Capel et al v. Ottawa County Board of County Commissioners et al

Filing 452

OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Claire R Kelly ; denying 437 Motion to Reconsider (Re: 437 MOTION to Reconsider Order Denying Remittitur and New Trial and Brief in Support ) (alg, Dpty Clk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
Austin P. Bond as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Terral
Ellis II,
Plaintiff,

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL

v.
The Sheriff of Ottawa County, in his
Official Capacity,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Remittitur and New
Trial, March 27, 2024, ECF No. 437 (“Def. Mot.”), filed by Defendant Sheriff of Ottawa
County, in his official capacity (“Defendant”), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59 and 60. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
The Court presumes familiarity with the facts of this case as set forth in this
Court’s prior opinion denying Defendant’s Motions for a New Trial, Judgment as a
Matter of Law, and Remittitur, see Opinion & Order [Re New Trial, J. Matter L., and
Remittitur] at 1–2, February 29, 2024, ECF No. 435 (“Post-Trial Denials”), and
recounts only those pertinent to the motion currently at issue. This matter involves
the death of Terral Brooks Ellis II (“Mr. Ellis”). In response to an outstanding
warrant, Mr. Ellis surrendered himself to the Ottawa County Jail on October 10,

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
2015. Pretrial Order at 3, Aug. 4, 2023, ECF No. 352-1. Mr. Ellis was detained at
the jail between October 10 and October 22, 2015. Id. at 3–5. On October 22, 2015,
Mr. Ellis died of sepsis and pneumonia. Id. at 5.
On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff Austin P. Bond (“Plaintiff”), as the personal
representative of Mr. Ellis’ estate, filed suit against Defendant, pursuant 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See generally Compl., June 9, 2017, ECF No. 2. Plaintiff alleged that the jail
did not provide Mr. Ellis with adequate medical care as a pre-trial detainee and thus
violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶¶ 49–64. In August of 2023, the
case was tried in the Northern District of Oklahoma. At the close of trial, the jury
found in favor of Plaintiff, consequently awarding compensatory damages in the
amount of $33 million as well as post-judgment interest at a rate of 5.39% per annum
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Jury Verdict, August 8, 2023, ECF No. 392. On
September 8, 2023, in accordance with the jury’s verdict, the Court entered final
judgment in favor of Plaintiff. See Judgment, Sept. 8, 2023, ECF No. 400.
On October 5, 2023, Defendant filed motions for judgment as a matter of law,
new trial, and remittitur. See generally Mot. J. Matter of L., Oct. 5, 2023, ECF No.
410; Mot. New Trial, Oct. 5, 2023, ECF No. 411; Mot. Remit., Oct. 5, 2023, ECF No.
412. On February 29, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s motions. See Post-Trial
Denials at 46. The Court found that the breadth of evidence presented at trial was
sufficient for the jury to find Defendant liable and therefore a new trial was
unwarranted. Id. at 14–37. Moreover, the Court found that the jury’s verdict was
based on the evidence presented at trial, rather than inappropriate remarks or any

2

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
desire to punish the municipality, and therefore did not shock the judicial conscience
nor warrant remittitur or a new trial. Id. at 37–46.
On March 27, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion seeking reconsideration
of the Court’s denial for a new trial and remittitur, requesting review of the
determination that the $33 million compensatory damages verdict was “not excessive
and was not the product of passion or prejudice, particularly in light of the Order on
Remittitur in Young v. Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.” issued the same day
as the Post-Trial Denials. See generally Def. Mot.; id. at 1 (citing No. 13-CV-315-IDJJFJ, 2024 WL 866286, at *1–67 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 29, 2024)). On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff
submitted a response urging the Court to deny Defendant’s motion, to which
Defendant replied on May 15, 2024. See generally Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n [Def. Mot.], May
1, 2024, ECF No. 448, (“Pl. Resp.”); Def.’s Reply Supp. [Def. Mot], May 14, 2024, ECF
No. 451 (“Def. Reply”).
DISCUSSION
The Court has jurisdiction to consider a party's motion for relief from a final
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Defendant’s appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, see Notice of Appeal, March 28, 2024, ECF
No. 439, divests this Court of jurisdiction “over those aspects of the case involved in
the appeal.”

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).

