Springer v. United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER by Judge John E Dowdell ; denying 104 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief; denying 109 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief; denying 112 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (SAS, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LINDSEY KENT SPRINGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF OKLAHOMA, Danny C.
Williams, Sr., Officially; et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 15-CV-0142-JED-FHM
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a closed civil action brought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. By
Opinion and Order filed October 30, 2015 (Doc. 70), the Court granted summary judgment
in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s FOIA claims and dismissed Plaintiff’s APA claims.
The Court entered judgment (Doc. 71) against Plaintiff the same day. Plaintiff filed a
notice of appeal on January 5, 2016 (Doc. 79). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal on March 4, 2016 (Doc. 90).
Before the Court are three post-judgment motions filed by Plaintiff: (1) an
“application to set aside opinion, order, and judgment, dated October 30, 2015, for fraud
on the court,” filed July 26, 2018 (Doc. 104), (2) a “motion to determine the constitutional
validity of the appointment to office of R. Trent Shores, Rachael F. Zintgraff, and Cathryn
D. McClanahan,” filed August 22, 2018 (Doc. 109), and (3) a “motion for partial judgment
on the pleadings,” filed September 24, 2018 (Doc. 112). The Defendants filed a response
in opposition to each motion (Docs. 107, 110, 113), and Plaintiff filed replies (Docs. 108,
111, 114). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motions.
I.
“Application to set aside opinion, order, and judgment, dated October 30, 2015,
for fraud on the court” (Doc. 104)
Plaintiff seeks relief from the judgment entered against him on October 30, 2015,
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3), “due to Fraud on the Court.” Doc. 104, at 5. He claims
summary judgment was entered against him because Assistant United States Attorney
Cathryn McClanahan committed three frauds on the court during summary judgment
proceedings. Id. at 8, 17-20.
Defendants urge this Court to construe Plaintiff’s motion as one seeking relief under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) and deny the motion as untimely. Doc. 107, at 7-9. Alternatively,
they contend the motion should be denied on the merits. Id. at 10-12.
In his reply, Plaintiff objects to “recasting” his motion as one filed under Rule
60(b)(3), and argues his fraud claims are sufficiently pled and merit relief. Doc. 108.
Under Rule 60(b)(3), a “court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order
or proceeding” due to “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” A motion made under subsection
(b)(3) must be made “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the
date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Rule 60(d)(3), sometimes referred to as
the savings clause to Rule 60(b), see Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281,
1289 (10th Cir. 2005), provides that the powers to grant relief from judgment, as provided
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in Rule 60(b), “does not limit a court’s power to: (1) entertain an independent action to
relief a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding; . . . or (3) set aside a judgment for
fraud on the court.” The one-year time bar does no apply to Rule 60(d)(3) motions.
“Ordinarily . . . claims of fraud between the parties are brought under Rule 60(b)(3),
while claims of fraud on the court are brought as an independent action which is recognized
in the savings clause.” Zurich N. Am., 426 F.3d at 1291. However, a party alleging fraud
on the court may file a motion seeking relief from judgment under either Rule 60(b)(3) or
Rule 60(d)(3). Id. Under either subsection, the movant alleging fraud on the court must
provide “evidence of ‘an intent to deceive or defraud the court by means of a deliberately
planned and carefully executed scheme.’” Id. at 1292 (quoting Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186
F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999)). The burden to establish fraud on the court is a heavy
one.
Generally speaking, only the most egregious misconduct, such as bribery of
a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in
which an attorney is implicated will constitute a fraud on the court. Less
egregious misconduct, such as nondisclosure to the court of facts allegedly
pertinent to the matter before it, will not ordinarily rise to the level of fraud
on the court.
Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir.1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978)). More recently, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained,
“Fraud on the court . . . is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery
itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false
statements or perjury.” Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th
Cir. 1985) (en banc). To establish fraud on the court, one must prove that
“the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.” Id.
Furthermore, the party alleging fraud on the court bears a heavy burden to
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prove the fraud by clear and convincing evidence, and “all doubts must be
resolved in favor of the finality of the judgment.” Id. Indeed, a party alleging
fraud on the court must demonstrate “conscious wrongdoing [, which] can
properly be characterized as a deliberate scheme to defraud[,] before relief
from final judgment is appropriate.” Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56
F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1995).
Orient Mineral Co. v. Bank of China, 416 F. App’x 721, 725 (10th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished)1 (ellipsis and alterations in original).
