Ortiz et al v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company
Filing
108
ORDER denying 40 Motion to Exclude Expert Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiffs' Experts; granting in part and denying in part 52 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 3/31/2015. (mb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MANUELLA ORTIZ, as surviving spouse
of JUAN GUTIERREZ PEREZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. CIV-13-32-D
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Cooper Tire & Rubber Company’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 52], filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and its Motion to
Exclude the Expert Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Experts, Roderick C. Moe and
Craig Lichtblau, M.D. [Doc. No. 40], filed pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Plaintiffs have timely responded in opposition
to the motions, which are fully briefed. Because the motions raise a common issue regarding
Plaintiffs’ proof of damages, and Plaintiffs adopt their arguments regarding the Daubert
motion in their summary judgment response brief, the motions are taken up together.
This diversity case concerns the death of Juan Gutierrez Perez and personal injuries
suffered by other passengers in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by the failure of
a tire manufactured by Defendant. Plaintiffs claim the tire was defective in design,
manufacture, and marketing/warning, and their Complaint asserts claims of strict products
liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Defendant moves for partial summary
judgment, seeking a judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ warranty and marketing
claims, and a determination of two other issues: 1) whether Plaintiffs Carlos Morales and
Rolando Morales (collectively, the “Morales Plaintiffs”) can recover damages for loss of
future earnings in the United States; and 2) whether Plaintiff Manuella Ortiz can recover
damages as Mr. Gutierrez’s spouse for his alleged wrongful death and for her loss of
consortium.1 Plaintiffs do not oppose summary judgment on their cause of action for breach
of express and implied warranties, and affirmatively state “Plaintiffs abandon any warranty
claims.” See Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. [Doc. No. 60], p.1. Therefore, the Court will
grant summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiffs’ warranty claims without further
discussion.
Standard of Decision
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute
is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.
Id. at 255. All facts and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Id. If a party who would bear the burden of proof at trial lacks
sufficient evidence on an essential element of a claim, all other factual issues concerning the
claim become immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
1
Defendant does not challenge Ms. Ortiz’s standing to bring the wrongful death claim on behalf of
the minor children of Mr. Gutierrez.
2
The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a dispute of material
fact warranting summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. If the movant carries this
burden, the nonmovant must then go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts” that
would be admissible in evidence and that show a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671
(10th Cir. 1998). “To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits,
deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671; see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but may
consider other materials in the record.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court’s inquiry
is whether the facts and evidence identified by the parties present “a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
Statement of Undisputed Facts2
On June 14, 2012, Plaintiffs were passengers in a 2002 Honda Odyssey van being
driven by Fidelino Castro when it was involved in an automobile accident in Texas County,
Oklahoma. The accident resulted in Mr. Gutierrez’s death and injured the Morales Plaintiffs.
The van was owned by Abner Ocasio of Liberal, Kansas. Plaintiffs did not know Mr. Ocasio
and did not know he was the owner. Mr. Ocasio had purchased the van in December 2008
2
Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendant’s statement of facts in the manner required by LCvR56.1(c),
and did not address Defendant’s assertions of fact in the manner required by Rule 56(c). Accordingly, the
material facts stated by Defendant are considered undisputed, as authorized by Rule 56(e)(2), and are deemed
admitted pursuant to LCvR56.1(c). In argument regarding some issues, Plaintiffs make factual assertions that
are accompanied by citations to record materials, in accordance with Rule 56(c)(1). While the Court does
not condone Plaintiffs’ failure to follow the Local Civil Rules, all properly supported facts will be considered.
3
from Dua’s Used Auto Sales with an odometer reading of 91,824 miles. The subject of
Plaintiffs’ claims is a tire that was manufactured by Defendant in April 2006. Plaintiffs have
designated a tire expert to testify about alleged defects in the tire, but he is not qualified as
an expert in warning defects and has not provided any opinions regarding such a defect.
The Morales Plaintiffs are citizens of Guatemala who separately entered the United
States without legal authorization in 2005 and 2008. Carlos Morales obtained employment
with National Beef Packing Company in Liberal, Kansas, using the name and social security
number of an individual named Emmanuel Garay, who lives in Los Fresnos, Texas.
Mr. Garay does not know Carlos Morales, and did not authorize the use of his identity.
Carlos Morales was previously employed by Seaboard Farms but was terminated for using
false identification papers and being an undocumented worker. Rolando Morales also
obtained employment with National Beef Packing Company using the name and social
security number of another person, Carlos Hernandez Ruiz. National Beef Packing Company
complies with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in its employment practices,
and is committed to preventing the employment of unauthorized workers. The company
would not permit a non-citizen employee to continue working if it discovered that the
employee was not authorized to work.
Carlos Morales has not returned to work since the accident. Plaintiffs have designated
an economist, Roderick C. Moe, to provide an opinion regarding Carlos Morales’ economic
losses, including a loss of future wages or earning capacity. Mr. Moe bases his calculation
4
regarding this alleged loss on the amount of wages that Carlos Morales had earned during
his employment with National Beef Packing Company.
Mr. Gutierrez was living with Ms. Ortiz, his brother, Ms. Ortiz’s sister, and her
husband at the time of his death. Mr. Gutierrez and Ms. Ortiz were not formally married; her
spousal claims depend on proof of a common law marriage. The couple did not have a joint
bank account. When Mr. Gutierrez began working for National Beef Packing Company in
January 2012, he was designated as “single” on tax withholding forms. He did not list
Ms. Ortiz as the person to be contacted in case of a medical emergency. However, the
official death certificate lists Mr. Gutierrez as married and names Ms. Ortiz as his spouse.
Ms. Ortiz testified that the couple considered themselves to be married and that she referred
to Mr. Gutierrez as her husband. According to the affidavit of a brother, Vincente Gutierrez,
the couple considered themselves to be married, introduced themselves publicly as husband
and wife, and always acted and treated each other as husband and wife.3
Discussion
A.
Plaintiffs’ Defective Marketing/Warning Claim
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs lack any evidence to establish a claim based on
Defendant’s alleged failure to warn consumers of a defect in the subject tire or to establish
a causal connection between an inadequate warning and Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.
Defendant particularly points to a lack of any expert opinion regarding an appropriate
3
Plaintiffs state other facts regarding consummation of the marriage, its duration, and Ms. Ortiz’s
actions as a spouse after Mr. Gutierrez’s death, such as arranging for his body to be buried in Guatemala. The
excerpts of her deposition testimony cited in support of these facts are not included in the exhibit to Plaintiffs’
brief, however, so these facts are disregarded.
5
warning. Plaintiffs respond by arguing that expert testimony is not needed where the case
concerns a common consumer product, the facts concerning the dangerous condition are not
complex, and evidence of other product failures show notice to Defendant of the inadequacy
of its warnings. Plaintiffs do not address the issue of causation.
An essential element of an inadequate warning claim is that the defendant’s failure
to warn of the unreasonably dangerous characteristics of its product was the cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries. See Duane v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 833 P.2d 284, 285-86 (Okla. 1992)
(“The plaintiff must establish that the failure to warn was a proximate, producing cause of
the injuries received.”); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Okla.
1975) (“defendant would be liable only if its failure to warn was the cause of plaintiff’s
injury”).4 Plaintiffs present no facts to suggest that Defendant’s failure to warn of a tread
separation problem in its radial tires was the proximate cause of injuries suffered by the
vehicle’s passengers, Mr. Gutierrez and the Morales Plaintiffs. On the present record, there
is simply no basis for a reasonable finding that the accident and resulting injuries were
causally related to any lack of an appropriate warning.
Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ claims based on a failure to warn of an unreasonable danger.
B.
Spousal Claims of Ms. Ortiz
Defendant contends Ms. Ortiz cannot establish her status as Mr. Gutierrez’s spouse
at the time of his death. Defendant argues that Oklahoma law places a heavy burden on a
4
The Court, like the parties, assumes that Plaintiffs’ claims are governed by Oklahoma law. No
choice of law issue is presented for decision.
6
person claiming a common law marriage to establish the relationship by clear and convincing
evidence. See Mueggenborg v. Walling, 836 P.2d 112, 113 (Okla. 1992); see also Standefer
v. Standefer, 26 P.3d 104, 107 (Okla. 2001). The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently
summarized the essential elements of a common law marriage as follows: “To constitute a
valid common-law marriage it is necessary that there should be an actual and mutual
agreement to enter into the matrimonial relation, permanent and exclusive of all others,
between parties capable of making such a contract, consummated by their cohabitation as
man and wife, or their mutual assumption openly of marital duties and obligations.” State
ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Casey, 295 P.3d 1096, 1100 (Okla. 2012) (internal quotation
omitted).
Upon consideration of the facts shown by the summary judgment record, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine dispute of fact regarding the existence of
a common law marriage between Mr. Gutierrez and Ms. Ortiz. The facts presented by
Plaintiffs all support Ms. Ortiz’s claim to be Mr. Gutierrez’s wife. The only fact presented
by Defendant that weighs against a finding of a marriage relationship is that Mr. Gutierrez’s
tax withholding forms identify his status as single. No facts are provided, however,
regarding who completed the forms or supplied the status information.5 The fact that the
couple did not have a joint bank account is based on deposition testimony of Ms. Ortiz that
they had no bank account. The failure to list Ms. Ortiz as an emergency contact could be due
to her lack of English proficiency; her deposition was taken through an interpreter.
5
From the handwriting on the forms, it appears that Mr. Gutierrez signed forms completed by
someone else.
7
Accordingly, even under the high standard of proof required by Oklahoma law, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have made a sufficient factual showing from which a reasonable jury
could find that a common law marriage existed.
Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the claims asserted by
Ms. Ortiz as the spouse of Mr. Gutierrez.
C.
Damages for Loss of Future Wages
Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, the Morales Plaintiffs cannot claim
damages for lost future earnings based on employment in the United States because they are
undocumented workers who are not legally authorized to work here and who fraudulently
obtained employment in the United States using false papers.
Defendant relies primarily on a United States Supreme Court decision, Hoffman
Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), which held that
federal immigration policy as expressed in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(“IRCA”) precluded an award of back pay to an undocumented alien whose employment was
terminated for union activities in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The
employee was not legally authorized to be present or work in the United States, but had
obtained employment by utilizing another person’s identification document in violation of
IRCA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a), and criminal law. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148. The Court
found that an award of pay “to an illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages
that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained by a criminal fraud” ran
“counter to policies underlying IRCA” and “exceeded the bounds of Board’s remedial
8
discretion.” Id. at 148-49. The Court reasoned that “awarding backpay in a case like this not
only trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations”
because the employee qualified for the award “only by remaining inside the United States
illegally” and he could not have mitigated his damages “without triggering new IRCA
violations, either by tendering false documents to employers or by finding employers willing
to ignore IRCA and hire illegal workers.” Id. at 150-51. The Court concluded “that allowing
the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA.” Id. at 151.
Defendant argues that the rule of Hoffman should be extended to preclude damage
awards in tort cases where an undocumented alien’s personal injuries result in a loss of future
United States wages that he could not lawfully earn.6 Defendant contends that barring the
Morales Plaintiffs from claiming lost wages at United States rates is particularly appropriate
because they gained employment through fraudulent and illegal conduct. Defendant’s
argument is based almost exclusively on a decision of a federal district court interpreting
Kansas law. See Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ.A 01-1241-JTM, 2003 WL
22519678 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003). On similar grounds, Defendant contends the opinions of
Plaintiff’s experts – economist Roderick C. Moe, and rehabilitation expert Craig Lichtblau,
M.D. – are irrelevant and unreliable because they have calculated Carlos Morales’ damages
for lost future wages and future medical expenses based on United States rates. Defendant
6
Defendant does not assert a defense of federal preemption but presents its argument as one of sound
public policy. Accordingly, the Court does not address the issue as one of federal preemption. See Madeira
v. Affordable Housing Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 239-49 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding IRCA did not expressly
or impliedly preempt state workers’ compensation law).
9
relies on rulings of federal district courts excluding as speculative and unreliable an expert
economist’s opinion regarding future economic damages that assumed an illegal alien would
continue to work in the United States. See Romero v. Reiman Corp., No. 11-CV-216-F, 2011
WL 11037890 (D. Wyo. Dec. 21, 2011); Garay v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 60 F. Supp. 2d
1168, 1173 (D. Kan. 1999).
Plaintiffs contend the weight of authority from other jurisdictions has not precluded
undocumented workers from claiming lost future wages at United States pay rates as a matter
of state tort law. They concede that some courts have excluded expert opinions regarding
an illegal alien’s claim for a loss of future wages if the expert failed to take into account
variables unique to the individual plaintiff, such as his immigration status, a possibility of
deportation, or a likelihood of voluntarily returning to his home country. Plaintiffs contend
their experts have considered the personal circumstances of the plaintiff claiming lost future
wages and future medical expenses, Carlos Morales, and they provide affidavits of Mr. Moe
and Dr. Lichtbrau explaining the consideration of his circumstances and the experts’
decisions to utilize United States wage rates and medical expenses in reaching their
conclusions regarding future damages.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the parties have not sufficiently identified or
addressed the issue for decision. “A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state law
as propounded by the forum’s highest court. Absent controlling precedent, the federal court
must attempt to predict how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue.” Royal
Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Choren, 393 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus in this case,
10
the Court must predict how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule on the question of
whether undocumented alien status is a legal bar to a tort recovery of damages for lost future
wages based on employment in the United States that the plaintiff could not lawfully perform
and may have fraudulently obtained.
