Reyna et al v. Independent School District No 1 of Oklahoma County Oklahoma et al

Filing 68

ORDER granting 50 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 3/27/2012. (mb, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DANA REYNA, individually and as mother
and next friend of K.M.R., a minor,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
NUMBER 1 OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY,
OKLAHOMA, commonly referred to as
PUTNAM CITY SCHOOLS, et al.
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-09-1223-D
(District Court of Oklahoma County,
Oklahoma, Case No. CJ-2009-9583)

ORDER
Before the Court is the Individual School Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
No. 50], filed by Defendants Paul Hurst, Melanie Mouse, Jennifer DeSouza, Hallie Wright, Paula
Smitherman, Tina Nunn, Roslyn Patrick, Frances Blickenstaff, Diane Barnard, and Kelli Hau.
Plaintiffs have timely opposed the Motion, and Defendants have replied. The movants are school
employees sued in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the
civil rights of the minor plaintiff, K.M.R., while a student at Kenneth Cooper Middle School. Other
named defendants have also moved for summary judgment, but the Court first addresses the instant
Motion because the § 1983 claims at issue provide the sole basis for federal jurisdiction.1 For
reasons that follow, the Court grants summary judgment on all remaining § 1983 claims and declines

1

The Court has previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Defendant Independent
School District No. 1, all claims against Kenneth Cooper Middle School, and Plaintiffs’ tort claims against
the individual school employees. See Order of May 21, 2010 [Doc. No. 20]. Plaintiffs assert pendant state
law claims against the school district under the Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151-172,
and against Defendants Sheila Alderson and Child Defendant #1. Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed
Defendant Tiffany Hutchinson. Other minor defendants listed in Plaintiffs’ pleading and designated only by
numbers, have not been identified or served with process.

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims, which will be remanded to
state court.2
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Dana Reyna is the mother of K.M.R., who was allegedly a victim of bullying at
Kenneth Cooper Middle School. The moving defendants are the school superintendent, an assistant
superintendent, the principal, an assistant principal, a counselor, a nurse, and four teachers.
Plaintiffs allege that eight students bullied K.M.R. at school and at non-school events by subjecting
her to taunting, threats, battery, vandalism, and other acts of bullying, which caused K.M.R. to suffer
depression and severe migraine headaches. Plaintiffs claim that the named school employees failed
in various ways to assist K.M.R. and her mother in efforts to stop the bullying. Also, three teachers
and the nurse allegedly denied K.M.R. timely access to medication for migraine headaches, a
condition to which she was susceptible due to a prior illness, despite two letters from treating
physicians. Ms. Reyna alleges she was forced to quit a job to care for K.M.R., and Plaintiffs
allegedly were forced to abandon their home and move to a rental house in another school district
so that K.M.R. could attend a different school.
Based on the allegations of Plaintiffs’ pleading, as clarified by arguments in their briefs,
Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims for damages against the movants under the following legal theories:
(1) the teachers and nurse who deprived K.M.R. of necessary medication violated a duty to provide
care that existed under the “special relationship” doctrine; (2) various school personnel failed to
protect K.M.R. from the bullies, which was a duty that existed under the “state created danger”
doctrine; and (3) school management failed to adequately supervise and train the personnel who
2

Defendants removed the action to federal court based on the assertion of § 1983 claims in
Plaintiffs’ state court petition and, therefore, the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
2

violated K.M.R.’s constitutional rights to care and protection. See Petition [Doc. No. 1-2], ¶¶ 72-77;
Pls’ Resp. Br. [Doc. No. 60] at 10-11. By their Motion, the school employees assert that Plaintiffs
cannot establish a violation of K.M.R.’s constitutional rights by any school employee or establish
liability of any managers, and cannot overcome the defense of qualified immunity.
Standard of Decision
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Id. at 255. All facts and reasonable
inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. If a party who
would bear the burden of proof at trial lacks sufficient evidence on an essential element of a claim,
then all other factual issues concerning the claim become immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a dispute of material
fact warranting summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. If the movant carries this burden,
the nonmovant must then go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts” that would be
admissible in evidence and that show a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998). “To
accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or
specific exhibits incorporated therein.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
“The court need consider only the cited materials, but may consider other materials in the record.”
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see also Adler, 144 F.3d at 672. The Court’s inquiry is whether the
3

