Azubuko v. Massachusetts Supreme Judical Court et al

Filing 11

ORDER denying 10 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 5/10/2012. (mb, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CHUKWUMA E. AZUBUKO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT and DORCHESTER’S DISTRICT
COURT,
Defendants.

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NO. CIV-11-503-D

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s April, 2, 2012 Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 10],
seeking reconsideration of this Court’s June 23, 2011 Order [Doc. No. 7] dismissing this action
without prejudice. Plaintiff seeks reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or, in the
alternative, relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) and (6).
Plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this
action to assert violations of his constitutional rights by two Massachusetts courts. As explained in
detail in the June 23, 2011 Order, the Complaint was deficient because it failed to allege facts to
show that venue is proper in this forum; furthermore, the Complaint showed on its face that venue
is improper here. In any event, as explained in the June 23 Order, the allegations in the Complaint
dictated dismissal upon filing because the facts alleged fail to state a plausible claim for relief
pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983. See June 23, 2011 Order [Doc. No. 7] at page 3.

The Court

determined dismissal without prejudice was proper in lieu of transferring the case to the District of

Massachusetts because that court had previously enjoined Plaintiff from pursuing these claims in
that forum. Id. (citing Azubuko v. Vargas, 2010 WL 4183699, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2010)
(unpublished opinion)). Accordingly, this action was dismissed and the case was closed. Plaintiff
now asks the Court to reconsider the dismissal or grant him relief from the Order.
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a ‘motion to reconsider.’” Van
Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorizes the alteration or amendment of a judgment or final order, and the proper
grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) are extremely limited:
Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) new evidence previously unavailable; and (3) the need to correct
clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Thus, a motion for reconsideration is
appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the
controlling law. It is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance
arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.
Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F. 3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
Assuming, arguendo, that the Order dismissing this action without prejudice constitutes a
final order, relief cannot be granted because Plaintiff offers no argument or authority which would
warrant reconsideration of the June 23, 2011 Order on any of the bases specified in Rule 59(e). He
cites no intervening change in the law, and identifies no new evidence. Nor does he offer authority
suggesting that there is a need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. He does not
address the Court’s conclusion in the June 23, 2011 Order that venue is improper here, and he does
not offer argument supporting his apparent contention that he can bring a § 1983 action in Oklahoma
against two Massachusetts courts. Nor does he offer authority suggesting that state courts can
constitute “persons” subject to potential § 1983 liability.
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To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief

pursuant to Rule 59(e), his motion is denied.
The same result is mandated if Plaintiff’s motion is construed as seeking relief from an
interlocutory order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), which permits the Court’s alteration of an
interlocutory ruling prior to final judgment. When considering a Rule 54(b) motion seeking
reconsideration of an interlocutory order, courts apply the legal standards applicable to a Rule 59(e)
motion to alter or amend a judgment. Tomlinson v. Combined Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 684 F.
Supp. 2d 1296, 1299 (N. D. Okla. 2010); Sump v. Fingerhut, Inc., 208 F. R. D. 324, 326-27 (D.
Kan. 2002) (citing Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F. Supp. 1116, 1117 (D. Kan. 1990)) (“courts
routinely turn to the standards established under Rule 59(e) for instruction in constructing a review
standard when considering a possible revision of an interlocutory order.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff
cannot obtain relief on this basis.
Plaintiff’s request for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is similarly deficient. Pursuant
to Rule 60(b), the Court may relieve a party from a final judgment only for specified reasons set
forth in the rule as:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). The Rule further expressly provides that a motion seeking relief
thereunder “shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than
one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In

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this case, Plaintiff’s motion specifically cites Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) as bases for relief.
Rule 60(b) relief “is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.”
Zurich North America v. Matrix Service, Inc. 426 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2005). “Parties seeking
relief under Rule 60(b) have a higher hurdle to overcome because such a motion is not a substitute
for an appeal.” Cummings v. General Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955 (10th Cir. 2004). According
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, review of the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion “is meaningfully
narrower than review of the merits of a direct appeal.” Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 694, 697
(10th Cir.2000) (internal quotation omitted). “Given the lower court's discretion, the district court's
ruling is only reviewed to determine if a definite, clear or unmistakable error occurred below.”
Cummings, 365 F.3d at 955 (internal quotation omitted).
“Rule 60(b)(6) relief is even more difficult to attain and is appropriate only ‘when it offends
justice to deny such relief.’ ” Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir.1999)( quoting
Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 580 (10th Cir.1996)). “The denial of a 60(b)(6) motion
will be reversed ‘only if we find a complete absence of a reasonable basis and are certain that the
... decision is wrong.’” Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1232 (quoting State Bank of S. Utah v. Gledhill, 76 F.3d
1070, 1080 (10th Cir.1996)).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to offer argument or authority in support of his request for
relief under Rule 60(b)(4), as there is no contention that the June 23, 2011 Order is void. With
respect to his request pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), he offers no persuasive argument to warrant a
conclusion that the Court’s decision, or any part of that decision, was incorrect. Instead, he offers
general arguments regarding issues which did not form the basis for the Court’s prior determination
that venue is improper or that a § 1983 claim is proper on the facts alleged in the Complaint. The
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Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a basis for Rule 60(b) relief. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No. 10] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of May, 2012.

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