United States of America v. 2003 Mercedes CL55 VIN #WDBPJ74J13A033111 et al

Filing 19

ORDER granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment, as more fully set out. Signed by Honorable David L. Russell on 2/18/15. (jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ONE 2003 MERCEDES CL 55
VIN # WDBPJ74J13A033111, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-12-1366-R

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. No. 18. This
is an action for civil forfeiture of two vehicles allegedly purchased with proceeds earned
through illegal drug activity. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6. The only individual who has asserted a
claim over the vehicles has not objected to the motion. After reviewing the evidence
provided in support of its motion, the Court grants summary judgment for Plaintiff.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). All facts and reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). If the motion for summary judgment is uncontested, the
moving party still “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party fails to meet this burden of
production, summary judgment must be denied. Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194
(10th Cir. 2002). “By failing to file a response within the time specified by the local rule,
the nonmoving party waives the right to respond or to controvert the facts asserted in the
summary judgment motion.” Id. at 1195. Summary judgment is appropriate if, after
accepting “as true all material facts asserted and properly supported in the summary
judgment motion…. those facts entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id.
Analysis
All proceeds traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the
Controlled Substances Act are subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right exists in such proceeds. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (West). This includes property
purchased with proceeds of illegal drug transactions. See United States v. $39,000 in
Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir. 1986). The government need not tie
a vehicle to a specific drug transaction if the vehicle was purchased with cash during a
time when a claimant has failed to demonstrate legitimate alternative sources of income
large enough to account for the purchase. United States v. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency,
965 F.2d 868, 878 (10th Cir. 1992). “[T]he burden of proof is on the Government to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”
18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (West).

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An “innocent” owner’s interest in property is not, however, subject to civil
forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (West). For an interest acquired after the conduct giving
rise to forfeiture, an “innocent owner” is one who, “at the time that person acquired the
interest in the property (i) was a bona fide purchaser or seller for value … and (ii) did not
know and was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture.” Id. § 983(d)(3)(A). An “innocent owner” does not include “a nominee who
exercises no dominion or control over the property.” United States v. 1997 Int’l 9000
Semi Truck VIN: 1HSRUAER8VH09632, 412 F. App’x 118, 122-23 (10th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished) (quoting § 983(d)(6)(B)(iii)) (footnote omitted). This is because “people
engaged in illegal activities often attempt to disguise their interests in property by placing
title in someone else’s name.” Id. (quoting United States v. One 1990 Beechcraft, 619
F.3d 1275, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2010)). The claimant has the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that s/he is an innocent owner. § 983(d)(3)(A).
Claimant Iraac Juan Zamarripa (“Claimant”) attests that he is the registered owner
of the two vehicles at issue in this case, the 2003 Mercedes CL55 (“Mercedes”) and the
2007 GMC Yukon Denali (“Yukon”), and denies that these vehicles are subject to
forfeiture. Answer 2. Claimant is the brother of Iran Carrillo-Zamarripa, the defendant in
United States v. Iran Juan Carrillo-Zamarripa, Case No. 12-CR-231-R, United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Doc. No. 16, at 1; Compl., Ex. 1,
¶ 5. After Iran Zamarripa was arrested in August 2012, he admitted purchasing six or
seven cars with proceeds from illegal drug sales, including the Mercedes and Yukon, and
admitted purchasing vehicles for his brother with money earned through his illegal drug
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business. Compl., Ex. 2, ¶ 6. He also admitted that at the time he purchased these
vehicles, he had no other means of income. Id. The government contends that the
Mercedes and Yukon were previously registered in the name of Iran Zamarripa, but are
currently registered in the name of his brother, Iraac. Doc. No. 18, ¶¶ 13-14. It contends
that Iran transferred ownership of the vehicles in an attempt to hide the vehicles from the
government. Compl., Ex. 2, ¶ 5. Although registered to Claimant, both vehicles were
found at Iran’s residence when they were seized. Id. In his verified answer, Claimant
denies that the Yukon was previously registered to his brother, and denies that his brother
purchased the Yukon. Answer 2. He also denies that he purchased the vehicles with
proceeds of unlawful activity, and denies that “‘Agents believe’ that the property was
placed in Claimant’s name in an attempt to hide the assets.” Id. at 1-2.
Claimant’s contentions are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Plaintiff has produced an affidavit by a Task Force Officer for the Drug Enforcement
Administration in which the officer attests that Iran Zamarripa told agents that he
purchased the Mercedes and Yukon with drug proceeds during a time when he had no
alternative source of income. And Claimant has not produced evidence to satisfy the two
elements of the innocent owner defense, that he was a bona fide purchaser for value and
did not know and was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject
to forfeiture. Claimant states in his verified answer that his brother did not purchase the
Yukon, and this vehicle was not previously registered to his brother. Answer 2. But this is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum
Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 834 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Conclusory allegations, general
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denials, or mere argument of an opposing party’s case cannot be utilized to avoid
summary judgment.” (citations omitted)).
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
No. 18] is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of February, 2015.

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