facts and evidence identified by the parties present “a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 251-52.
Undisputed Facts 3
K.M.R. was a student at Kenneth Cooper Middle School during the 2007-08 and 2008-09
school years, covering her enrollment in the sixth and seventh grades. Plaintiffs state that K.M.R.
was absent due to illness during sixth grade, and after she returned in January, 2008, K.M.R. was
ridiculed and threatened by other students. Plaintiffs also state that in late January, 2008, a
psychotherapist diagnosed K.M.R. with severe depression and recommended that she be removed
from school. Ms. Reyna obtained homebound status for K.M.R. until March 7, 2008. K.M.R. then
attended a private school for the remainder of the school year.
K.M.R. returned to Kenneth Cooper Middle School for seventh grade. At the beginning of
the school year, Ms. Reyna gave the school nurse, Diane Barnard, ibuprofen to administer to K.M.R.
as needed for headaches; on December 1, 2008, Ms. Reyna provided Aleve to be administered
instead of ibuprofen. School rules prohibited K.M.R. from carrying medication to school and selfadministering it. Ms. Barnard administered ibuprofen and Aleve to K.M.R. during the school year
as shown by medication logs. Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Barnard denied K.M.R.’s request for
medication on November 12, 2008, because she was busy with other duties, and that she delayed
giving Aleve to K.M.R. several times in order to consult Ms. Reyna, according to the instructions
Ms. Reyna had given about administering Aleve. Plaintiffs also claim that one teacher, Francis
Blickenstaff, required K.M.R. to wait on several occasions when she asked to leave class to take her
3

This statement includes material facts presented by both parties that are supported as required by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). If a party has asserted a fact, or asserted that a fact is disputed, but has failed to
provide such support, the assertion is disregarded. All facts are stated in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
4

medication and that another teacher, Roslyn Patrick, refused K.M.R.’s request to take her medication
on one occasion. Ms. Reyna informed the principal, Jennifer DeSouza, in November, 2008, about
K.M.R.’s problem regarding timely access to her medication and Ms. DeSouza resolved the
problem, although Plaintiffs allege the resolution took eight or nine weeks.4
During K.M.R.’s seventh grade year, Ms. Reyna first reported to a school counselor, Paula
Smitherman, in September, 2008, that some girls were calling K.M.R. names. In December, 2008,
Ms. Reyna informed Ms. Smitherman of two bullying incidents that K.M.R. had experienced – one
in which K.M.R.’s keys were placed in a toilet and her lunch card was cut up, and another in which
her books were thrown in the trash. One of K.M.R.’s teachers, Kelli Hau, had seen K.M.R.
retrieving her keys from the toilet. Ms. Reyna provided the names of students that K.M.R. believed
were involved in these incidents, based on information K.M.R. had obtained from another student.
After the school break, additional bullying incidents occurred outside of school hours during
non-school events. K.M.R. and other students were invited to the home of a classmate (H.A.) in
January, 2009, but K.M.R. was then locked outside in freezing temperatures. K.M.R. and other
students were invited to the home of another classmate (L.B.) in February, 2009, but K.M.R. was
then insulted and taunted until Ms. Reyna came to get her. During spring break in March, 2009, a
group of students, including H.A. and L.B., toilet-papered and vandalized K.M.R.’s house.
Ms. Reyna subsequently learned of postings by some of the students on MySpace.com about the

4

In support of this allegation, Plaintiffs cite deposition testimony of Ms. Reyna that, read in context,
suggests this estimated period of delay includes time that elapsed before Ms. DeSouza was informed of a
problem. Ms. Reyna testified that she sent Ms. DeSouza an email in November, 2008, asking for help in
resolving the problem of K.M.R.’s access to medication. According to Ms. Reyna, she told Ms. DeSouza,
“‘You need to do something right away,’ and she did. But it had been eight or nine weeks before she did
anything about it.” See Reyna Dep. [Doc. No. 50-1], 97:5-12 (emphasis added). Ms. Reyna also testified that
once Ms. DeSouza helped resolve the medication issue, K.M.R.’s behavioral issues at school improved to the
point that she earned a reward before the December school break. See id. 178:6-20.
5

