Racher et al v. Lusk et al

Filing 156

ORDER denying 144 defendants' Motion to Bifurcate Trial, or in the Alternative Motion for Severance and finding defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings for Claims of Doris Racher, Sandra Cisper, and Earlene Adkisson [docket no. 144] is now moot (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 12/22/2015. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DORIS RACHER,
SANDRA CISPER,
EARLENE ADKISSON, Co-Personal
Representatives of the ESTATE OF
ERYETHA MAYBERRY,
DECEASED, and
JAMES KINGSBURY, Personal
Representative of the Estate of and Next
of Kin to Rachel Mary Kingsbury,
Deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RON LUSK, an Individual,
WESTLAKE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, a Texas Corporation, and
WESTLAKE NURSING HOME
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Oklahoma
limited partnership, formerly d/b/a
Quail Creek Nursing and Rehabilitation
Center,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-13-665-M

ORDER
Before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for
Severance, and Motion to Stay Proceedings for Claims of Doris Racher, Sandra Cisper, and Earlene
Adkisson, filed November 13, 2015. On December 4, 2015, plaintiffs filed their response, and on
December 11, 2015, defendants filed their reply. Based upon the parties’ submissions, the Court
makes its determination.

I.

Introduction
The instant action involves fraudulent transfer claims brought by the following two plaintiff

groups: (1) Doris Racher, Sandra Cisper, and Earlene Adkisson, co-personal representatives of the
estate of Eryetha Mayberry, deceased (“Mayberry Plaintiffs”), and (2) James Kingsbury, personal
representative of the estate of and next of kin to Rachel Mary Kingsbury, deceased (“Kingsbury
Plaintiff”). The claims of both plaintiff groups allege fraudulent transfers relating to the transfer of
the same nursing home sales proceeds and Medicaid and Medicare receipts following the sale of the
nursing home. Further, the claims of the plaintiff groups are based on two discrete judgments. The
Kingsbury Plaintiff obtained a judgment against defendant Westlake Nursing Home Limited
Partnership based on a jury verdict entered on February 28, 2014; the judgment awarded was for
$349,427.23, and as of August 15, 2015, the Kingsbury Plaintiff’s claim totaled about $382,713.
The Mayberry Plaintiffs obtained a judgment based on a jury verdict for damages of $1,210,000
against defendants Westlake Nursing Home Limited Partnership and Westlake Management
Company on February 18, 2015. Defendants now move this Court to bifurcate the trial of the
Kingsbury Plaintiff’s claim and the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(b), or in the alternative, to sever the claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
21. Additionally, defendants move for a stay of the proceedings related to the Mayberry Plaintiffs’
claim until final resolution of Case No. CIV-13-364-M in the Western District of Oklahoma.
II.

Motion to Bifurcate
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides, in pertinent part: “[f]or convenience, to avoid

prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate
issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). “The
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give district courts broad discretion in deciding whether to sever
issues for trial and the exercise of that discretion will be set aside only if clearly abused.” Easton
v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985). However, ordering a separate trial
is an abuse of discretion if it is unfair or prejudicial to a party. See Angelo v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993).
Defendants assert that separate trials for the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ claim and the Kingsbury
Plaintiff’s claim are warranted in order to avoid undue prejudice to defendants and to prevent
confusion of the jury. Specifically, defendants assert that separate trials are necessary for the
following reasons: (1) evidence relating to the Kingsbury judgment is not relevant to or admissible
for the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ fraudulent transfer claim, and evidence relating to the Mayberry
judgment is not relevant to or admissible for the Plaintiff Kingsbury’s fraudulent transfer claim; (2)
the damages sought by the Mayberry Plaintiffs are significantly greater than the damages sought by
the Kingsbury Plaintiff; (3) the facts and circumstances relating to the Kingsbury judgment and the
Mayberry judgment are considerably different; (4) at least one legal defense, equitable estoppel,
applies to the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ claim but not the Kingsbury Plaintiff’s claim; and (5) the lawsuit
related to the Kingsbury Plaintiff’s claim was already on file when the sale of the nursing home
occurred, but the lawsuit related to the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ claim had not been filed when the sale
of the nursing home occurred, and defendants state they will offer evidence that the Mayberry
Plaintiffs had repeatedly informed the staff at the nursing home that they would not be filing such
a lawsuit.
Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that separate trials for
the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ claim and the Kingsbury Plaintiff’s claim are not warranted in this case.
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Specifically, the Court finds that defendants will not be unduly prejudiced by a single trial and that
a single trial will not confuse the jury. First, the Court finds that because Oklahoma’s Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the
debtor made the transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor, see
Okla. Stat. tit. 24, §116(A)(1), evidence regarding the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ claim is likely relevant
to the Kingsbury Plaintiff’s claim and evidence regarding the Kingsbury Plaintiff’s claim is likely
relevant to the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ claim. Second, while the damages sought by the Kingsbury
Plaintiff and the Mayberry Plaintiffs are greatly different, the damage amounts are set by the prior
judgments and, thus, the actual amount of damages will not be determined by the jury. Third, while
the facts and circumstances relating to the Kingsbury judgment and the Mayberry judgment are
considerably different, the Court finds that these differences do not warrant separate trials. The
issues in this case involve the alleged fraudulent transfers, and any evidence regarding the facts and
circumstances relating to the judgments will be minimal. Fourth, because the jury can be adequately
instructed to only consider the equitable estoppel defense in relation to the Mayberry Plaintiffs’
claim, the Court finds that separate trials are not warranted. Finally, the Court finds that bifurcating
the trials would, in fact, result in two duplicate trials with the same witnesses and evidence being
presented.
Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants’ motion to bifurcate should be denied.
III.

Motion for Severance
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides, in pertinent part: “[o]n motion or on its own,

the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim
against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. For the same reasons they rely on to bifurcate the trial,
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defendants assert that this Court should sever the Kingsbury Plaintiff’s claim from the Mayberry
Plaintiffs’ claim. As the Court has denied defendants’ motion to bifurcate, and for the same reasons
set forth above, the Court finds that defendants’ motion for severance should be denied.
IV.

Motion to Stay Proceedings
Defendants also request the Court to stay the proceedings for the Mayberry Plaintiffs’ claim

until resolution of the post-trial motions in Case No. CIV-13-364-M. Subsequent to defendants
filing the instant motion, the Court denied the pending post-trial motions in Case No. CIV-13-364M. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants’ motion to stay proceedings is now moot.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate Trial,

or in the Alternative Motion for Severance [docket no. 144] and FINDS defendants’ Motion to Stay
Proceedings for Claims of Doris Racher, Sandra Cisper, and Earlene Adkisson [docket no. 144] is
now MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 2015.

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