Nonetheless, a district court may “consider a Rule 60(b) motion and deny it on its
merits without remand by the Court of Appeals.” W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171,
1173 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Aldrich Enters., Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1134,

3

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
1143 (10th Cir. 1991)). Further, although the Court retains jurisdiction to hear a
Rule 59 despite the notice of appeal, here Defendant’s successive Rule 59 motion is
untimely. Finally, because Defendant invokes no Rule 60(b) grounds to support its
request and merely recites arguments rejected in the Post-Trial Denials, its motion
is denied. See generally Def. Mot.
I.

The Appropriate Basis of Review
Defendant moves the Court for reconsideration of the Post-Trial Denials under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and Rule 60. 1 Def. Mot. at 1. Plaintiff responds
that Defendant’s appeal to the Tenth Circuit divests this Court of jurisdiction, and in
any event, a Rule 59 motion is untimely. Pl. Resp. at 2–3. Defendant concedes that
generally an appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction, Def. Reply at 1, but
argues that (i) a timely filed Rule 59 motion postpones the effect of a notice of appeal
and (ii) the Court retains jurisdiction under Rule 60(b) to under certain
circumstances. Def. Reply at 1–5. Although the court may retain authority to hear
both a Rule 60 and Rule 59 motion despite the notice of appeal in this case, only the
Rule 60 motion is timely and will be considered by the Court.

In its moving brief, Defendant is unclear as to under which rule it brings its motion
to reconsider. See generally Def. Mot. Defendant states that “[w]hether a motion for
reconsideration should be considered under Rule 59 or Rule 60 depends on the timing
of the motion and on the basis for the motion identified by the movant.” Id. at 1–2.
A motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) must be filed within
28 days of the entry of final judgment by the district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b),
(e). The instant motion was filed some six months after this Court entered judgment
on September 8, 2023. See Judgment.
1

4

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a motion to
amend or alter the judgment and motion for relief from a judgment or order,
respectively. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b); see also Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy
Prod., LLC, 308 F.R.D. 410, 430–31 (D.N.M. 2015); Warren v. Am. Bankers Ins. Of
FL, 507 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2007); Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n. 9
(10th Cir. 2005). 2
Rule 59(e) provides:
A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28
days after the entry of the judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

2

One district court aptly explains these alternatives:
[The court in Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005
(10th Cir. 2000)] uses the term “motion to reconsider” as an umbrella
term that can encompass three distinct motions: (i) motions to
reconsider an interlocutory order, which no set standard governs, save
that the district court must decide them “before the entry
of . . . judgment[]”; (ii) motions to reconsider a judgment made within 28
days of the entry of judgment, which the Servants of the Paraclete v.
Does standard governs; and (iii) motions to reconsider a judgment made
more than 28 days after the entry of judgment, which rule 60(b) governs.
There is arguably a fourth standard for motions to reconsider filed more
than a year after the entry of judgment, as three of the rule 60(b)
grounds for relief expire at that point.
Much confusion could be avoided by using the term “motion to
reconsider” exclusively to refer to the first category, “motion to amend
or alter the judgment” exclusively to refer to the second category, and
“motion for relief from judgment” exclusively to refer to the third
category (and arguable fourth category). These are the terms that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—and other Circuits—use to describe
(ii) and (iii) . . .

Anderson Living Tr., 308 F.R.D. at 430 n.11 (internal citations omitted).
5

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
Rule 60(b) governs motions brought beyond 28 days after the entry of
judgment, providing in pertinent part:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated;
or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Despite these provisions, the well-established general rule within the Tenth
Circuit is that “when a litigant files a notice of appeal, the district court loses
jurisdiction over the case, save for ‘collateral matters not involved in the appeal.’”
McKissick v. Yuen, 618 F.3d 1177, 1196 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lancaster v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 1998)). “The filing of a notice of appeal
is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of
appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal.” Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58; Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985); see also Soboroff v. Doe, 569 F. App’x 606, 608
n.4 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The district court wasn’t free to reopen the case because the
filing of the notice of appeal divested it of jurisdiction”). “This rule ‘is a judge-made
doctrine, designed to promote judicial economy and avoid the confusion and

