Beacham v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections et al

Filing 19

ORDER granting 9 respondents' Motion to Dismiss and dismissing petitioner's claims (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 8/29/2014. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
STEVEN BEACHAM,
Petitioner,
v.
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
DIRECTOR RONALD PATTON and
his successor,
Respondents.

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Case No. CIV-14-601-M

ORDER
Before the Court is respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, filed July 02, 2014. Plaintiff filed no
response.1
I.

Introduction
On April 18, 2007, petitioner was convicted in Cleveland County, Oklahoma of one

count of lewd molestation of a minor in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1123. Respondents
informed petitioner of his duty, pursuant to the Oklahoma Sex Offenders Registration Act
(“SORA”), to register for life as an aggravated sex offender upon his release on or about April
30, 2014. As a result, petitioner filed this instant action in the Oklahoma County District Court
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In reply to his own motions, petitioner filed reply briefs which appear to address all the pending
motions and reassert petitioner’s arguments made in all of his filings. It was not clear to the
Court if those filings were also meant as a response to respondents’ Motion to Dismiss [docket
no. 9]. Although the time to file his response brief to respondents’ motion to dismiss had lapsed,
in light of petitioner’s pro se status, the Court directed petitioner to file his response brief, if any,
to respondents’ Motion to Dismiss [docket no. 9] on or before August 21, 2014. See Docket No.
18. In the alternative, the Court directed plaintiff to file an advisement to the Court, on or before
August 21, 2014, that his reply briefs [docket no. 12] and [docket no. 14] were meant to serve as
a response brief to respondents’ motion to dismiss. Id. A review of the record shows that
petitioner has not responded to the Court’s Minute Order.

seeking an injunction preventing his registration based on the following claims: (1) he is not
required to register for life as an aggravated sex offender under SORA because the statute does
not apply to him (“Claim I”)2 and (2) respondents have violated his federal and state
constitutional rights (“Claim II – constitutional claims”). