Wright v. Stanley et al

Filing 270

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 209 Defendant Gary Stanley's, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Second Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part and moot in part 210 Defendant Board of County Commissioners of the County of Woodward's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Robin J. Cauthron on 6/8/15. (lg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MANDI WRIGHT, Individually and as
Administrator of the Estate of CORY
WRIGHT, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GARY STANLEY, individually and
in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Woodward County; JENNIFER
COLLISON, in her individual capacity;
JEREMY CANNON, in his individual
capacity; BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY
OF WOODWARD;
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-11-1235-C

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants Gary Stanley
and the Woodward County Board of County Commissioners (“the Board”) (Dkt. Nos. 209
& 210). Each Motion has a Response (Dkt. Nos. 223 & 224) and a Reply (Dkt. Nos. 230 &
231). The Motions are now at issue.
I. BACKGROUND
On the night of August 16, 2011, Plaintiff’s husband, Cory Wright, was arrested on
complaint of driving under the influence of alcohol. Police also arrested Wright’s passengers
David Anglin and Jeff Tindel for public intoxication. All three were booked into the
Woodward County Jail (“WCJ”). The jail was over capacity at that time, and it is undisputed
that overcrowded conditions were a recurring problem at the WCJ prior to Wright’s arrest.

A new jail facility was being constructed but did not open until November 2011, about three
months after Wright’s arrest. Defendant Gary Stanley is the Sheriff of Woodward County
and manages the WCJ. Sheriff Stanley was not present at the WCJ the night of Wright’s
arrest. Jennifer Collison and Jeremy Cannon were the jailers on duty that night. Although
jail policy requires intoxicated persons to be separated from the general population, Collison
assigned Wright to Cell 6. Cannon and Collison both testified that they believed Wright and
Tindel would fight each other if placed in the drunk tank together. Cell 6 had an inmate
capacity of 4 and already contained 5 inmates. Michael Riggs, an inmate being held in Cell
6, told Cannon that placing Wright in Cell 6 would not work because the cell was already
full.1 Plaintiff alleges the inmates in Cell 6 threatened, in the presence of the jailer, to harm
Wright. Shortly after Wright was placed in Cell 6, some of the inmates assaulted him.
Wright suffered injuries to his face and was treated at Woodward Regional Hospital
emergency room. Wright was released from the jail and the hospital on the day after his
arrest. Wright filed this lawsuit in October 2011 but passed away in November 2011 from
an overdose of prescription pills. Plaintiff is now Mandi Wright, “as Administrator of the
Estate of Cory Wright.” Plaintiff alleges the Board and Sheriff Stanley are liable pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the injuries Wright sustained at the WCJ. Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that Sheriff Stanley and the Board “maintained an official practice of housing
arrestees in overcrowded cells with actual knowledge that such a practice created a

1

A genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Defendant Collison was present
when Wright was placed in Cell 6. (See Order, Dkt. No. 249, at 7.)
2

substantial risk of serious harm to arrestees” and thus acted with deliberate indifference in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Sixth Am. Cmpl., Dkt.
No. 187, at 8.) Plaintiff also alleges that Sheriff Stanley failed to adequately train the jail
staff to respond to overcrowded conditions.
Both Defendants argue the Court must grant summary judgment in their favor for
several reasons. The Board argues that it is not, as a matter of law, a proper party to this
lawsuit.2 Both Defendants argue they cannot be held liable for “deliberate indifference”
because neither had requisite knowledge of any risk of harm to Wright and because
reasonable steps were taken to alleviate the overcrowded conditions. Sheriff Stanley also
asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity.3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly granted if the movant shows that no genuine dispute
as to any material fact exists and that the movant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it affects the disposition of the substantive claim.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 247, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary
judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and of identifying

2

The Board also argues for summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s claim of “excessive
force.” The Court need not address this argument because that claim has been dismissed. (See
Order, Dkt. No. 248.)
3

