Kirkpatrick et al v. Department of Human Services et al

Filing 61

ORDER finding as moot 33 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 35 Motion to Dismiss; granting 39 Motion to Dismiss; granting 44 Motion to Dismiss; granting 46 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 48 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 50 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 52 Motion to Dismiss; granting 55 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 1/30/2013. (mb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TIFFANY KIRKPATRICK, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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OKLAHOMA COUNTY DEPT. OF HUMAN )
SERVICES, et al.,
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Defendants.
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NO. CIV-12-197-D

ORDER
In this action, Plaintiffs assert claims pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging their
constitutional rights were violated when Defendant Oklahoma Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) initiated an action in the District Court of Oklahoma County to remove Plaintiff Tiffany
Kirkpatrick’s three children from her custody and place them in DHS protective custody. Plaintiffs,
who appear pro se, allege the remaining defendants were also involved in the violation of their
rights.
Now before the Court are nine separate motions to dismiss this action [Doc. Nos. 33, 35, 39,
44, 46, 48, 50, 52, and 55]. Four of the nine motions [Doc. Nos. 39, 44, 46, and 55] expressly assert
that this Court should not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this action because abstention is
mandated by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or because the relief requested by Plaintiffs is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 The remaining motions [Doc. Nos. 33, 35, 48, 50 and 52]
argue Plaintiffs have failed to adequately state a claim for relief, or assert claims for relief which

1

The doctrine is derived from two United States Supreme Court decisions, D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

are barred by immunity. Two of the motions also argue that Plaintiffs failed to properly serve
process upon the moving defendant.
Because the Court must first determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction to consider
Plaintiffs’ claim, the motions based on Younger and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will be considered
prior to the motions asserting other arguments. Starkey ex rel. A.B. v. Boulder County Social
Services, 569 F.3d 1244, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2009).
Background:
After filing this action, Plaintiffs2 sought a temporary restraining order in which they asked
this Court to enter an order directing DHS to return the children to Ms. Kirkpatrick or to place them
in the custody of her relatives. The Court entered an Order [Doc. No. 42] denying the requested
injunctive relief. In that Order, the Court questioned the propriety of exercising jurisdiction over
this matter because the allegations in the Complaint and the documents attached thereto indicate
there is an ongoing proceeding in the District Court of Oklahoma County (the “State court
proceeding”) regarding the custody of Ms. Kirkpatrick’s children. The Court noted that, in its
response to Plaintiff’s request for temporary injunctive relief, DHS confirmed that it brought the
action, styled In the Matter of ZSA, MJB, and MLK, Case No. JD-2012-6, pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit.
10A § 1-1-102, and the State court entered a January 4, 2012 Order to Take Minor Children into
Emergency Custody (the “Custody Order”). See Order [Doc. No. 42] at pp. 2-3. The result of the
State court’s order was the removal of the children from Ms. Kirkpatrick’s custody. The parties
confirmed that the State court proceeding had not concluded.

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In addition to Ms. Kirkpatrick and her three minor children, also named as plaintiffs are Ms.
Kirkpatrick’s finance, Jesse H. James, Jr., and her roommate, Crystal Bonsall.

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In denying the temporary restraining order, the Court explained in some detail that,
assuming it otherwise had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims,3 it is required to abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction when doing so would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding
involving important state interests. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court further
explained that, even if the State court proceeding had concluded, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
would preclude this Court’s review of the decisions reached in the State court proceeding. See
Order [Doc. No. 42] at pp. 5-6. The Court concluded that, in any event, Plaintiffs had not satisfied
the requirements for a temporary restraining order, and denied the request.
Four of the defendants moving to dismiss this action now reassert their arguments in support
of Younger abstention or application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs’ response to the
motions4 argues that Younger does not apply because the State court proceeding is not a criminal
action, and Plaintiffs are not charged with crimes.
Application:
A. Younger abstention:
Pursuant to Younger, even if a federal court otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction over
an action, it must decline to exercise jurisdiction when doing so would interfere with an ongoing
state proceeding involving important state interests.

