Lancaster v. Sprint Nextel Corporation et al

Filing 45

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 36 Motion to Dismiss, as more fully set out. Signed by Honorable David L. Russell on 7/24/14. (jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CATHERINE LANCASTER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
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v.
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SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT )
CO., a/k/a SPRINT NEXTEL CORP., )
)
Defendant .
)

CIV-13-1348-R

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendant,
Sprint/United Management Company. Plaintiff responded in opposition to the motion.
Having considered the parties' submissions, the Court finds as follows.
Plaintiff filed this action alleging discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and disability, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. She also alleges claims of retaliation, including a claim that she was
subjected to retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. Plaintiff first filed an
EEOC charge on June 18, 2013, alleging:
I. On about April 22, 2013 I returned to work to my position of Adv Tech and
presented my employer with doctor's release to work with restrictions. I
requested reasonable accommodation for my disability which my employer is
aware of and the ADA paperwork to complete. I completed the ADA
paperwork and gave it to my employer. On April 22, 2013 and May 1, 2013
I was threaten (sic) if I do not return to work on April 22, 2013 and May 13,
2013 it would be considered a resignation. I objected and complained to my
employer by letter dated May 6, 2013.

On or about May 16, 2013 I contacted my employer and was advised I was
discharged as of May 13, 2013. I have been employed with the Company
since about April 2003.
II. No reason was given for my denial of reasonable accommodation or my
discharge.
III. I believe I have been discriminated against because of my Race, Black in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and due to
my Disability & Retaliation ion violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, as amended.
Citing to Manning v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, 522 Fed.Appx. 438 (10th
Cir. April 12, 2103), Defendant contends that Plaintiff's filing with the EEOC was
insufficient to exhaust her administrative remedies, and therefore this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under Title VII or the ADA.
“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under
Title VII.” Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1399 (10th Cir.1996) (quotation omitted). “[A]
plaintiff normally may not bring a Title VII action based upon claims that were not part of
a timely-filed EEOC charge for which the plaintiff has received a right-to-sue letter.” Simms
v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th
Cir.1999). In addressing whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is appropriate, we may consider documents submitted by the parties to resolve
any jurisdictional fact questions. See Sizova v. Nat'l Institute of Standards & Tech., 282 F.3d
1320, 1324-25 (10th Cir.2002). The only document presented by the parties is Plaintiff's
EEOC charge quoted above.

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The Court concurs with Defendant's contention that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies with regard to her Title VII claim. Even giving her EEOC charge
liberal construction, as mandated by Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1186
(10th Cir. 2007), there are simply no facts alleged therein to support a charge of race
discrimination in violation of Title VII. "To determine whether a plaintiff has exhausted her
administrative remedies, courts identify the scope of the allegations raised in a plaintiff's
charge of discrimination because a 'plaintiff's claim in federal court is generally limited by
the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the
charge of discrimination.'" Villalva v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 2013 WL 6804585, *10
(D.Colo. Dec. 23, 2013)(quoting Jones, 502 F.3d at 1186). Plaintiff merely checked the box
indicating race discrimination, she did not, however, include any facts to support her
allegation. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted with regard to Plaintiff"s Title VII
claim as the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.
The exhaustion issue with regard to Plaintiff's ADA claim is a closer question.
Certainly Plaintiff alleges that she was under the care of a doctor, for reasons unstated in the
EEOC charge, and that the doctor had imposed limitations on her. She alleges she requested
accommodation for her unspecified disability and that she was denied her request and
terminated as a result. She indicates both discrimination and retaliation in violation of the
ADA. 29 C.F.R. § § 1601.12(b) provides that a charge is sufficient when it "describe[s]
generally the action or practices complained of." The Court finds Plaintiff's allegations of

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disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA sufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction on this Court.
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of July 2014.

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