Howell v. Astrue
ORDER granting 28 plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) with Supporting Memorandum (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 1/17/2017. (ks)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Case No. CIV-11-327-M
Before the Court is plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) with
Supporting Memorandum, filed November 28, 2016. Defendant filed no response.
On March 10, 2012, this Court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff, reversing the
Administrative Law Judge’s decision and remanding this case for further proceedings. Plaintiff
filed an application for an award of attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”), and on July 2, 2016, the Court awarded attorney fees pursuant to the EAJA in the
amount of $6226.80. On remand, the Social Security Administration issued a decision awarding
past due benefits in the total amount of $113,138.80. Plaintiff’s attorney now moves the Court,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), to approve an award of attorney fees in the amount of
Section 406(b) provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under
this subchapter who was represented before the court by an
attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment
a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25
percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is
entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of
Social Security may, notwithstanding the provisions of section
405(i) of this title, but subject to subsection (d) of this section,
certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of,
and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. In
case of any such judgment, no other fee may be payable or
certified for payment for such representation except as provided in
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
The United States Supreme Court has concluded:
§ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the
primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing
Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls
for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to
assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.
Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are
unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25
percent of the past-due benefits. Within the 25 percent boundary .
. . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee
sought is reasonable for the services rendered.
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (internal citation omitted). Further,
[i]f the attorney is responsible for delay, for example, a reduction
is in order so that the attorney will not profit from the
accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in court.
If the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time
counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is similarly in
Id. at 808 (internal citations omitted).
Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s attorney’s motion, the Court finds that plaintiff’s
attorney’s motion for attorney fees was filed within a reasonable time of when he received notice
of entitlement to receive fees under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court
further finds that an award of $22,284.70, which is twenty-five percent of plaintiff’s past due
benefits award, is reasonable due to the amount of time plaintiff’s attorney spent working on this
case. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. §
406(b) with Supporting Memorandum [docket no. 28] and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b),
AWARDS plaintiff’s attorney an attorney fee in the amount of $22,284.70, to be paid out of the
past due benefits plaintiff received by reason of the judgment in this case. The Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration shall pay said fees directly to plaintiff’s
attorney Gayle Troutman, of Troutman & Troutman, P.C. Further, pursuant to Weakley v.
Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 580 (10th Cir. 1986), plaintiff’s attorney will refund to plaintiff the
$6226.80 in EAJA fees previously awarded.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of January, 2017.
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