Roberts v. Southwest Youth and Family Services Inc et al

Filing 19

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss Defendant Southwest Youth and Family Services, Inc.'s (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 8/23/2013. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
BRANDY ROBERTS, formerly Ingram,

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Plaintiff,
v.
SOUTHWEST YOUTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES, INC. and STANLEY EUGENE
WILSON, JR., individually and in his official
capacity,
Defendants.

Case No. CIV-13-307-M

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Southwest Youth and Family Services, Inc.’s (“Southwest”)
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed May 9, 2013. Plaintiff’s response was filed on May
24, 2013, and Southwest’s reply was filed on May 31, 2013. Based upon the parties’ submissions
the Court makes its determination.
I.

Introduction
In April 2011, plaintiff was a participant and under the jurisdiction of the Caddo County,

Oklahoma Drug Court. Plaintiff alleges that while under the jurisdiction of the Drug Court in March
through July, 2011, she was subjected to improper sexual conduct by defendant Stanley Eugene
Wilson, Jr. (“Wilson”), her drug court coordinator. Plaintiff contends that Southwest, operating as
a governmental entity under contract with the Oklahoma State Department of Mental Health and the
Caddo County District Attorney’s office pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§471.1 et seq., selected
Wilson as the drug court coordinator. Plaintiff contends that Wilson while, exercising the powers
delegated to him by the State, beginning around the end of March or the first of April, 2011,

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coerced, extorted and compelled sexual conduct with her. Plaintiff contends Wilson’s conduct
continued through approximately the beginning of July 2011. Plaintiff asserts that Southwest is
liable for Wilson’s actions because it had prior notice of inappropriate behavior by Wilson towards
other female participants in Drug Court and was warned about the risk and impropriety of Wilson’s
unsupervised home visits and contact with such females. Plaintiff asserts that Southwest is liable
by virtue of its negligent supervision and retention of Wilson. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that
Southwest ignored the risk and warnings and acted with either deliberate indifference or reckless
disregard creating the danger causing injury to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges Southwest’s conduct
constitutes violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.
Southwest contends it cannot be liable for Wilson’s alleged sexual assault under Oklahoma
law or § 1983. Southwest contends that employer liability under § 1983 cannot be based upon
respondeat superior because an employer does not possess the required intent to deprive another of
a constitutional right. Southwest also asserts that as a governmental entity, it is entitled to sovereign
immunity, and that plaintiff has failed to comply with the notice and pleading requirements of the
Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”).1
II.

Standard of Review
Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

the United States Supreme Court has held:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

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Plaintiff concedes in her response that her claims for the torts of assault and battery are
barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that
are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Additionally, “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 678 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Finally, “[a] court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff’s
factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
III.

Discussion
A.

Section 1983

Plaintiff alleges violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Southwest. “To state a claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). “Liability cannot be imposed on an entity
under section 1983 based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Briggs v. Oklahoma, 472 F. Supp.
2d 1304, 1313 (W.D. Okla. 2007); Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.[s], 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Thus, to the extent that plaintiff has sought to impose liability on Southwest based on Wilson’s
conduct, Southwest is entitled to dismissal of this claim.
Plaintiff also alleges Southwest is liable under § 1983 because it had prior notice of
inappropriate behavior by Wilson towards the females he supervised and that Southwest ignored the
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risks and warnings and thereby created the danger that resulted in plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff fails
to submit any factual support for its conclusory allegation that Southwest was warned or given
notice of prior inappropriate behavior by Wilson. Plaintiff does state in her complaint that
Southwest, “a governmental entity . . . exercising authority vested in [it] by State law” is liable for
its government employees’ sexual assaults on plaintiff. Plaintiff contends such assaults are a
violation of plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and, therefore, Southwest is directly
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In her Complaint, plaintiff states she is suing Southwest and Wilson as government actors
and that at all times Southwest was operating as a governmental entity exercising authority vested
by State law. See Complaint at p. 2. Plaintiff also states the Drug Court program, a governmental
branch exercising governmental powers under Okla. Stat. tit. 22 §§ 471.1 et seq., delegated certain
administrative responsibilities to Southwest. Plaintiff alleges that Southwest failed to supervise
Wilson during home visits of females under his charge and that Southwest was somehow warned
of the possible risk that its employee would assault plaintiff causing her injury.
Southwest asserts it cannot be liable for the alleged sexual assault by its employee under §
1983 because any employee that commits a sexual assault, as alleged herein, is not acting within the
scope of his employment. See Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Okla. City, 188 P.3d 158 (Okla. 2008).
Southwest also asserts that plaintiff has failed to allege Southwest possessed the required intent to
deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right or that Southwest was somehow personally involved or
participated in the alleged deprivation. See Briggs, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.

“It is firmly established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when

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he abuses the position given to him by the State. Thus, generally, a public employee acts under
color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities
pursuant to state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 50 (internal citations omitted). In order to prevail
under § 1983 a plaintiff is also required to plead facts demonstrating that each defendant participated
in conduct while acting under the color of law, resulting in the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. See N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 600 (Okla. 1999).
Additionally, to hold Southwest, a governmental body liable, plaintiff must demonstrate that “the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officer,” such that an
official policy is responsible for a deprivation of constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.
Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). It is also clear that government entities such as
Southwest can be sued “for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental custom
even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decision
making channels.” Id. at 691.
The Court, upon review of plaintiff’s Complaint, finds plaintiff has failed to present any
factual support of wrong doing by Southwest or factual basis for imposition of § 1983 liability.
Rather, plaintiff simply makes conclusory allegations that Southwest’s failure to properly supervise
its governmental employee violates her constitutional rights. Plaintiff makes no reference to any
policy or custom promulgated by Southwest or that the Southwest is responsible for the alleged
deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Additionally, plaintiff has failed to assert Southwest
possessed the required intent to violate plaintiff’s rights as alleged. Accordingly, the Court grants
Southwest’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

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B.

Time Limitation of State Law Claims

Plaintiff also asserts several state law claims against Southwest, including assault and
battery, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision and
retention of Wilson. Plaintiff contends that while Southwest, during all relevant times, was
“operating as a governmental entity and exercising authority vested in [it] by State law”, more facts
are needed before it can be determined whether Southwest is entitled to governmental immunity.
Complaint, at page 2. Southwest contends because plaintiff makes no reference to having met the
notice requirements of the GTCA prior to the filing of this lawsuit, plaintiff’s tort claims are barred.
The GTCA, the exclusive vehicle of recovery against an Oklahoma non-exempt
governmental entity, requires that all claims against defendants be raised within one year of their
occurrence or forever be barred. Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 156(A). Plaintiff alleges that beginning the
end of March or early April, 2011, Southwest’s employee “using his position of power granted by
his state conferred title and authority, coerced, extorted and compelled sexual conduct with the
Plaintiff.” Complaint, at page 2. Because any claims arising prior to March 29, 2012 are timebarred, Southwest contends that plaintiff may not bring her state law tort claims. Plaintiff counters
that more facts are needed to determine whether Southwest, a governmental entity, is entitled to
governmental immunity.
The Court, having carefully reviewed the submissions of the parties, finds that Southwest
is a governmental entity as defined by the GTCA and at all times relevant, was acting pursuant to
State law. See Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152(11)(o). Because it remains uncontested that plaintiff has
failed to meet the notice requirements of the GTCA, plaintiff’s tort claims are are barred.
IV.

Conclusion

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Southwest Youth and Family
Services, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [docket no. 7] and DISMISSES all claims
against Southwest Youth and Family Services, Inc.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of August, 2013.

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