March incident and about K.M.R. All of these incidents were first brought to the attention of Ms.
Smitherman in March, 2009. Ms. Smitherman determined that the MySpace.com postings did not
contain threats and, in her opinion, did not constitute cyberbullying.
In April, 2009, an incident occurred at school in which K.M.R. received an anonymous note.
Ms. Reyna provided the note to Ms. Smitherman and identified L.B. as the student whom K.M.R
believed was responsible. Ms. Smitherman questioned L.B. and discussed the matter with her. L.B.
admitted writing the note, and agreed not to do it again. Ms. Smitherman hoped this discussion
would resolve the problem. Subsequently, in mid-April, Plaintiffs reported to an assistant principal,
Hallie Wright, that L.B. had tripped K.M.R. in the gym while students were running.5 K.M.R. fell
and bruised her knee. Ms. Wright investigated the incident by talking to students who were present
and reviewing a video recording of the gym to try to determine what had occurred. L.B. denied
K.M.R.’s accusation; the other students could not say what happened; and the video did not show
the incident. L.B. was not disciplined because Ms. Wright could not confirm K.M.R.’s report that
L.B. had intentionally tripped her. On April 21, 2009, K.M.R.’s teaching team met with Ms. Reyna
to discuss various concerns, including K.M.R.’s behavior, discipline, and grades, and the alleged
bullying. Ms. Reyna was advised that K.M.R must report any incidents to a teacher, Ms Wright, or
Ms. Smitherman.
At the end of April, 2009, Ms. Reyna reported to Ms. Smitherman that L.B. and H.A. were
writing on their arms and bodies, as well as the arms, hands or bodies of other students, letters that
signified a hate-club against K.M.R. Ms. Smitherman asked the students to wash off the markings,
and she placed phone calls to parents of some students, particularly L.B. (who had previously
5

Ms. Wright had prevoiusly assisted Plaintiffs with behavioral problems K.M.R. was experiencing
in late 2008. Ms. Wright had rewarded K.M.R. for improving her behavior by allowing her to be “principal
for a day” and be Ms. Wright’s assistant.
6

written the note). Despite several messages, Ms. Smitherman was unsuccessful in reaching L.B.’s
parents. On April 30, 2009, Ms. Reyna sent Ms. Wright an email message stating that she had
learned of another incident that occurred while K.M.R. was absent from school that week. Ms.
Reyna reported that the same two students (L.B. and H.A.) had written the hate-club letters on their
stomachs, that L.B. had been seen by a teacher showing the writing on her stomach to another other
student, and that the teacher had sent L.B. to the nurse to wash off the writing. Ms. Wright
responded to the message the same day and informed Ms. Reyna that the incident had been
addressed. Ms. Wright issued a detention, and she and Mrs. Smitherman counseled the students
involved, consistent with the school’s policy of progressive discipline. Ms. Reyna was not satisfied
with this resolution; she believed that students who had bullied K.M.R. should be suspended from
school activities such as cheerleading.
On April 30, 2009, Ms. Reyna also sent a letter to the school superintendent, Paul Hurst,
outlining her complaints about what K.M.R. had experienced during the school year. Mr. Hurst did
not personally respond to the letter. Ms. Reyna then sent a copy of the letter to an assistant
superintendent, Melani Mouse, who responded by calling Ms. Reyna and speaking with her by
telephone. Ms. Reyna and Ms. Mouse discussed K.M.R.’s options for the remainder of the school
year, such as enrolling in a night program. Ms. Mouse stated that she would help Ms. Reyna, but
then she did not follow through with arrangements for an alternative placement. Ms. Reyna did not
request assistance from the principal, Ms. DeSouza, with the bullying issue. Instead, Ms. Reyna
removed K.M.R. from school shortly after the hate-club incident.6

6

K.M.R. returned to school briefly following the incident on about May 1, 2009, but learned from
other students that one of the bullies sent out a mass text message that day when K.M.R. boarded the school
bus saying something to the effect, “K.M.R. is back in school. Watch out.” See Reyna Dep. [Doc.
No. 60-14], 157:16-22.
7

During this time, K.M.R. was depressed and, at one point, reported suicidal thoughts.7 She
considered taking an overdose of her anti-depressant medication; she also used a razor to cut her
arms, but not as a suicide attempt. A counselor diagnosed K.M.R. with acute stress disorder, panic
attacks, depressive disorder, and impulse-control disorder. Ms. Reyna quit a job in March, 2009,
due to K.M.R.’s health issues and other problems, although she did not know the severity of the
bullying issue at the time. Ms. Reyna rented a house in another school district in June, 2009, and
lived there the following school year.
Discussion
The legal theories on which Plaintiffs rely to establish a violation of K.M.R.’s constitutional
rights are based on doctrines discussed in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services,
489 U.S. 189 (1989), arising under the Due Process Clause. Specifically, an individual’s right ro
substantive due process may entitle the individual to governmental protection from third parties or
to governmental aid in limited circumstances. An affirmative duty to provide care and protection
has been recognized with respect to persons taken into state custody, such as incarcerated prisoners
and involuntarily committed mental patients. In this situation, the duty arises from “the State’s
affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf.” See id. at 200. A
duty may also arise where the state plays a part in creating a danger and rendering an individual
vulnerable to harm. See id. at 201. In this case, Plaintiffs seem to contend that both doctrines are
applicable and imposed on school employees an affirmative duty to assist K.M.R.8

7

According to Plaintiff’s counselor, K.M.R. first disclosed suicidal thoughts in September, 2009.
See Baumann Letter [Doc. No. 60-17] at 2.
8

Plaintiffs do not respond to the part of the Motion seeking summary judgment on behalf of school
officials who are alleged to be liable based on a failure to train or supervise subordinate employees.
However, a supervisor’s liability depends, at a minimum, on the existence of a constitutional violation by the
subordinate. See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010).
8

A.

