Climarex Energy v Calhoon

Filing 95

ORDER granting 91 Motion to Dismiss and Realign the Parties. The Clerk shall Administratively close CIV-11-525-D and reopen CIV-11-725-D. Parties shall file a Final Pretrial Report and any previous trial submissions in CIV-11-725-D within 21 days. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 4/21/2014. (mb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CIMAREX ENERGY CO.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT W. CALHOON, M.D.,
Defendant-Counterclaimant,
v.
QEP ENERGY COMPANY,
Additional Counterclaim Defendant.

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Case No. CIV-11-525-D
(Consolidated with
Case No. CIV-11-725-D)

ORDER
Before the Court is the Opposed Motion of Cimarex Energy Co. and QEP Energy
Company to Dismiss Their Claims and to Realign the Parties For Trial [Doc. No. 91], filed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Defendant Scott W. Calhoon opposes the Motion.
Plaintiff Cimarex Energy Co. (“Cimarex”) and Counterclaim Defendant QEP Energy
Company (“QEP”), by their respective pleadings, seek a declaratory judgment that the oil and
gas lease in dispute remains in effect. Defendant Calhoon seeks a declaratory judgment that
the lease terminated for lack of production in paying quantities.1 The current alignment of
the parties is a result of consolidation of two competing cases filed separately: an original
action by Cimarex against Calhoon filed May 12, 2011 (Case No. CIV-11-525-D); and a

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An additional claim for breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing, and seeking punitive damages, has
been dismissed. See Order of April 19, 2012 [Doc. No. 22].

state court action by Calhoon against Cimarex and QEP filed June 6, 2011, and removed
June 27, 2011 (Case No. CIV-11-725-D).
By the Motion, Cimarex and QEP request permission to voluntarily dismiss their
declaratory judgment claims because a determination of Calhoon’s claim will fully resolve
the controversy between the parties and a dismissal of their claims would permit them to be
realigned as defendants on Calhoon’s claim. The movants contend this procedural change
will permit an orderly presentation of evidence at trial, streamline the issues, and cause the
party with the burden of proof (Calhoon) to proceed first. Calhoon objects only to the
dismissal of claims but not to a realignment of QEP. Calhoon “agrees that the parties should
be aligned according to their positions,” but he proposes that Cimarex and QEP proceed as
plaintiffs while he remains the defendant. See Resp. Br. [Doc. No. 93], ¶ 5. This proposal
is not based on any argument regarding the burden of proof or any prejudice that will result
from a dismissal of claims. Calhoon instead argues that Cimarex has proceeded as plaintiff
for more than two years and this status should be preserved to avoid confusion of the record.
Notwithstanding the procedural reasons underlying the request to dismiss Cimarex’s
and QEP’s claims, the Motion correctly states it is governed by Rule 41(a)(2). Under this
rule, “the district court normally should grant [a voluntary] dismissal” absent “legal
prejudice” to the opposing party. See Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir.
1997); see also Brown v. Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 2005). In this context,
“prejudice is a function of . . . practical factors including: ‘the opposing party’s effort and
expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the
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movant; insufficient explanation of the need for a dismissal; and the present stage of
litigation.’ These factors are neither exhaustive nor conclusive; the court should be sensitive
to other considerations unique to the circumstances of each case.” Brown, 413 F.3d at 1124
(quoting Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537).
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds no legal prejudice to Calhoon
if Cimarex and QEP are permitted to dismiss their claims. Because the case will proceed to
trial on Calhoon’s competing claim for a declaratory judgment, his effort and expense in
preparing for trial will not be wasted. Because no trial date has been set, Calhoon will have
ample opportunity to make appropriate adjustments to his trial presentation. Thus, although
the Court is not unsympathetic to Calhoon’s complaint about Cimarex’s and QEP’s eleventhhour decision to voluntarily dismiss their claims, the Court finds the delay is insufficient by
itself to justify requiring them to proceed as plaintiffs. The Court is not aware of any
additional confusion of the case record that will result from permitting dismissal; some
confusion is inherent in the consolidation of two cases.
Further, because the requested dismissal will cause the parties to resume the positions
they originally held in Case No. CIV-11-725-D, the Court finds that the record will be
clarified if Case No. CIV-11-525-D is closed, Case No. CIV-11-725-D is reopened, and the
parties refile their trial pleadings in that case. Also, because the Final Pretrial Report will
need to be revised to permit orderly trial presentations, the Court will require Cimarex and
QEP to prepare a new proposed Final Pretrial Report – subject to review and revision by

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Calhoon in order to assure accuracy and permit any adjustments he elects to make in light
of the procedural change – for filing in Case No. CIV-11-725-D.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion of Cimarex and QEP to Dismiss
Their Claims and Realign the Parties [Doc. No. 76] is GRANTED. Cimarex’s Complaint
[Doc. No. 1] and QEP’s Counterclaim [Doc. No. 19] are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively close Case No.
CIV-11-525-D and reopen Case No. CIV-11-725-D. The parties shall file a Final Pretrial
Report in Case No. CIV-11-725-D within 21 days from the date of this Order. By that same
date, the parties shall refile in Case No. CIV-11-725-D any previous trial submissions on
which they intend to rely at trial, which may be modified to reflect the proper party
designations and the case caption.

Appropriate filings may include designations of

deposition testimony to be used at trial and objections thereto, trial briefs, and proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.2 By this Order, the Court does not intend to
authorize the filing of any new trial submissions.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of April, 2014.

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The Court has already ruled on all timely-filed motions in limine. Only one motion was granted, and the
Court’s ruling is reflected in the approved Final Pretrial Report.

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