Harper v. Woodward County District Court et al

Filing 32

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge...plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED...the claims against the State of Oklahoma acting through the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System are dismissed with prejudice; plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint within 30 days... 18 , 20 , 28 & 30 are STRICKEN as moot and/or premature. Signed by Honorable Joe Heaton on 05/17/2011. (lam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DALE E. HARPER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WOODWARD COUNTY DISTRICT
COURT, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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NO. CIV-10-0849-HE

ORDER
Plaintiff Dale Harper, a pro se state prisoner appearing in forma pauperis, filed this
suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights.1 His
claims reflect various objections to the proceedings against him in the District Court of
Woodward County, alleging matters with respect to the presiding judge or judges, his
appointed defense counsel,2 and the medical treatment he has received. He also raised issues
as to the substantive merit of the charges then pending against him.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge
Valerie K. Couch, who recommended that plaintiff’s § 1983 action be dismissed, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii), for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Judge Couch further recommended that plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time
for the clerk to serve the defendants and plaintiff’s petition for a continuance also be denied.

1

Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21

(1972).
2

Plaintiff apparently objects to, among other things, his counsel’s efforts to secure a
competency evaluation for him.

The report and recommendation also noted, as an alternate ground, that dismissal was
warranted on the basis of Younger abstention to the extent the relief sought by plaintiff
would interfere with ongoing state proceedings.3
Plaintiff has filed an objection to the report and recommendation, continuing to object
to the alleged bias of the state district judge and otherwise reiterating essentially the same
matters as were described in Judge Couch’s report and recommendation. He has also
attached various police reports, photos, and his preliminary hearing transcript. His response,
together with various other motions he has filed, also requests leave to amend his pleadings
in response to the legal issues identified in the report.
For substantially the same reasons as were set out in the report and recommendation,
the court ADOPTS the report and recommendation. See Coopersmith v. Supreme Court,
State of Colo., 465 F.2d 993, 994 (10th Cir. 1972) (state district courts are not “persons” for
purposes of a § 1983 claim); Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 908 (10th Cir. 1995) (OIDS
is a state agency that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on damages claims);4
Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 Fed. Appx. 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of §
1983 claims against police departments and county sheriff’s departments, entities with no
apparent legal existence). Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. #1] is DISMISSED. The claims
against the State of Oklahoma, acting through the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, are

3

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).

4

Harris has been superseded by statute as to certain issues not apparently involved here.
See Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011).
2

dismissed with prejudice. While the court has considerable doubt whether plaintiff may
ultimately be able to state a plausible claim against either Woodward County, its deputies in
their individual capacities, or against his lawyers individually, that cannot be determined with
complete certainty as this point. Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint [Doc. #16] is
GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint, remedying the various
defects identified in the report, if he can do so, within thirty (30) days from entry of this
order. Plaintiff’s other motions [Doc. Nos. 18, 20, 28 & 30] are STRICKEN as moot and/or
premature.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 17th day of May, 2011.

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