To date, this issue has arisen only in workers’ compensation cases and has been
decided only by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals. The holding of these cases is that
illegal aliens or undocumented workers are not excluded from workers’ compensation
coverage, although some benefits may be unavailable due to their immigration status. See
Cherokee Indus., Inc. v. Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798, 801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); Lang v. Landeros,
918 P.2d 404, 405-06 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996). The court reached this conclusion in Alvarez
even though the injured employee had provided false documents to obtain employment in
violation of IRCA. See Alvarez, 84 P.3d at 802. The court specifically rejected the
employer’s argument that the period of temporary total disability benefits should have ended
when the employee disclosed his unauthorized status and his employment was terminated.
See id. at 802. These cases suggest that Oklahoma courts would not bar undocumented
workers from obtaining legal relief to which they are otherwise entitled based solely on their
alien status or violation of IRCA. Because workers’ compensation awards are a statutory
matter and serve a different purpose than tort damages, however, these cases do not answer
the question of whether Oklahoma would allow undocumented aliens to recover future
earnings in a tort action.
11
The decisions of courts in other jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether a
plaintiff’s immigration status should preclude an award of damages for lost future wages
under state tort law. See Wielgus v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860-62 (N.D.
Ill. 2012); Silva v. Wilcox, 223 P.3d 127, 132 (Colo. App. 2009). On one hand, Texas courts
have held: “Texas law does not require citizenship or the possession of immigration work
authorization permits as a prerequisite to recovering damages for lost earning capacity.
Therefore, the fact that [the plaintiff] was not a United States citizen at the time of the
accident has no bearing on his ability to recover damages for lost earning capacity.” Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 247 (Tex. App. 2003); see also Grocers Supply, Inc.
v. Cabello, 390 S.W.3d 707, 721 (Tex. App. 2012) (Hoffman does not apply to personal
injury damages). Other courts have addressed the issue as a factual matter to be decided
based on the proof in a particular case. See Ayala v. Lee, 81 A.3d 584, 598 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2013) (“whether a party is entitled to United States earnings or home country earnings
is a question of fact, because it necessarily depends on the jury determining the likelihood
of whether or not the party will remain in the United States for the duration of the awarded
compensation”); Madeira v. Affordable Housing Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507
(S.D. N.Y. 2004) (“In New York, alien plaintiffs are free to establish that their earning
capacity has been diminished as a result of an accident.”).
Despite the lack of consensus, the Court is persuaded that Oklahoma would join the
jurisdictions that have declined to erect a legal bar to recovery by an undocumented alien of
compensatory damages caused by a tortfeasor, but would treat the issue as a matter of factual
12
proof. Under Oklahoma tort law, “recovery may be had for all the natural and proximate
consequences of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission, such as pain and suffering, . . .
loss of time and earning capacity, loss of profits, ill-health or disability naturally resulting
from the wrong or injury, subsequent aggravations of the injury proximately traceable to the
original wrong, and any other damage that can reasonably be said to have followed as the
proximate consequence of the injury received.” Shebester, Inc. v. Ford, 361 P.2d 200, 202
(Okla. 1961) (internal quotation omitted). An award of damages for a decrease in earning
capacity does not require proof of a specific loss of earnings. See Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Reese, 425 P.2d 465, 469 (Okla. 1967) (“unemployed plaintiff is entitled to recover
for loss of earning capacity”). The rule in Oklahoma is that, unless there is “no competent
evidence reasonably tending to show that plaintiff’s future earning capacity would be
impaired,” this item of alleged damages is properly submitted to the jury for consideration.
See St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McBride, 376 P.2d 214, 219 (Okla. 1961).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Carlos Morales should have an opportunity to
prove lost future wages in the United States or lost earning capacity based on United States
wages, if warranted by the evidence.
E.
Admissibility of Plaintiffs’ Expert Opinions
As stated above, Defendant challenges the admissibility of expert opinion testimony
by Mr. Moe and Dr. Lichtblau regarding Carlos Morales’ loss of future wages and future
medical expenses because they “are derived exclusively from the wages and lifestyle choices
of American workers using statistical average American values.” See Def.’s Mot. Exclude
13
Opinions and Testimony [Doc. No. 40], p.12. Defendant contends the experts’ opinions are
unreliable because they fail to account for factors that are unique to Carlos Morales, such as
his immigration status, illegal United States employment, and possible deportation or
voluntary return to Guatemala. Id.
