Climarex Energy v Calhoon

Filing 11

ORDER denying 9 Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Remand to State Court. The parties shall show cause why this case should not be consolidated with CIV-11-725-D within 14 days from the date of this Order. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 8/1/2011. (mb, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CLIMAREX ENERGY CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOTT W. CALHOON, M.D.,
Defendant.

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Case No. CIV-11-525-D

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Remand to the District Court of
Canadian County, Oklahoma [Doc. No. 9], which challenges the existence of diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Although the Motion requests a remand to state court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c), this case is an original action filed by Plaintiff Climarex Energy Co. under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Thus, the Court considers the Motion as one for
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 19(b).1 Defendant’s main contention is that QEP Energy
Company (“QEP”) is an indispensable party, but its joinder would destroy diversity of citizenship
because it is a corporation with a principal place of business in Oklahoma, the same state in which
Defendant resides and is a citizen. Defendant also challenges whether the jurisdictional amount is
satisfied; he argues that “Plaintiff does not allege that [Defendant] has taken any action giving rise
to an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.” See Def.’s Motion [Doc. No. 9] at 13-14.

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Defendant may have confused this case with one he filed in the District Court of Canadian County,
Oklahoma, which was subsequently removed to federal court. See Calhoon v. Cimarex Energy Corp., Case
No. CIV-11-725-D (W.D. Okla.).

Plaintiff has responded in opposition to the Motion with evidentiary materials showing that
QEP is a Texas corporation and that its principal place of business is in the State of Colorado.
Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that QEP’s joinder would not destroy diversity, even if QEP should
be joined as an additional plaintiff with an interest in the oil and gas lease that is the subject of this
action. Further, Plaintiff contends the Complaint adequately alleges the requisite amount in
controversy. Plaintiff notes that in a declaratory judgment action the amount “is measured by the
value of the object of the litigation.” See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 347 (1977). Plaintiff points to factual allegations of the Complaint stating that the value
of hydrocarbons to be produced under the lease, as well as Plaintiff’s financial investment in drilling
activity on the leased property, each exceed $75,000.
Defendant has not filed a reply brief within the time period authorized by LCvR7.1(i).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations and documentary evidence regarding the jurisdictional issues stand
unchallenged for purposes of ruling on Defendant’s Motion. Accepting Plaintiff’s evidence as true,
the Court finds the existence of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).2
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 9] is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall show cause why this case should not be
consolidated with Case No. CIV-11-725-D, supra note 1, which also seeks a declaratory judgment

2

Where, as here, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the factual basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the
court’s decision is not constrained by the pleadings, and the court “has wide discretion to allow documentary and
even testimonial evidence.” Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers Int'l Union v. Continental
Carbon Co., 428 F. 3d 1285, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2005). In this case, Plaintiff has met its burden to provide
evidentiary support for its jurisdictional allegations, and because this evidence is unrefuted, no factual issue is
presented for decision in connection with Defendant’s Motion.

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regarding the validity of the same lease and raises the same ground of alleged invalidity. The parties
shall respond in writing within 14 days from the date of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of August, 2011.

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