Woods v. Social Security Administration

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Frank H McCarthy (tjc, Dpty Clk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TOMMY JACK WOODS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 16-CV-88-FHM

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Tommy Jack Woods, seeks judicial review of a decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying Social Security disability
benefits.1 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) & (3), the parties have consented to
proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge.
Standard of Review
The role of the court in reviewing the decision of the Commissioner under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) is limited to a determination of whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence to support the decision and whether the correct legal standards were applied.
See Briggs ex rel. Briggs v. Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235, 1237 (10th Cir. 2001); Winfrey v.
Chater, 92 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 1996); Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less
than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

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Plaintiff's February 11, 2013, application for disability benefits was denied initially and on
reconsideration. A hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Gene M. Kelly was held March 24, 2014.
By decision dated July 15, 2014, the ALJ entered the findings that are the subject of this appeal. The Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on December 9, 2015. The decision of the Appeals Council
represents the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of further appeal. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct.
1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)). The court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment
for that of the Commissioner. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d
799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Even if the court would have reached a different conclusion, if
supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision stands. Hamilton v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1992).
Background
Plaintiff was 38 years old on the alleged date of onset of disability and nearly 44 on
the date of the ALJ’s denial decision. He has a high school education and formerly worked
as a foundry worker and forklift operator. He claims to have been unable to work since
June 1, 2009 as a result of depression, bipolar disorder, polysubstance dependence in
sustained partial remission, organic brain injury, as well as back, hand, knee, shoulder and
leg pain.
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform a range of light work with some environmental and postural limitations and the
ability to change positions from time to time. Taking note of his depression, anxiety,
bipolar, and history of substance abuse, and intending to limit stress and contact, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff is restricted to simple, repetitive, and routine work. The ALJ also found
that Plaintiff should have limited contact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors.
Contact with the public should be brief, cursory, and incidental. If work is on an assembly

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line, he should have enough space between him and co-workers that he does not have to
socially interact. He is able to attend employee meetings, shift meetings, and meetings of
that nature, but should no be an integral member of a team that will participate in goal
setting and process planning, etc. [Dkt. 24].
Although Plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work, based on the
testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that there are a significant number
of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform with these limitations. The case
was thus decided at step five of the five-step evaluative sequence for determining whether
a claimant is disabled. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)
(discussing five steps in detail).
Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff had only a moderate
limitation in social functioning and that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence
because the RFC does not fully incorporate the limitations found by the consultative
examiner to whose opinions the ALJ gave great weight.
Analysis
Social Functioning
When there is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant
from working, the ALJ must follow the procedure for evaluating mental impairments set
forth in the regulations and is required to document the application of the procedure, known
as the psychiatric review technique (PRT), in the decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(e),
416.920a(e), Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008)(discussing

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application of the psychiatric review technique by the ALJ), Cruse v. United States Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 49 F.3d 614, 617 (10th Cir. 1995) (same). The procedure for
evaluating alleged mental impairments requires the ALJ to consider the effect of the mental
impairment on four broad areas of functioning known as the “paragraph B” criteria:
activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence or pace; and
episodes of decompensation of extended duration. See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1, § 12.00 (C). The PRT is used to assess mental impairments for purposes of
steps two (identifying severe impairments) and three (rating severity for the listings)2. See
generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a. Many of the mental listings include the PRT
ratings in the four areas of functioning contained in the Paragraph B criteria in their
requirements.
In the area of social functioning, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has moderate
difficulties. [R. 23]. Plaintiff argues that this area should have been rated “marked”
because consultative mental examiner, Melinda Shaver, Psy.D.,completed a Medical
Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental) wherein she rated
Plaintiff as having a “marked” limitation in the ability to interact appropriately with
supervisors. [R. 352]. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ committed clear error by not citing
to Dr. Shaver’s report for his finding concerning the area of social functioning and the
finding is not supported by substantial evidence because it does not incorporate Dr.
Shaver’s finding.

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The listings describe, for each of the major body systems, medical findings which are considered
severe enough that they represent impairments which presumptively prevent a person from performing any
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App

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The court finds no error in the ALJ’s performance or evaluation of the criteria
contained in the PRT. For purposes of step 2, the ALJ’s use of the PRT lead him to the
conclusion that Plaintiff had mental impairments of a severity that they caused work-related
functional limitations, which he addressed in the RFC. Nothing more was required of the
ALJ for step 2. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007). With regard
to whether Plaintiff meets a mental listing at step 3, all of the specified medical criteria must
be matched to meet a listing. An impairment that manifests only some of the criteria, no
matter how severely, does not qualify. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531, 110 S.Ct.
885, 891, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1988). As a result, even if Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ
should have rated him as having “marked difficulties in social functioning,” since Plaintiff
does not even argue he satisfies the other criteria to meet a listing, the difference between
rating Plaintiff as “moderate” or “marked” in social functioning could not affect the outcome
of the decision. Therefore if the ALJ erred in this rating, the error is harmless. The Tenth
Circuit has counseled that the court should exercise common sense and not insist on
technical perfection. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012).
Further, no principle of administrative law or common sense requires that a case be
remanded in quest for a perfect opinion, unless there is reason to believe that the remand
might lead to a different result. See Moua v. Colvin, 541 Fed. Appx. 794, 798 (10th Cir.
2013).
RFC Finding
The consultative mental examiner, Dr. Shaver, expressed the opinion that Plaintiff
has a “marked” impairment in his ability to interact appropriately with supervisors and found

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that Plaintiff had a “moderate” restriction in the ability to respond appropriately to usual
work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. [R. 352]. Plaintiff argues that the
RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because, according to Plaintiff, the RFC did
not incorporate Dr. Shaver’s limitation on the ability to interact with supervisors as the RFC
states, “he has no restrictions with routine, ordinary supervision.” [R. 24]. Plaintiff also
points out that Dr. Shaver found Plaintiff had a “moderate” restriction in the ability to
respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting
and asserts that the RFC fails to contain such a limitation. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s
statement that he gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Shaver, [R. 29], is inconsistent
with the RFC finding of no restrictions with routine, ordinary supervision and the lack of an
RFC limitation for a moderate limitation in the ability to respond appropriately.
The RFC limits Plaintiff to the performance of simple, repetitive, and routine work.
The ALJ specifically stated the restriction was to limit stress and contact. [R. 24]. The
RFC also states that “[h]e should have limited contact with the public, co-workers, and
supervisors.” Id. The RFC further restricted interaction with others by saying that he
should not be an integral member of a team that will participate in goal setting and process
planning. Id. The court finds that the moderate limitation on the ability to respond to work
changes is accounted for by these RFC limitations. Further, it is within that already
restricted job environment that the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no restrictions with routine,
ordinary supervision. The court finds that, although the ALJ did not include Dr. Shaver’s
limitations in the RFC verbatim, the ALJ did fully account for Dr. Shaver’s limitations and
the RFC is supported by substantial evidence.

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The court likewise finds that the ALJ adequately accounted for Dr. Shaver’s opinions
about Plaintiff’s ability to interact with the public and co-workers. Plaintiff comments that
the ALJ’s RFC restrictions regarding interaction with the public and with co-workers do not
seem to be as restrictive as Dr. Shaver’s opinion. Again, although the ALJ did not
incorporate Dr. Shaver’s restrictions word-for-word, the RFC restrictions fairly encompass
Dr. Shaver’s opinion.
Conclusion
The court finds that the ALJ evaluated the record in accordance with the legal
standards established by the Commissioner and the courts. The court further finds there
is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision. Accordingly, the
decision of the Commissioner finding Plaintiff not disabled is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED this 18th day of April, 2017.

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