Jones v. Astrue

Filing 34

ORDER granting 32 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Honorable Robin J. Cauthron on 1/7/14. (lg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

WILLIE MAE HENDERSON,
o/b/o LAURIE A. JONES, deceased,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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Case Number CIV-11-1360-C

ORDER
Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits was denied by the Social
Security Administration. Plaintiff then filed the present action seeking review of the
Agency’s decision. In July 2011, the Court remanded the case to the Commissioner for
further proceedings. On April 17, 2012, the Commissioner issued a Notice of Award,
awarding Plaintiff back benefits. Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks an award of attorney fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
The contingent fee agreement executed between Plaintiff and her counsel indicated
that if Plaintiff were awarded benefits she would pay the firm a fee equal to 25% of the past
due award. Now that the Notice of Benefit has been issued, the firm now seeks an award of
attorney fees. By prior Order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60, reopening the case so that this motion for attorney fees could be timely
filed. Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks a fee of $7,358.00.

Plaintiff’s fee request is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), which states:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits
to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .
Where a contingent fee agreement is in place, the Court must examine the reasonableness of
its terms and reduce an award as appropriate “based on the character of the representation
and the results the representative achieved.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808
(2002). Whenever fees are awarded under both § 406(b) and the EAJA, “the claimant’s
attorney must ‘refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.’” Id. at 796 (citation
omitted). In support of the motion, counsel has attached a time report demonstrating that
counsel expended in excess of 22.2 hours of attorney and 4.3 hours of paralegal time in
performing the work before the Court. After considering the extent of work performed, the
result received or obtained, and the fee award sought, the Court finds the amount sought to
be a reasonable fee for the work performed. Indeed, the benefits awarded to Plaintiff
certainly justify the amount of time spent by the firm handling the case and the evidence
before the Court offers nothing to suggest that the character of the representation or the
results achieved were in any way deficient. Because an award of fees under the EAJA has
already been made, Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of the smaller fee.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Dkt. No.
32) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s counsel is awarded a fee in the amount of $7,358.00. Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), this amount shall be paid to the firm of Troutman & Troutman, P.C.,
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in the name of Steve A. Troutman. Because Plaintiff was previously awarded fees under the
EAJA, she is entitled to a refund of the smaller EAJA award which the firm shall forward
immediately upon receipt of the fees awarded herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of January, 2014.

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