Deborah G Mallow IRA SEP Investment Plan et al v. McClendon et al

Filing 20

ORDER denying the portion of plaintiff's motion 17 which requests limited expedited discovery (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 5/16/2012. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DEBORAH G. MALLOW IRA SEP
INVESTMENT PLAN, individually and
derivatively on behalf of CHESAPEAKE
ENERGY CORPORATION,

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)
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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AUBREY K. MCCLENDON, RICHARD )
K. DAVIDSON, V. BURNS HARGIS,
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FRANK A. KEATING, BREENE M.
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KERR, CHARLES T. MAXWELL, DON )
L. NICKLES, FREDERICK B.
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WHITTEMORE, MARCUS C.
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ROWLAND, MICHAEL A. JOHNSON,
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and MERRILL A. MILLER, JR.,
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Defendants,
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and
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CHESAPEAKE ENERGY
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CORPORATION,
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Nominal Defendant. )

Case No. CIV-12-436-M

ORDER
This shareholder direct and derivative action was filed on April 19, 2012. On May 14, 2012,
plaintiffs filed a Motion and Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Limited
Expedited Discovery. In their motion for limited expedited discovery, plaintiffs request that the
documents requested in their document request provided to defendants on May 4, 2012 be produced
no later than May 21, 2012 and that the depositions of defendant Aubrey K. McClendon
(“McClendon”) and that of an officer or director who can testify most knowledgeably as to

Chesapeake Energy Corporation’s knowledge of McClendon’s financial dealings be scheduled no
later than May 25, 2012.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) generally provides that formal discovery will not
commence until after the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f). In the exercise of its
broad discretion, a court may alter the timing, sequence and volume of discovery. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(2) and 26(d). “However, a party seeking expedited discovery in advance of a Rule 26(f)
conference has the burden of showing good cause for the requested departure from usual discovery
procedures.” Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Worldquest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418, 419 (D.
Colo. 2003). Further, “[i]n applying the ‘good cause’ standard under Rule 26(d), the court should
consider the scope of the requested discovery.” Id. at 420.
Having carefully reviewed plaintiffs’ motion, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not met
their burden of showing good cause for the expedited discovery. Having reviewed plaintiffs’
document requests, the Court finds that these requests are quite broad and are not narrowly tailored
to the specific issues to be addressed at the preliminary injunction hearing. Further, the Court finds
that in their motion plaintiffs make the general, conclusory assertion that good cause exists for the
expedited discovery and that they will be prejudiced without said discovery; however, plaintiffs
provide absolutely no specifics as to how they would be prejudiced or how the requested discovery
would allow them to establish likelihood of irreparable harm, the stated purpose for the discovery.1

1

In fact, the document requests do not appear to seek information that would be pertinent to
establish the likelihood of irreparable harm.
2

Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for limited expedited discovery [docket
no. 17].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of May, 2012.

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