Beacham v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 6 petitioner's Motion to Strike and Dismiss to Respondent's Notice to Remove (as more fully set out in order). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 8/6/2014. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
STEVEN BEACHAM,
Petitioner,
v.
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
DIRECTOR RONALD PATTON and
his successor,
Respondents.

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Case No. CIV-14-601-M

ORDER
Before the Court is petitioner’s “Motion to Strike and Dismiss to Respondent’s Notice to
Remove” (“Motion to Remand”), filed June 20, 2014. On July 03, 2014, respondents filed their
response, and on July 09, 2014, petitioner filed his reply. Based upon the parties’ submissions,
the Court makes its determination.
I.

Introduction
On April 18, 2007, petitioner was convicted in Cleveland County, Oklahoma with one

count of lewd molestation of a minor in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1123. Respondents
informed petitioner of his duty, pursuant to Oklahoma Sex Offenders Registration Act
(“SORA”), to register for life as an aggravated sex offender upon his release on or about April
30, 2014. As a result, petitioner filed this instant action in the Oklahoma County District Court
seeking an injunction preventing his registration based on the following claims: (1) he is not
required to register for life as an aggravated sex offender under SORA because the statute does

not apply to him (“Claim I”)1 and (2) respondents have violated his federal and state
constitutional rights (“Claim II – constitutional claims”). Respondents removed the case to this
Court. Petitioner filed this instant motion seeking to remand this case back to the Oklahoma
County District Court.
II.

Discussion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court has jurisdiction of civil actions
“arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” Under
28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant in a state court case may remove the case to
federal court “when a federal court would have had jurisdiction if the case had
been filed there originally.” Topeka Hous. Auth. v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 1245,
1247 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987)). “The removing party has the burden to demonstrate the
appropriateness of removal from state to federal court.” Baby C v. Price, 138
F. App’x 81, 83 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (citing McNutt v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)).

Shockley v. City of Waurika, CIV-10-517-D, 2010 WL 3081528, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 6,
2010). In determining if petitioner’s claims arise under federal law, the Court follows
the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, under which a suit arises under
federal law “only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of
action shows that it is based” on federal law . . . . The plaintiff is
the “master of the claim” and may prevent removal by choosing
not to plead a federal claim even if one is available. Under the
“artful pleading” doctrine, however, a plaintiff may not defeat
removal by failing to plead federal questions that are essential
elements of the plaintiff's claim. Similarly, removal is permitted
when the plaintiff's right to relief requires resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.
Ethridge v. Prime Conduit, CIV-11-1350-L, 2012 WL 400034, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 7, 2012)
(quoting Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)). For a
claim to arise under federal law:

Petitioner also asserts a related violation based on the Oklahoma Department of Corrections’
Notice Register policy, which reflects respondents’ interpretation of SORA.
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a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of
action. The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the
Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or
effect, and defeated if they receive another. A genuine and present
controversy, not merely a possible or conjectural one, must exist with
reference thereto.
Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936) (internal citation omitted). Once a case is
removed, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over a petitioner’s state claims. City of Chi. v.
Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)) (“in any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy”).
Petitioner contends this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because he has not
asserted any federal claims; instead, he has only pled claims involving a state statute. Further, in
light of petitioner’s motion, the Court directed petitioner to advise the Court whether he is
withdrawing his federal claims – in which petitioner responded,
There are only two possible claims against the respondents that this
court can legally entertain as possible federal claims, those are the
eighth and fourteenth amendment claims, and as such it is well known
to this Court that the fourteenth and eighth amendment claims can and
normally are raised first as state claims, therefore this Court by the
precedence established in the courts above this court must only view
Mr. Beacham’s claim upon the face of his injunction not by the
respondents’ claiming it is a federal issue.
Pet. Beacham Resp. to the Court’s Order Directing Resp. on Federal Claims, at 1-2. Further,
petitioner emphasizes that he did not bring this action pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, thus, there
is no federal statute being challenged.
Having carefully reviewed petitioner’s petition, the Court finds that removal to this Court
is proper. Specifically, the Court finds that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because
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petitioner’s claims require a resolution of a substantial question of federal right embedded in the
United States Constitution. Petitioner contends that he is not asserting any federal claims in this
case. However, petitioner’s assertions are contrary to his pleadings in his petition, which on its
face clearly raises federal constitutional claims. In his petition, petitioner asserts numerous
violations of the United States Constitution, including the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pet. at 1, 2, the Eighth Amendment as applied in Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Pet. at 7-8, and violation of the Ex Post facto provisions of the
United States Constitution, Pet. at 8-9. While the statute at issue is the Oklahoma Sex Offenders
Registration Act and petitioner ultimately seeks an injunction preventing his registration under
SORA, he bases this assertion on alleged violations of the constitutions of both the United States
and the State of Oklahoma. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner has pled claims that
require resolution of a substantial question of federal law, and, thus, the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a).2 See Int'l Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 165 (quoting 1367(a)) (“once the case was removed, the District Court had
original jurisdiction over [petitioner’s] claims arising under federal law, and thus could exercise
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Petitioner appears to have some misunderstandings of the procedural aspect of this case. First,
petitioner asserts that because his petition did not specifically state he is asserting a § 1983 claim,
he has not pled any claims implicating a federal question. However, § 1983 does not in itself
create a substantive right. See Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“Section 1983 itself does not create any substantive rights, but merely provides relief against
those who, acting under color of law, violate federal rights created elsewhere.”). Thus, § 1983 is
a procedural mechanism that allows private citizens to bring a claim against a state actor who
allegedly violates petitioner’s federal rights, such as the United States Constitution, while acting
under the color of law, such as SORA. Second, petitioner also appears to be under the impression
that there is a Temporary Restraining Order/Permanent Injunction issued in the state court and
that respondents are attempting to override that order by removing this case to the federal court.
However, there was no Temporary Restraining Order or Permanent Injunction issued in the state
court. While petitioner has filed a motion requesting one, the state court has not ruled on the
motion; thus, to date, there is no injunction issued by this Court or the state court addressing this
matter.
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supplemental jurisdiction over the accompanying state law claims so long as those claims
constitute ‘other claims that . . . form part of the same case or controversy.’”).
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court DENIES petitioner’s Motion to Remand [docket no. 6].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of August, 2014.

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