Siegel v. Blue Giant Equipment, LLC

Filing 38

OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul J Cleary ; granting 34 Motion for Protective Order (kjp, Dpty Clk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TIMOTHY I. SIEGEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
BLUE GIANT EQUIPMENT, LLC., et al,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15-CV-143-TCK-PJC

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion for Protective Order filed by Defendant Blue Giant
Equipment Corporation. [Dkt. No. 34]. Plaintiff disputes the appropriateness of a Protective
Order and argues that the Court should do an in camera inspection of documents to determine
whether a protective order is appropriate. [Dkt. No. 35]. For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is GRANTED. The protective order will be entered separately.
Background
The present product liability case arises out of Plaintiff’s claims that a loading dock he
was utilizing was “defective and unreasonably dangerous” and that Blue Giant “acted in reckless
disregard to the rights of others and the safety of the using and consuming public.” [Dkt. No. 21]. In the course of conducting discovery, Plaintiff requested, inter alia, information and
documents pertaining to the “engineering, design, and technical drawings,” documentation of the
“installation, and/or manufacture” of the loading dock, and “any subsequent changes thereto.”
[Dkt. No. 34-1]. Defendant has already produced 241 pages of documents and has 29 additional
pages that Defendant is willing to produce, but only pursuant to a court-entered Protective Order
because the documents contain “internal information regarding ordering and configuration of the

device at issue as well as specific engineering calculations and data, all of which is proprietary
and trade secret information.” [Dkt. No. 34].
Applicable Legal Standard
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to obtain
information concerning “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Rule 26(c)(1) provides that upon a showing of good cause, the court “may issue an
order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). This may include protection of trade secret, or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating “good cause” and requires a particular and
specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from conclusory or stereotyped statements. Gen.
Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973); Samson Resources Co. v.
J. Aron & Co., 2009 WL 1606564, *1 (N.D. Okla. June 8, 1999). However, the “good cause”
standard of Rule 26(c) is “highly flexible, having been designed to accommodate all relevant
interests as they arise.” Rohrbough v. Harris, 549 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation
and citation omitted). Trial courts have broad discretion in managing discovery matters and are
subject to review only for abuse of discretion. WN Petroleum Corp. v. OK-Tex Oil & Gas Inc.,
998 F.2d 853, 858 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36
(1984) (trial courts have broad discretion in deciding when to issue a protective order and in
deciding the appropriate degree of protection).

2

Discussion
Plaintiff complaints that Defendant’s proposed protective order, which is the standard
template order created by and utilized by this Court,1 would allow for unnecessary “wholesale
designation of confidentiality of documents.” [Dkt. No. 35, p. 1]. Relying on U.S. v. Pickard,
733 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2013), Plaintiff contends that the protective order goes against the
common-law right of access to discovery information. [Id. at p. 2].
Plaintiff’s reliance on Pickard is misplaced. In Pickard, the Tenth Circuit was not
examining discovery material, but judicial records and was ruling on evidentiary objections, not
discovery issues. 733 F.3d at 1302. Pre-trial discovery may produce unrelated or only
tangentially related information. Okla. Hosp. Assn. v. Okla. Pub. Co., 748 F.2d 1421, 1425 (10th
Cir. 1984) (citing Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33). The Tenth Circuit has approved the issuance
of protective orders, such as the proposed one in this case, to expedite discovery documents,
noting that at the discovery stage of litigation, “those documents ha[ve] not been filed with the
court and certainly ha[ve] not satisfied threshold tests of relevancy and admissibility. They
therefore [a]re not available to the public generally. . .” Id. See also Burke v. Glanz, 2013 WL
211096, at *2, *4-5 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 2013) (noting the frequent practice of entering into
“blanket” or “umbrella” protective orders and observing the distinction between materials
produced in discovery and admissible materials) (citations omitted). Despite Plaintiff’s
insistence, the public has no right to access discovery material, which is what the proposed
protective order seeks to protect.

 Plaintiff, or Plaintiff’s counsel, takes issue with multiple provisions of this Court’s standard protective order and
the undersigned declines to address those arguments. The order was developed by this Court after careful
consideration and input of multiple judges. For purposes of consistency and ease of enforcement, proposed orders
that vary from the standard order are routinely rejected.

1

3

To establish good cause under Rule 26(c)(1)(H), Defendant must demonstrate that the
information sought constitutes a trade secret, or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information and then demonstrate that its disclosure might be harmful. Centurion
Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir. 1981). Defendant has
sought to protect only 29 pages (out of 270 pages) of responsive documents containing
proprietary and trade secret information. The Court finds that Defendant has met its burden of
demonstrating good cause for the issuance of a protective order.
Plaintiff has also raised concerns regarding the potential misuse of the proposed
protective order. However, the protective order provides Plaintiff with a remedy to prevent
and/or resolve any type of potential misuse. As outlined in the protective order, the parties are
required to attempt to resolve any objection to a designation, but if unable to do so, the objecting
party may file a motion with the Court to resolve the dispute. The Court cautions Defendant to
make all designations in good faith and not to over-designate discovery material. Should it
become necessary for Plaintiff to challenge any designations, they will be strictly scrutinized
according to Rule 26(c) and the protective order entered in this case.
The Court’s ruling today is consistent with its previous rulings concerning similar issues.
For example, in Burke, the plaintiff had argued that due to the government’s alleged negligence,
the public should have a right to access discovery material. 2013 WL 211096. In denying
Plaintiff’s motion to provide discovery material to the public, the Court noted that it was not
denying public access to information concerning the factual and legal issues of the case; it was
only limiting public access to discovery material at this stage of the litigation. Id. at *4-5.
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED. The
protective order will be entered separately.

4

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of November, 2015.

5