Both Defendants note that Plaintiff, individually, lacks standing to prosecute the asserted
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The Court clarified this issue in a previous order, holding that “the only
appropriate party is Wright’s estate, and Plaintiff, individually, has no claim for damages on behalf
of herself or her children.” (Order, Dkt. No. 249, at 13.)
3

those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations
omitted). If the movant satisfactorily demonstrates an absence of genuine issue of material
fact with respect to a dispositive issue for which the non-moving party will bear the burden
of proof at trial, the non-movant must then “go beyond the pleadings and . . . designate
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. These specific
facts may be shown “by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except
the mere pleadings themselves.”

Id.

Such evidentiary materials include affidavits,

deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits. Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968
F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a
court must “‘view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220,
1225 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health &
Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds
by Eisenhour v. Weber Cnty., 739 F.3d 496 (10th Cir. 2013)).
III. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause4 “does not mandate
comfortable prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). It does, however,

4

U.S. Const. Amend. VIII.
4

require prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Prison officials “must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). The
Supreme Court has been firm in its resolve that “having stripped [inmates] of virtually every
means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its
officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id. at 833. Because Wright
was a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff’s claims arise under the protections of “the Due Process
clause rather than the Eighth Amendment.” Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1999) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)). However, the analysis
is the same. Id. (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996)). An Eighth
Amendment claim has two requirements. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Overcrowding alone is not ‘sufficiently
serious’ to establish a constitutional violation.” Stevenson v. Whetsel, 52 F. App’x 444, 446
(10th Cir. 2002) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. 348-49). Plaintiff must show that Wright was
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834. Both Defendants concede that Wright’s injuries are sufficiently serious to meet this
objective element. (Def. Stanley’s Br., Dkt. No. 209, at 17-18; Def. Bd.’s Br., Dkt. No. 210,
at 18.) Second, “a prison official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). “In prison-conditions
cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id.
(citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03). Deliberate indifference, as a standard of liability,
5

requires more than a showing of negligence; the U.S. Supreme Court has equated deliberate
indifference to acting or failing to act with reckless disregard for a substantial risk of serious
harm. Id. at 836. However, application of this standard varies depending on whether the
defendants are sued in their individual or official capacities, or are municipalities. In the
instant case, the Board, as a representative of Woodward County, is equivalent to a
municipality. Plaintiff has sued Sheriff Stanley in both his official and individual capacities.
Because a “‘[section 1983] suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official
acting in his or her official capacity are the same,’” the Court will treat Plaintiff’s conditions
of confinement claims against the County and Sheriff Stanley, in his official capacity, as one
claim. Myers v. Okla. Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commr’s, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 n.2 (10th Cir.
1998) (quoting Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988).
A. Municipal Liability
“Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included
among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, there is no concept of respondeat superior in
§ 1983 claims. Id. at 691. A municipality is only liable under § 1983 for harm caused
“through the execution of its own policy or custom by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy.” Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1529 (10th Cir.
1988), abrogated on other grounds by Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717
F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2013). The Board and Sheriff Stanley do not dispute that the practice of
maintaining an overcrowded jail constitutes an official policy or custom. To establish
6

liability of the Board and Sheriff Stanley, in his official capacity, Plaintiff must establish the
following: (1) that Wright was deprived of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) that the
municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Winton v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Tulsa Cnty., Okla., 88 F.Supp.2d
1247, 1262 (N.D. Okla. 2000).
The Board argues it is not the proper party because it is an entity distinct from the
Sheriff’s office and the Sheriff, not the Board, has “charge and custody of the jail of his
county.” 19 Okla. Stat. § 513. However, the Board cannot defeat potential liability merely
by showing that the Sheriff is the official policymaker at the WCJ. Bryson v. Okla. Cnty.
ex rel. Okla. Cnty. Det. Ctr., 2011 OK CIV APP 98, ¶ 24, 261 P.3d 627, 636; see also Lopez,
172 F.3d at 763 (“[T]he county may be liable on the basis that [the sheriff] is a final
policymaker with regard to its jail, such that his actions ‘may fairly be said to be those of the
municipality.’”) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 404 (1997)). The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that any official or entity whose
actions represent official policy may be liable under § 1983. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “[I]t is when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Another judge in this
district has recognized that “the county’s board of commissioners sets policies, including
fiscal policies, that may be implicated in a violation of a county inmate’s federal rights.”
7

