Smith v. Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 24 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 8/1/2011. (mb, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CYRUS M. SMITH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA,
et al.,
Defendants.
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) Case No. CIV-10-782-D
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ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint by
Defendants Maughan, Satterwhite, and Matthews [Doc. No. 24], filed pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1 The Motion is directed at the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Cyrus
Smith, David Blount, Melvin Ballard, Donnie Roper, Reginald Coulter, Steven Patillo, and
Danny Lee Chitwood, and the Complaint of Don Segura in this consolidated action.2 The
Motion is fully briefed and at issue.
1
The Court has previously ruled on a similar motion by Defendant Board of County Commissioners of
Oklahoma County, which will be discussed further below.
2
The First Amended Complaint reflects the consolidation of Mr. Smith’s action with the separately filed
actions of other plaintiffs who filed suit at the same time (Case Nos. CIV-10-783-D, CIV-10-784-D, CIV-10-785-D,
CIV-10-786, CIV-10-787, and CIV-10-788). Mr. Segura filed suit later, and his case was recently consolidated as
well. See Segura v. Board of County Comm’rs, Case No. CIV-10-1375-D, Order (W.D. Okla. May 10, 2011).
Defendants have advised the Court that the grounds for dismissal urged in this case should also be considered as
directed at Mr. Segura’s pleading, and that the separate motions for dismissal filed in his case may be disregarded.
The Court proceeds accordingly.
Plaintiffs are former employees of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, who are over
40 years of age and claim they were terminated in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”). Plaintiffs also assert claims against
three individuals involved in the terminations. Briefly stated, Plaintiffs allege they were
subjected to age discrimination by Commissioner Brian Maughan, who took office in
January, 2009, and “embarked on a campaign to discriminate against, harass, and defame the
older employees of Oklahoma County District 2 because of their age.” See First Am. Compl.
[Doc. No. 20], ¶ 18. Commissioner Maughan allegedly was assisted in this effort by his
chief deputy, Steve Satterwhite, and the director of human resources, Dan Matthews.
Plaintiffs allege Commissioner Maughan manufactured pretextual reasons to terminate older
workers by falsely accusing them of misusing county equipment and resources. These
accusations allegedly were published to the news media outside of public meetings, and
attributed criminal conduct to Plaintiffs in connection with their employment.
Plaintiffs assert some claims against all individual defendants: intentional infliction
of emotional distress; and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs assert two additional claims against
only Commissioner Maughan: defamation (allegedly based on conduct outside the scope of
his office or employment and, thus, not subject to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims
Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 151 et seq.); and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged
violation of each plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right of substantive due process. The
movants seek dismissal of all claims asserted against them.
2
Standard of Decision
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is proper “if, viewing the
well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, the complaint does not contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Macarthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th Cir.
2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Aschcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.
2008). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The question to be decided is “whether the complaint
sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to
relief under the legal theory proposed.” Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation omitted).
Discussion
A.
Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Denial of Substantive Due Process
Commissioner Maughan argues that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against him fails for the
same reasons asserted by the Board of Commissioners of Oklahoma County (the “County”)
in support of its motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. In essence, the County argued
that the alleged facts do not establish either that Plaintiffs’ terminations implicated a liberty
or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, or that a termination of public
employment for allegedly false and pretextual reasons constitutes a violation of substantive
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due process. For the reasons stated in the Court’s Order of June 21, 2011, granting this part
of the County’s motion and dismissing Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the County,
Commissioner Maughan is also entitled to the dismissal of this claim. See Order [Doc.
No. 40] at 5-7. Also, Commissioner Maughan asserts the defense of qualified immunity,
which protects him from personal liability under § 1983 unless he violated a constitutional
or statutory right that was clearly established at the time of his conduct under the specific
circumstances of the case. See Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 2010); Archuleta
v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs have failed to respond to
Commissioner Maughan’s qualified immunity defense with argument showing their asserted
right of substantive due process was “‘clearly established by reference to cases from the
Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, or the weight of authority from other circuits’” at the time
of their terminations. See Mink, 613 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Archuleta, 523 F.3d at 1283).
