Riggins v. Redman

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER by Judge John E Dowdell ; dismissing/terminating case (terminates case) ; denying certificate of appealability; adding party Mike Hunter terminating party Rodney R Redman (Warden) ; denying 7 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241/2254) (SAS, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DARRELL JOE RIGGINS,
Petitioner,
v.
MIKE HUNTER, Oklahoma
Attorney General,1
Respondent.

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Case No. 15-CV-0058-JED-FHM

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner’s amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition (Doc. 7).
Petitioner, appearing pro se, challenges the constitutional validity of the judgment and sentence
entered against him in Tulsa County District Court Case No. CF-2012-156. In that case, a jury
convicted Petitioner of endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63, § 2-408 (2011), after former conviction of a felony. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to habeas
relief on three grounds: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) law

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Petitioner was incarcerated at the Northeast Oklahoma Correctional Center (NOCC) when
he filed his amended habeas petition. See Doc. 7 at 1. In March 2017, Petitioner updated
his address to reflect that he is no longer incarcerated. See Doc. 21. The Oklahoma
Department of Corrections website reflects Petitioner’s status as “inactive,” but is not clear
whether he was released on parole. See https://okoffender.doc.ok.gov, last visited March 24,
2018. In any event, Petitioner’s release from custody does not deprive this Court of
jurisdiction because he was in custody when he filed his amended habeas petition. See
Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that petitioner
must satisfy § 2254(a)’s in-custody requirement at time habeas petition is filed and that
prisoners released on parole may seek habeas relief). However, because Petitioner is not
currently incarcerated, Mike Hunter, Oklahoma Attorney General, is substituted in place of
Rodney R. Redman, NOCC’s former warden, as party respondent. See Rule 2(a), Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The Clerk of Court shall
note this substitution on the record.

enforcement officers illegally searched his car, and (3) a trial witness gave false testimony. See Doc.
7. Respondent moved to dismiss the amended petition as a “mixed” petition, arguing Grounds 2 and
3 were unexhausted. See Doc. 11. By Order filed February 5, 2016 (Doc. 14), the Court denied
Respondent’s motion, but advised Petitioner that it would apply an anticipatory procedural bar2 to
the unexhausted claims raised in Grounds 2 and 3 unless Petitioner could demonstrate either “cause
and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to excuse his procedural default of these
claims. See Doc. 14 at 6. As directed by the Court, Petitioner filed a response addressing the
defaulted claims (Doc. 15), and Respondent filed a response addressing the merits of Petitioner’s
Ground 1 claim (Doc. 16). Respondent also provided the state court records necessary to adjudicate
Petitioner’s claims (Docs. 16, 17). Petitioner filed a reply to the response (Doc. 18). Respondent
filed a response addressing Petitioner’s arguments as to his defaulted claims (Doc. 19). For the
reasons discussed below, the Court finds the amended habeas petition shall be denied.
BACKGROUND
In January 2012, Tulsa Police Officer Michelle Armentrout stopped Petitioner near the
intersection of Pine and Lewis for driving a vehicle with an expired tag. Doc. 17-8, Tr. vol. 3, at
272-75.3 Petitioner pulled into the parking lot of the Springdale Shopping Center. Id. at 275. When
Armentrout approached the car, Petitioner confirmed he was the owner of the car and advised

