Campbell v. Spencer Oklahoma, City of et al

Filing 84

ORDER granting 75 and 76 defendants' motions to dismiss...counts 1 and 2 of the amended complaint are dismissed...if plaintiff desires to seek to amend her complaint further, she shall file a motion to that effect within 10 day of this order...absent such a motion a dismissal will be deemed to be with prejudice. Signed by Honorable Joe Heaton on 01/17/2013. (lam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ANN ELAINE CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF SPENCER, ET AL.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. CIV-09-0821-HE

ORDER
Plaintiff Ann Elaine Campbell brought this action against defendants City of Spencer
(“Spencer”) and Town of Forest Park (“Forest Park”), asserting 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for
alleged violations of her Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights.1 The court dismissed
the claims against Spencer and Forest Park on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed as to the Fifth and Eighth Amendment
claims, but reversed the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claims, concluding that those
claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682
F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012). Following remand, a second action which had been pending in
state court between the same original parties was removed to this court and that action
consolidated with this one.2 Upon the joint motion of the parties, plaintiff was allowed to
amend her complaint. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. #72] which asserted

1

An additional defendant, Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue, Inc., was also named in the
original complaint, but was dismissed by stipulation of the parties [Doc. #46].
2

The rationale for the second action is not apparent, but, in any event, the actions were
consolidated. Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue, Inc. had not been dismissed in the removed case and
hence is still a party in this consolidated case.

Fourth Amendment claims against Spencer, Forest Park, and Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue
Inc., as well as a state law defamation claim against the latter defendant. Spencer and Forest
Park have now filed motions to dismiss on the basis that the Fourth Amendment claims
against them are barred by principles of preclusion.3 The court agrees and concludes that
counts I and II of the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.
Background4
Plaintiff alleges that her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because
defendants illegally searched and seized her property.5 On July 31, 2007, Oklahoma County
Deputy Sheriff John Cothran submitted an affidavit to the Oklahoma County District Court
in support of a search warrant for plaintiff’s property. A warrant issued and was executed
by Spencer and Forest Park police officers. Forty-four of plaintiff’s horses were seized.
Defendants petitioned a state court to order forfeiture of the horses.
Under 21 Okla. Stat. § 1680.4, a court may order “immediate forfeiture” of an animal
if “probable cause exists that an animal has been abused.” A hearing was held on August
10, 2007, before the District Court of Oklahoma County, to determine whether probable

3

Defendants also assert that the claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
separate and apart from preclusion principles. As the court concludes preclusion principles bar the
claims against Spencer and Forest Park, it need not address whether some further basis for a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal exists.
4

The background of this case is set out more fully in this court’s May 4, 2010, order [Doc.
#34] and the Tenth Circuit opinion.
5

In addition to the allegations of the complaint, the court has considered various documents
filed in the state court proceeding and attached as exhibits to the parties’ briefs. Their authenticity
is not challenged by the parties.

2

cause existed for the seizure of plaintiff’s horses. On August 24, 2007, that court issued an
order finding that, on the day of the seizure, probable cause existed that plaintiff’s horses
were “in an abusive and neglected situation,” and ordering their forfeiture under § 1680.4.
Order of Forfeiture, Case No. MI-2007-170 (Dist. Court of Okla. Cnty. Aug. 24, 2007) [Doc.
#75-6]. The court also stated that it found on July 31, 2007, that probable cause existed to
issue the search warrant for the seizure of the 44 horses. Id. That order was affirmed by the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals. Town of Forest Park v. Campbell, Case No. 105,087, slip
op. at 12, 14 (Okla. Civ. App. June 12, 2008) [Doc. #75-7]. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
subsequently denied plaintiff’s petition for certiorari. Order, Case No. 105,087 (Okla. Dec.
15, 2008) [Doc. #75-9].
Analysis
Plaintiff now asserts two Fourth Amendment claims. Count One challenges the
legality of the search of her property, alleging there were insufficient grounds for the search
(presumably meaning insufficient grounds for the warrant that was issued) and whether there
was (again, presumably in the warrant) a sufficiently particular description of the property
to be searched. Count II makes the same essential allegations, but focuses on the alleged
wrongful seizure rather than the search. The court concludes that preclusion principles
prevent plaintiff from pursuing her Fourth Amendment claims in this case. See Lavicky v.
Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel may
preclude plaintiff from litigating a Fourth Amendment issue in a § 1983 action if a state court
has decided that same issue in previous litigation.” (citations omitted)). Federal courts must
3

