Blueberry et al v. Comanche County Facilities Authority et al

Filing 218

ORDER granting 164 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 165 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 166 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 167 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 168 Motion for Summary Judgment, as more fully set out. Signed by Honorable David L. Russell on 4/28/16. (jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
NATASHA BLUEBERRY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COMANCHE COUNTY FACILITIES
AUTHORITY, a/k/a COMANCHE
COUNTY DETENTION CENTER,
d/b/a COMANCHE COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant.

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CIV-13-278-R

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on five separate motions for summary judgment,
filed by Defendant, Comanche County Facilities Authority (“the Authority”), a/k/a
Comanche County Detention Center (“CCDC”), addressing the claims of the various
Plaintiffs, all of whom were detained in the Comanche County Detention Center during 2011
and allege they were subjected to sexual assault at the hands of a jailer, Lamont Rainwater,
or other inmates with the cooperation of Rainwater. Plaintiffs have responded in opposition
to the motions. Having considered the parties submissions, the Court finds as follows.1
Although Defendant filed separate motions for summary judgment with regard to each
Plaintiff, the Court finds that resolution will be most expeditious with entry of a single order

1

At the outset the Court notes that Defendant repeatedly utilized briefing by incorporation, allegedly premised
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c). This reliance was inappropriate. Rule 10(c) provides that “[a] statement in a
pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.” Motions,
however, are not pleadings. Rule 10 does not contemplate briefing by incorporation and Defendant’s method increased
the Court’s workload by making it difficult to fully consider a single set of briefs by referencing other briefs, which in
turn incorporated a third brief.
With regard to Plaintiffs’ response briefs, to the extent Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Local Civil Rule
56.1(d) by failing to cite to evidence to contradict the Defendant’s numbered uncontested fact, the fact is deemed
admitted pursuant to Rule 56.1(e).

that can address the issue that exists in each of their cases, whether Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims that the CCDC violated their constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs concede Defendant’s contention that it is entitled to summary judgment as to their
claims arising under state law, and accordingly, Defendant’s motion is granted with regard
to the state tort constitutional claims.
“‘The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.’” Ribeau v. Katt, 681 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).
“A fact is material if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the
lawsuit. A dispute over a material fact is genuine if a rational jury could find in favor of the
nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th
Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be
discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “[A] party opposing a properly supported
motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d
1299, 1307 (10th Cir.1998) (“If the movant carries this initial burden, the non-movant may
not rest upon its pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial
2

as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Common to each Plaintiff was Lamont Rainwater, who was hired as a detention
officer at the CCDC on February 23, 2011, after receiving an honorable discharge from the
United States Army. The parties agree that there is no evidence of anything in Mr.
Rainwater’s background that would have given Mr. Cagle or Officer Gossen, the chief of
security who actually hired Mr. Rainwater, pause with regard to his background or
qualifications.2 Mr. Rainwater, however, was allegedly responsible for either sexually
harassing or assaulting, or permitting inmate/trustees to sexually assault each of the named
Plaintiffs as will be set forth in more detail below.3
Plaintiff Natasha Blueberry was booked into the Detention Center on March 25,
2011, and released to the custody of Oklahoma County on March 30, 2011. While at the
CCDC, she was housed in cell 123 on the first floor in the booking area. She alleges that on
March 26, 2011, she was taken by Rainwater to a shower area, in the corner of the booking
area, and that while in that area she was sexually assaulted by Rainwater and two male
inmate trustees. She alleges the same thing happened two more times in her four days at the
CCDC, on March 27 and 29, 2011, at approximately the same time of day and involving the
same guard and trustees. After the first assault, Plaintiff Blueberry alleges that she attempted

2

Mr. Rainwater died in a car accident, which apparently occurred shortly after he was removed from his duties
at the CCDC, and during an apparent attempt to elude police.
3

Certain of the Plaintiffs allege sexual assault or harassment by other employees of the CCDC as well. Mr.
Rainwater’s involvement was common to all Plaintiffs.

