Hill v. Memorial Drive United Methodist Church

Filing 45

OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan ; striking/terminating deadline(s)/Hearing(s); granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 44 Motion to Strike Hearing(s)/Deadline(s) (Re: State Court Petition/Complaint ) (RGG, Chambers)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LADON E. HILL,

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Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORIAL DRIVE UNITED
METHODIST CHURCH,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-CV-0227-CVE-JFJ

OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant Memorial Drive United Methodist Church’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 37). Defendant Memorial Drive United Methodist
Church (MDUMC) argues that plaintiff’s employment as a youth minister was terminated after
plaintiff engaged in numerous incidents of hostile and insubordinate behavior, and MDUMC seeks
summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims of racial discrimination and retaliation. Dkt. # 37. Plaintiff
responds that MDUMC’s stated reason for terminating his employment was pretextual, and he
claims that MDUMC retaliated against him for filing a charge of discrimination even after his
employment was terminated. Dkt. # 40.
I.
In 2004, MDUMC hired Ladon Hill as a part-time youth minister. Hill is an AfricanAmerican male. Dkt. # 37-1, at 2. Shawna Genshaw, MDUMC’s director of children and youth
services, was taking a leave of absence in 2012, and Hill was specifically instructed to state that
Genshaw “is taking time off to deal with personal issues” if asked about Genshaw’s absence. Dkt.
# 37-2, at 1. However, Hill told members of MDUMC that Genshaw was on “study leave” and he

admits that he departed from MDUMC’s instructions. Dkt. # 37-1, at 20-21. On October 9, 2012,
MDUMC terminated Genshaw’s employment and Hill became upset. Dkt. # 37-3, at 2. Hill threw
a five-pound ankle weight against the wall and “almost tore a door off the hinge,” and he said that
he felt “like I want to rip somebody’s head off.” Dkt. # 37-1, at 12-14. On October 28, 2012, Hill
grabbed a microphone during a church service, and he told the congregation that Genshaw “was
fired from [MDUMC] for no reason.” Id. at 18. Hill submitted an article for publication in the
church bulletin, proposing a meeting in which parents and youth could voice their concerns, and the
article stated that it “is time to RISE!” Dkt. # 37-4, at 1. MDUMC’s pastor, Sharon FletcherTaylor, reviewed Hill’s submission and found that it could not appear in the church bulletin as
submitted, because the article did not promote reconciliation, healing, and forgiveness. Id. In a
separate e-mail, Hill explained that he was upset at the treatment of Genshaw, and he stated that was
speaking to MDUMC members about the perceived mistreatment of Genshaw. Id. at 2. On
November 11, 2012, Hill failed to properly supervise approximately eight to ten youths in violation
of MDUMC’s safe sanctuary policy, and the youths interrupted a church service. Dkt. # 37-5.
On November 12, 2012, the Staff Parish Relations Committee learned that Hill had sent a
text message to a large group of church members in which he advised people that he was meeting
with the pastor the next day, and he believed that his employment with MDUMC would be
terminated. Dkt. # 37-11. Hill claimed that he had been bullied by Fletcher-Taylor and he referred
to her as “Bane,” a villain from the Batman comic books. Id. The notes from the committee
meeting show that they did not want to terminate Hill’s employment, but there was concern that
Hill’s conduct was harming MDUMC. Id. Members of the committee expressed a desire to retain
Hill as an employee if he could move on from his feelings over Genshaw’s termination. Id. In his