Therefore, Commissioner Maughan is entitled to the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.
B.
Defamation
Regarding the state-law tort of defamation, Commissioner Maughan similarly adopts
the County’s arguments for dismissal of this claim. For the reasons stated in the June 21
Order, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ pleadings state a plausible claim of defamation. See
Order [Doc. No. 40] at 7-9. Therefore, Commissioner Maughan is not entitled to dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ defamation claim.
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C.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Oklahoma
law, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) the
defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) the defendant’s conduct caused the
plaintiff emotional distress, and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.” See
Computer Publications, Inc. v. Welton, 49 P.3d 732, 735 (Okla. 2002). To satisfy the second
element, the defendant’s conduct must be so extreme and outrageous as to be “beyond all
possible bounds of decency” in the setting in which it occurred, or “utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.” See Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla. 1986); see also Welton,
49 P.3d at 735. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to
suggest extreme and outrageous conduct.
Accepting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, the pleadings relate the following
conduct by Commissioner Maughan, Mr. Satterwhite, and Mr. Matthews (collectively,
“Defendants”). Defendants allegedly requested a criminal investigation of Plaintiffs by the
Oklahoma County Sheriff based on a purported report from an “anonymous citizen” that
county trucks were dumping dirt on private property in Lincoln County. See First Am.
Compl. [Doc. No. 20], ¶ 26. Defendants caused Plaintiffs to be interrogated for baseless
criminal accusations and, although no charges were filed, placed Plaintiffs on administrative
leave from their jobs. Subsequently, on October 1, 2009, Defendants called each plaintiff
into an office at the Oklahoma County Courthouse and during the meeting with each plaintiff
“intimidated, harassed, and subjected Plaintiffs to severe emotional distress by threatening
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them with further criminal interrogation and, significantly, with criminal prosecution” that
had no factual basis but was solely intended to harass Plaintiffs based on their age. See id.,
¶ 29.3 At least two plaintiffs were told to either retire or be fired. See id. ¶¶ 33, 35. During
the meetings, each plaintiff was discharged for the pretextual reason that he had misused
county resources or equipment. Commissioner Maughan made multiple comments to the
news media about the reasons for Plaintiffs’ suspensions and terminations and, in so doing,
published false information that attributed criminal activity to Plaintiffs and identified them
by name. Commissioner Maughan expressly stated that criminal charges were warranted
against Plaintiffs, even though none of them had engaged in any wrongdoing or criminal
conduct, and he allegedly did so “to cover his own unlawful actions in discharging Plaintiffs
because of their age.” See id. ¶ 49. Further, Defendants allegedly acted together to
accomplish the age discrimination and defamation perpetrated by Commissioner Maughan.
Upon consideration of these alleged facts, the Court finds them sufficient, if proven
and viewed most favorably to Plaintiffs, to permit a finding of extreme and outrageous
conduct by Defendants. With respect to this element of Plaintiffs’ claim, a trial court
performs a gatekeeper role. “‘Where, under the facts before the court, reasonable persons
may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether the
conduct in any given case has been significantly extreme and outrageous to result in
liability.’” Welton, 49 P.3d at 735 (quoting Breeden v. League Serv. Corp., 575 P.2d 1374,
1377-78 (Okla. 1978)). To terminate county employees after decades of service based on
3
The one exception is Plaintiff Segura, who apparently quit after being placed on administrative leave and
allegedly was constructively discharged. See Case No. CIV-10-1375-D, Complaint, ¶¶ 20-21.
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unfounded charges of criminal conduct in order to accomplish a new commissioner’s goal
to rid the county of older workers; to cause these employees to endure criminal interrogations
and fear unfounded criminal prosecutions; and to release false accusations to the public that
effectively “branded [the employees] as criminals on multiple occasions in various news
sources” (see Pls.’ Resp. Br. [Doc. No. 31] at 17-18) might reasonably be regarded as beyond
the bounds of decency and intolerable in a civilized society. Therefore, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
D.