3

to get the attention of an unidentified female officer working in the booking area, yelling that
she had been raped. Ms. Blueberry contends the officer acted as if she did not understand.
Plaintiff Blueberry did not inform anyone else of what occurred until after her release from
the CCDC and after Plaintiff Griggs made her allegations.
Plaintiff Karen Thrash was incarcerated at the CCDC from March 25, 2011 until
August 3, 2011, absent between July 20 and July 25 while in federal custody. Her allegations
relate to her confinement on the third floor. She asserts that officer Rainwater and another
detention officer made multiple requests for her to expose her breasts. She testified that
Officer Rainwater demanded that she remove her clothing and masturbate while he watched
from the catwalk in exchange for providing her with a telephone number she had requested.
He thereafter entered her cell and raped her. A few days later he entered her cell and again
assaulted her. She testified that she believed other inmates might be aware of the assaults,
but she never reported them because she was unsure who to tell. She also alleges she was
subject to degrading and inappropriate comments during strip searches and that male guards
watched while she was strip-searched upon her return from federal custody.4
Plaintiff Lamara Glaze was incarcerated at the CCDC from January 13, 2011 until
June 1, 2011 in various locations on the third floor. She alleges she was subjected to verbal
assaults and harassment from Detention Officers Rainwater, Morris, Brown, Chewning, and

4

Included in Plaintiff Thrash’s deposition testimony is reference to an unreturned request to staff. The Court
is unable to discern from the testimony what the request to staff listed as the issue, that is did it complain about the
alleged sexual assault or some other transgression and to whom it was addressed and to whom it was presented. As such,
her testimony that “I think I did one time, but I never – I just had to write it on a request to staff and I never got it back”
is of limited value.

4

Rasco. She contends these statements were made to her in person and over the intercom and
included explicit language and sexual requests. She also alleges that officer Rainwater
exposed himself to her, raped her and her cellmate, and that she was sexually assaulted by
detention officer Angus Moore. She contends she complained about a female officer, Ms.
Fraze, staring at her while she bathed in the sink.5
Plaintiff Jessica Reese was detained at the CCDC from May 20, 2011 until May 24,
2011, in cell 123 in the booking area. She alleges she was asked by Officer Rainwater to
expose her breasts in exchange for a blanket. She also asserts that she was sexually assaulted
by two inmate trustees on the first day of her four days at the center, who had assistance from
Officer Rainwater, who rather than interceding, aided the assaults by providing each of the
trustees with a condom.
Plaintiff Dana Griggs was incarcerated at the CCDC from July 16, 2011 to November
23, 2011 in the booking area, cell 123. She testified that she was sexually assaulted by
Rainwater as well as by two inmate trustees, Wooden and Shaver, in the presence of officer
Rainwater, after he permitted them to gain access to her cell. Plaintiff Griggs complained to
employees of the CCDC which led to the suspension of officer Rainwater pending
investigation by the OSBI and ultimately this litigation.
As a preliminary issue, in each motion Defendant argues that detention officer
Rainwater was not acting under color of state law when he committed the variety of sexual

5

Plaintiff Glaze makes an allegation of rape against Mark Brown, however, the rape is alleged to have occurred
after her release from the CCDC.

5

offenses alleged by Plaintiffs. With regard to Plaintiff Glaze, Defendant raises the same issue
as to officers Angus Morris and Mark Brown. Defendant contends that because these officers
were not acting under color of state law, it is entitled to summary judgment because the
underlying claims arise out of their involvement in the alleged sexual assault of the Plaintiffs.
The Court disagrees.
There is no legal or factual basis for concluding that Mr. Rainwater, Mr. Morris or Mr.
Brown were not acting under color of state law at the time one or more of the men allegedly
sexually assaulted or permitted the assault of one or more of the Plaintiffs.
“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the
defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law.’ “ West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)).
“The authority with which the defendant is allegedly ‘clothed' may be either
actual or apparent.” Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d at 493. Accordingly, at a base
level, to find that an action was taken under color of state law, the court must
find that “‘the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right’
must be ‘fairly attributable to the State.’” Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom
Concert, 49 F.3d at 1447 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)).
Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1218-19 (D.N.M. 2013). Where, as here, the employee
was on duty, serving as a detention officer at the time he sexually assaulted or permitted the
sexual assault of a Plaintiff, and the assaults occurred while he was, at least pretending, to
perform his duties, the employee was acting under color of state law. But for each man’s
position as a detention officer for the CCDC he would have had no access to or authority
over the women he allegedly victimized or permitted others to victimize. Defendant is

