Moore v. Oklahoma City, City of et al

Filing 57

ORDER denying 22 the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 1/13/2012. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
WESLEY T. MOORE,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY and
DANIEL GODSIL,
Defendants.

Case No. CIV-11-86-M

ORDER
This case is scheduled for trial on the Court’s February 2012 trial docket.
Before the Court is defendant City of Oklahoma City’s (“City”) Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed December 1, 2011. On January 5, 2012, plaintiff filed his response, and on January
9, 2012, the City filed its reply. Based upon the parties’ submissions, the Court makes its
determination.
I.

Introduction
On July 24, 2009, plaintiff Wesley T. Moore was arrested by defendant Officer Daniel

Godsil.1 As a result of his arrest, plaintiff was handcuffed by an officer. Plaintiff complained to the
officer “in car 3”2 that the handcuffs were too tight. An Officer Burton applied a second pair of
handcuffs to allow plaintiff additional room between his wrists but did not touch the left cuff.
Plaintiff does not know if his wrist was injured because of the initial handcuffing or the refusal to
adjust it.

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The facts of the arrest are in dispute.

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In his deposition, plaintiff identifies Officer Godsil as the officer “in car 3.”

On December 29, 2010, plaintiff filed the instant action, asserting a negligence cause of
action against the City based upon the injuries he received as a result of the too tight handcuffing
and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action against defendant Godsil based upon his alleged false arrest,
false imprisonment, and violation of plaintiff’s civil rights. The City now moves for summary
judgment, asserting that it cannot be liable for an intentional act of its employee pursuant to the
Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151, et seq. (“GTCA”).
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving
party is entitled to summary judgment where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. When applying this standard, [the Court] examines
the record and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (10th Cir.
1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Furthermore, the non-movant has a burden
of doing more than simply showing there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.
Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Neustrom v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 156 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

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III.

Discussion
Liability of a political subdivision on state law tort claims is governed by the terms of the

GTCA. Section 153 of the GTCA provides:
A.
The state or a political subdivision shall be liable for loss
resulting from its torts or the torts of its employees acting within the
scope of their employment subject to the limitations and exceptions
specified in this act and only where the state or political subdivision,
if a private person or entity, would be liable for money damages
under the laws of this state. The state or a political subdivision shall
not be liable under the provisions of this act for any act or omission
of an employee acting outside the scope of his employment.
B.
The liability of the state or political subdivision under this act
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the state, a
political subdivision or employee at common law or otherwise.
Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 153. The GTCA defines scope of employment as follows:
“Scope of employment” means performance by an employee acting
in good faith within the duties of the employee’s office or
employment or of tasks lawfully assigned by a competent authority
including the operation or use of an agency vehicle or equipment
with actual or implied consent of the supervisor of the employee, but
shall not include corruption or fraud; . . . .
Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152(12). Further, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held:
[t]he question of whether an employee has acted within the scope of
employment at any given time is normally a question for the jury,
except in cases where only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn
from the facts.
Nail v. City of Henryetta, 911 P.2d 914, 918 (Okla. 1996).
The City alleges that according to plaintiff’s testimony, Officer Godsil acted knowingly,
intentionally and maliciously in arresting him and then, after notice of the harm in not loosening the
handcuff on his left wrist, intentionally refused to loosen the cuff. Based upon this testimony, the
City contends that the officer’s actions could not be taken in good faith nor could they be negligently
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done and, accordingly, the officer was not acting in the scope of his employment and the City cannot
be held liable. In his response, plaintiff states that Officer Godsil denies that he intentionally injured
plaintiff.

Based upon this denial, plaintiff asserts that whether Officer Godsil was acting

intentionally or negligently is a question of fact for the jury.
Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to plaintiff and viewing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Godsil was acting within the scope
of his employment. Specifically, the Court finds that based upon the evidence presented a jury could
reasonably find that Officer Godsil was negligent in failing to lock the cuffs causing plaintiff’s
injury and/or was negligent in failing to loosen the cuffs or a jury could reasonably find that Officer
Godsil intentionally locked the cuffs causing plaintiff’s injury and/or intentionally failed to loosen
the cuffs. Further, the Court finds that based upon the evidence presented a jury could reasonably
find that Officer Burton negligently failed to loosen the left hand cuff when he loosened the right
hand cuff. Accordingly, the Court finds that the City is not entitled to summary judgment.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[docket no. 22].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 13th day of January, 2012.

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