Phillips et al v. Cudd Pressure Control Inc et al

Filing 236

ORDER denying 228 plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 motion to vacate its April 6, 2012 order 221 granting summary judgment to Cudd and enter order denying Cudd's motion for summary judgment (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 6/11/2012. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TONYA DIANE PHILLIPS,
Individually, and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ALLEN DARREL PHILLIPS,
deceased,
Plaintiff,

CUDD PRESSURE CONTROL, INC.,
a Mississippi Corporation, and
CMP OILFIELD SERVICES, LLC,
a Texas Limited Liability Co., and
SAGE INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Texas Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CIV-09-1197-M

ORDER
Before the Court is plaintiff’s Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motion to Vacate Its April 6, 2012 Order
[Dkt. 221] Granting Summary Judgment to Cudd and Enter Order Denying Cudd’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed May 3, 2012. On May 17, 2012, defendant Cudd Pressure Control, Inc.
(“Cudd”) filed its response. On May 24, 2012, plaintiff filed her reply, and on June 8, 2012, plaintiff
filed her Supplemental Brief to Her Rule 59 and 60 Motion. Based upon the parties’ submissions,
the Court makes its determination.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60, plaintiff moves this Court to
reconsider its decision to grant Cudd’s motion for summary judgment. “Grounds warranting a
motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence
previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of
the Paraclete v. John Does I-XVI, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). A motion to reconsider
is appropriate “where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling

law” but is not appropriate “to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have
been raised in prior briefing.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that this Court’s ruling that plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Parret v. UNNICO
Service Company, 127 P.2d 572 (Okla. 2005), is barred by the election of remedies doctrine is a
manifest error of law and clearly a mistake of law. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the election
of remedies doctrine does not apply to Parret intentional tort claims and that Parret itself clearly
permits a plaintiff to bring both a district court claim for intentional tort and prosecute to finality a
death claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Plaintiff further asserts that the ends of justice
will only be served by the Court reviewing the legal issue again, vacating its order granting summary
judgment to Cudd, entering an order denying Cudd’s motion for summary judgment, and re-setting
this case on the Court’s jury trial docket.
Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, as well as the applicable case law cited
therein, the Court finds no need to vacate its order granting Cudd’s motion for summary judgment.
Specifically, the Court finds that it did not misapprehend the controlling law and that its ruling is
not a manifest error of law. The Court finds that the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling in Parret
was limited to the issue of the evidentiary burden imposed on a plaintiff asserting an intentional tort
claim and did not address either the res judicata effect of a fully-adjudicated workers’ compensation
case or whether the election of remedies doctrine applies to Parret cases. The Court further finds
that it properly concluded that the issue of whether the election of remedies doctrine applies to a
Parret claim remains an issue of first impression in Oklahoma. Additionally, the Court would note
that the decisions from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma cited
by plaintiff are not binding precedent upon this Court and finds that this Court’s ruling is not a

2

manifest error of law because it reaches a different resolution.1 Further, the Court finds that in her
motion, plaintiff primarily re-asserts arguments she made in response to Cudd’s motion for summary
judgment and advances arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motion to Vacate Its April
6, 2012 Order [Dkt. 221] Granting Summary Judgment to Cudd and Enter Order Denying Cudd’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [docket no. 228].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of June, 2012.

1

The Court would note that it did not rely upon the September 22, 2011 opinion in Coulson
v. Jenson International, Inc., Case No. 10-CV-788-GKF-FHM (N.D. Okla.) in its April 6, 2012
order. Further, the Court would note that in the June 1, 2012 opinion and order in the Coulson case
granting the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment and motion for relief from final judgment,
Judge Frizzell states as follows: “The court, having reviewed cases cited in Torres, does not find the
weight of authority clearly favors permitting injured plaintiffs to pursue and collect both workers’
compensation awards and tort damages.” Opinion and Order at 4.
3