Rayner v. Union Pacific Railroad Company et al
Filing
158
ORDER denying 57 Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 12/1/2014. (ks)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MITZI JAYNE RAYNER, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Gary
Don Rayner (Deceased),
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, and
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION
MID-CONTINENT, INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-13-46-M
ORDER
This case is scheduled for trial on the Court’s January 2015 trial docket.
Before the Court is defendant The Union Pacific Railroad Company’s (“Union Pacific”)
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 2, 2014. On June 30, 2014, plaintiff filed her response,
and on July 10, 2014, plaintiff filed a supplement to her response. On July 14, 2014, Union Pacific
filed its reply, and on September 2, 2014, Union Pacific filed its reply to plaintiff’s supplemental
response. Based upon the parties’ submissions, the Court makes its determination.
I.
Introduction
This case arises out of a vehicle-train collision occurring on March 1, 2012. Mr. Rayner’s,
plaintiff’s husband, vehicle was struck by a Union Pacific train, and Mr. Rayner did not survive the
collision. Plaintiff has brought suit against Union Pacific seeking damages due to his death. Union
Pacific now moves for summary judgment.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving
party is entitled to summary judgment where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. When applying this standard, [the Court] examines
the record and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (10th Cir.
1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Furthermore, the non-movant has a burden
of doing more than simply showing there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.
Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Neustrom v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 156 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
III.
Discussion
Union Pacific moves this Court for summary judgment on the following bases: (1) Mr.
Rayner’s violation of various Oklahoma statutes constitutes negligence per se and is the proximate
cause of the collision, thereby negating any alleged acts of negligence by Union Pacific; (2) Mr.
Rayner was a trespasser and, as such, has no cause of action against Union Pacific; (3) the statute
of repose bars any claim regarding the design of the crossing; (4) any claims as to the adequacy of
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the train’s warning devices are barred by federal preemption; and (5) any claims related to the speed
of the train are barred by federal preemption.
A.
Negligence per se/proximate cause
To constitute negligence per se, (1) the violation of a statute or
ordinance must have caused the injury, (2) the harm sustained must
have been of a type intended to be prevented by the statute or
ordinance, and (3) the injured party must be one of the class intended
to be protected by the statute.
Hamilton v. Allen, 852 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted).1 If a
party is found to be negligent per se, that party’s negligence breaks the causal chain between a
defendant’s negligence and the injury if the negligent per se party’s actions are the proximate cause
of his injury.
Generally, the proximate cause of an injury in a negligence case is for
the jury to determine. It becomes a question of law for the court only
when there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find
a causal nexus between the defendant’s alleged negligent act and the
injury.
Akin v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 977 P.2d 1040, 1054 (Okla. 1998).
Union Pacific asserts that Mr. Rayner violated the following Oklahoma Statutes: (1) Okla.
Stat. tit. 47, § 11-701(A)(3),(4); (2) Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-703; and (3) Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11801(E).2 Section 11-701(A)(3),(4) provides:
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The parties do not dispute that the harm sustained by Mr. Rayner was of a type intended to
be prevented by the statutes relied upon by Union Pacific or that Mr. Rayner was one of the class
intended to be protected by the statutes in question.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court, when presented with conclusive evidence, has held that a
driver’s violation of these statutes constitutes the proximate cause of his injuries/death. See Akin,
977 P.2d at 1056; Hamilton, 852 P.2d at 699-701.
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A. Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad
grade crossing under any of the circumstances stated in this section,
the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty (50) feet but not less
than fifteen (15) feet from the nearest rail of such railroad, and shall
not proceed until he can do so safely. The foregoing requirements
shall apply when:
*
*
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3. A railroad train approaching within approximately one thousand
five (1,500) hundred feet of the highway crossing emits a signal
audible from such distance and such railroad train, by reason of its
speed or nearness to such crossing, is an immediate hazard;
4. An approaching railroad train is plainly visible and is in hazardous
proximity to such crossing; . . . .
Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-701(A)(3),(4). Section 11-703 provides, in pertinent part:
(d) Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or trafficcontrol signal, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop
intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop before entering the
crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, in the event there is
no crosswalk, shall stop at a clearly-marked stop line, but if none,
then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver
has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before
entering the intersection.
Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-703(d). Finally, section 11-801(E) provides, in pertinent part:
The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of
subsection A of this section, drive at an appropriate reduced speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade
crossing . . . .
Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-801(E).
