Layton et al v. Correctional Healthcare Management of Oklahoma Inc et al

Filing 91

ORDER granting 63 Defendants Sheriff John Whetsel, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Oklahoma County, and Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County Motion for summary Judgment; DENYING 64 Defendant Correctional Healthcare Management of Oklahoma, Inc's Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 71 Motion of Defendant, John Whetsel, Individually for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Robin J. Cauthron on 7/28/11. (lg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

APRIL LAYTON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Charles
Holdstock, deceased; APRIL LAYTON,
Individually; VALERIE WINFREY,
Individually; and MELANIE
HUFNAGEL, Individually,

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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE
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MANAGEMENT OF OKLAHOMA,
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INC.; THE BOARD OF COUNTY
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COMMISSIONERS OF OKLAHOMA
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COUNTY; a Political Subdivision of the
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State of Oklahoma; and JOHN WHETSEL, )
individually and in his capacity as Sheriff )
of Oklahoma County,
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Defendants.
)

Case Number CIV-09-1208-C

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs filed the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Oklahoma tort law
following the death of Charles Holdstock (“Holdstock” or “decedent”) while he was held as
a pretrial detainee in the Oklahoma County Jail. Plaintiffs allege that while in custody at the
Oklahoma County Jail, Mr. Holdstock suffered a series of health events which ultimately led
to his death. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated Mr. Holdstock’s constitutional rights
and acted in violation of Oklahoma tort law in relation to their custody of Mr. Holdstock.
Defendant Correctional Healthcare Management of Oklahoma, Inc. (“CHMO”), Sheriff John
Whetsel in his official capacity as Sheriff of Oklahoma County, and Defendant Board of

County Commissioners of Oklahoma County (“BOCC”), and John Whetsel individually
(“Whetsel”), each filed Motions for Summary Judgment, arguing the undisputed facts
demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ claims cannot survive.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[A] motion for summary judgment should be granted
only when the moving party has established the absence of any genuine issue as to a material
fact.” Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir.
1977). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of material fact
requiring judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986). A fact is material if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the movant carries this initial burden,
the nonmovant must then set forth “specific facts” outside the pleadings and admissible into
evidence which would convince a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). These specific facts may be shown “by any of the kinds of evidentiary
materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324. Such evidentiary materials include affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific
exhibits. Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992).
“The burden is not an onerous one for the nonmoving party in each case, but does not at any
point shift from the nonmovant to the district court.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144
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F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998). All facts and reasonable inferences therefrom are construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
DISCUSSION
The following facts are undisputed: Decedent Charles Holdstock was booked into the
Oklahoma County jail on September 5, 2006. At that time, he had numerous preexisting
medical conditions, including diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure, hypertension,
elevated cholesterol, and arthritis. Further, Mr. Holdstock had had a pacemaker installed in
2002. One of the medications decedent was prescribed to treat his health conditions was
Digoxin. At high levels, Digoxin becomes toxic and prevents the heart from properly
functioning. Digoxin is filtered through the kidneys and if the kidneys are not functioning
properly, Digoxin can build up to toxic levels in the bloodstream.
On April 28, 2009, while incarcerated in the Oklahoma County jail, decedent was
found cool, clammy, and non-responsive in his jail cell. Decedent was taken to the infirmary
run by CHMO and evaluated and treated. Decedent was later returned to his cell. On April
29, decedent was again found in his cell with labored respiration and unable to explain what
his problems were. He was again taken to CHMO’s infirmary where blood was drawn and
other tests were done. After his condition stabilized, Holdstock was returned to his cell. The
blood work taken on April 29 was processed by LabCorp and a report was returned to
CHMO on May 1, 2009. That lab work showed that decedent’s white blood count was in the
high range. His neutrophils were in the high range, his glucose serum was high, his BUN
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count was high, his creatinine serum was high, and his potassium serum was high. Despite
these tests, the evidence before the Court demonstrates that the medical personnel employed
by CHMO undertook no action to address the high results. Plaintiffs’ medical expert has
testified that these blood results should have been recognized by CHMO’s medical
professionals as demonstrating kidney or renal failure and prompted them to take further
action to correct this problem. Plaintiffs’ medical expert further testified that the failure to
correct the situation timely ultimately contributed to decedent’s death. The question
presented is whether CHMO’s failure to act is actionable under the Constitution and/or
Oklahoma tort law, and if so, against which Defendants. The Court will address the
constitutional claim first.
Because Mr. Holdstock was a pretrial detainee, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are
evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause which applies the
protections of the Eighth Amendment to persons in his position. Garcia v. Salt Lake County,
768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985) (“pretrial detainees are . . . entitled to the degree of
protection against denial of medical attention which applies to convicted inmates”). In order
to state a valid Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs must show deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The test for deliberate
indifference has both objective and subjective components. Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d
1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). The objective component of the test is met if the “harm
suffered rises to a level ‘sufficiently serious’ to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause” of the Eighth Amendment. Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 752-53 (10th
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Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Here, the harm suffered
by decedent, death, is clearly sufficiently serious to meet the objective component necessary
to implicate the Eighth Amendment.
The query now turns to the subjective component. “To prevail on the subjective
component, the prisoner must show that the defendants ‘knew he faced a substantial risk of
harm and disregarded that risk, by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Callahan,
471 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir. 2006)). It
is on this clause that the differing liability of the various Defendants hinges.
In evaluating the subjective component, the symptoms displayed by the prisoner are
relevant to a determination of whether a defendant acted with deliberate indifference. The
question to be answered is, “[W]ere the symptoms such that a prison employee knew the risk
to the prisoner and chose (recklessly) to disregard it?” Mata, 427 F.3d at 753. The Supreme
Court has set forth the standard as follows:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. So first, the Court must evaluate the actions taken by the various
Defendants against the risk of death faced by Mr. Holdstock.
The facts presented by Plaintiffs demonstrate that on April 28, 2009, decedent was
found in his cell by jail employees, in a distressed condition. It is clear that the jail officials