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accordingly not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. The Court therefore turns to the
issue of whether Defendant has established the absence of any genuine issues of material fact
with regard to the potential for liability of the Authority.
The Authority cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. That one or
more of its employees may have harmed a Plaintiff is not sufficient to establish its liability.
Rather, each Plaintiff must ultimately demonstrate (1) the existence of a policy or custom by
which she was denied a constitutional right and (2) that the policy or custom was the moving
force behind the constitutional deprivation (i.e. that “there is a direct causal link between the
policy or custom and the injury alleged”). Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788
(10th Cir. 2010).
A municipal policy or custom may take the form of (1) “a formal regulation
or policy statement”; (2) an informal custom “amoun[ting] to ‘a widespread
practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal
policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with
the force of law’”; (3) “the decisions of employees with final policymaking
authority”; (4) “the ratification by such final policymakers of the
decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was
delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval”; or (5) the
“failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure
results from ‘deliberate indifference’ to the injuries that may be caused.”
Id. (citations omitted). It appears to the Court that Plaintiffs are pursuing relief under a theory
that the employees of the CCDC were not adequately supervised, which was the result of the
deliberate indifference of the final policymaker for the CCDC, Dale Cagle. Defendant does
not dispute that Cagle was the final policymaker for the Authority with regard to the
Detention Center during the relevant time period.

7

Under this standard, “an official or municipality acts with ‘indifference if its
conduct (or adopted policy) disregards a known or obvious risk that is very
likely to result in the violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights.” [Berry v.
City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1496 (0th Cir. 1990)]. Deliberate
indifference requires “a higher degree of fault than negligence, or even gross
negligence.” Id. at 1495 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 &
n.7 (1989)). The “mere fact that an assault occurs ... does not establish the
requisite indifference to a prisoner's constitutional rights.” Hovater v.
Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright,
802 F.2d 397, 403 (11th Cir. 1986)). Actual knowledge of an excessive risk is
not required. Imputation of constructive knowledge in this case requires a
showing that “the underlying unconstitutional misconduct was ‘so widespread
or flagrant that in the proper exercise of its official responsibilities the
governing body should have known of [it].’ ” Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488,
491 (10th Cir. 1995).
Kocsis v. County of Sedgwick, 2016 WL 1255593, *12 (D.Kan. Mar. 29, 2016).6 “In a
‘narrow range of circumstances,’ however, deliberate indifference may be found absent a
pattern of unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal rights is a ‘highly predictable’
or ‘plainly obvious’ consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction, such as when a
municipality fails to train an employee in specific skills needed to handle recurring situations,
thus presenting an obvious potential for constitutional violations.” Pulsipher, 143 F.3d at
1307-08 (citations omitted). The basis for Plaintiffs’ claims is the failure to supervise. In
order to prevail each Plaintiff must show there was an obvious risk that an inmate would be
sexually assaulted by a guard or by another inmate with the assistance of a guard, and that
the Authority, through Cagle, failed to act to prevent predictable violations of their

6

The underlying constitutional right at issue is the right to constitutionally adequate safety under either the
Eighth Amendment or the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. The status of the Plaintiffs, that is whether pretrial detainee
or post-conviction is not clear. Although the amendment may be different, the same standard applies. See Lopez v.
LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1999).

8

constitutional rights. Id.
Plaintiffs argue the Authority is liable because Dale Cagle consciously chose to
disregard the CCDC’s policies, particularly those addressing inmate sexual assault
complaints and the supervision of new employees. The Plaintiffs housed on the first floor of
the CCDC premise their arguments on the fact that Dale Cagle knew the booking area had
blind spots with regard to cameras and that he did not procure additional cameras until after
these events. Those Plaintiffs who were assaulted on the third floor argue that Cagle failed
to enforce his own policy of excluding male guards from the floor where females were
housed. Each Plaintiff argues that Cagle’s failure to perform performance appraisals on
Rainwater or any other guard during his tenure supports a finding of deliberate indifference
as well.
Plaintiffs rely primarily on two cases from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2005), and Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912
(10th Cir. 2008). The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that this case is
indistinguishable from that presented to the court in Gonzales and Tafoya. Although
Plaintiffs characterize Jail Administrator Cagle’s attitude as lackadaisical, a term used by the
court in Gonzales when it reversed the summary judgment granted to the defendants, the
undersigned finds the factual background in those cases distinguishable.
Gonzales, like the instant action, was premised on sexual assault. Two females alleged
assault by separate detention officers, including the jail administrator, on a single day. The
sheriff, Salazar, was rarely present at the jail and the inmates were granted what could be
9