Harper v. Woodward Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. CIV-11-0996-HE, 2014 WL
7399367, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 29, 2014). In the instant case, Plaintiff’s claims concern
matters falling under the authority of the Board. Plaintiff asserts that Wright’s injuries are
causally linked to the County’s long-standing practice of maintaining overcrowded jail
conditions in dereliction of its duties to provide a jail adequate for the safekeeping of
prisoners and to prioritize funding.

Oklahoma law requires every board of county

commissioners in Oklahoma to provide a jail “for the safekeeping of prisoners lawfully
committed.” 57 Okla. Stat. § 41.5 This duty is constitutional as well as statutory. Bryson,
2011 OK CIV APP 98, ¶ 25, 261 P.3d at 637. Also, “because the necessary maintenance of
a jail is a constitutional duty, a county must first appropriate funds for such duty and any
other constitutional duties before any county funds are expended for statutory duties or other
functions.” Okla. A.G. Opin., No. 07-35, 2007 WL 4699709 (Oct. 23, 2007). The Board’s
reliance on Meade and Janzten v. Hawkins6 is not persuasive. Meade involved a claim that
a deputy sheriff used excessive force against an arrestee. In Janzten, several deputy sheriffs
and a jailer claimed the county sheriff improperly terminated their employment in violation
of the First Amendment. In both cases, the Tenth Circuit ruled the Board of County
Commissioners could not be held liable because it had no authority or responsibility over the
hiring, training, or supervision of county law enforcement officers. See Meade, 841 F.2d at
5

“Every county, by authority of the board of county commissioners and at the expense of
the county, shall have a jail or access to a jail in another county for the safekeeping of prisoners
lawfully committed.” 57 Okla. Stat. § 41.
6

188 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1999).
8

1528; see also Janzten, 188 F.3d at 1259. In the instant case, Plaintiff does not argue the
Board is liable for the actions of employees under the supervision of the Sheriff Stanley or
for the actions of Sheriff Stanley as a supervisor. Rather, Plaintiff argues the Board is liable
for its own inaction in failing to address the overcrowded conditions of the WCJ. Because
the Board has authority to set policies impacting the conditions at the WCJ, any argument
that the Board cannot be held liable as a matter of law must fail.
The Board and Sheriff Stanley argue Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim must
fail because Plaintiff cannot show that either Defendant was deliberately indifferent. A
municipality shows deliberate indifference when it “has actual or constructive notice that its
action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it
consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143
F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1997)). Plaintiffs generally establish notice by “proving the
existence of a pattern of tortious conduct.” Id. However, it is undisputed in the instant case
that inmate-on-inmate violence was a rare occurrence prior to Wright’s assault, and “inmate
violence did not increase appreciably with overcrowding conditions.” (Def. Bd.’s Br., Dkt.
No. 210, at 8.) “[D]eliberate indifference may be found absent a pattern of unconstitutional
behavior if a violation of federal rights is a ‘highly predictable’ or ‘plainly obvious’
consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction.” Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307-08.
The Board and Sheriff Stanley argue Plaintiff cannot show that either Defendant
disregarded a known or obvious risk that the overcrowded conditions would result in inmate9