Special Relationship
Plaintiffs contend K.M.R. was entitled to assistance with accessing her medications under

the “special relationship” doctrine. They argue that K.M.R. was prevented from accessing the
medications by school policies that prohibited self-administration by K.M.R. and required her to
obtain them from the school nurse. When K.M.R.’s teachers or the school nurse blocked her access
to the medications, Plaintiffs argue, they limited K.M.R.’s ability to care for herself to the extent that
they assumed a special relationship with K.M.R. and had an affirmative duty to assist her in
accessing the medications. The Court is not persuaded by this argument.
Although the special relationship doctrine is not limited to custodial prisoners and mental
patients, “[t]his doctrine applies ‘when the state assumes control over an individual sufficient to
trigger an affirmative duty to provide protection to that individual.’” J.W. v. Utah, 647 F.3d 1006,
1011 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly,
the doctrine has been extended to impose an affirmative duty to protect foster children taken into
state custody and placed in foster care. See id.; see also Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human
Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 892-93 (10th Cir. 1992).9 Plaintiffs fail to provide any legal authority,
however, for the proposition that middle school children attending public school enjoy a special
relationship with their teachers or other school employees. The Court is aware of no such authority.
Instead, federal appellate courts addressing the issue have found no special relationship between
school officials and students, even elementary school children, entrusted to their care. See, e.g.,
Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 733 (10th Cir. 1992) (“the state does not confine school children
in the same way that it confines prisoners, the institutionalized, or children in foster homes”); see
9

The court of appeals expressly noted in J.W. that this theory is limited to foster children who are
in state custody. See J.W., 647 F.3d at 1011 n.2.
9

also Lee v. Pine Bluff Sch. Dist., 472 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (8th Cir. 2007) (middle school student on
school trip); Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir.
1998) (special education student attending public school).
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a triable issue with
respect to any claim of § 1983 liability based on the “special relationship” doctrine.
B.

Danger Creation
Plaintiffs assert that K.M.R. was entitled to protection from bullies under the “state created

danger” doctrine. The court of appeals has explained the “danger creation” theory as follows:
In general, state actors may only be held liable under § 1983 for their own acts, not
the acts of third parties. The “danger creation” exception to this rule applies only
when a state actor affirmatively acts to create, or increases a plaintiff’s vulnerability
to, or danger from private violence. To state a prima facie case, the plaintiff must
show that (1) state actors created the danger or increased the plaintiff’s vulnerability
to the danger in some way, (2) the plaintiff was a member of a limited and
specifically definable group, (3) the defendants’ conduct put the plaintiff at
substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm, (4) the risk was obvious
or known, (5) the defendants acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk, and
(6) the conduct, when viewed in total, shocks the conscience.
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); accord Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir.
2008). In essence, “[t]he danger creation doctrine makes a state official liable for the private
violence of third parties if that official created the danger that caused the harm and the official’s
conduct was conscience shocking.” Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 2006); see
also Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 576 (10th Cir. 1995) (the theory requires conduct “so egregious,
outrageous and fraught with unreasonable risk as to shock the conscience”).
Upon consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient facts to
prevail under the “danger creation” theory. Plaintiffs do not expressly address this theory of

10

recovery in their brief or explain its applicability under the circumstances. However, the facts
shown by the summary judgment record do not support a prima facie case under Robbins and Rost.
The facts do not suggest school employees acted in a way that created a danger of bullying to
K.M.R. or increased her vulnerability to bullying, nor do the facts establish that any employee
consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to K.M.R. Further, Plaintiffs have failed
to present properly-supported facts to establish conduct by school employees that would satisfy the
conscience-shocking standard established by existing case law. At most, Plaintiffs have put forth
facts suggesting that some school employees may have been negligent in not more appropriately
addressing K.M.R.’s medical needs or her mother’s complaints of bullying. However, “negligent
government conduct is insufficient to prove liability under § 1983.” Rost, 511 F.3d at 1126.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material
facts with regard to any § 1983 claim based on the “danger creation” theory of liability.
C.