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A federal court typically lacks subject matter jurisdiction where a plaintiff seeks redress for alleged
constitutional violations occurring in a state court proceeding which terminates parental rights. Roman-Nose
v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Services, 967 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Plaintiffs filed a response “in opposition to all motions to dismiss.” However, DHS filed its motion
to dismiss [Doc. No. 55] after the response was filed, and Plaintiffs did not respond to that motion. Pursuant
to Rule 7.1 of the Local Civil Rules, the Court may, in its discretion, deem the motion of DHS confessed.
LCvR 7.1(g). However, that motion raises the Younger and Rooker-Feldman arguments raised in other
motions to which Plaintiffs responded. Accordingly, the merits of the motion are addressed in this Order.

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“A federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction when: (1) there is an ongoing state
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear
the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings ‘involve important state
interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately
articulated state policies.’” Amanatullah v. Colorado Board of Medical Examiners, 187 F. 3d 1160,
1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1005 (1998)). Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions “consistently state that the
application of Younger is mandatory.” Chapman v. Barcus, 372 F. App’x 899, 901 (10th Cir. 2010)
(unpublished opinion) (citing Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational and Professional Licensing of Dept.
of Commerce, 240 F. 3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001)).
The record before the Court reflects that the State court entered the Custody Order placing
Ms. Kirkpatrick’s children in DHS custody. According to the Custody Order, submitted as Exhibit
11 to the Complaint, the State court determined that, pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 10A § 1-4-201, the
continuation of the children in the home in which they resided at the time “is contrary to the
child(ren)’s welfare,” and the children are “in need of immediate protection due to an imminent
safety threat,” or the continuation of the children in the care of the parent “would present an
imminent safety threat” to Ms. Kirkpatrick’s children. Custody Order, Ex. 11 to Complaint.
The Complaint in this case asks this Court to order the State court to reverse that decision
and direct that Ms. Kirkpatrick’s children be returned to her or placed in the custody of relatives.
She contends that they are suffering abuse or mistreatment in DHS custody. She has not argued to
this Court, however, that she has asserted that allegation in the State court proceeding. She offers

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no argument that she is unable to present to the State court the evidence which she contends supports
her allegation that the children have been mistreated or abused while in DHS custody.
The record before the Court establishes that the Younger factors are present in this case.
First, the record reflects that there is an ongoing state proceeding. Second, Plaintiffs have an
opportunity to present, in that proceeding, their claims that the children are being mistreated or
abused in their current custody setting, and should be returned to Ms. Kirkpatrick or her relatives.
Plaintiffs offer no argument that they are prevented from raising, in the State court proceeding, the
same contentions and requests for relief that are asserted in this lawsuit. As DHS explained in its
brief in response to Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order, Ms. Kirkpatrick’s children
are represented in the State court proceeding by the Oklahoma County Public Defender’s office, and
their attorney has the authority to present to the State court any issue regarding the children’s
interests. Thus, any claim of mistreatment in their current custodial setting can be asserted on their
behalf by their appointed attorney. Finally, “custody issues are traditional state-law matters that
implicate important state interests, fulfilling the third condition” of Younger, and the Tenth Circuit
has recognized that Younger is particularly important in child custody proceedings, which “‘are an
especially delicate subject of state policy.’” Chapman, 372 F. App’x at 902 (quoting Morrow v.
Winslow, 94 F. 3d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1996)).
In this case, Plaintiffs ask this Court to not only reverse the State court’s prior decision with
regard to the placement of Ms. Kirkpatrick’s children in DHS custody, but to direct that court to
return the children to her or to place them with her relatives. Younger precludes the Court from
taking such action. “Younger abstention dictates that federal courts not interfere with state court
proceedings by granting equitable relief-such as injunctions of important state proceedings or