on-inmate violence because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that either Defendant knew of any
such risk of harm. There is no dispute that both the Board and Sheriff Stanley knew the jail
was overcrowded at the time of Wright’s arrest and that overcrowding had been a recurring
condition since at least 2008.7 From October 2007 to May 2011, the WCJ received at least
seven citations from jail inspectors for the State Department of Health based, in part, on
overcrowding. (Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 223, Ex. 1.) The Defendants have presented evidence
that the jail staff monitored the inmates closely, that inmate violence was a rare occurrence
prior to Wright’s assault, and that inmate violence did not increase appreciably with the
overcrowded conditions. Sheriff Stanley and a representative of the Board both testified that
the conditions of jail, while dangerous for the jail staff, were adequate for the safekeeping
of prisoners. (Def. Bd.’s Br., Dkt. No. 210, Ex. 2, at 59-60, 65-66, & 112-13; Def. Bd.’s Br.,
Dkt. No. 210, Ex. 17, at 59.) The Board’s representative testified that the Board relied on
Sheriff’s Stanley representations and believed Sheriff Stanley was adequately managing the
jail and taking actions to reduce inmate population. (Id., Ex. 17, at 33.) Although the Board
and Sheriff Stanley assert that they had no notice or knowledge of a risk of harm to the
inmates as a result of the overcrowded conditions, Plaintiff presents some evidence proving
otherwise. In 2009, the Board commissioned a report from jail consultant Don Jones. That

7

Plaintiff asserts the Board has known the WCJ lacked adequate capacity since the 1970s
and presents as evidence a letter purportedly written by the Board. The Board argues the letter is
inadmissible because the letter is an unsigned draft with no evidence as to who drafted it or whether
the Board reviewed it. Regardless of whether the letter is inadmissible, the Board admits that
overcrowding had been a recurring problem since 2008, and the evidence shows the WCJ was cited,
in part, for overcrowding as early as October 29, 2007. (Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 223, Ex. 1, at 1-4.)
10

report states the following: “The county jail is almost 32 years old. It is not safe for the jail
staff or inmates. The jail does not meet any state jail standards, or state fire codes.” (Pl.’s
Resp., Dkt. No. 223, Ex. 12, at 2.) Plaintiff also presents a flyer that Sheriff Stanley created
and circulated in 2009 to encourage Woodward citizens to vote for a sales tax for the
construction of a new jail. That flyer describes the WCJ as overcrowded and asserts that a
new jail is needed to “PROTECT Inmates from injuring each other and themselves.” (Id.,
Ex. 13.) Both Defendants assert that Sheriff Stanley disagreed with the consultant’s report
and argue the flyer is merely campaign puffery. However, it is not the Court’s function at
the summary judgment stage “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Plaintiff
has presented sufficient evidence to establish that a genuine dispute exists as to whether the
Board and/or Sheriff Stanley had actual or constructive notice that the overcrowded
conditions were “substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation.” Barney, 143
F.3d at 1307.8
The Board and Sheriff Stanley also argue that Plaintiff cannot establish deliberate
indifference because both Defendants took reasonable steps to alleviate the overcrowded
conditions. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or
safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the
8

Plaintiff also presents a newspaper article that quotes Sheriff Stanley as saying that a jail
inspector had informed Sheriff Stanley that the WCJ “was the second most dangerous jail in the state
for inmates.” (Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 223, Ex. 14.) Both Defendants argue that the news story is
inadmissible hearsay. Regardless of whether the news article is inadmissible, Plaintiff has presented
other evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
11

harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The following facts are
undisputed: At the time of Wright’s arrest, construction on a new jail was underway; in
2009, Sheriff Stanley spoke with the Woodward County district attorney and a judge about
reducing the amount of bonds on incoming inmates to help reduce overcrowding; Sheriff
Stanley had previously contacted other jails to find space for Woodward County inmates; in
September 2009, the Board contracted with the Board of County Commissioners of Custer
County to allow Woodward County inmates to be housed in the Custer County Jail at the
expense of Woodward County; and, finally, the WCJ had an informal arrangement with the
Woodward City Jail to take a few Woodward County inmates if room was available.
The Court is not persuaded that these facts are a sufficient basis for summary
judgement. While the new jail facility may have improved conditions for prisoners held after
November 2011, there is no evidence that construction of the new jail improved conditions
at the WCJ for Wright and other prisoners held before the new facility’s opening. See
Winton, 88 F.Supp.2d at 1266. Defendants have produced no case law showing that Sheriff
Stanley’s discussions with the district attorney and a judge, occurring about two years prior
to the assault on Wright, constitute “reasonable steps.” Plaintiff argues the other steps listed
are “merely token gestures.” (Pl.’s Br., Dkt. No. 224, at 6.) Plaintiff has provided evidence
that the WCJ was overcrowded for 896 days preceding the assault on Wright; that the Board
chose not to prioritize jail funding; and that in the three years prior to August 2011, Sheriff
Stanley only contacted five other counties, once each, regarding the possible transfer of

12

inmates and failed to contact other nearby counties.9 Plaintiff also presents some evidence
that the Board and Sheriff Stanley failed to utilize other interim measures, such as early
release, bond reduction, and ankle monitor bracelets. “A prison official may be liable for a
substantial risk of serious harm to inmates in spite of efforts reasonably calculated to reduce
the risk, if he intentionally refuses other reasonable alternatives and the dangerous conditions
persist.” Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 2008). Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s evidence is not competent and should be disregarded because Plaintiff has not
shown the other measures were feasible. However, the Court is obligated, at the summary
judgment stage, to view the evidence and make reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff and is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Bearing this in mind, the Court finds a reasonable jury
could find that the Board and Sheriff Stanley did not respond reasonably and thus acted with
deliberate indifference to the risk of harm to inmates, including Wright.
Sheriff Stanley argues Plaintiff cannot show a direct causal link between the policy
and the constitutional harm. “The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate
conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Brown, 520
9

Plaintiff also argues there is no evidence that the jail use agreement with Custer County
had any appreciable effect on the conditions at the WCJ. Plaintiff presents release sheets from the
Custer County Sheriff’s Office to prove that Sheriff Stanley only transferred a total of 31 inmates
to Custer County between September 1, 2009, and August 15, 2011. (Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 224, Ex.
9.) Attached to these documents is an unsigned typed statement on paper with no letterhead alleging
that the release sheets represent the recorded bookins for July 2009 to present. The Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to establish a reliable foundation proving that the documents do in fact represent
a complete record of the bookins for the dates alleged. Thus, any evidence based on these
documents is inadmissible.
13

U.S. at 404. Both parties agree that inmate Riggs objected to Wright’s placement in Cell 6
because the cell was already full. As discussed above, a genuine dispute exists as to whether
the Board and Sheriff Stanley knew the overcrowding posed a serious risk of inmate harm
and failed to respond reasonably. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the inaction, or ineffective action, of the Board and
Sheriff Stanley was the moving force behind the overcrowded conditions at the WCJ and
could find that those conditions caused Wright’s injuries. See Layton v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Okla. Cnty., 512 F. App’x 861, 872 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding plaintiff had
demonstrated a “direct causal link” through evidence that the county and the sheriff had
notice of the problems in the jail’s medical-care system and that the plaintiff’s death could
have been avoided had the defendants taken any of the possible remedial measures); see also
Winton, 88 F.Supp.2d at 1268.
Plaintiff has presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that the Board and
Sheriff Stanley, in his official capacity, had actual notice of a serious risk of harm to inmate
safety at the WCJ, that both Defendants failed to respond reasonably, and that the inaction
or ineffective action of both Defendants was the moving force behind the overcrowded
conditions and resulting harm to Wright. Thus, the Motions for Summary Judgment of the
Board and Sheriff Stanley, in his official capacity, as it pertains to Plaintiff’s conditions of
confinement claim must be denied.
B. Sheriff Stanley—Individual Capacity