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deposition, Hill testified that Fletcher-Taylor bullied all MDUMC employees, and that many other
employees had resigned because of Fletcher-Taylor’s conduct. Dkt. # 37-1, at 7-8. Hill did not
testify that Fletcher-Taylor singled out African-American employees for alleged bullying, and he
testified that “everyone had been fed up with the bullying . . . .” Id. at 8. On November 13, 2012,
Hill met with Fletcher-Taylor and was handed five employee warning notifications, which
concerned the events that occurred in October and November of 2012. Dkt. # 37-5; Dkt. # 37-6;
Dkt. # 37-7; Dkt. # 37-8; Dkt. # 37-9. Hill did make written remarks on some of the notifications,
but he did not deny that the conduct occurred. Hill’s employment was not terminated on November
13, 2012, even though he claims that he was not willing to move on until “justice is done.” Dkt. #
37-1, at 32.
On December 9, 2012, Hill had an argument with a parent whose son was in Hill’s youth
group at the church. The argument concerned MDUMC’s treatment of Genshaw. Id. at 37-38. Hill
admits that he used “some language” and the parent attempted to obtain a restraining order against
Hill. Id. at 38. MDUMC placed Hill on 30 days of unpaid administrative leave after the incident,
and Hill was instructed that he could not communicate with any church member about his
employment or participate in youth activities during the suspension. Dkt. # 37-12. Hill was warned
that violating this condition of his suspension could result in the termination of his employment.
Id. Hill admits that he violated the MDUMC’s instructions and that he communicated with church
members about his suspension. Dkt. # 37-1, at 42; Dkt. # 37-3. Hill returned from his suspension
and, on January 27, 2013, he informed the new director of children and youth services that he would
be taking over youth lessons for several weeks. Parents expressed concern that Hill was trying to

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push the new director out of the way, and plaintiff told the new director that “if anybody thought
that, they could take those thoughts and stick it.” Dkt. # 37-1, at 46; Dkt. # 37-3, at 5.
MDUMC implemented a new van policy on February 1, 2013. MDUMC personnel were no
longer permitted to transport children for activities outside of a two mile radius of the church. Dkt.
# 37-13. Hill strongly disagreed with the new policy, and sent several e-mails expressing his
disagreement. Dkt. # 37-14. Hill stated that “90 percent of our youth live more than 2 miles from
this church,” and he believed that many children would no longer be able to attend the church. Id.
at 2-3. Hill did not advise anyone at MDUMC that the van policy would disproportionately or
unfairly harm minority children. Fletcher-Taylor responded to Hill and encouraged him to help the
children locate churches closer to home if they could no longer attend the church. Id. at 2.
MDUMC terminated Hill’s employment on February 10, 2013, and he was advised to return his keys
and collect his final check on February 12, 2013. Dkt. # 40-1, at 28.
Even though Hill’s employment was terminated, he remained a member of MDUMC and he
continued to attend church services and activities. Hill received an e-mail from the district youth
leader to attend a meeting on March 3, 2013, and he attended the meeting without advising anyone
that he had been fired by MDUMC. Dkt. # 40-2, at 7. Hill retained an attorney and, on March 27,
2013, his attorney sent a letter to representatives of the Methodist Church in Oklahoma threatening
to file suit alleging racial discrimination if Hill was not reinstated by April 10, 2013. Dkt. # 40-6.
Hill’s attorney did not send the letter directly to MDUMC, but the letter was sent to the regional
office for the United Methodist Church. Dkt. # 40-7. Counsel for MDUMC did not receive a copy
of the letter until April 8, 2013, and he investigated Hill’s allegations of racial discrimination. Dkt.
# 40-8. MDUMC’s attorney sent a letter to Hill’s attorney stating that Hill was terminated for