In his motion, Plaintiff alleges McClanahan committed three frauds against the
Court: first, “when she declared to this Court that she held a current valid appointment
from the Attorney General personally under 28 U.S.C. § 542(a) as of October 1, 2015, id.
at 7, 17-18; second, when she “falsely declared” that records he sought through FOIA2014-00473 and FOIA-2015-01085 relating to the appointments of Charles O’Reilly,
Kenneth Snoke and Thomas Woodward “were not retained in the USAO-NDOK,” id. at 8,
18-19; and third, when she “falsely declared” that Snoke’s records “were located at the
National Personnel Records Center (“NPRC”), when she knew” those records “were never
sent to NPRC by the USAO-NDOK,” id. at 8, 19-20. In support of these claims, Plaintiff
alleges that the records he sought through his FOIA requests “are clearly existing [and]
within the reach of the FOIA and the USAO-NDOK” because United States Attorney R.
Trent Shores produced some of those records on April 10, 2018, in response to a court
order in “USA v. Springer, 09-CR-043.” Id. at 17-20.
The Court declines to construe Plaintiff’s motion as one seeking relief under Rule
1
The Court cites this unpublished decision for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P.
32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
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60(b)(3). Plaintiff’s motion alleges that a government attorney committed fraud on the
court to obtain a favorable ruling. He specifically alleges McClanahan’s false declarations
were directly related to his FOIA claims and intended to influence the Court’s decision on
the issue of whether the agency’s search for requested records was adequate. Doc. 104, at
18-20; see Doc. 70, at 12-17 (discussing FOIA claims). In other words, he alleges
misconduct “directed to the judicial machinery itself.” Bulloch, 763 F.2d at 1121; see also
Weese, 98 F.3d at 542. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the motion as untimely
seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
However, construing the motion as one seeking relief under Rule 60(d)(3), the Court
finds and concludes, based on its review of the motion, response, and supporting materials
submitted by the parties, that Plaintiff’s allegations, even if proven true, would not be
sufficient to meet the demanding burden to establish either “a deliberate scheme to
defraud,” Robinson, 56 F.3d at 1267, or that “the impartial functions of the court [were]
directly corrupted,” Bulloch, 763 F.2d at 1121, during the summary judgment proceedings.
The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment.
II.
“Motion to determine the constitutional validity of the appointment to office of
R. Trent Shores, Rachael F. Zintgraff, and Cathryn D. McClanahan”
(Doc. 109)
Plaintiff asks this Court to issue an order determining the constitutional validity of:
(1) R. Trent Shores’ appointment as the United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, as of September 21, 2017, (2) Rachael F. Zintgraff’s appointment as an
Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, as of August 16,
2018, and (3) Cathryn D. McClanahan’s appointment as an Assistant United States
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Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, as of October 1, 2015. Doc. 109, at 1.
Plaintiff further requests that the Court “find that Mr. Shores, Ms. Zintgraff, and Ms.
McClanahan are not properly appointed Officers of the United States and find that
everything they have done in this case are void . . . .” Id. at 7.
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants’ response (Doc. 110), and
Plaintiff’s reply (Doc. 111), the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s cited
authorities do not support his requests and that Plaintiff’s arguments are frivolous. In
addition, Plaintiff previously challenged the validity of McClanahan’s appointment as an
Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, see Docs. 40, 52,
and the Court found “no legal basis for disqualification,” Doc. 70, at 7. Nothing in
Plaintiff’s current motion convinces this Court to find otherwise. For these reasons, the
Court denies the motion.
III.
“Motion for partial judgment on the pleadings” (Doc. 112).
Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), Plaintiff moves for partial judgment on the pleadings.
Doc. 112, at 1. He contends his Rule 60(d)(3) motion is a “pleading” in an independent
fraud action, and that he is entitled to “partial judgment” because Defendants either
admitted or failed to deny the allegations in his Rule 60(d)(3) motion, as required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(b). Id.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not
to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Even assuming Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 12(c) applies in the context of a Rule 60(d)(3) motion alleging fraud on the court,2
the Court denies Plaintiff’s Rule 12(c) motion for the reasons discussed in Section I of this
Opinion.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s “application to set aside opinion, order, and judgment, dated October 30,
2015, for fraud on the court,” filed July 26, 2018 (Doc. 104), is denied.
2.
Plaintiff’s “motion to determine the constitutional validity of the appointment to
office of R. Trent Shores, Rachael F. Zintgraff, and Cathryn D. McClanahan,” filed
August 22, 2018 (Doc. 109), is denied.
3.
Plaintiff’s “motion for partial judgment on the pleadings,” filed September 24, 2018
(Doc. 112), is denied.
ORDERED this 25th day of February, 2019.
2
Because a Rule 60(d)(3) motion is not considered a “pleading” under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 7(a), it is not clear that either Rule 8(b) or Rule 12(c) applies.
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