14

Sheriff Stanley argues that he cannot be held liable in an individual capacity for
Plaintiff’s claims because he was not directly involved in the underlying incident. However,
“[p]ersonal involvement does not require direct participation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614
F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010). A defendant-supervisor may be liable if “(1) the defendant
promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation
of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state
of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. Sheriff Stanley
argues Plaintiff cannot establish the second and third elements.
Bearing in mind that the requisite state of mind is one of deliberate indifference,
Plaintiff must show that Sheriff Stanley knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Unlike the standard for municipalities, this
standard “is subjective, requiring that the official actually be ‘aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.’” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “An official’s
failure to alleviate a significant risk of which he was unaware, no matter how obvious the risk
or how gross his negligence in failing to perceive it, is not an infliction of punishment and
therefore not a constitutional violation.” Id. This standard does not require Plaintiff to prove
that Sheriff Stanley knew of a risk of harm particular to Wright. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.
Plaintiff does not need to show that Sheriff Stanley acted or failed to act while believing that
Wright would actually suffer harm; it is sufficient to show that Sheriff Stanley “acted or
failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “[A]
15

jury is permitted to infer that a prison official had actual knowledge of the constitutionally
infirm condition based solely on circumstantial evidence, such as the obviousness of the
condition.” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916-17 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). “‘The requisite
causal connection is satisfied if the defendant[s] set in motion a series of events that the
defendant[s] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the
plaintiff of [his] constitutional rights.’” Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir.
2006) (quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990)). As discussed above,
there is evidence in the record that Wright was placed in a cell that was overcapacity, that
Sheriff Stanley knew the overcrowded conditions posed a substantial risk of harm to the
inmates, and that Sheriff Stanley failed to respond reasonably. Viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds a reasonable jury could infer that Sheriff
Stanley’s practice of maintaining overcrowded conditions, and failure to reasonably alleviate
the risk of harm, caused the assault on Wright. Thus, Plaintiff has produced sufficient
evidence to overcome summary judgment on the conditions of confinement claim against
Sheriff Stanley in his individual capacity.
C. Qualified Immunity
Sheriff Stanley asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity, which is an affirmative
defense available to public officials sued in their individual capacities. Barney, 143 F.3d at
1309. “Qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 579
16

(10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). It is not simply
a defense: “It is ‘an immunity from suit.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985)). When a defendant’s motion for summary judgment rests on a claim of qualified
immunity, the Court “must grant qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show (1) a
reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was
clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.” Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745
F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014). If Plaintiff successfully meets this burden, then Sheriff
Stanley, as movant for summary judgment, bears the burden of showing that no material
issues of fact would defeat the claim of qualified immunity. Id. at 412 (citing Mick v.
Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Sheriff Stanley has failed to meet this burden. The Court has determined that facts
material to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim are disputed and that a reasonable jury
could find Sheriff Stanley liable for disregarding a substantial risk to prisoner safety in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, any argument that Sheriff Stanley’s
actions did not violate a clearly established right is without merit. “The law is clearly
established when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly
established weight of authority from other courts shows that the right must be as plaintiff
maintains.” Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th Cir. 2003). This
does not require case law holding that the specific action at issue is unlawful. See Armijo
by and Through Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff need only establish that “‘the asserted right’s contours are sufficiently clear such
17