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“insubordination, wanton destruction of church property, willful disturbance and interruption of
worship services, dereliction of duty and violations of the denomination’s safe sanctuary policies.”
Id. MDUMC had also learned that Hill attended a district youth council meeting on March 3, 2013
and held himself out as a representative of MDUMC. Id.
On April 24, 2013, MDUMC sent a letter to its members after learning that Hill was holding
himself out as an MDUMC employee stating that:
Donny Hill is no longer an employee nor is he a sponsor of [MDUMC]’s youth
ministry. Parents or guardians who allow their child to go with him are hereby
notified it is not a church sanctioned event and MDUMC will not be responsible for
any circumstance that happens.
Dkt. # 40-9, at 1. The April 26, 2013 church bulletin further advised MDUMC members that Hill
had formed a new youth group known as the “Dark Knights,” and had attended a district youth
council meeting where he led people to believe that he represented MDUMC. Dkt. # 40-13, at 2.
The bulletin also repeated the same notice from the April 24, 2013 letter that Hill was no longer an
MDUMC employee. Id. Hill was not permitted to attend a district youth council meeting in April
2013 “due to lawsuits” and, in response, Hill acknowledged that he had been fired by MDUMC.
Dkt. # 40-11. Plaintiff was informed by Audra Ogle of the district youth counsel that he could not
attend the April 2013 meeting, and the decision to prohibit Hill from attending the meeting was not
made by anyone at MDUMC. Id. On June 27, 2013, MDUMC received notice that Hill had filed
a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
alleged that Hill’s employment was terminated “for standing up for a coworker and because of [his]
race.” Dkt. # 40-1, at 21, 23. On July 12, 2013, Fletcher-Taylor notified the staff parish relations
committee that Hill had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Dkt. # 40-1, at 26. Hill
and his sister had volunteered to be ushers for services on July 7, 2013, but an amended bulletin was
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published removing their names from the list of ushers. Dkt. # 40-14. There is no evidence as to
who made the decision to remove Hill and his sister from the list of ushers for the July 7, 2013
service or that the person or persons making the decision knew of Hill’s EEOC charge.
On October 23, 2013, Hill filed a civil action against MDUMC in Tulsa County District
Court, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The case was removed to federal court. Ladon E. Hill v. Memorial Drive
United Methodist Church, 13-CV-745-JHP-TLW (N.D. Okla.). The parties filed a joint stipulation
of dismissal and Hill’s claims were dismissed without prejudice to refiling. On February 9, 2017,
Hill refiled the case in Tulsa County District Court, and MDUMC removed the case to this Court.
Hill alleges claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under § 1981. Dkt. # 2-2.
II.
Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is appropriate where there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986); Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1993). The plain language of
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317. “Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Id. at 327.

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“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986) (citations omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In essence, the inquiry for the Court
is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 250. In its review,
the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998).
III.
Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination,
because plaintiff has no evidence that he was treated differently than any other similarly situated
employee who engaged in similar conduct. Dkt. # 37, at 9-10. Defendant also argues that plaintiff
did not engage in any protected activity during his employment that would support a retaliation
claim. Id. at 13. Plaintiff responds that he received five employee warning notifications on the same
day and there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact as to whether race was a motivating factor
in his termination. Dkt. # 40, at 12. He also claims that defendant retaliated against him following
his termination, and he asserts that defendant retaliated against him in his capacity as a member of
MDUMC for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at 14.

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A.
Plaintiff claims that race was a motivating factor in MCUMC’s decision to terminate his
employment. Plaintiff does not have direct evidence of discrimination and the Court must apply the
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting analysis in reviewing
plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination under § 1981.1 Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. Carney v. City and County of Denver, 534 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.
2008). To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination based on a wrongful discharge
theory, plaintiff is required to produce evidence raising a genuine dispute as to a material fact
showing that “(1) the victim belongs to a protected class; (2) the victim suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) the challenged action took place under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination.” EEOC v. PVNF, LLC, 487 F.3d 790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007). If plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to defendant to come forward with
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for any adverse employment action. Adamson v. Multi
Community Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008). If the defendant
provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the burden shift to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant’s explanation is pretextual. Young v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 468 F.3d 1243,
1249 (10th Cir. 2006).