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An “[a]nticipatory procedural bar occurs when the federal courts apply procedural bar to an
unexhausted claim that would be procedurally barred under state law if the petitioner
returned to state court to exhaust it.” Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131, 1139 n.7 (10th
Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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The record cites to the trial transcripts refer to the original transcript page number. For
clarity, all other record cites refer to the CM/ECF page number in the upper, right-hand
corner of each document.
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Armentrout he had no insurance. Id. at 277. Petitioner’s passenger, Ashley Snow, volunteered that
she had outstanding warrants. Id. at 280-81. Armentrout performed a records check on Petitioner
and Snow, confirmed that Snow had an outstanding arrest warrant, and arrested Snow. Id. at 281-82.
Armentrout issued citations to Petitioner for the tag and insurance violations. Id. at 283. Based on
the tag violation, Armentrout decided to have the car towed, but she told Petitioner he was free to
leave. Id. at 284-88. Petitioner left. Id. at 285. Armentrout and a second officer began an inventory
search of the car, discovered what they believed was a possible “meth lab,” discontinued the search,
and called in officers with specialized training in meth lab clean up. Id. at 286-91, 304.
Based on the items found in Petitioner’s car, the State ultimately charged Petitioner with one
count of endeavoring to manufacture a controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine), in
violation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-408, after former conviction of a felony. Doc. 17-10, O.R. vol.
1, at 80-82. Following a trial in Tulsa County District Court, a jury found Petitioner guilty as
charged and, consistent with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court imposed a 16-year prison
sentence. Doc. 17-11, O.R. vol. 2, at 77, 81-82.
Represented by counsel, Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (OCCA), alleging one proposition of error: the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction. Doc. 16-1, Pet’r App. Br., at 2. In an unpublished summary opinion, filed October 1,
2013, the OCCA rejected his sufficiency challenge and affirmed the trial court’s judgment and
sentence. Doc. 16-3, Riggins v. State, No. F-2012-955 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (unpublished)
(hereafter, “OCCA Op.”). Petitioner then filed an application for post-conviction relief in state
district court, raising three propositions of error. See Doc. 16-4 at 3. The state district court denied
relief. Id. Petitioner did not file a post-conviction appeal.

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DISCUSSION
Petitioner, appearing pro se, filed his amended habeas petition on February 26, 2015. Doc.
7. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to habeas relief on three grounds: (1) the evidence is insufficient
to support his conviction, (2) law enforcement officers illegally searched his car, and (3) a trial
witness gave false testimony. See Doc. 7. Respondent concedes, and the Court finds, that Petitioner
timely filed his federal habeas petition. Doc. 16 at 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (imposing one-year
statute of limitation for filing § 2254 habeas petition). Respondent argues, however, that § 2254(d)
bars Petitioner’s request for habeas relief on Ground 1 and that his Ground 2 and Ground 3 claims
are procedurally barred. Doc. 16 at 5; Doc. 19 at 1-2.
I.

Scope of habeas review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) guides this Court’s review of

Petitioner’s habeas claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the AEDPA, a federal court may grant
habeas relief to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2254(a). In addition, before a federal
court may grant habeas relief, a state prisoner must exhaust available state-court remedies, id.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A), by “fairly present[ing] the substance of his federal habeas claim[s] to state courts,”
Hawkins v. Mullins, 291 F.3d 658, 668 (10th Cir. 2002).
If the state court adjudicates the merits of a state prisoner’s federal habeas claims, a federal
habeas court may not grant relief on those claims unless the prisoner demonstrates that the state
court’s adjudication of those claims either (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to . . . clearly
established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” id. § 2254(d)(1);
(2) “resulted in a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

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Federal law,” id.; or (3) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts” in light of the record presented to the state court, id. § 2254(d)(2).4
“To determine whether a particular decision is ‘contrary to’ then-established law, a federal
court must consider whether the decision ‘applies a rule that contradicts [such] law’ and how the
decision ‘confronts [the] set of facts’ that were before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 406). When the
state court’s decision “‘identifies the correct governing legal principle’ in existence at the time, a
federal court must assess whether the decision ‘unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner’s case.’” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). Significantly, an “unreasonable
application of” clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) “must be ‘objectively
unreasonable,’ not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct.
1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76). Likewise, under § 2254(d)(2), “a statecourt factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have
reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). The
Court must also presume the correctness of the OCCA’s factual findings unless Petitioner rebuts that
presumption “by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In sum, the standards set forth in § 2254 are designed to be “difficult to meet,” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011), and require federal habeas courts to give state-court decisions
the “benefit of the doubt,” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). Thus, to obtain federal

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As used in § 2254(d)(1), the phrase “clearly established Federal law” means “the governing
legal principle or principles” stated in “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme
Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).
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habeas relief a state prisoner ultimately “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562
U.S. at 103.
II.

Analysis
A.