6

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
inefficiency that might flow from putting the same issue before two courts at the same
time.’” United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting 20
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 303.32[1] (3d ed. 2010)).
However, the Tenth Circuit has recognized several exceptions to the general
rule. Relevant here, the district court may “consider a Rule 60(b) motion and deny it
on its merits without remand by the Court of Appeals.” Yocom, 257 F.3d at 1173 n.1
(citing Aldrich Enters., Inc., 938 F.2d at 1143). Thus, the district court retains a
limited role on a Rule 60(b) motion where a notice of appeal has already been filed:
Rule 60(b), which provides for the correction of substantive legal
errors, has an interestingly one-sided application when the case is up on
appeal: A notice of appeal does not divest a district court of jurisdiction
to consider a Rule 60(b) motion, although it prevents a district court
from granting such a motion unless it notifies this court of its intention
to grant the motion upon proper remand. In other words, a district court
does have the authority to consider on the merits and deny a 60(b)
motion after a notice of appeal, because the district court’s action is in
furtherance of the appeal, but the district court does not have the
authority to grant a rule 60(b) motion without first asking the Court of
Appeals to remand the case.
Lujan v. City of Santa Fe, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1235 n.8 (D.N.M. 2015) (internal
quotations, citations, alterations, and emphasis omitted).
The Court also retains jurisdiction to hear a Rule 59 motion when a notice of
appeal is filed after the filing of a Rule 59 motion because the notice of appeal “is
suspended until the motion is disposed of, whereupon, the previously filed notice

7

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
effectively places jurisdiction in the court of appeals.” Madrid, 633 F.3d at 1226–27
citing Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). 3
Here, the Court has jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s Rule 60(b) and a
motion under Rule 59, however only the Rule 60 motion is timely. Pursuant to the
exceptions recognized by the Court of Appeals, the Court may either consider and
deny the Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment or alert the Court of Appeals that

3

Other exceptions exist:

To be sure, an effective notice of appeal does not prohibit all later
action in the case by the district court. Under the Federal Rules the
district court can proceed to resolve some matters simultaneously with
the appellate court's consideration of the appeal. For example, Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(5) gives the district court concurrent
jurisdiction to correct a sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35(a). Also, the Appellate Rules specify certain motions that
toll the time to file a notice of appeal, and the effect of a notice of appeal
is suspended while such a motion is under consideration by the district
court. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i) (civil appeals); id. 4(b)(3)(B)
(criminal appeals); id. advisory committee's note, 1993 Amendment (“A
notice [of appeal] filed before the filing of one of the specified motions or
after the filing of a motion but before disposition of the motion is, in
effect, suspended until the motion is disposed of, whereupon, the
previously filed notice effectively places jurisdiction in the court of
appeals.”).
In addition, appellate courts have carved out further exceptions
to the general rule that allow district courts to address certain matters
when judicial efficiency is thereby enhanced. District courts “may act in
aid of the court of appeals’ exercise of its jurisdiction,” may address
“matters that are [not] comprehended within the appeal,” and may
continue full consideration of the case if it certifies that the notice of
appeal is invalid or frivolous.
Madrid, 633 F.3d at 1226–27 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted);
see also McKissick, 618 F.3d at 1196 (“an award of attorney fees for the case at issue
is perhaps the paradigmatic example of a collateral issue a district court may
entertain after an appeal has been taken to this court”).
8

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
it intends to grant the motion upon remand. See Anderson Living Tr., 308 F.R.D. at
431. Likewise, the filing of a Rule 59 motion would normally suspend the notice of
appeal, assuming the Rule 59 motion was timely. 4
Defendant’s argument that this Court may consider a motion under Rule 59
because the pendency of the previous Rule 59 motion prevented the finality of the
judgment is wrong. See Def. Reply at 4–5. Defendant concedes that a Rule 59 motion
must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment. Id. at 4. But
Defendant argues “[w]hen a Rule 59(e) motion is filed within the 28-day period
following the entry of judgment, the finality of that judgment is suspended.” Id.
Defendant argues that because finality is suspended, it may file a successive Rule 59
motion within 28 days of the decision of the first rule 59 motion.

Id. at 4–5.

Defendant ignores that Rule 59 does not require the motion to be filed within 28 days
of when the judgment becomes final, but within 28 days of when the judgment is
entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 5 Thus, the plain language of the rule reveals that the
finality of the judgment is irrelevant to whether the Rule 59 motion is timely, and
Defendant’s argument is without merit.