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Even though plaintiff’s petition does not contain a claim under Title VII, the McDonnellDouglas analysis applies to plaintiff’s § 1981 claim of racial discrimination and the Court
considers plaintiff’s § 1981 claim under the same standards applicable to Title VII claims
of racial discrimination. See Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corp., 803 F.3d 510, 514 (10th Cir.
2015) (racial discrimination claims for wrongful termination under Title VII and § 1981 are
both subject to the burden-shifting analysis in cases not involving direct evidence of
discrimination).
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Defendant does not contest that plaintiff belongs to a protected class or that he suffered an
adverse employment action, but defendant argues that plaintiff has no evidence tending to show that
he was terminated because of his race. Plaintiff’s primary argument is that he received five
employee warning notifications on November 13, 2012, and he claims that the failure to give him
warnings contemporaneously with the alleged misconduct suggests that defendant was seeking to
build a case for his termination. Dkt. # 40, at 4, 12. He argues that defendant did not have an
express policy prohibiting racial discrimination, and he claims that no Caucasian employees received
warning notifications for the entire 2012 year. Id. at 12. He claims that two Caucasian church
members interrupted a service and did not receive a warning. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also alleges that he
complained about a racially discriminatory van policy. Id. at 7. A plaintiff’s burden at the prima
facie case stage is “not onerous” and the Court will assume that plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. Ortiz v. Norton, 254 F.3d 889, 894 (10th Cir. 2001). The Court will
consider the parties’ arguments concerning the alleged discriminatory conduct as part of the pretext
analysis.
Defendant states that it terminated plaintiff’s employment after plaintiff damaged church
property and engaged in repeated disruptive or inappropriate acts. “The defendant’s burden is
merely to articulate through some proof a facially nondiscriminatory reason for the termination; the
defendant does not at this stage of the proceeding need to litigate the merits of the reasoning, nor
does it need to prove that the reason relied upon was bona fide, nor does it need prove that the
reasoning was applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion.” EEOC v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312,
1316 (10th Cir. 1992). The Tenth Circuit has described the defendant’s burden at this stage of the
proceedings as “exceedingly light.” Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir.

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2007). Defendant has stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff’s
employment, and the Court must determine if plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to show that
a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists suggesting that defendant’s stated reason is pretextual.
At this stage of the proceeding, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that defendant’s
explanation for terminating his employment is pretextual. Plotke v.White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1099
(10th Cir. 2005); Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff
demonstrates pretext by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Stinnett v.
Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d
1450, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994)). A plaintiff typically attempts to satisfy his burden by “revealing ‘such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
unworthy of credence.’” Mackenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1278 (10th Cir.
2005) (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)). A plaintiff’s “mere
conjecture” that the employer’s explanation is pretext is not a sufficient basis to deny a motion for
summary judgment. Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 786, 772 (10th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff argues that he was treated differently than similarly situated Caucasian employees.
Plaintiff’s entire argument concerning disparate discipline relies on his statement that two Caucasian
members allowed youths to disrupt a service on November 4, 2012 and that two Caucasian church
members interrupted a service on October 28, 2012. Dkt. # 40, at 5. The only evidence supporting
these allegations is contained in plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories, and the Court has reviewed
plaintiff’s discovery responses. Dkt. # 40-4, at 3. Plaintiff’s allegations do not support his claim

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that he was treated differently than similarly situated Caucasian employees. Plaintiff alleges that
“two white male church members” interrupted a service on November 4, 2012, but plaintiff was a
church employee and could reasonably be held to a different standard than a member of the church.
Id. As to the incident on October 28, 2012, he claims that George DeShazo and Denny Redmon got
up to adjust the thermostat during a sermon, but he does not allege that these persons were MDUMC
employees. Id. at 3-4. Even if these persons were MDUMC employees, the alleged conduct is not
comparable to the undisputed evidence that plaintiff grabbed a microphone during a service on
October 28, 2012 and complained about the defendant’s treatment of another employee. Dkt. # 371, at 18. In addition, plaintiff failed to supervise some of his youths on November 11, 2012 and at
least one of the youths interrupted a service. Dkt. # 40-1, at 33. Plaintiff now claims that the
incident was exaggerated or did not occur. Dkt. # 40, at 5. However, he did not deny the allegations
when presented with an employee warning notification, and it was reasonable for defendant to rely
on plaintiff’s failure to properly supervise some of his youths in making a decision to terminate his
employment. Dkt. # 40-1, at 33. The Court finds no evidence that similarly situated Caucasian
employees were treated differently than plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments fail to raise even an inference that defendant’s stated reason
for terminating his employment was pretextual. Plaintiff argues that defendant did not have an
express policy prohibiting racial discrimination. However, plaintiff was an MDUMC employee
since 2004 and he does not allege that MDUMC engaged in or tolerated the disparate treatment of
any African-American employee, other than himself, during that time. Plaintiff argues that
defendant enacted a discriminatory van policy that disproportionately impacted minority youths
living more than two miles away from MDUMC. Dkt. # 40, at 7. It is true that plaintiff complained