Union Pacific contends that the video of the accident taken by the video camera mounted on
the front of the train conclusively establishes that Mr. Rayner violated the above-referenced statutes
when he failed to stop at the crossing and yield to the train. Having carefully reviewed the video,
and noting that the train’s horn was clearly blown and that there was a stop sign at the crossing, the
Court finds that while extremely supportive of Union Pacific’s contention that Mr. Rayner violated
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certain statutes, the video does not “conclusively demonstrate” that Mr. Rayner was negligent per
se because he violated one or several of the above-referenced statutes and, thus, was the proximate
cause of the accident. A review of the video reveals that Mr. Rayner’s view of the train may have
been partially obstructed by vegetation. Additionally, the video shows that Mr. Rayner did stop his
vehicle a certain distance before the railroad tracks. It is unclear what Mr. Rayner would have been
able to see when his vehicle was stopped.
Accordingly, because the video does not conclusively demonstrate that Mr. Rayner was
negligent per se, the Court finds that Union Pacific is not entitled to summary judgment on this
basis.
B.
Trespasser
Union Pacific contends that the road and crossing upon which Mr. Rayner was traveling was
private, and the landowner did not give Mr. Rayner permission to be on the road. Union Pacific,
therefore, contends that Mr. Rayner was trespassing on private property and Union Pacific, thus,
owed no duty to Mr. Rayner other than not to injure him wilfully or intentionally when his peril
came to the notice of the company. Because plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that Union Pacific
willfully or intentionally injured Mr. Rayner, Union Pacific asserts that plaintiff’s claim fails as a
matter of law.
In her response, plaintiff asserts that Mr. Rayner was a surveyor employed by White Hawk
Engineering & Design, LLC, which was working under an agreement with Oklahoma Department
of Transportation contractor, A.M. Cohron & Son, Inc., to provide surveying services in connection
with bridge work being performed on U.S. Highway 81. Based upon Okla. Stat. tit. 69, § 702,
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plaintiff contends that Mr. Rayner was not a trespasser. In its reply, Union Pacific asserts the notice
required under section 702 was never provided, and, thus, Mr. Rayner was a trespasser.
Section 702 provides:
The [Oklahoma] Department [of Transportation], through its
authorized agents and employees, may enter upon any lands, waters,
and premises in the state for the purpose of making surveys,
soundings and drillings, and examinations as may be determined
necessary or convenient for the purpose of establishing, locating,
relocating, constructing, and maintaining state highways or
relocations thereof and facilities necessary and incidental thereto.
Such entry shall not be deemed a trespass, nor shall an entry for such
purpose be deemed an entry under any condemnation proceedings
which may be then pending; but notice shall be given to the owner of
or person residing on the premises, personally or by registered mail,
at least ten (10) days prior to such entry.
Okla. Stat. tit. 69, § 702 (emphasis added).
Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, and having carefully reviewed section
702, the Court finds that Mr. Rayner was not a trespasser. Assuming that notice was not provided
as required by section 702, the Court finds that the failure to provide notice does not abolish the
statute’s clear language that a surveyor entering land as an agent of the Oklahoma Department of
Transportation is not trespassing. The Court finds the language of section 702 simply does not
support a finding that a failure to provide notice abdicates the statute’s conveyance of non-trespasser
status. Accordingly, the Court finds that Union Pacific is not entitled to summary judgment on this
basis.
C.
Design of crossing claim
Union Pacific contends Oklahoma’s statute of repose bars any claim regarding the design
of the crossing at issue. In her response, plaintiff states that she is not bringing a claim for negligent
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design of the crossing at issue. Accordingly, the Court finds Union Pacific’s request for summary
judgment as to any claim for negligent design of the crossing is moot.
D.
Claims as to the adequacy of the train’s warning devices
Union Pacific contends any claims plaintiff is alleging regarding the adequacy of the train’s
warning devices are barred by federal preemption. In her response, plaintiff states she is not
contesting the adequacy of the train’s dimensions, lights, horn, etc. Accordingly, the Court finds
Union Pacific’s request for summary judgment as to any claims as to the adequacy of the train’s
warning devices is moot.
E.
Claims as to speed of the train
Union Pacific contends that any claims related to the speed of the train are also barred by
federal preemption. Based upon a review of the file in this case, as well as the lack of any response
by plaintiff to this contention, the Court finds that plaintiff is not asserting any claim related to the
speed of the train. Accordingly, the Court finds that Union Pacific’s request for summary judgment
as to any claims related to the speed of the train is moot.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Union Pacific’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [docket no. 57].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of December, 2014.
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