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took him to the infirmary for evaluation and treatment, if necessary. Once in the infirmary,
Defendant CHMO’s employees examined decedent, determined that his blood sugar was low,
and treated that condition. Once decedent’s condition had stabilized, he was released by the
medical professionals to return to his cell. Plaintiffs complain that Mr. Holdstock could not
be monitored while in his cell and/or that the long history of problems at the jail should have
caused BOCC and/or Whetsel to act differently to Mr. Holdstock. However, there simply
is no evidence from which any reasonable jury could find that on April 28, 2009, Mr.
Holdstock faced death. Thus, it cannot be said that anyone recognized that risk existed and
recklessly ignored it.
Essentially the same events repeated on April 29. Mr. Holdstock was found
unresponsive in his cell by jail personnel and taken to the infirmary for treatment. Critical
to CHMO’s potential liability, tests were run on this visit which eventually put those
Defendants on notice of the risk faced by Mr. Holdstock. As noted above, CHMO
employees received those results on May 1, 2009. Plaintiffs’ expert has testified that medical
personnel seeing the lab reports should have recognized the impending risk faced by Mr.
Holdstock and immediately taken action. However, it was not until May 15, 2009, when
decedent was again found in his cell unresponsive, that he was sent to the emergency room.
As noted, Mr. Holdstock died on that day.
As these facts demonstrate, in each instance the employees of the BOCC and/or
Whetsel took the appropriate action to provide medical care for decedent by taking him to
the infirmary. While Plaintiffs argue that policies should have been in place to require
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different action, they fail to offer any evidence to show any other policy, procedure, or
custom would have advised the BOCC/Whetsel employees of the risk faced by Mr.
Holdstock. Simply put, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that any
of the jail employees responding to decedent’s condition were aware of facts from which an
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed or that those officials
in fact made that inference. Consequently, the undisputed material facts demonstrate that
Defendants BOCC and John Whetsel individually were not deliberately indifferent to the
medical condition of decedent. Accordingly, those Defendants’ Motions for Summary
Judgment will be granted.
While Defendants make much of the fact that Plaintiffs’ medical expert testified he
was not a “standard of care” expert, and therefore can’t testify that CHMO employees failed
to properly care for Mr. Holdstock, the fact remains that his testimony, when viewed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that medical
providers in the position of CHMO’s employees would have been aware of the risk to
decedent, and that they recklessly chose to disregard that risk. For these reasons, CHMO’s
Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.
Turning to the state law claims: CHMO argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim
of medical negligence because they have no expert testimony. To the contrary, the same
facts and testimony which demonstrate that CHMO’s employees acted with deliberate
indifference are sufficient to satisfy the elements of a medical negligence claim under
Oklahoma law. Thus, to the extent CHMO seeks summary judgment on that claim, it will
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likewise be denied. Whether or not CHMO is entitled to the protections of Oklahoma’s
Governmental Tort Claims Act and its exception to the waiver of sovereign liability was not
raised by this Defendant and therefore has not been considered by the Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants Sheriff John Whetsel, in his official
capacity as Sheriff of Oklahoma County, and Defendant Board of County Commissioners
of Oklahoma County Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 63) and the Motion of
Defendant, John Whetsel, Individually for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 71) are
GRANTED. Defendant Correctional Healthcare Management of Oklahoma, Inc.’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 64) is DENIED. A separate judgment will issue at the
close of the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 2011.

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