Pierce v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections et al

Filing 11

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 11/20/2013. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LEE ANN PIERCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-13-713-M

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support, filed on September
24, 2013. On October 21, 2013, plaintiff filed her response. Based upon the parties’ submissions,
the Court makes its determination.
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff, a pro se litigant1, filed the instant action seeking relief against the State of

Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), and the Director of the Department
of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that defendants refuse to recognize her marriage by proxy or
common law marriage to inmate Robert Waylon Pierce (“inmate Pierce”) who is incarcerated at
defendants’ facilities. Construing plaintiff’s complaint liberally, as the Court must, it appears that
plaintiff is alleging that defendants violated her constitutional right to marry when they refused to
allow her visitations with inmate Pierce on the basis that defendants no longer recognize her proxy

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(1972).

Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21

or common law marriage to him.2
II.

Standard
Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the United States Supreme Court has held:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that
are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 679 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pleading that offers labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at
678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A court “must determine whether the complaint
sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief
under the legal theory proposed.” Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Further, “[a] court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint

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In her Complaint, plaintiff moves the Court to appoint her counsel for this litigation.
The Court does not address plaintiff’s request for a court appointed attorney because it is not
properly raised before the Court. Plaintiff must file a separate motion for such request in
compliance with the Local Rules.
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presumes all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
Lastly, the Court construes a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. Gaines v. Stenseng, 292
F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002). However, pro se parties must still follow the same rules of
procedure that govern other litigants. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
(10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted).
III.

Discussion
Defendants assert that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because (1) she failed to

state a claim for which relief can be granted, (2) she fails to allege a claim for violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, and (3) she fails to allege a claim for injunctive relief because she does not show
that there is an ongoing violation of her constitutional rights.
A.

Failure to State a Claim

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
for which relief can be granted. Specifically, defendants assert that plaintiff failed to set forth a short
and plain statement of jurisdiction and entitlement to relief. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
requires a short and plain statement of: (1) the grounds for the Court's jurisdiction, (2) the claim
showing entitlement to relief, and (3) demand for the relief sought.
Defendants assert that it is not clear what plaintiff’s claims are exactly or what actions
defendants engaged in that form the basis of her claims. Defendants contend that plaintiff simply
names ODOC and the State of Oklahoma with no facts to support her claims that meet the
requirements of Rule 8.
Having reviewed the complaint and the parties’ submissions carefully, construing pro se

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plaintiff’s claims liberally as it must, and presuming all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff has set forth
short and plain statement of jurisdiction and entitlement to relief.3 Specifically, plaintiff has alleged
that she was married to inmate Pierce through proxy marriage ceremony in Texas and is his common
law wife, that she sought to continue her visitation with inmate Pierce through ODOC’s policy that
allows married inmates to have such visitation, and that defendants have refused to recognize her
proxy or common law marriage, which resulted in the deprivation of her federally protected
constitutional right to marriage. Plaintiff moves the Court to find her proxy or common law
marriage valid and, thus, rendering defendants’ policy unconstitutional, or, in the alterative, plaintiff
requests that the Court certify the question of the validity of her marriage to the proper judicial
forum. Accordingly, the Court finds that, at this stage of the proceedings and construing plaintiff’s
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff has met Rule 8(a)’s requirements.4
B.

Equal Protection Claim

Defendants assert that plaintiff has failed to assert a claim for a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically,
defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she is a member of a suspect class
and that her fundamental rights were violated. Defendants contend that plaintiff is not a suspect