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about the van policy because “90 percent of our youth live more than 2 miles from this church.”
Dkt. # 37-14, at 2. Plaintiff did not complain about the policy on the ground that it was racially
discriminatory, and he did make any allegation that the policy discriminated on the basis of race
until he responded to defendant’s discovery requests. Dkt. # 40-4, at 4. Plaintiff’s complaint about
the van policy does not tend to show that defendant discriminated against him or anyone else
because of race. Finally, plaintiff argues that he received five employee warning notifications on
one day, and he claims that the lack of contemporaneous discipline tends to show that defendant’s
stated reason for terminating his employment was pretextual. This argument would be more
persuasive if plaintiff’s employment had actually been terminated on November 13, 2012 when he
received the notifications. Instead, there is evidence that defendant was seeking a way to avoid
terminating plaintiff’s employment if he could move on from the perceived mistreatment of a fellow
employee, and his employment was terminated several months later after he continued to violate
defendant’s employment policies. See Dkt. # 37-11. Plaintiff has not come forward with any
evidence tending to show that race had anything to do with his termination, and he has not raised
a genuine dispute that defendant’s stated reason for terminating his employment was pretextual. The
Court finds that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim
under § 1981.

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B.
Defendant argues that plaintiff did not engage in any protected activity during his
employment and there is no possibility that he could prevail on a retaliation claim.2 Dkt. # 37, at
12-14. Plaintiff responds that he filed a charge of discrimination after his employment was
terminated, and he was retaliated against in his capacity as a member of MDUMC for filing the
charge. Dkt. # 40, at 8-10, 13-15.
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to take any adverse action against an
employee for filing a charge or reporting acts of alleged workplace discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a). The Supreme Court has found that § 1981 encompasses acts of retaliation and a plaintiff
can proceed with a retaliation claim under § 1981. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humpries, 553 U.S. 442
(2008). The same standards apply to retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1981, and “the
principles set for in Title VII retaliation cases apply with equal force in § 1981 retaliation cases.”
Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 998 (10th Cir. 2011). To prove a prima facie case
of retaliation, plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2)
his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) there is a causal connection
between the opposition and the adverse action. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir.
2004). The law is clear that reporting workplace discrimination to the EEOC is protected behavior.
Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999); McCue v. State of Kansas,
Dep’t of Human Resources, 165 F.3d 784, 789 (10th Cir. 1999). An employee may establish

2

Plaintiff argues that defendant did not move for summary judgment on his retaliation claim,
and he claims that the Court cannot reach this issue. Dkt. # 40, at 7. Plaintiff is blatantly
incorrect and defendant specifically moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation
claim. Dkt. # 37, at 12-14. The Court rejects plaintiff’s procedural argument that the Court
cannot enter summary judgment as to his retaliation claim.
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causation by showing that the adverse employment action occurred soon after the protected activity.
Annett v. University of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2004); Burrus v. United Tel. Co.
of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982). “Unless there is a very close temporal
proximity between the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct, the plaintiff must offer
additional evidence to establish causation.” O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1252
(10th Cir. 2001). If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to
the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. Pinkerton v. Colorado Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1064 (10th Cir. 2009). If the
employer comes forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the burden
shifts to the employee to show that employer’s stated reason is pretextual. Id.
Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot prove the first element of a prima facie case of
retaliation, because he did not file a charge of discrimination or even make an informal complaint
of discrimination before his employment was terminated. Plaintiff does not contest this argument,
but he argues that defendant engaged in post-termination conduct that could be considered an
adverse employment action. Dkt. # 40, at 14. He cites Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), for the proposition that acts of retaliation are not limited to the
workplace and an employee can bring a retaliation claim based on harm that occurs outside of the
workplace. The Supreme Court found that the “scope of the antiretaliation provision extends beyond
the workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts harm.” Id. at 67. However, the
“antiretaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that
produces injury or harm.” Id. A plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found
the challenged action materially adverse, “which in this context means it might well have ‘dissuaded

