Matlock v. Bryant
Filing
11
OPINION AND ORDER by Judge John E Dowdell Respondent's motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is granted. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. A certificate of appealability is denied. ; dismissing/terminating case (terminates case) ; denying certificate of appealability; granting 6 Motion to Dismiss; dismissing 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241/2254) (SAS, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MICHAEL A. MATLOCK,
Petitioner,
v.
JASON BRYANT, Warden,
Respondent.
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Case No. 17-CV-645-JED-FHM
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, a state inmate appearing pro se, commenced this action on November 30,
2017, by filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1). Before the
Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies
(Doc. 6). Petitioner filed a response, urging this Court to deny the motion (Doc. 10). For
the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss and
dismisses the habeas petition without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner challenges the validity of the judgment and sentence entered against him
in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2010-1691. Doc. 1 at 2. In that case,
the state district court convicted Petitioner, upon his guilty pleas, of two counts of lewd
molestation, in violation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1123, and one count of possessing,
procuring, manufacturing, or distributing child pornography, in violation of OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 1021.2. Doc. 7-1. On June 2, 2011, the state district court imposed a twelve-year
prison sentence for each lewd molestation conviction and a two-year prison sentence for
the child pornography conviction, with all sentences to be served consecutively. Id.
Petitioner did not move to withdraw his guilty pleas within 10 days of sentencing nor did
he pursue a certiorari appeal with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1051; Rule 4.2(A), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2018).
On September 11, 2017, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court of Alfalfa County, seeking immediate release from custody. Doc. 7-2.1
Petitioner alleged his convictions were void because the District Court of Tulsa County
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his prosecution given that he (1) is a member of the
Cherokee Nation and (2) committed his crimes “within the bounds of the Muscogee
(Creek) reservation.” Id. For support, he cited Murphy v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir.
Aug. 8, 2017), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc by Murphy v. Royal,
875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017);2 and State v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1989). In Klindt, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that “the State of
Oklahoma does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by or against an Indian in
Indian Country.” 782 P.2d at 403. In Murphy, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit applied the three-part analysis developed in Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463
(1984), to conclude that Congress has not disestablished the boundaries of the Muscogee
1
Petitioner is incarcerated at the James Crabtree Correctional Facility, located in
Helena, Oklahoma. Helena is located in Alfalfa County. Thus, Petitioner filed his state
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of his confinement.
2
Petitioner cited the original Murphy opinion, issued August 8, 2017, in his petition.
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(Creek) reservation. 875 F.3d 932-66. By order filed October 16, 2017, in Case No. WH2017-19, the state district court dismissed the petition. Doc. 7-3. In doing so, the court
reasoned that the proper procedure for Petitioner to challenge the validity of his Tulsa
County convictions would be to file an application for post-conviction relief in the District
Court of Tulsa County. Id. at 1.
On November 1, 2017, Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.3 Doc. 7-4. Again, relying on Klindt and
Murphy,4 Petitioner alleged his Tulsa County convictions were void for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. By order filed November 13, 2017, in Case No. HC-2017-1110, the OCCA denied his
application. The OCCA stated,
For a writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner must establish that his confinement is
unlawful or that he is entitled to immediate release. Rule 10.6, Rules of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2017);
Ekstrand v. State, 1990 OK CR 21, 791 P.2d 92. Petitioner has not met this
burden. Habeas corpus is not a substitute for a direct appeal. Challenges to
the Judgment and Sentence must be made through post-conviction
procedures and not an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Id.
Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on November
30, 2017. Doc. 1. He seeks federal habeas relief on one ground:
The Judgment and Sentence is void because the state district court did not
3
Under Oklahoma law, “the Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, all other
appellate courts and the District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and
determine habeas corpus.” State v. Powell, 237 P.3d 779, 780 (Okla. 2010). Thus,
Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus in the OCCA was an original proceeding
rather than an appeal from the state district court’s order denying relief.
4
Petitioner again cited the original Murphy opinion; the amended Murphy opinion
was issued eight days after he filed his application in the OCCA.
3
have jurisdiction over the Petitioner, who is an Indian, for crime(s) which
were alleged to have been committed in “Indian Country.”
Id. at 3. As he did in state court, Petitioner alleges he is a member of the Cherokee Nation
and he committed his crimes within the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) reservation.
Id. at 4. Thus, he argues, federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over his prosecution
under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Id. at 1; see Murphy, 875 F.3d 896 (10th
Cir. 2017) (concluding Congress had not disestablished the 1866 boundaries of the Creek
Reservation and therefore [the petitioner] should have been charged and tried in federal
court under the Major Crimes Act), cert. granted 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018).
In response to the petition, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
failure to exhaust state court remedies (Doc. 6) and a brief in support (Doc. 7). Petitioner
filed a response (Doc. 10), urging this Court to deny the motion.
ANALYSIS
Respondent contends Petitioner has not properly exhausted his federal habeas claim
because he sought state habeas relief in his district of confinement and in the OCCA rather
than seeking state post-conviction relief “in the district court where he pled guilty and was
sentenced.” Doc. 7 at 2-6. Because Petitioner still has an available remedy in state courts,
Respondent argues, this Court must dismiss the petition based on Petitioner’s failure to
exhaust the sole claim asserted therein. Id. at 5-6.
Petitioner contends he properly exhausted his claim by seeking state habeas relief
because he challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction. Doc. 10 at 2-3. He further contends
the OCCA ruled on the merits of his claim when it stated that he “has not met his burden”
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to show that his confinement was unlawful and that he was entitled to immediate release.
