American Atheists Inc et al v. Thompson et al

Filing 33

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 16 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable Robin J. Cauthron on 5/22/14. (lg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
AMERICAN ATHEISTS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TRAIT THOMPSON, Chair of the
State Capitol Preservation Commission,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Case Number CIV-14-42-C

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Following the placement of a monument depicting the Ten Commandments on the
grounds of the state capitol, Plaintiffs filed the present action asserting that the monument
violated their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs allege that placement of the monument is a
violation of their rights under the First Amendment, as well as the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. Arguing that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails
to state a claim for relief, Defendant filed the present motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Additionally, Defendants challenge the standing of Plaintiff William Poire, arguing
that he lacks standing to bring his claims.
In support of their motion regarding the Establishment Clause, Defendants argue that
the facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005). According to Defendants, in Van Orden, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional
a monument which is, for all intents and purposes, identical to that at issue here. According
to Defendants, because the monuments are identical, and their placements on state capitol

grounds are the same, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief. It is the last portion of
the previous sentence that distinguishes the present case from Van Ordun and dooms
Defendants’ motion.
It is the context in which a monument exists that plays a significant role in whether or
not a monument runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.1 The Supreme Court in Van Orden
recognized this fact as it noted the monument challenged in that case was in a large park
containing 17 monuments and 21 historical markers all designed to illustrate the “ideals” of
those who settled in Texas. Id., at 702. The presence of other monuments created a context
in which the display promoted historical significance, rather than solely religious belief. As
Justice Breyer noted in his concurring opinion in Van Orden, the courts must exercise their
legal judgment and consider the physical setting of the monument, examining the overall
context in which it resides. Id. at 701-02 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Here, the factual allegations2 made by Plaintiffs assert the challenged monument stands
alone. That is a far different circumstance for placement of the monument than that at issue
in Van Orden. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ argument, this case is not the same as Van
Orden and Defendants’ motion will be denied on the Establishment Clause claim.

1

See Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 800 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A challenged
government action that might pass constitutional muster in some settings might be deemed ‘constitutionally
suspect in some other American communities or in other contexts.’”) (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Los
Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017, 1039 (10th Cir. 2008)).
2

Because Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must consider
whether Plaintiffs have pleaded facts which, if true, would state a plausible claim for relief. Alvarado v.
KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).

2

According to Defendants, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any violation of the Due
Process Clause, but as Plaintiffs note, they do not bring a stand-alone Due Process claim.
Rather, Plaintiffs merely note that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies the First Amendment to actions by a state. Because Plaintiffs do not bring a separate
Due Process Clause claim, Defendants’ request for dismissal will be denied, as moot.
As for the Equal Protection claim, Plaintiffs argue that the placement of a clearly
religious monument constitutes state discrimination against non-believers or people with a
different faith, therefore denying those people the equal protection of laws. Plaintiffs argue
the same can be said of the passage of the legislation that directed placement of the
monument. Plaintiffs also argue that the conduct of Defendants and their moratorium on
placing additional monuments constitutes a policy of exclusion which favors only the current
Ten Commandments monument. Neither party offers much legal support for their positions.
However, at this stage of the proceeding the burden falls squarely on the shoulders of
Defendants. As they have failed to meet this burden, their challenge to Plaintiffs’ Equal
Protection claim will be denied.
Finally, Defendants challenge the standing of Plaintiff Poire. According to Defendants,
Mr. Poire alleges only that he disagrees with the placement of the monument and that its
presence discourages him from travel to the Capitol. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that as with
all other Plaintiffs, Mr. Poire objects to the State-sponsored religious aspect of the monument
and the fact that the monument was placed by action of the State Legislature through a law
respecting the establishment of religion.
3

“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three
elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130,
119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First, the plaintiff must have suffered a concrete,
actual “injury in fact.” Id. Second, there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct at issue. Id. Third, it must be likely that a favorable
decision will redress the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Green, 568 F.3d at 793. Mr. Poire does not allege direct contact with the monument but
merely that his knowledge of its presence impacts his rights. The Court finds this level of
“injury” insufficient under the facts of this case. As the Supreme Court noted in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
486 (1982), “the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct
with which one disagrees” is not a sufficient injury in fact to grant standing. Id. at 485.
Indeed, in Green, the “injury in fact” issue was decided favorably based, at least in part, on
the plaintiff’s direct physical contact with the monument.3 Consequently, the Court finds Mr.
Poire does not have standing and he will be dismissed as a Plaintiff.
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 16) is
DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. To the extent the motion challenges the standing of
Plaintiff William Poire, the motion is granted; in all other respects the motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of May, 2014.

3

Green, 568 F.3d 793-94.

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