Ruiz v. Bethany City of et al
Filing
72
ORDER denying 45 defendant Austin Warfield's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 3/13/2015. (ks)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LUIS ENRIQUE RUIZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF BETHANY, a municipal
corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-14-156-M
ORDER
Before the Court is defendant Austin Warfield’s (“Warfield”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint, filed July 18, 2014. On August 8, 2014, plaintiff Luis Enrique Ruiz
(“Ruiz”) filed his response, and on August 15, 2014, Warfield filed his reply. On September 2,
2014, Ruiz filed a supplemental brief in opposition to Warfield’s motion to dismiss, and on
September 3, 2014, Warfield filed his response to Ruiz’s supplemental brief.
I.
Introduction1
On October 13, 2011, the Bethany Police Department was dispatched to 7101 N.W. 23rd
Street in Bethany, Oklahoma, following a report of a foul odor in the area. An officer searched the
area and discovered a black nylon bag that contained a plastic bag inside. Upon opening the plastic
bag, the officer discovered a severed human head and other dismembered body parts. After making
this discovery, the officer called for backup. A criminal investigation into the apparent homicide
was initiated by the Bethany Police Department. It was ultimately determined that the remains
belonged to Carina Brianne Saunders and that she had been murdered on October 11, 2011.
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The facts set forth in this Introduction are based upon the facts alleged in Ruiz’s Second
Amended Complaint.
On October 11, 2011, Ruiz was arrested by the Oklahoma City Police upon an outstanding
City of Oklahoma City arrest warrant related to a speeding ticket. Ruiz was booked into the
Oklahoma County Jail shortly after midnight on October 12, 2011. At some point during the
investigation, Ruiz became a suspect.2 On June 27, 2012, defendant officer Jack Ronald Jencks
(“Jencks”) signed an Affidavit of Probable Cause (“Affidavit”) that resulted in the issuance of an
arrest warrant for Ruiz. According to Ruiz, the Affidavit contained multiple statements that Jencks
and officer Warfield knew were false, and Jencks omitted information from the Affidavit with the
intention of misleading the district court. Ruiz was then arrested by Jencks and Warfield. Ruiz
further alleges that Jencks and Warfield, after the preparation of the Affidavit and Ruiz’s arrest,
altered police reports and back-dated the police reports when confronted with questions by the
District Attorney about the accuracy of the reports. On February 22, 2013, the District Attorney
dismissed the criminal charges against Ruiz before the preliminary hearing.
On February 20, 2014, Ruiz filed the instant action. On July 9, 2014, Ruiz filed his Second
Amended Complaint, in which he alleges the following causes of action: (1) false arrest and
detention and malicious prosecution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jencks, (2) false arrest
and detention and malicious prosecution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warfield, (3)
violation of article 2, § 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution against defendant City of Bethany (“City”),
(4) supervisory liability in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Phil Cole, the Chief of
Police of the City of Bethany Police Department, and (5) municipal liability in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the City. Warfield now moves this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
2
There were other suspects as well, including Jimmy Massey. Mr. Massey was arrested on
November 4, 2011. The District Attorney ultimately dismissed without prejudice the charges against
Mr. Massey.
2
Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss all claims against him for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
II.
Standard for Dismissal
Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the United States Supreme Court has held:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that
are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 679 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pleading that offers labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at
678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A court “must determine whether the complaint
sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief
under the legal theory proposed.” Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Finally, “[a] court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint
presumes all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
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III.
Discussion
Ruiz alleges a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Warfield based upon the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.3 Warfield asserts Ruiz’s allegations
are insufficient to state a claim for malicious prosecution. Additionally, Warfield asserts that he is
entitled to qualified immunity because Ruiz has failed to establish that any of Warfield’s actions
violated clearly established law.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known. Once a defendant asserts
qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying a strict
two-part test. The plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant
violated a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) that this right was
clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Further,
[b]ecause a plaintiff can neither recover under § 1983 from a
government official nor overcome the official’s assertion of qualified
immunity without demonstrating that official violated his
constitutional or statutory rights, the legal analysis required to
surmount these separate obstacles is often related, if not identical.
Id. at 1193-94.
[A] § 1983 malicious prosecution claim includes the following
elements: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued
confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in
favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original
arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted
with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.