Ground 1- Insufficient evidence

In Ground 1, Petitioner alleges the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. He
argues “[t]here was no evidence presented to the jury that [he] had any knowledge of the evidence
they found in [his] car, due to the fact they had already released [him] from the scene before they
searched the car.” Doc. 7 at 5.
Respondent contends Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his Ground 1 claim under
§ 2254(d) because the OCCA’s determination that the evidence is sufficient to support Petitioner’s
conviction is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Doc. 16 at 5, 16.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a criminal defendant cannot
be convicted of a crime unless the state proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, every essential element
of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970). Jackson supplies the clearly established legal rule governing Petitioner’s claim. See
Johnson v. Mullin, 505 F.3d 1128, 1134 (10th Cir. 2007) (identifying Jackson as constitutional
standard for reviewing state habeas petitioner’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim). Under Jackson,
“the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

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a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319. “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas
proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566
U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam).
First, on direct appeal, “it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide
what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing
court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if
no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” And second, on habeas
review, “a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with
the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision
was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011)); see also id. at 656
(“[T]he only question under Jackson is whether [the jury’s] finding was so insupportable as to fall
below the threshold of bare rationality.”); Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir.
1993) (noting that Jackson “standard requires [reviewing court] to accept the jury’s resolution of the
evidence as long as it is within the bounds of reason”). In applying the Jackson standard on federal
habeas review, the Court looks to state law to determine the substantive elements of the crime.
Johnson, 566 U.S. at 655. “[B]ut the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause
requires to prove the offense is purely a matter of federal law.” Id.
Petitioner challenges his conviction for endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine, in
violation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-408 (2011), after former conviction of a felony. To obtain his
conviction, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner (1) knowingly (2)
endeavored (3) to manufacture (4) methamphetamine. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-408 (2011);
Okla. Unif. Crim. Jury Instr. No. 6-3B (2d ed.). The term “endeavoring” is defined as “any effort
to do or accomplish the evil purpose that the law was enacted to prevent.” Okla. Unif. Crim. Jury
Instr. No. 6-16 (2d ed.).
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On direct appeal, Petitioner appeared to challenge the second element by arguing the
evidence presented at trial established the completed crime of manufacturing methamphetamine
rather than the charged crime of endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine. See Doc. 16-1,
Pet’r App. Br., at 10-21; Doc. 16-3, OCCA Op., at 2. The OCCA rejected Petitioner’s argument.
In doing so, the OCCA reiterated that under OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-408 endeavoring to
manufacture a controlled dangerous substance is not the same as attempting to manufacture a
controlled dangerous substance. Doc. 16-3, OCCA Op., at 2 (citing Tidmore v. State, 95 P.3d 176,
177-78 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004)). The OCCA also stated, “A conviction for Endeavoring to
Manufacture Methamphetamine is not barred where there is evidence of the commission of the
completed crime.” Id. (citing Mehdipour v. State, 956 P.2d 911, 914-15 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998)).
Finally, the court noted that, under state law, “[t]he prosecutor retains discretion over which act to
charge” unless the prosecutor’s decision is based on an impermissible standard like race or religion.
Id. at 2-3. Applying its interpretation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-408 to the facts of Petitioner’s case,
the OCCA reasoned,
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, there was more to the State’s case than a
completed manufacturing process and a bottle containing methamphetamine.
Appellant was found driving his car containing everything necessary to manufacture
methamphetamine—plastic tubing, syringes, a fuel can, sulfuric acid, a funnel, coffee
filters, a measuring cup, wire cutters, cotton balls, and a 2 liter pop bottle containing
a whitish grainy substance with two rubber tubes coming out of it which acted as a
gas generator. Coleman fuel, an empty aluminum foil box, container of Morton salt,
an empty box of pseudoephedrine and an open cold pack were also found in the car.
Approximately 15-20 yards from Appellant’s parked car was found a 2 liter green
pop bottle containing the methamphetamine. Officers described the car as a “one pot
methamphetamine lab.” Officers testified that the items recovered from Appellant’s
car were for making methamphetamine in the bottle found in the parking lot or for
use in a previous methamphetamine lab or were going to be used to cook
methamphetamine. This evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
knowingly and intentionally endeavored to manufacture methamphetamine. See
Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, ¶ 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559.
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Doc. 16-3, OCCA Op., at 3.
In his habeas petition, Petitioner appears to argue the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish the first element of the charged crime, i.e., that he “knowingly” endeavored
to manufacture methamphetamine. Specifically, he argues “[t]here was no evidence” that he “had
any knowledge” of the items found in his car that were consistent with the manufacturing of
methamphetamine. Doc. 7 at 5. As Respondent points out, this argument differs from the one he
presented to the OCCA on direct appeal. See Doc. 16 at 9. However, like Respondent, the Court
will liberally construe Petitioner’s pro se petition as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as
to both elements. See Doc. 16 at 9 & n.1. And, for two reasons, the Court agrees with Respondent
that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his Ground 1 claim.
First, to the extent Petitioner’s argument could be construed as challenging the OCCA’s
interpretation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-408, this Court “is bound by the state court’s interpretation
of its own law.” Hawkins, 291 F.3d at 662.
Second, to the extent Petitioner challenges the OCCA’s determination that the evidence is
sufficient to support his conviction, this Court must “accept the jury’s resolution of the evidence as
long as it is within the bounds of reason.” Grubbs, 982 F.2d at 1487. And, because the OCCA
applied the Jackson standard in rejecting Petitioner’s claim,5 this Court must defer to the OCCA’s
decision unless it is “objectively unreasonable.” Johnson, 566 U.S. at 651; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