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The Court is mindful that “[w]hile we of course liberally construe pro se pleadings,
[plaintiffs'] pro se status does not excuse the obligation of any litigant to comply with
fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure.” Ogden v. San
Juan Cnty, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir.1994) (citation committed).
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Next, defendants assert that plaintiff’s motion should be dismissed because plaintiff
failed to name a proper defendant for her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, in her
response, plaintiff states that she is not asserting any claims under § 1983. Accordingly, the
Court does not address defendants’ motion as it pertains to § 1983.
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class due to her status as a spouse of an incarcerated person and while marriage is a fundamental
right, a prison visitation right is not. Thus, defendants contend that plaintiff has not alleged
sufficient facts that demonstrate that ODOC’s refusal to recognize her marriage that occurred outside
ODOC’s marriage policy was irrational as applied to ODOC’s visitation privileges.
Having reviewed the complaint and the parties’ submissions carefully, construing pro se
plaintiff’s claims liberally as it must, and presuming all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff has asserted
sufficient facts – by the thinnest margins – to allege a cause of action for a violation of her
constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that defendants infringed on her constitutional right to marry
when they refused to recognize her proxy marriage celebrated in Texas and her common law
marriage. Further, plaintiff alleges that defendants denied her the right to visit with her husband,
who is incarcerated at defendants’ facility, while at the same time extending such privileges to other
spouses who are married to incarcerated individuals at defendants’ facilities. Defendants allegedly
refused to recognize proxy marriages because Oklahoma prohibits such marriages. While it is true
Oklahoma does not authorize proxy marriages,5 it is also true that her proxy marriage occurred in
the state of Texas and that plaintiff alleges that she is the common law wife of inmate Pierce. In
addition, defendants’ motion is void of any assertion of how their policy serves penalogical interests
by refusing to recognize proxy marriages validly entered in another state simply because such
marriages are not permitted in Oklahoma. The Court finds that these issues raised by the parties
are more appropriately decided at the summary judgment stage where the Court can benefit from
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Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 5(A) provides that “[p]ersons desiring to be married in this state
shall submit an application in writing signed and sworn to in person before the clerk of the
district court by both of the parties . . . .”
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specific factual findings and more developed arguments and citations from the parties on these
issues. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claims for violation of her Constitutional rights
should not be dismissed at this stage of the proceedings.
C.

Injunctive Relief

In her Complaint, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. Although it is not clear as to what
injunctive relief plaintiff is requesting, but construing pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally as the
Court must, plaintiff seems to be moving the Court to enjoin ODOC from enforcing its policy,
alleging that the policy violates the United States Constitution by infringing on her right to marry
and treats her marriage differently than other similarly situated married couples. To obtain a
preliminary injunction, plaintiff must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
irreparable harm to the movant if the injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the
harm that the preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued,
will not adversely affect the public interest. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, L.L.C., 500 F.3d
1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and
drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the
burden of persuasion.” O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973,
976 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).
Defendants assert that plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed because she
has not alleged an ongoing constitutional violation. Specifically, defendants contend that plaintiff
has alleged constitutional and equal protection violation claims against defendants relating to
ODOC’s refusal to recognize her marriage to inmate Pierce; her allegations do not involve a

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fundamental constitutional right because she is not part of a suspect class and a right to visitation
is not a fundamental right. Therefore, defendants assert that plaintiff’s claim can only be sustained
if she alleges sufficient facts to show that the policy of denying recognition of her marriage was
irrationally applied in this case, which she has failed to do. Further, defendants assert that
supervision of the internal affairs of correctional institutions lies with prison officials and
administrative officials and generally is not subject to judicial review absent the prison
administration being exercised in an abusive and capricious manner; it is generally beyond the reach
of the Court to enjoin the administration of prison policies and procedures.
Having reviewed the complaint and the parties’ submissions carefully, construing pro se
plaintiff’s claims liberally as it must, and presuming all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff’s request
for preliminary injunction should be denied. Specifically, the Court finds that because of the highly
deferential standard of upholding prison officials’ policy that regulate marriage in the context of
prison visitations if the policies are reasonably related to a penalogical interest and the overall
deference courts give to prison officials in making difficult judgments concerning institutional
operations, see Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977), plaintiff has not
shown that she has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. In addition, a premature
injunction without proper and thorough analysis would place substantial burden on defendants in
dealing with the complex nature of problems involving the operation of their prison facilities.
Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants’ motion to dismiss as it pertains to plaintiff’s request
for preliminary injunction should be granted.
IV.

Conclusion
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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss and Brief in Support [docket no. 9].
IT IS SO ORDERED this

20th

day of November, 2013.

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