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a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Id. at 68 (quoting
Rochon v. Gonzalez, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The Tenth Circuit has found that posttermination conduct by an employer can qualify as retaliation if the conduct is intended to dissuade
the employee from engaging in protected activity. Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d
1079 (10th Cir. 2007).
This case presents a situation in which plaintiff voluntarily maintained a relationship with
his former employer after his employment was terminated. Plaintiff chose to remain a member of
the church community after his employment was terminated, and this is distinguishable from cases
where a defendant reached out to harm a plaintiff’s personal life or future employment prospects
based on an allegedly retaliatory motive. See Williams, 497 F.3d at 1090 (former employer
allegedly interfered with a former employee’s claim for unemployment benefits and threatened to
spread rumors of sexual misconduct to discourage the employee from pursuing a charge of
discrimination). Plaintiff voluntarily remained a member of the church after his termination, and
he could be treated in the same manner as any other person who attended the church. Plaintiff
complains that defendant “disparaged” him by publishing notices that he was no longer an employee
and advising church members that defendant would not be responsible for children placed in
plaintiff’s care. Dkt. # 40-13, at 2. Plaintiff may have been personally upset that church members
were advised that he was no longer an employee, but it was a true statement and it was reasonable
for defendant to advise its members of the change in plaintiff’s employment status given the nature
of his work. Plaintiff’s own conduct made this particularly important, because plaintiff was not
forthcoming about the change in his employment status and he led others to believe that he was still
an MDUMC employee. Dkt. # 40-2, at 7. Plaintiff claims that he did not expressly state that he was

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still employed by defendant when he attended a youth council meeting on March 3, 2013, but he
clearly states that the youth council leader did not know that he had been terminated and he did not
volunteer this information. Id. The Court does not find that MDUMC’s publication of notice that
plaintiff was no longer an employee can viewed as a retaliatory act for the purpose of liability under
§ 1981.
After he filed a charge of discrimination, he claims that, on July 12, 2013, defendant advised
many of its members that plaintiff had filed a charge “against all of us” and that defendant was in
communication with an attorney. Dkt. # 40-12. He states that he was confronted by church
members about his allegations of racial discrimination. Dkt. # 40-4, at 5-6. The fact that individual
members of the church may have confronted plaintiff does not show that defendant was retaliating
against plaintiff. Plaintiff has produced no evidence that any of these persons were speaking on
behalf of MDUMC as his former employer or that defendant sanctioned or encouraged this conduct.
There is also no temporal connection between his former employer’s publication of this information
and the alleged harassment. The information about plaintiff’s charge of discrimination was
published on July 12, 2013, and plaintiff’s discovery responses state that alleged incidents of
harassment occurred in 2014 and 2015. Dkt. # 40-4, at 5-6. This shows that plaintiff continued to
attend the church well after defendant notified its members about the charge of discrimination, and
the alleged harassment was not so pervasive that plaintiff felt that he could no longer attend services
at the church. Plaintiff claims that he was not permitted to be an usher in July 2013, and he claims
that this was retaliation for his decision to file a charge of discrimination. The Court finds that this
is not the type of action that can be considered materially adverse, because it is not such a severe
action that it suggests that a reasonable person would be discouraged from proceeding with a charge

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of discrimination. Even if it could be materially adverse, plaintiff was replaced as an usher before
news of his charge of discrimination had been published to church members, and he has no evidence
that the person or persons who removed him as an usher knew of the charge of discrimination. See
Dkt. # 40-14 (amended church bulletin published on July 7, 2013, which was before the July 12,
2013 e-mails giving notice to church members that plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination).
The Court finds that the alleged post-termination retaliation committed by defendant either cannot
be linked to defendant acting in its capacity as plaintiff’s former employer or cannot be considered
materially adverse, and plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 1981.
Summary judgment should be entered in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s retaliation claim under §
1981.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Memorial Drive United Methodist
Church’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 37) is granted. A separate
judgment is entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Strike Deadlines (Dkt.
# 44) is moot.
DATED this 20th day of February, 2018.

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