Id. Finally, he argues that because the OCCA ruled on the merits of his claim, he has no
available state remedies left to exhaust. Id. at 3-4.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) generally “prohibits
federal courts from granting habeas relief to state prisoners who have not exhausted
available state remedies.” Ellis v. Raemisch, 872 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2017); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement “is designed to give
the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before
those claims are presented to the federal courts.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
845 (1999). Significantly, a state prisoner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of [§ 2254], if he has the
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). In Boerckel, the Supreme Court explained that § 2254(c)
does not require state prisoners to “invoke any possible avenue of state court review.” Id.
at 844 (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that “state prisoners
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by
invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” Id. at
845; see Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (explaining state prisoner does not
properly exhaust state court remedies by presenting constitutional claim for “first and only
time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered”). “[T]he exhaustion
doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry into what procedures are ‘available’ under
state law.” Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 847.
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Here, as Respondent points out, both the state district court and the OCCA advised
Petitioner that filing a state habeas action was not the proper procedure for challenging the
trial court’s jurisdiction. Doc. 7 at 4-5. Both courts explained that Petitioner must instead
seek post-conviction relief in the District Court of Tulsa County. Id. Thus, Respondent
argues, Petitioner has an available state remedy that he must exhaust before he is entitled
to seek habeas relief in federal court. Id.; see Doshier v. Oklahoma, 67 F. App’x 499, 50001 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished)5 (holding state prisoner’s filing of state habeas petition
was not sufficient to exhaust state remedies, particularly in light of OCCA’s statement that
prisoner could seek out-of-time appeal through state post-conviction procedures).
In response, Petitioner argues that he fairly presented his claim to the OCCA and
obtained a ruling on the merits as evidenced by the OCCA’s statement that he did not meet
his burden to show that his confinement was unlawful. Doc. 10 at 1. He further argues
that Doshier’s reasoning does not apply in this case because he is challenging the trial
court’s jurisdiction, an issue he asserts falls within the scope of the limited remedy
available through a state habeas action. Doc. 10 at 2-3; see Smith v. Oklahoma, 546 P.2d
1351, 1354 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (stating that the OCCA “ha[s] consistently held that
the scope of habeas corpus is limited to a determination of whether the trial court had
jurisdiction of the person, subject matter, and authority under the law to pronounce the
judgment and sentence imposed”). He also argues that, unlike the petitioner in Doshier,
he has “not been invited by the OCCA to file an Appeal-Out-of-Time in the District Court.”
5
The Court cites this unpublished decision for its persuasive value. See Fed. R.
App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
6
Id. at 3.
Smith does tend to support Petitioner’s position that he properly exhausted his claim.
The OCCA explained in Smith “that the scope of habeas corpus is limited,” in part, “to a
determination of whether the trial court had jurisdiction of the person, subject matter, and
authority under the law to pronounce the judgment and sentence imposed.” 546 P.2d at
1354. And Petitioner’s sole claim challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction. Doc. 1 at 3.
However, as Respondent argues, under Oklahoma law, the OCCA generally will not
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless “the statutory appeal procedures
enacted by the [state legislature] have first been exhausted.” Rule 10.6(C)(1), Rules of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2018). Rule 10.6(C)(1)
specifically provides:
The writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended or altered by the PostConviction Procedure Act so long as the statutory appeal procedures enacted
by the Legislature have been first exhausted. The writ of habeas corpus is not
an authorization to bypass the statutory appeal process.
In Doshier, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Court applied
Castille to determine that invoking state habeas relief in Oklahoma does not constitute “fair
presentation” of a claim “sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement” when the
petitioner has state post-conviction remedies “available to him.” Doshier, 67 F. App’x at
500. This Court recognizes that Petitioner presents a jurisdictional claim, whereas the
petitioner in Doshier presented only non-jurisdictional claims. See Doc. 1 at 3; Doshier,
67 F. App’x at 500. The Court nevertheless finds Doshier’s rationale applicable and
persuasive. As stated, the plain language of Rule 10.6(C)(1) expressly requires a criminal
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defendant to exhaust his or her claims through the statutory appeal process before the
OCCA will entertain a state habeas action. And the language of Rule 10.6(C)(1) neither
suggests nor supports that the defendant may bypass the statutory appeal process if he or
she asserts only a jurisdictional claim. Moreover, as Respondent points out, two state
courts have explicitly advised Petitioner that he must pursue his jurisdictional claim by
filing an application for post-conviction relief in state court—specifically, in the District
Court of Tulsa County. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Petitioner has an
available state remedy. Thus, the Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner’s sole
habeas claim is unexhausted and that the petition should be dismissed without prejudice.
See Grant, 886 F.3d at 891-92 (stating general rule that “a federal court should dismiss
unexhausted claims without prejudice so that the petitioner can pursue available state-court
remedies” (quoting Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1012 (10th Cir. 2006))).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Petitioner’s sole habeas claim is
unexhausted. The Court therefore grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss and dismisses
the petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice. In addition, the Court concludes
that reasonable jurists would not debate that the instant habeas petition should be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to exhaust the sole claim asserted therein. Thus, the Court
also denies a certificate of appealability.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts.
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ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is granted.
2.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is dismissed without prejudice for
failure to exhaust state remedies.
3.
A certificate of appealability is denied.
4.
A separate judgment shall be entered in this matter.
ORDERED this 12th day of September, 2018.
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