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declaratory judgments regarding constitutional issues in those proceedings-when such relief could
adequately be sought before the state court.” Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th
Cir.1999) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the fact that the State court proceeding is not a criminal
action does not preclude the application of Younger. The Supreme Court has held that Younger
applies to state civil proceedings where important state interests are involved. Ohio Civil Rights
Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics
Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). As the Tenth Circuit has held, the
“important state interests” covered by Younger include “matters which traditionally look to state law
for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.” Amanatullah, 187 F.3d at
1163. Consideration and enforcement of Oklahoma statutes designed to ensure the protection of
Oklahoma children certainly serve important state interests. See Chapman, 372 F. App’x at 902.
Thus, to the extent the State court proceeding is ongoing, this Court finds the factors
dictating Younger abstention are present. Accordingly, the Court will not exercise jurisdiction over
this case.
B. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
Even if the State court proceeding has concluded, this Court cannot properly consider
Plaintiffs’ claims in this action to review or reconsider the State court’s rulings because the RookerFeldman doctrine bars a federal court from reviewing state court judgments where the plaintiff seeks
review and reversal of the state court’s judgment. Thus, federal district courts are precluded from
“effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over claims ‘actually decided by a state court’ and
claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a prior state-court judgment.” Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin,

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441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006). To determine whether federal and state claims are inextricably
intertwined, the Court must focus on the relief sought in the federal action:
“To determine whether a federal plaintiff’s claim is inextricably intertwined with a
state court judgment, [the Court] must pay close attention to the relief the plaintiff
seeks.” Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147–48 (10th
Cir.2004), overruled in part on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. 280.
“Where a plaintiff seeks a remedy that would disrupt or undo a state court judgment,
the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.”
Crutchfield, 389 F.3d at 1148. Furthermore, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine
“precludes not only review of adjudications of the state’s highest court, but also the
decisions of its lower courts.” See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192,
199 (4th Cir.1997).
Ingersoll v. El Paso County Child Support Enforcement, 2011 WL 6181432, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec.
13, 2011) (unpublished opinion).
The Tenth Circuit has held that Rooker-Feldman applies to actions in which a plaintiff
challenges a state court’s determination of child custody matters, finding Rooker-Feldman barred
the federal court’s review of a final state court order terminating the plaintiff’s parental rights
because the federal court “lacked jurisdiction to take the action requested...to strike the state court
decisions and replace them with its own orders regarding the custody of [Plaintiff’s] children.”
Hepple v. New Mexico, 434 F. App’x 771, 772 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished opinion). The same
result was reached where the parent seeking custody asserted, in a federal lawsuit, that his civil
rights were violated in connection with the state court’s unfavorable custody decision. AtkinsonBird v. State of Utah, 2004 WL 267754, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 2004) (unpublished opinion).
According to the Tenth Circuit, the federal court’s adjudication of the claims would, of necessity,
require relitigation and review of the state court decisions, a result prohibited by Rooker-Feldman.
Id.

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In this case, the relief requested in the Complaint would necessarily require this Court to
review the State court’s decisions regarding the propriety of removing the children from Ms.
Kirkpatrick’s custody and to reconsider the proper custody decision to ensure their safety and wellbeing. Because these matters have been, at a minimum, partially determined by the State court,5
this Court lacks jurisdiction to review or reconsider that determination. Accordingly, the Court finds
dismissal is warranted under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the extent that the State court has
finally adjudicated the custody proceeding.
Conclusion:
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss [Doc. Nos. 39, 44, 46, and 55] are granted
to the extent the motions assert the propriety of Younger abstention. Having so ruled, the Court need
not consider the remaining motions, as adjudication of the claims against the remaining movants
would also be precluded by Younger abstention.

Accordingly, the Court deems those motions

[Doc. Nos. 33, 35, 48, 50 and 52] moot. If the State court proceeding has concluded, the action is
dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This action is dismissed without prejudice6 to
the filing of a future action.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of January, 2013.

5

The parties have not advised this Court of the current status of the State court proceeding, and it is
not clear that a final adjudication has been determined.
6

A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice. Brereton v. Bountiful City
Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006). “Younger abstention is jurisdictional,” and dismissal should be
without prejudice. Bryner v. Lindberg, 429 F.App’x 736, 737-38 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished opinion)
(citing D.L. v. United School Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004)).

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