“give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which
the judgments emerged would do so.” Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295, 1302 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 96 (1980)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Oklahoma recognizes both claim preclusion (res
judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), and the doctrines are often used
interchangeably. See B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Corp., 531 F.3d 1282, 1300-01
(10th Cir. 2008).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he doctrine of collateral
estoppel, or issue preclusion, is activated when an ultimate issue has been determined by a
valid and final judgment—that question cannot be relitigated by parties, or their privies, to
the prior adjudication in any future lawsuit.” Carris v. John R. Thomas & Assocs., P.C., 896
P.2d 522, 527 (Okla. 1995) (citations omitted). “[I]ssue preclusion applies only to those
issues actually adjudicated and necessary or essential to the prior judgment.” Id. at 528; see
also Oklahoma Dept. of Pub. Safety v. McCrady, 176 P.3d 1194, 1199 (Okla. 2007) (“An
issue is actually litigated and necessarily determined if it is properly raised in the pleadings,
or otherwise submitted for determination, and judgment would not have been rendered but
for the determination of that issue.”). The court must find “1) that the party against whom
[issue preclusion] is being asserted was either a party to or a privy of a party to the prior
action; 2) that the issue subject to preclusion has actually been adjudicated in the prior case;
3) that the adjudicated issue was necessary and essential to the outcome of that prior case;
and 4) the party against whom it is interposed had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
4

claim or critical issue.” Durham v. McDonald's Rests. of Okla., Inc., 256 P.3d 64, 66-67
(Okla. 2011) (emphasis and citations omitted). Those elements are met here.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. The Constitution also states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id. The lawfulness of the search and
seizures at issue here was adjudicated in the state court lawsuit, evidenced by the court’s
finding that the search warrant was issued upon probable cause and there was probable cause
to seize the 44 horses and later forfeit them. As the Tenth Circuit noted in its previous
review of this case, “The state court considered the same issues—the lawfulness of the search
and seizure . . . .” Campbell, 682 F.3d at 1285. The state district court order stated: “The
court after hearing the testimony of the parties and after reviewing the exhibits and evidence
clearly finds that probable cause exists that the 44 horses were in an abusive and neglected
situation, as described in 21 O.S. 1685, when they were seized on July 31, 2007” [Doc. #75-6
at 1]. The court also recognized that it previously found there was probable cause to issue
the search warrant prior to its execution, and necessarily relied on the validity of that warrant
in upholding the seizure of the horses.6 Id.
6

Furthermore,“evidence that is obtained through an illegal search must be suppressed in
civil proceedings in Oklahoma, just as it is suppressed in criminal proceedings.” Brumfield v. State,
155 P.3d 826, 833-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Turner v. City of Lawton, 733 P.2d 375,
376–78 (Okla. 1986)) (noting further that “[t]his Court has repeatedly held that in order to preserve
a claim that evidence should have been suppressed, the defendant must object to the admission of

5

As to the other issue preclusion elements, it is undisputed that plaintiff was a party to
the prior action. Further, because of the probable cause standard required in the forfeiture
proceeding and the applicability of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings in Oklahoma,
it is clear that the issue of the lawfulness of the search and seizure—and the existence of
probable cause for both—was necessary and essential to the outcome. Finally, it is
undisputed that plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the lawfulness of the search
and seizure at the evidentiary hearing held before the state district court as well as on her
direct appeal.7 As such, relitigation of the lawfulness of the search and seizure of plaintiff’s
horses is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.
Tenth Circuit authority also suggests that the same disposition would be reached as
a matter of claim preclusion. Claim preclusion “operates to bar the relitigation of issues by
the parties or their privies which were or could have been litigated in an action which
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.” Carris, 896 P.2d at 527. As the Tenth Circuit has
noted, “res judicata bars not only relitigation of those issues that were or might have been
offered to sustain the claim, but also all defenses that were or might have been offered to

the evidence at trial”); see also Valley View Angus Ranch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Field Servs., Inc.,
497 F.3d 1096, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007) (“An issue decided by a court as a matter of law is also
preclusive under Oklahoma law.” (citation omitted)). The state court’s decision that there was
probable cause for the search and seizure—and the decision’s subsequent affirmation by the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals—necessarily determined as a matter of law that the evidence was
obtained pursuant to a lawful search.
7

To be sure, there is considerable imprecision in the structure and language of the state
court documents, but there is no apparent reason why any issue arising from that imprecision was
not within the scope of the state court determination given preclusive effect here.

6

defeat the claim” if the success in federal court of those previously unraised defenses would
“undermine a prior state judgment or impair rights established thereby.” Copeman v.
Ballard, 214 F. App'x 739, 741 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citations omitted); but see
Valley View, 497 F.3d at 1101 n.6 (noting, in dicta, that “the failure to raise a defense does
not have the same preclusive effect as a plaintiff's failure to raise all transactionally related
claims” (emphasis omitted)). Allowing plaintiff to proceed with these claims would certainly
undermine a prior state court judgment, as the order of forfeiture necessarily rested on the
lawfulness of the search and seizure in the first place.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment rights are
barred by preclusion principles and therefore do not state a plausible claim. Defendants’
motions to dismiss [Doc. Nos. 75, 76] are GRANTED and Counts I and Count II of the
Amended Complaint are DISMISSED. If plaintiff desires to seek to amend her complaint
further, she shall file a motion to that effect within ten days.8 Absent such a motion, this
dismissal will be deemed to be with prejudice.9

8

It does not appear that amendment can avoid the basis for dismissal relied on here as to
Counts I and II as now pled. However, as there is some ambiguity in the briefs as to exactly what
plaintiff views as the basis for a Fourth Amendment violation, the court concludes it would be
premature to reach the conclusion now that amendment is futile.
9

The court notes that defendant Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue, Inc. has not filed an answer
or otherwise responded to the Amended Complaint.

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 17th day of January, 2013.

8