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The OCCA did not cite Jackson; instead, it cited its own precedent recognizing Jackson as
the controlling legal principle. Doc. 16-3, OCCA Op., at 3; see Easlick v. State, 90 P.3d 556,
558-59 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (discussing and applying Jackson standard). Even if the
OCCA had not cited Easlick, its decision would still be entitled to AEDPA deference. See
Miller v. Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying § 2254(d)
“notwithstanding the [OCCA’s] failure to cite or discuss federal case law”).
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Based on this Court’s review of the trial transcripts, the Court concludes Petitioner cannot overcome
these “two layers of judicial deference.” Id.
The record reflects that, at trial, the State presented detailed evidence regarding the traffic
stop and subsequent search that resulted in Petitioner’s conviction. Tulsa Police Officer Michelle
Armentrout testified she stopped Petitioner near the intersection of Pine and Lewis for driving a
vehicle with an expired tag. Doc. 17-8, Tr. vol. 3, at 272-75. Petitioner pulled into the parking lot
of the Springdale Shopping Center. Id. at 275. When Armentrout spoke with Petitioner, he
confirmed he owned the car and stated he had no insurance. Id. at 277. Petitioner’s passenger,
Ashley Snow, told Armentrout she had outstanding warrants. Id. at 280. Armentrout ran a warrants
check on both Petitioner and Snow, confirmed Snow had an outstanding arrest warrant, and placed
Snow under arrest. Id. at 281-82. Armentrout cited Petitioner for the tag and insurance violations,
advised his car would be towed to the impound lot, and told Petitioner he was free to leave. Id. at
283-88. After Petitioner left, Armentrout and Officer Tyler Turnbough began an inventory search
and discovered several items commonly associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Id.
at 285-88, 291, 304. Armentrout described those items as including a fuel can, plastic tubing,
syringes, a funnel, “a heat source, like a generator,” sulfuric acid, and Coleman fuel. Id. at 288-90.
The officers discontinued the search and requested assistance from officers with specialized training
in recognizing and dismantling meth labs. Id. at 291-92. Turnbough testified he searched the area
for Petitioner but could not find him. Id. at 325.
Petitioner’s passenger, Ashley Snow, testified she saw Petitioner reach behind his seat to
grab something and saw him throw a “colored bottle” out of his window as he pulled into the
parking lot for the traffic stop. Doc. 17-8, Tr. vol. 3, at 332-35. After Petitioner stopped the car she

