Thompson v. Independent School District No I-1 of Stephens County Oklahoma et al

Filing 19

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 17 defendant Jeremy Smith's Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the Court: (1) grants Smith's Motion to Dismiss as to plaintiff's Title IX and negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision claims against Smith and dismisses said claims; and (2) denies Smith's Motion to Dismiss as to plaintiff's gross negligence claim (as more fully set out in Order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 5/9/2012. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JADE THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. I-1 OF STEPHENS COUNTY,
OKLAHOMA; and
JEREMY SMITH,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-12-13-M

ORDER
Before the Court is defendant Jeremy Smith’s (“Smith”) Motion to Dismiss, filed April 4,
2012. On April 25, 2012, plaintiff filed her response. Smith did not file a reply. Based upon the
parties’ submissions, the Court makes its determination.
I.

Introduction
During the school years of 2007 to 2010, Smith was employed with defendant Independent

School District No. I-1 of Stephens County, Oklahoma’s (“District”) as plaintiff’s teacher and
assistant band director. Plaintiff alleges that, from September 2007 to May 2010, Smith subjected
plaintiff to sexual harassment, advances, and sexual conduct while he worked for District.
According to plaintiff, the conduct included: Smith giving plaintiff favorable or special treatment
in Smith’s class or activities; Smith sending messages expressing his affection and desire for plaintiff
and acknowledging her reluctance to become sexually involved with him; Smith sexually touching
plaintiff in his classroom; Smith sexually assaulting plaintiff at his home, in his vehicle, and at other
locations. Plaintiff further alleges that the conduct occurred during school hours and in furtherance
of school events both on and off school property. Purportedly, Smith told plaintiff to keep Smith’s

affections secret.
In May 2010, Smith was arrested and charged with felony rape by instrumentation. In August
2011, in Stephens County District Court, State of Oklahoma, defendant entered a plea of guilty to
the charge of felony rape by instrumentation and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.
Plaintiff alleges that, from September 2007 to his May 2010 arrest, Smith subjected at least
two other students at Duncan High School to similar sexual behavior. Purportedly, Smith’s superiors
confronted Smith about his perceived sexual conduct on more than one occasion. Plaintiff further
alleges that District did not timely investigate. Plaintiff now brings causes of action for, inter alia,
gross negligence and negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision.
II.

Standard
Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

the United States Supreme Court has held:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent
with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pleading that offers labels and

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conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 1949
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
III.

Discussion
A.

Title IX and Negligent Hiring, Retention, Training and Supervision Claims

Smith moves to dismiss plaintiff’s Title IX and negligent hiring, retention, training, and
supervision claims on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. In her response, “[p]laintiff stipulates that she did not allege a cause of action for a Title
IX claim or Negligent Hiring, Retention, Training and Supervision against Defendant Smith and that
the inclusion of his name . . . was an oversight . . . .” Plaintiff’s Objection and Response to Smith’s
Motion to Dismiss [docket no. 18] at p. 1.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiff’s Title IX and negligent hiring, retention, training,
and supervision claims against Smith.
B.

Gross Negligence

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s gross negligence claim for failure to satisfy Twombly
and Iqbal standards and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff
contends that she alleges sufficient facts to establish a gross negligence claim and satisfy the
Twombly and Iqbal standards.
Under Oklahoma law, “[g]ross negligence is defined by 25 O.S.1981 § 6 as the lack of slight
care and diligence.” Fox v. Okla. Mem’l Hosp., 774 P.2d 459, 461 (Okla. 1989). “Gross negligence
is characterized as reckless indifference to the consequences. It falls short of an intentional wrong’s
equivalent.” Myers v. Lashley, 44 P.3d 553, 563 (Okla. 2002).
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Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff
alleges sufficient facts to establish a gross negligence claim and satisfy the Twombly and Iqbal
standards. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that Smith subjected plaintiff to sexual harassment,
advances, and sexual conduct while he was plaintiff’s teacher and assistant band director. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint [docket no. 5] at ¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiff further alleges that Smith’s conduct
included: Smith giving plaintiff favorable or special treatment in Smith’s class or activities; Smith
sending messages expressing his affection and desire for plaintiff and acknowledging her reluctance
to become sexually involved with him; Smith sexually touching plaintiff in his classroom; Smith
sexually assaulting plaintiff at his home, in his vehicle, and at other locations. Id. at ¶ 14. Accepting
plaintiff’s allegations as true,1 the Court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish
that Smith was recklessly indifferent to the consequences of his conduct and that Smith’s conduct
was lacking slight care and diligence. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff has a plausible claim for
gross negligence.
Accordingly, the Court denies Smith’s motion to dismiss as to gross negligence.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Smith’s Motion to Dismiss [docket no. 17]. Specifically, the Court: (1) GRANTS Smith’s Motion
to Dismiss as to plaintiff’s Title IX and negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision claims
against Smith and DISMISSES said claims; and (2) DENIES Smith’s Motion to Dismiss as to

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When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).
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plaintiff’s gross negligence claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of May, 2012.

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