When the opinion testimony of an expert is challenged under Rule 702 and Daubert,
the proponent of the testimony bears the burden of establishing its admissibility. See United
States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). “In
performing [the district court’s] gatekeeper role, the judge must assess the reasoning and
methodology underlying the expert’s opinion, then determine whether it is scientifically valid
and applicable to a particular set of facts.” In re Williams Sec. Litigation-WCG Subclass, 558
F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). The question presented by
Defendant’s Daubert Motion, which is based solely on the experts’ written reports, is
whether Plaintiffs can sufficiently demonstrate that Mr. Moe’s and Dr. Lichtblau’s methods
of calculating Carlos Morales’ future losses are reliably linked to the facts of his case.
In response to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiffs present the affidavits of Mr. Moe and
Dr. Lichtblau explaining the facts and data on which they relied in reaching the conclusion
that Carlos Morales’ diminished earning capacity and future medical needs should be
calculated using United States rates. Defendant’s reply brief is silent concerning this
additional information, and despite a footnote in the Motion regarding supplementation after
the experts’ depositions were taken, Defendant has never asked to file a supplemental brief.
See Def.’s Mot. Exclude Opinions and Testimony [Doc. No. 40], p.1 n.1.
14
Were the Court to address the issue of the reliability of the experts’ opinions based
solely on the contents of their reports, Defendant’s argument that the experts failed to
adequately tailor their opinions to the facts of Carlos Morales’ case might be persuasive.
Viewed in the context of explanations provided in the experts’ affidavits, however, the Court
finds that their opinions are adequately supported and reliably linked to the facts of Carlos
Morales’ situation.
Mr. Moe explains his decision to utilize wage rates from employment at National Beef
Packing Company based on immigration statistics regarding undocumented workers in the
national economy, Mr. Morales’ employment history and past behavior, a “statistically
insignificant” possibility of deportation, and a lack of evidence that Carlos Morales would
have considered returning to Guatemala if the accident had not occurred. See Moe Aff. [Doc.
No. 57-1], ¶¶ 5-6. After considering relevant economic factors, Mr. Moe concludes that
“more likely than not, the earning capacity Mr. Morales lost due to the accident prevented
employment which otherwise would have occurred in the United States, notwithstanding his
civil immigration status.” Id. ¶ 6.
Dr. Lichtblau similarly explains his decision to utilize medical care standards and
rates in the United States in forming his opinions regarding Carlos Morales’ future medical
needs. Dr. Lichtblau states his medical opinion that the level of care available in Guatemala
to a person with Mr. Morales’ extensive medical needs is not reasonable. Dr. Lichtblau bases
this opinion on published literature regarding health care in Guatemala, his personal
experience providing medical care in Central America, and documented civil rights issues
15
in Guatemala regarding discriminatory treatment of disabled persons like Mr. Morales, who
has paraplegia. Dr. Lichtblau takes into account Carlos Morales’ testimony that he has
considered returning to Guatemala because he lacks family support and assistance in the
United States to meet his attendant care needs; this consideration would be alleviated by
Dr. Lichtblau’s plan for in-home assistance. Finally, like Mr. Moe, Dr. Lichtblau considers
Mr. Morales’ immigration status and finds a “statistically insignificant” possibility of
deportation, but Dr. Lichtblau further finds that Mr. Morales likely would qualify for a
medical hardship exemption if he ever became the subject of a deportation proceeding. See
Lichtblau Aff. [Doc. No. 57-2], ¶¶ 8-9. Finally, Dr. Lichtblau notes that unauthorized
immigrants are not legally prohibited from receiving medical care in the United States.
Absent any indication that the experts’ opinions are not grounded in the methodology
or expertise of their respective fields, which Defendant does not suggest, the Court finds that
Mr. Moe and Dr. Lichtblau have tailored their opinions regarding Carlos Morales’ loss of
future earnings and future medical expenses to the facts of his case. Defendant’s criticisms
of Mr. Moe’s and Dr. Lichtblau’s opinions go to the weight rather than the admissibility of
their testimony.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in
its favor on Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of warranty and defective marketing or inadequate
warnings. However, genuine disputes of material facts preclude summary judgment on all
16
other issues raised by Defendant. Further, the Court finds that the opinion testimony of
Plaintiffs’ economic and medical rehabilitation experts should not be excluded.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Cooper Tire & Rubber Company’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 52] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,
as set forth herein, and Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Opinions and Testimony
of Plaintiffs’ Experts, Roderick C. Moe and Craig Lichtblau, M.D. [Doc. No. 40] is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2015.
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?