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noticed tin foil and a straw on the dashboard. Id. at 339-40. Snow testified she also saw Petitioner
toss foil out of her window during the stop. Id. at 340, 351-52. Snow told Armentrout about the
bottle thrown out the window, but did not tell her about the foil. Id. at 351-52.
Officers Darrell Johnson and Brian Booth, members of the special investigation division,
testified they were called out to the traffic stop to investigate a possible meth lab. Id. at 357, 370-71;
Doc. 17-9, Tr. vol. 4, at 396-98, 401. Johnson testified he recovered from Petitioner’s car an empty
aluminum foil box and a two-liter pop bottle with plastic tubes coming out of it. Id. at 373-74.
Johnson testified the bottle contained “whitish or tan granules,” and appeared to be a gas generator
used to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. at 374. Johnson also recovered a green, two-liter pop
bottle from the parking lot. Id. at 376. He found the bottle 15-20 yards from Petitioner’s car, and
identified it as a “one-pot meth lab.” Id. at 376-77. Johnson testified he took a sample from the
bottle for further testing. Id. at 379. Jared Lieser, a forensic analyst, testified that methamphetamine
was detected in the sample Johnson submitted for testing. Doc. 17-9, Tr. vol. 4, at 431, 438.
Officer Booth testified the green bottle found in the parking lot contained all materials
necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. at 404. He also testified the following items were
recovered from Petitioner’s car: a Coleman fuel can, drain cleaner, plastic tubing, coffee filters, a
measuring cup, wire cutters, cotton balls, a can of Morton salt, and an empty Sudafed box. Id. at
406-16. Booth opined, based on his training and experience, that these materials were either used
to make the meth lab found in the green bottle, used for a previous meth lab, or for use in a future
meth cook. Id. at 418.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and giving proper
deference to the jury’s finding of guilt and the OCCA’s rejection of Petitioner’s sufficiency

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challenge, the Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner has failed to make the requisite
showings under § 2254(d) to obtain habeas relief. Thus, the Court denies relief on Ground 1.
B.

Grounds 2- Illegal search; Ground 3- False testimony

In Ground 2, Petitioner claims that the search of his car was illegal because it exceeded the
scope of an inventory search. Doc. 7 at 7. In Ground 3, Petitioner claims that a witness at his trial
falsely testified that he threw a pop bottle out of his car. Id. at 8.
As discussed, this Court previously determined that these claims were unexhausted and
advised Petitioner it would apply an anticipatory procedural bar to these claims unless Petitioner
could show “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to excuse his procedural
default of these claims. Doc. 14 at 5-6; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). The
cause standard requires a petitioner to “show that some objective factor external to the defense
impeded . . . efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rules.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
488 (1986). Examples of such external factors include the discovery of new evidence, a change in
the law, and interference by state officials. Id. A petitioner is additionally required to establish
prejudice, which requires showing “‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he
complains.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982). The alternative is proof of a
“fundamental miscarriage of justice,” which requires a petitioner to demonstrate that he is “actually
innocent” of the crime of which he was convicted. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991).
In his response to the Court’s order to file a brief demonstrating either “cause and prejudice”
or “a miscarriage of justice,” Petitioner filed a brief urging this Court to forgive him for not
appealing the state court’s order denying his application for post-conviction relief or for “any other
faults that [he] ha[s] done.” Doc. 15 at 1. Even liberally construing Petitioner’s pro se response

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brief, the Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner fails to make the necessary showings to
excuse the procedural default of the claims he asserts in Grounds 2 and 3. Thus, the Court denies
habeas relief as to Grounds 2 and 3.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not established he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Therefore, the Court denies his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, instructs
that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant.” A district court may issue a certificate of appealability (COA) “only if
the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies habeas relief by rejecting the merits of petitioner’s
constitutional claims, the petitioner must make this showing by “demonstrat[ing] that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). However, if the district court denies habeas relief on
procedural grounds, the petitioner must make this showing by demonstrating both “[1] that jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.

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Because the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the
Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s Ground 1claim or the Court’s finding that his claims in Grounds
2 and 3 are procedurally defaulted, the Court denies a certificate of appealability as to all claims.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The Clerk of Court shall note the substitution of Mike Hunter, Oklahoma Attorney General,
in place of Rodney R. Redman, Warden, as party respondent.

2.

The amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 7) is denied.

3.

A certificate of appealability is denied.

4.

A separate Judgment shall be entered in this case.
ORDERED this 26th day of March 2018.

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