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id.
(quoting Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 1997)). In 1994, the U.S.
Supreme Court clearly established that “‘prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners
from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (quoting CortesQuinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988). Farmer also clearly set
forth the principle that “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial
risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate
it.” Id. at 847. At least as early as 1999, the Tenth Circuit made clear that pretrial detainees
are afforded the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lopez, 172 F.3d at 759
n.2. Therefore, the law had been clearly established at the time of the incident that Sheriff
Stanley had a duty to take reasonable measures to protect the WCJ inmates from conditions
of confinement posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Because a question of fact remains
as to whether Sheriff Stanley disregarded this duty, Sheriff Stanley is not entitled to qualified
immunity.
IV. FAILURE TO TRAIN
Plaintiff asserts that Sheriff Stanley failed to adequately train jail staff to respond to
the overcrowded conditions and that this failure caused the jailers to place Wright inside the
overcrowded cell with inmates intending to harm Wright. This claim requires Plaintiff to
establish that Sheriff Stanley, sued in both his official and individual capacities, acted with
deliberate indifference. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307-10.
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A. Official Capacity
“A municipality can be liable where ‘the need for more or different training is so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that
the policymakers of the [municipality] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need.’” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760,
773 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989)).
Plaintiff has failed to show that need for more or different training was obvious, and the
Court is not persuaded that Wright’s injuries are a plainly obvious consequence of failing to
train jailers to respond in specifically overcrowded conditions. In denying such claims, the
Tenth Circuit has held that “[s]pecific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a
jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.” Barney, 143 F.3d
at 1308. Similarly, the Court finds that specific or extensive training on responding to
overcrowded conditions is not necessary for a jailer to know that placing a pretrial detainee
in a cell with other inmates who are threatening to harm the detainee is wrongful conduct.
B. Individual Capacity
Sheriff Stanley, individually, “is liable only if [he] ‘knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Id. at 1310 (emphasis added) (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837). Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence showing that Sheriff Stanley knew
that failing to train jailers to deal specifically with the overcrowded conditions posed an
excessive risk to inmate safety. The evidence shows that jailers at the WCJ received annual
jailer training required by the Oklahoma Jail Standards and that inmate-on-inmate violence
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was a rare occurrence prior to the assault on Wright. Sheriff Stanley, Collison, and Cannon
testified that the overcrowded conditions did not impact the ability of the jailers to supervise
the inmates. (Def. Stanley’s Br., Dkt. No. 209, Ex. 2, at 38 & 45; Id., Ex. 4, at 58; Id., Ex.
8 at 65.) Plaintiffs argument that Stanley, Collison, and Cannon are not qualified to render
such an opinion is without merit. Opinion testimony of lay witnesses is admissible when the
witnesses have personal knowledge of the matter and their opinions are rationally based on
their perceptions. Fed. R. Evid. 602; Fed. R. Evid. 701. Without any evidence that
overcrowded conditions have caused previous acts of violence or that inadequate training has
caused previous constitutional violations, Plaintiff has failed to raise a question of fact as to
whether Sheriff Stanley acted with deliberate indifference. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311.
Based on the reasoning above, Sheriff Stanley’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s claim of failure to train must be granted.
V. WRONGFUL DEATH
To hold the Board and Sheriff Stanley liable for Wright’s death, and thereby claim
wrongful death damages, Plaintiff must show the alleged constitutional violation caused
Wright’s death. Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Section 1983
imposes liability on a government official who ‘subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights.”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). This Court
determined in a prior order that Wright’s action in taking a fatal amount of prescription pills
more than three months after the assault at the WCJ constitutes an unforeseeable superseding
cause. (Order, Dkt. No. 249, at 11.) Superseding causes relieve a defendant of liability
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because they are “‘not within the scope of the risk created by the actor’s conduct.’” See
James v. Chavez, 511 F. App’x 742, 747 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 442B (1965)). Thus, the Board and Sheriff Stanley cannot be held liable for Wright’s
death.
VI. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant Board of County Commissioners of the County of
Woodward’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 210) is GRANTED IN
PART, DENIED IN PART, and is MOOT IN PART. Defendant Gary Stanley’s, in his
Individual and Official Capacity, Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 209) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court grants summary judgment in
favor of the Board and Sheriff Stanley on Plaintiff’s wrongful death claims. The Court
grants summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Stanley on Plaintiff’s failure to train claim.
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against the Board was previously dismissed, rendering that
portion of the Board’s motion moot. The Motions are denied in all other respects. A
judgment will enter at the conclusion of the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of June, 2015.

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