Martin-Barber v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority

Filing 53

ORDER granting 49 defendant's motion to dismiss as to plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim and declines to entertain jurisdiction over plaintiff's Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act claim and dismissing it without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 4/11/2014. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DEBRA A. MARTIN-BARBER,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
ex rel. OKLAHOMA HEALTH
CARE AUTHORITY, and
KARA KEARNS, an individual,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-13-349-M

ORDER
This case is scheduled for trial on the Court’s June 2014 trial docket.
Before the Court is Defendant Oklahoma Health Care Authority’s (“OHCA”) Motion to
Dismiss, filed January 30, 2014. On February 20, 2014, plaintiff filed her response, and on
February 27, 2014, OHCA filed its reply. Based on the parties’ submissions the Court makes its
determination.
I.

Background
Plaintiff, a 59 year old African-American female, was employed continuously by OHCA

from on or about August 27, 2003 until she was terminated on June 6, 2012. On March 10, 2013,
plaintiff filed this instant action alleging employment discrimination based on race in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”).
On September 30, 2013, plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint adding a state law claim for
employment discrimination based upon age and race pursuant to the Oklahoma AntiDiscrimination Act, as amended, Okla. Stat. tit. 25, §§ 101 et seq. (“OADA”) and a state law
claim for tortious interference with employment against an additional named defendant Kara

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Kearns (“Kearns”), an individual.1 On January 9, 2014, plaintiff filed her Second Amended
Complaint.2
II.

Standard for Dismissal
Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the United States Supreme Court has held:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pleading that
offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Id. at 678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “While the 12(b)(6)
standard does not require that Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements
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Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed her claims against defendant Kara Kearns [docket no.
33], and Mrs. Kerns has been dismissed without prejudice from this case.
2

In the Court’s December 30, 2013 Order, plaintiff was granted leave to file a second
amended complaint in order to specifically allege facts regarding her Title VII and OADA
claims.
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of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible
claim.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012). Finally, “[a] court
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true
and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
III.

Discussion
A.

Title VII Race Discrimination

Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To set forth a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff must establish that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position at issue, and (4) she was treated less
favorably than others not in the protected class. See Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192 (internal citation
omitted).

OHCA asserts that plaintiff has failed to make a plausible claim for race

discrimination, and plaintiff contends that she has set forth enough facts to establish a prima
facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII.
Having carefully reviewed the Second Amended Complaint, and presuming all of
plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
the Court finds that plaintiff has not set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for
race discrimination under Title VII. Specifically, plaintiff alleges she is a black 59 year-old
woman that was qualified for her position as Senior Human Resources Coordinator at OHCA,
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and that Kearns, as her supervisor, over-scrutinized her work performance, gave her a write up
and suspension without pay, and ultimately terminated her because of her race. Plaintiff further
alleges that Kearns refused to provide her assistance and training that was given to non-black coworkers and that plaintiff was treated differently upon her termination than Teri Dalton, a white
female. Plaintiff alleges that despite Dalton having genuine performance problems, she was
allowed to resign her employment, take early retirement, paid severance benefits, and was
informed her unemployment would not be contested by OHCA, all of which plaintiff claims was
not offered to her upon her termination. Sec. Amd. Compl. ¶ 23. The Court finds that while it
may be conceivable that the alleged conduct by Kearns and OHCA was motivated by plaintiff’s
race, the racial discrimination claims plaintiff has set forth are not plausible, but are merely
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Accordingly, the Court finds that
plaintiff’s Title VII claims should be dismissed.
B.

OADA Race and Age Discrimination

As the Title VII claim is no longer before the Court, and it was the sole basis for this
Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction of the remaining OADA
claim and dismisses it without it prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss [docket no. 49] as to plaintiff’s Title VII race discrimination claim and DECLINES to
entertain jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act claim and DISMISSES
it without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of April, 2014.

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