described as “free rein” over the premises. On more than one occasion drunk inmates were
found inside the control room with access to the controls in the presence of staff members,
including one of the officers, Dominick, who was alleged to have sexually assaulted an
inmate. Staff members permitted assaults by inmates upon other inmates. Dominick had
been arrested for assault at a local bar for harassing dancers, and attempted to assert his
position as a detention officer at that time. The sole discipline imposed was a written warning
that covered a myriad of transgressions in which Dominick had engaged. Furthermore,
despite the fact that the accused men were the jail administrator and a detention officer, the
sheriff did not remove the women from the facility or otherwise attempt to protect them when
they complained. Rather, they were left for nearly a day in the custody of the men accused
of sexually assaulting them. The jail administrator attempted to assault his victim a second
time during this delay. The Tenth Circuit found the sheriff’s immediate response indicative
of his lackadaisical attitude. Additionally, prior complaints by inmates were virtually ignored
by the sheriff, who dismissed the complainants as troublemakers and the sheriff was well
aware that the jail administrator admittedly had no interest in investigating allegations of staff
misconduct.
Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2008), involved the same facility and same
sheriff as Gonzales. The plaintiff therein was sexually assaulted by a jailer on more than one
occasion, three years after the allegations in Gonzales. The 1998 assaults provided the sheriff
with notice of the dangerous jail conditions and the court concluded that
[g]iven his knowledge, Sheriff Salazar was under a duty not
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only to take reasonable measures to remedy the circumstances
that directly led to the sexual assaults, but to cure his own lack
of attention and unresponsiveness to inmate complaints and
other indicators of serious problems with his detention staff.
Id. at 917.
Here, however, the evidence prior to the assaults involving Mr. Rainwater does not
involve “egregiously undisciplined behavior of the detention staff” at the CCDC. Id.
Furthermore, none of the evidence cited by Plaintiffs, including the report issued by
Plaintiffs’ expert, establishes that Dale Cagle was presented with an obvious risk of
constitutional harm that would inevitably result in the type of injury any Plaintiff suffered.
The record reflects three potentially relevant instances involving different staff members,
none of which provides a basis for the conclusion that absent changes at the CCDC a rape
or rapes would “almost inevitably result.” See Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 745 (10th
Cir.1997) (“[A] local government policymaker is deliberately indifferent when he
deliberately or consciously fails to act when presented with an obvious risk of constitutional
harm which will almost inevitably result in constitutional injury of the type experienced by
the plaintiff.”)(internal quotation marks omitted).7 In February 2007, there was an alleged
consensual sexual relationship between inmate and jailer. Although such a relationship would
be illegal under Oklahoma law, if truly consensual it would not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir.2013)

7

There is no evidence that prior to Dana Griggs’ complaint in July 2011 that Dale Cagle or any other member
of administration at the CCDC had notice that Mr. Rainwater had engaged in any of the alleged activity. The only alleged
attempts at providing notice were Ms. Blueberry’s unsuccessful attempt to give notice to a female guard and Ms.
Thrash’s belief that she might have filed a request to staff.

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(consent to sex is a complete defense to an excessive force claim). The officer involved,
Hollars, was terminated. In June 2009 it was discovered that a male and female detainee were
engaging in consensual sexual activity, facilitated by employees of the CCDC who gave the
male inmate access to the female’s cell. An investigation was apparently conducted and the
officer involved resigned. Finally, in December 2009, a sergeant at the CCDC reported that
detention officer Killen, who had been employed since October 28, 2009, asked an inmate
to expose her breasts. Upon investigation an inmate indicated that Killen had made many
inappropriate sexually suggestive comments. A second inmate indicated the same. Killen was
terminated as a result of the incident.8
The Court concludes that with regard to the failure to eliminate any blind spots in the
booking area, where Plaintiffs Blueberry, Reece and Griggs allege they were raped, Plaintiffs
have presented no evidence that the absence of cameras presented an obvious risk that it was
very likely that not having cameras would result in violation of a prisoner’s constitutional
rights. See Kocsis, 2016 WL 1255593 at *12 (“Absent evidence to the contrary we assume
that jailers will not violate models of social decorum or otherwise commit a punishable
offense.”)(quoting Whitson v. Stone Cty. Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 927 (8th Cir. 2010)).
The same holds true with regard to the complaints of the two Plaintiffs assaulted while

8

Plaintiffs contend that under Mr. Cagle allegations by inmates regarding improprieties of detention officers
were not given credence. There is evidence to the effect that in 2009 Sergeant Chewning did not include certain inmate
allegations in the disciplinary proceedings against officer Killen because the allegations came from inmates. The
undisputed evidence, however, is that officer Killen was terminated as a result of his request over the intercom that
female inmates expose their breasts. Sergeant Chewning authored a statement indicating that in his opinion the
allegations were plausible. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a single instance of alleged impropriety with regard to
staff and inmate interactions where the employee retained his position.