Deliberate Indifference to Known Threat
In response to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiffs contend that school officials from whom

Ms. Reyna requested assistance with bullying may be liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference
to K.M.R.’s emotional distress, citing Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d
1226 (10th Cir. 1999). In Sutton, the court of appeals held that the plaintiff in that case, the mother
of a severely disabled child who was sexually abused by another student, stated a § 1983 claim
against a school principal under a “danger creation” theory, based on the principal’s failure to adopt
a protective policy and his inadequate training of school employees “so as to enhance the danger of
sexual assault to [the victim].” See id. at 1238. The court relied on factual allegations that the
principal was personally informed by the mother that her child – who had severe cerebral palsy and
the mental age of a three to five-year-old child, was totally blind, and could not speak – had
11

communicated to her that he had been sexually molested several times in the school bathroom by
a much larger student. The court found that the plaintiff’s pleading contained sufficient factual
allegations from which a conclusion could be drawn that the principal acted with deliberate
indifference to the risk of repeated abuse and, in light of the child’s severe impairments, the
principal’s personal notification of the danger, and his failure to take any action to prevent further
molestation of the child, “a viable claim that would ‘shock the conscience of federal judges’ was
stated.” Id. at 1241.10 The court of appeals further found that the plaintiff’s allegations were
sufficient to establish the principal’s duty to protect the child “from the violence committed by
private actors under the ‘danger-creation’ doctrine.” Id.11
The Court is unpersuaded that this case presents analogous facts. To be sure, viewing the
record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as required by Rule 56, the facts portray a disturbing
situation in which a group of bullies tormented a physically and emotionally fragile adolescent and
subjected her repeatedly to ridicule and demeaning treatment. Ms. Reyna, quite understandably,
pressed school officials in an effort to protect her daughter from such a situation. Clearly, school
officials who were aware of some incidents described by K.M.R., or who were subsequently
informed by her mother, might have done more to assist her. However, as stated above, the Court

10

The court was assessing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleading under the now-abrogated
standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1239, 1241.
11

The Court notes that the court of appeals recently discussed Sutton in a slip opinion and there
suggested that, despite statements in Sutton regarding the principal’s liability resting on a danger-creation
theory, the real holding of Sutton was that the plaintiff’s pleading stated a viable claim under a supervisory
liability theory. See Gray v. University of Colo. Hosp. Auth., No. 10-1446, 2012 WL 604164, *7 n.7 (10th
Cir. Feb. 27, 2012) (to be published). Viewed in this way, Sutton also does not assist Plaintiffs because this
theory of liability would require an underlying constitutional violation by a subordinate state actor, which has
not been established in this case. See id.
12

finds insufficient facts from which to establish liability under the “danger creation” theory. Analysis
of Sutton and subsequent case law explaining its rationale does not alter this conclusion.
D.

Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When claimed by a defendant, a court
must undertake a two-part inquiry:
First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of
a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court
must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of
defendant’s alleged misconduct.
Id. at 232 (citations omitted); see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “To be clearly
established, the contours of a right must be ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). “[T]here need not be precise factual
correspondence between earlier cases and the case at hand, because ‘general statements of the law
are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning . . . .’” Id. at 913-14 (quoting Hope, 536
U.S. at 741). To show that a legal right is clearly established, a plaintiff may demonstrate the same
“by reference to cases from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, or the weight of authority from
other circuits.” Id. at 914; see Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
In this case, the school employees have timely raised the defense of qualified immunity, and
they seek summary judgment based on a lack of legal authority that would have required them to
provide medical care or protection for K.M.R. under the circumstances presented. In response,
13

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any clearly established federal law governing the school
employees’ conduct. Plaintiffs cite no federal case law from which reasonable officials in the school
employees’ situation would have understood that their conduct violated a constitutional right of
K.M.R. Plaintiffs rely exclusively on Sutton as providing clear notice to the individual defendants
of the unconstitutionality of their conduct. For the reasons previously stated, however, the Court
finds that Sutton does not support Plaintiffs’ position. Therefore, the school employees are also
entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient
showing on essential elements of their § 1983 claims against the individual school employees, and
have failed to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. Thus, these defendants are entitle to a
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Because the Court has disposed of all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).12
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Individual School Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 50] is GRANTED. Summary judgment is granted in favor of the
moving defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all remaining state law claims asserted against Defendants
Independent School District No. 1 of Oklahoma County, Sheila Alderson and Child Defendant #1,

12

“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to
exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.” Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted).
13

As previously noted, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the school district was dismissed by Order
of May 21, 2010. See supra note 1.
14

are remanded to the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. For clarity of the record, a
separate judgment and order of remand will be entered.
IT SO ORDERED this 27th day of March, 2012.

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