Even if the court retained jurisdiction to hear a motion to alter or amend, the Court
would deny the motion because as discussed below Defendant’s efforts are simply
rehashed arguments previously rejected by the Court. See generally Def. Mot.
5
Defendant’s reading of Rule 59 would allow a perpetually open window to file
successive motions to alter or amend rendering meaningless the 28-day time frame
provided in the Rule.
4

9

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
II.

Defendant Lacks Grounds to Obtain Relief from Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides specific grounds for relief, none

of which apply in this case. Defendant attempts to conflate the standards for Rule 59
and Rule 60 motions to argue that the Court’s decision in Young v. Correctional
Healthcare Companies, Inc. supports its view that a manifest injustice would occur
without relief from the judgment. Def. Mot. at 1–2; see generally 2024 WL 866286.
Further, even applying the more generous standard of Rule 59, Defendant’s motion
must fail, as it only reasserts arguments raised and rejected in its previous filings.
Rule 60 sets forth the ground for relief from judgment on the following bases:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The grounds for relief from judgment are narrow, see Cashner
v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996), because a Rule 60 motion
“is not a substitute for an appeal.” Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281,
1289 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cummings v. General Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955
(10th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. SwiftEckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006)).
The standard under Rule 59(e) is broader than that of Rule 60. With respect
to a motion filed under Rule 59(e), the Tenth Circuit has found sufficient grounds for
10

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
alteration or amendment of a judgment upon a showing of “(1) an intervening change
in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d
at 1012 (citing Brumark Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir.
1995)). Furthermore, such a motion is an “‘inappropriate vehicle [ ] to reargue an
issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new
arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time of the original
motion.’” Wagner Equip. Co. v. Wood, 289 F.R.D. 347, 349 (D.N.M. 2013) (quoting
Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012) (alterations in original).
That motions made under Rule 60 and Rule 59 are generally made within the
same spirit does not make them identical sources of relief. They are distinct rules
applicable to similar but discernably different circumstances and are designed to
remedy issues at divergent points in time. See Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen.
Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit has explicitly
articulated the independent purposes of Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b):
Rule 59(e) permits a district court to entertain a motion to alter
or amend a judgment. A claimant can invoke the rule to direct a court's
attention to matters such as newly discovered evidence or a manifest
error of law or fact. The rule essentially enables a district court to
correct its own errors, sparing the parties and the appellate courts the
burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings. The rule must be invoked,
however, within ten days of the entry of judgment. And the rule may
not be used to raise novel legal theories that a party had the ability to
address in the first instance.
Rule 60(b), to some degree, provides overlapping relief. It enables
a court to grant relief from a judgment under the particular
circumstances listed in the text of the rule. One of those circumstances
envisions the vacation of a judgment in the event of “mistake,
11

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Rule 60(b) is, however, an
extraordinary remedy. The rule was designed to address mistakes
attributable to special circumstances and not merely to erroneous
applications of law. Attorney failures, for instance, provide no basis for
avoiding a judgment under Rule 60(b).
Russell, 51 F.3d at 749 (internal citations omitted). Relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) is
bound to the language of the rule. Rule 60(b) is not merely an amalgamation of the
two rules conveniently available when Rule 59(e) is prohibited by untimeliness.
There would be no purpose for Rule 60 if it were only meant to extend the deadline
explicitly set by Rule 59.
Defendant does not claim mistake, fraud, voidness, or satisfaction under Rule
60(b). See generally Def. Mot. Instead, Defendant seems to claim that the Young
order is somehow newly discovered evidence as contemplated under Rule 60(b)(2). 6
Def. Mot. at 3. However, the Young order does is not newly discovered evidence. 7

The district court possesses the authority to re-evaluate judgments under Rule
60(b)(2) based on newly discovered evidence if a movant, exercising reasonable
diligence, could not have timely discovered such evidence to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b). Zurich N. Am., 426 F.3d at 1289–90. The movant must show that:
6