12

detained on the third floor of the CCDC, Glaze and Thrash. The court addressed a similar
issue in Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 1993). Ms. Hovater sued the sheriff
alleging a failure to train and supervise, which she contended resulted in her being sexually
assaulted by a detention officer. The assault occurred when, in violation of more than one
policy of the Sedgwick County Jail, a male officer, without the presence of other officers,
supervised the female inmate. The court stated:
Under the facts alleged by Ms. Hovater, we must determine whether Sheriff
Hill disregarded an obvious risk to the safety of female inmates by allowing
a single male guard to have custody of a female inmate absent any indication
that the guard would assault her. The district court framed the issue in the same
way. “The issue is not whether Sheriff Hill and Sedgwick County had notice
of prior incidents of sexual misconduct between Robinson and female inmates.
Rather, the issue is that Robinson frequently had sole custody and care of
unsupervised female inmates.” Aplt. App. at 151. Thus, in order to determine
that a constitutional violation could have occurred, we must conclude that a
male guard having sole custody of a female inmate creates such a risk to her
safety that it constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and
unusual punishment clause. We are unable to do so.
Id. at 1066. The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish a constitutional
violation, noting that “to find a harm present in these circumstance would, in effect, require
the conclusion that every male guard is a risk to the bodily integrity of a female inmate
whenever the two are left alone. There is absolutely no evidence in this record to support that
conclusion.” Id. at 1068. The Court concludes the same holds true in this case. The mere fact
that male guards directly supervised female inmates is not sufficient to establish that the risk

13

of harm was apparent.9
With regard to Cagle’s failure to complete performance appraisals of newly hired
employees following 90 and 180 days of employment, or at all, Plaintiffs have failed to
establish how failure to follow such a policy caused any of the incidents herein. The mere
fact that performance appraisals were not completed provides an insufficient basis from
which the Court can conclude that Mr. Cagle was deliberately indifferent and that such
indifference led to the violation of any Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights for which the
Authority can be held liable. Although the court noted the absence of such reviews in
Gonzales and Tafoya, the facts of both of those cases presented, as noted above, a hands-off
approach by the sheriff, an absence of appropriate discipline and an atmosphere of
lawlessness within the detention facility.10 The Court concludes that the evidence herein does
not, as Plaintiffs argue, place this case on par with or worse than the scenarios presented by
those cases.
As is apparent from the evidence, the CCDC had at least one rogue employee and
perhaps others. However, the Court finds the evidence insufficient under extant authority,
that Defendant’s policies or lack of policies were a driving force behind the nightmare of
events alleged by Plaintiffs.
9

During the relevant time period the CCDC had policies that protected inmates from threats, intimidation and
physical harm, and sexual harassment. The personnel policy prohibited sexual contact of any kind between staff and
inmates.
10

To the extent Plaintiffs rely on the OSBI Report entitled “Interview of April Deenae Neville,” their reliance
is misplaced. The statements contained therein are hearsay to the extent Ms. Neville informed the OSBI agent that during
her first tenure at the CCDC rumors of officers engaged in sexual activity was inmates were rampant. Certain other
allegations in the statement are too vague as to provide support for Plaintiffs’ allegations given that Ms. Neville worked
at the CCDC at two different times, only one of which is relevant to this case.

14

Having considered the totality of the evidence presented by the parties in all five
motions for summary judgments, as well as the responses and replies thereto, the Court finds
that there are no disputed genuine issues of material fact, and construing the facts in favor
of the Plaintiffs, that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiffs have failed to
establish deliberate indifference by an official with policymaking authority as required to
establish liability of the Comanche County Facilities Authority. As such, Defendant’s
Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc. Nos. 164, 165, 166, 167, and 168] are hereby
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of April, 2016.

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