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In this case, Ruiz has alleged that he was falsely arrested and detained and subject to
malicious prosecution by Warfield. In his response to Warfield’s motion to dismiss, Ruiz states that
his false arrest and detention claim is properly classified as a malicious prosecution claim.
4
Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008).
Warfield first asserts that the claim against him should be dismissed because Ruiz makes
broad, vague, non-specific, and collective allegations against Warfield and Jencks, collectively.
Warfield further asserts that Ruiz’s consistent use of the collective term “Jencks and Warfield,”
jointly, as if they were one individual, without distinction as to what acts are attributable to whom,
makes it impossible for Warfield to ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts he is alleged to
have committed. Having carefully reviewed Ruiz’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds
that the claim against Warfield should not be dismissed based upon the use of the collective term
“Jencks and Warfield.” Specifically, the Court finds that when reading the Second Amended
Complaint, it is clear that Ruiz is alleging that both Jencks and Warfield, individually, performed
the actions alleged. Further, the Court finds that throughout the Second Amended Complaint,
allegations are made solely as to Jencks and solely as to Warfield. Upon review of the Second
Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Warfield should be able to ascertain the particular acts he
is alleged to have committed. Accordingly, the Court finds that the claim against Warfield should
not be dismissed on this basis.
Warfield further asserts that Ruiz’s allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are
insufficient to state a claim for malicious prosecution. Warfield contends that Ruiz fails to support
each of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim with specific, articulable facts sufficient to
show, assuming they are true, that Warfield plausibly violated Ruiz’s constitutional rights.
Specifically, Warfield contends that Ruiz cannot meet the second element of a malicious prosecution
claim because his case was dismissed without prejudice to refiling, pending further investigation.
“Criminal proceedings are terminated in favor of the accused by the formal abandonment of
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the proceedings by the public prosecutor.” Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 802 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Further, “the inability of a prosecutor to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
can be consistent with the innocence of the accused and can be deemed a favorable termination in
favor of the accused.” Id. at 803. A court, when making the determination of whether a dismissal
constitutes a favorable termination, looks “at the stated reasons for the dismissal as well as to the
circumstances surrounding it in an attempt to determine whether the dismissal indicates the
accused’s innocence.” Id. (internal citation omitted). A dismissal without prejudice, thus, is not
always fatal to a malicious prosecution claim. See Bryson v. Macy, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (W.D.
Okla. 2009) (holding that dismissal without prejudice was termination favorable to plaintiff where
case was dismissed because prosecuting authority believed DNA evidence raised reasonable doubt
as to accused’s guilt).
Having carefully reviewed Ruiz’s Second Amended Complaint, and presuming all of Ruiz’s
factual allegations are true and construing them in the light most favorable to Ruiz, the Court finds
that Ruiz has set forth sufficient allegations to satisfy the second element of a malicious prosecution
claim. Specifically, the Court finds that Ruiz has set forth sufficient factual allegations to support
a finding that the dismissal without prejudice of the criminal case against him constitutes a favorable
termination. Additionally, the Court finds that Ruiz has set forth sufficient factual allegations to
establish the remaining elements of a claim for malicious prosecution. Specifically, the Court finds
Ruiz’s Second Amended Complaint is replete with factual allegations showing that Warfield caused
Ruiz’s continued confinement and/or prosecution, that no probable cause supported Ruiz’s original
arrest, continued confinement, and prosecution, that Warfield acted with malice, and that Ruiz
sustained damages. In his Second Amended Complaint, Ruiz specifically alleges that although
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Warfield did not sign the Affidavit, Warfield was entirely aware that the Affidavit was based upon
multiple false statements and that exculpatory information was omitted from the Affidavit. Further,
Ruiz alleges that Warfield altered police reports and back-dated police reports in an attempt to create
probable cause where he knew none existed.
Thus, the Court finds that Ruiz has set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for
malicious prosecution against Warfield that is plausible on its face and has set forth sufficient factual
allegations of a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The
Court, therefore, must now determine if Ruiz’s Fourth Amendment right was clearly established at
the time of Warfield’s unlawful conduct.
A right is clearly established “when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of
a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that Ruiz’s
Fourth Amendment right was clearly established at the time of Warfield’s alleged unlawful conduct.
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Warfield’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [docket no. 45].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 13th day of March, 2015.
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