(1) the evidence was newly discovered since the trial; (2) movant was
diligent in discovering the new evidence; (3) the newly discovered
evidence could not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the newly
discovered evidence had to be material; and (5) that a new trial, with the
newly discovered evidence would probably produce a different result.
Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Tr., 994 F.2d 716, 727 (10th Cir. 1993).
7 Although not specifically addressed by the Tenth Circuit, it would seem that the
Young order does not constitute newly discovered evidence within the meaning of
Rule 59(e). Even if one could consider the Young order evidence, several circuits have
concluded that “post-judgment factual developments are not evidence that existed at
the time of trial and thus cannot be considered ‘newly discovered evidence’ in support
of a post-trial motion to amend the judgment.” Henry v. United States, 2022 WL
12

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
Indeed, the Young order is a determination by another trial court based on a different
record. Further, Defendant cites Young to support arguments that have already been
made and rejected; namely, that comparing the facts of this case to other cases
supports Defendant’s view that the verdict was too high and that counsel for
Plaintiff’s comments improperly influenced the jury’s award. See Post-Trial Denials
at 45; compare Def. Mot. at 3–13, with Mot. Remit. at 11–17. Whether made under
the guise of Rule 60 or Rule 59, Defendant’s argument must fail because it is an
argument that the Court has already addressed.
Defendant claims if Young concluded “the [$14 million] compensatory damages
amount was ‘high’” but “not unreasonable,” Def. Mot. at 3 (citing Young, 2024 WL
866286, at *27), then a $33 million “compensatory damages verdict is excessive and
completely unprecedented,” which “shocks the conscious[.]”

Def. Mot. at 3, 5.

However, and as previously stated, “the Court need not compare awards if the
‘noneconomic damage awards do not shock the judicial conscience’”—a standard the
Court determined had not been meet. Post-Trial Denials at 29 (“Although the size of
the verdict is large, the Court cannot say that it shocks the conscience given the
evidence heard by the jury”); id. at 45 (quoting Stokes v. United States, 967 F.3d 1034,

45029, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2022) (citing Rivera v. M/T Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152, 155
(1st Cir. 1988)) (collecting cases and rejecting post-trial investigation evidence);
Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir. 1988) (determining
that evidence concerning events occurring six months after trial was not “newly
discovered evidence”); Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33, 46 (9th Cir. 1954)
(stating that evidence in support of post-trial motion must be evidence “in existence
at the time of trial”); Campbell v. Am. Foreign S.S. Corp., 116 F.2d 926, 928 (2d Cir.
1941) (rejecting evidence of post-trial events pursuant to a Rule 59 motion because
they did not exist at the time of trial).
13

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
1044 (10th Cir. 2020)). Finally, Defendant makes no viable claim under Rule 60(b)(6)
provision for relief on account of “any other reason that justifies relief.” Subsection
(b)(6) of Rule 60 is a narrow provision, only available for where “it offends justice” to
deny relief, which Defendant has failed to demonstrate. See Cashner, 98 F.3d at 580.
Lacking a basis under Rule 60, Defendant turns to Rule 59(e) “manifest
injustice” standard. Defendant argues that “[a]llowing the damages award to stand
would result in manifest injustice[.]” Def. Mot. at 2; see also Def. Reply at 5 (citing
manifest injustice as grounds for relief).

Defendant invokes Young’s remittitur,

issued the same day as the Post-Trial Denials.

Def. Mot. at 13.

In doing so,

Defendant seems to compare the egregiousness of the conduct in Young to that in this
case. Id. at 6–10. Defendant concludes the award “is clearly excessive given that the
jury was presented with evidence that an ambulance was called for Mr. Ellis and that
he refused to let EMS take him to the hospital for further evaluation the day before
his death.” Id. at 10–11. Although the jury did hear such evidence when determining
whether Defendant acted with deliberate indifference, that evidence says little about
the measures that must be considered for compensatory damages in a Section 1983
case: the levels of Mr. Ellis’ pain and suffering before death, loss of life and his loss of
familial relationship. See Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1507 (10th Cir.
1990). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion lacks a basis for relief, and it must be denied.

14

4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s argument under both Rule 59 and Rule 60 fail to establish a basis
for relief. For the foregoing reason, Defendant’s motion is denied.
So Ordered.
/s/ Claire R. Kelly
Claire R. Kelly, Judge *
Dated:

June 5, 2024
New York, New York

Judge Claire R. Kelly, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.

*

15