Civil Conspiracy
Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ are attempting to bring a “nebulous civil conspiracy
claim” that appears to be asserted under federal and state law but is insufficient under either
one. Because Plaintiffs did not cite any federal statute or authority in their pleadings,
Defendants assume the claim is asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and argue Plaintiffs have
not alleged sufficient facts to support such a claim.4 Defendants do not specifically address
Oklahoma law regarding the tort of civil conspiracy but argue generally that Plaintiffs’
allegations are vague and conclusory.
1.
Federal Claim - Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights
Plaintiffs respond by identifying the legal authority for their federal civil rights
conspiracy claim as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and by articulating their legal theory is that Defendants
4
Defendants also argue that any federal conspiracy claim should be precluded by the “intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine,” but they concede that the Tenth Circuit has rejected this doctrine as a defense to a civil rights
conspiracy claim. See Defs.’ Mot. Dism. [Doc. No. 24] at 14-15.
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conspired to violate their constitutional right of substantive due process. See Pls.’ Resp. Br.
[Doc. No. 31] at 19, 20-21. Plaintiffs concede that such a claim requires proof that a
conspiracy existed and that an actual deprivation of constitutional rights occurred. See id.;
see also Thompson v. City of Lawrence, 58 F.3d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1995); Dixon v. City
of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990). Based on the Court’s finding that
Plaintiffs have failed to allege a violation of substantive due process, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim
based on a conspiracy to violate this right necessarily fails. Therefore, Defendants are
entitled to the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal conspiracy claim.
2.
State Law Claim - Conspiracy to Commit Common Law Torts
Under Oklahoma law, two or more persons who combine to do an unlawful act may
be held liable for the injuries caused by the unlawful act. See Brock v. Thompson, 948 P.2d
279, 294 (Okla. 1997). “In essence, a civil conspiracy claim enlarges the pool of potential
defendants from whom a plaintiff may recover for an underlying tort.” Id. at 294 n.66.5
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants, acting outside the scope of their employment,
conspired to commit the torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress
alleged in their pleadings.6 While this claim may add little to Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional
5
See also Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Okla. City, 188 P.3d 158, 175 (Okla. 2008) (“As a general rule, an
actionable conspiracy must consist of wrongs that could have been actionable against the individual conspirators.”)
(internal quotation omitted).
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The scope-of-employment allegation is both necessary to a suit against individual employees of a
governmental entity, despite their immunity under the Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151172, and necessary to a conspiracy claim because “a governmental entity cannot conspire with itself.” Tanique, Inc.
v. State ex rel. Okla. Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, 99 P.3d 1209, 1218 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (internal
quotation omitted). Plaintiffs also seem to argue that Defendants conspired to discharge them for unlawful reasons,
but because a termination of employment must be accomplished by an employer (or a managerial employee acting
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infliction of emotional distress, which is brought against all individual defendants, proof that
Defendants conspired to accomplish the defamation allegedly perpetrated by Commissioner
Maughan might permit Plaintiffs’ to recover from all individual defendants for the damages
allegedly caused by the defamation. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ pleadings are
sufficient to state a civil conspiracy claim under Oklahoma law.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ pleadings fail to state a § 1983 claim
against Commissioner Maughan for denial of substantive due process and fail to state a
§ 1983 civil rights conspiracy claim. However, Plaintiffs’ pleadings are sufficient to state
a defamation claim against Commissioner Maughan and claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and civil conspiracy against all individual defendants. Because Plaintiffs
have requested leave to amend their pleadings only if a factual deficiency is found, no
opportunity for amendment will be granted at this time.7
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint by Defendants Maughan, Satterwhite, and Matthews [Doc. No. 24] is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part, as set forth herein. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 substantive due process
within the scope of employment), it is unclear how Plaintiffs could assert such a conspiracy claim.
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The case will be set for a scheduling conference, and the Court anticipates entering a scheduling order
that will establish a deadline for any other amendments that Plaintiffs may wish to request.
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claim against Defendant Maughan and their § 1983 conspiracy claim against Defendants
Maughan, Satterwhite, and Matthews are dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of August, 2011.
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