officers turned
back and the slider reopened. Cpl. Miller told me to pick up the inhaler and I refused. He pulled
out the Taser, I put up my hands, and he tazed me.” Id. Plaintiff further claims that, when he fell
to the floor after Defendant stunned him with a Taser, he hurt his back, and that he experienced
embarrassment as a result of urinating on himself during the event. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action on January 16, 2015. Id. Based on the events described
above, Plaintiff identifies three (3) counts1:
Count I:
Cpl. Miller used excessive force against me.
Count II:
When my body locked up and I fell to the floor, my back was hurt.
Count III:
As I were [sic] being tazed, I urinated on myself. I was humiliated for
seeking medical care.
Id. at 2-3. In his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks $10,000 from Defendant Miller as well as “a
refund of everything that has been charged from inmate account.” Id. at 5.
Defendant Miller filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), based on Plaintiff’s “fail[ure] to identify any substantive law on which he bases his
claims.” Doc. 12 at 3. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss, asserting that Defendant’s
use of force violated the Eighth Amendment and that “Defendant intentionally denied, and delayed
access to medical care.” Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
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Plaintiff provides additional factual allegations in support of his claims. See Doc. 1 at 6-7. In
describing Plaintiff’s claims, the Court includes only Plaintiff’s first sentences for the three counts.
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ANALYSIS
A. Standard for dismissal
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual
allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).2 The complaint must contain “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint as true--even if doubtful in fact--and must construe the allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555. However, “when the allegations in a complaint,
however true, could not raise a [plausible] claim of entitlement to relief,” a court should dismiss the
cause of action. Id. at 558.
Under this standard, the Court should broadly construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The
generous construction the Court gives the pro se litigant’s allegations “does not relieve the plaintiff
of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based,” and it
is not “the proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.”
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). A reviewing court need not accept “mere
conclusions characterizing pleaded facts,” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th
Cir. 1990), and a court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d
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The Supreme Court articulated the pleading standard for all civil actions in Twombly. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
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1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997). Even so, “if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a
valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite
proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence
construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The Court
applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is
employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis,
500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007).
Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The inclusion of factual allegations that are “more than labels and
conclusions” and pled with some specificity fulfills these requirements, id. at 555, and “failure to
set forth in the complaint a theory upon which the plaintiff could recover does not bar a plaintiff
from pursuing a claim.” Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1121 (10th
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller, 490 F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1974)
(stating “it is not necessary to allege the particular law or theory under which recovery is sought”).
B. Request for relief based on “humiliation” (Count III) shall be dismissed
In Count III, Plaintiff seeks damages for alleged personal “humiliation” suffered when he
urinated on himself. See Doc. 1 at 3. Allegations of embarrassment or humiliation fail to state a
cognizable claim under section 1983. Chavez v. Cty. Jail of San Bernardino, 2015 WL 1565469,
*3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015) (citing Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir.
1981), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir.
1989)); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976); Payton v. Vaughn, 798 F. Supp. 258, 262
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(E.D. Pa. 1992) (“Embarrassment alone because of casual observances by others does not offend the
constitution.”). For that reason, Plaintiff’s claim in Count III fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted and shall be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Defendant’s motion to dismiss shall be denied
Defendant Miller requests that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim because
Plaintiff “failed to identify any substantive law on which he bases his claims.” Doc. 12 at 3.
Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any specific claims as to any constitutional
violation against Defendant Miller, and it is improper for the Court to enable Plaintiff to proceed on
a claim that he, himself did not allege.” Id. at 5. Defendant also complains that Plaintiff did not
“use pertinent language, which would identify [a constitutional] claim,” Doc. 12 at 5, and questions
whether two references to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are sufficient to put him on notice of the claims against
him. Id.
In Count I, Plaintiff clearly alleges that “Cpl. Miller used excessive force against me.” Doc.
1 at 2. To support this allegation, Plaintiff includes a fairly detailed narrative, describing the
sequence of events before and after Defendant stunned Plaintiff with a taser. These details include
the date, time, and place of the event, as well as a description of the actions of the participants. In
Count II, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied a prompt breathing treatment and medical treatment
for his back.
For at least three reasons, the Court finds the allegations in Counts I and II are sufficient to
state a claim. First, at the pleading stage “it is not necessary to allege the particular law . . . under
which recovery is sought.” Misco Leasing, Inc., 490 F.2d at 548 (citation omitted). Second,
although Plaintiff fails to identify the specific constitutional amendment at issue in the complaint,
that failure is not fatal to the complaint as long as the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . .
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claim is and the grounds [facts] upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff uses the term “excessive force” and includes a detailed description of the event underlying
his claim that could be brought under a theory of excessive force. He also complains of inadequate
or delayed medical treatment. The Court finds the complaint is sufficient to provide Defendant with
fair notice of the claims against him. Third, the multiple references to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the
court-approved form used by Plaintiff, including the reference in the caption which states “CIVIL
RIGHTS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” provide Defendant with ample notice
of the federal law supplying the basis for Plaintiff’s claims.
Based on the facts alleged and assuming Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the
incident, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as stating claims of excessive use of
force and denial of adequate medical care, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 Therefore, the Court finds the motion to dismiss shall be denied. Defendant Miller
shall file a motion for summary judgment addressing the claims raised in Counts I and II.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Count III is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) is denied.
3.
Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s complaint are liberally construed as stating claims of excessive
use of force and denial of adequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff asserts, for the first time, that his excessive force
claim is based on the Eighth Amendment. However, with regard to claims of excessive force, the
Eighth Amendment applies to convicted individuals, while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to individuals between the time of initial arrest and conviction. See Estate of
Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 419 (10th Cir. 2014).
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4.
Within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this Order, Defendant Miller shall file a motion
for summary judgment addressing Plaintiff’s claims of excessive use of force (Count I) and
denial of adequate medical care (Count II) in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5.
Plaintiff shall file a response within twenty-one (21) days of the filing of Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment. Failure to file a response could result in the entry of relief
requested in the motion. See LCvR 7.2(e),(f).
DATED this 21st day of December, 2015.
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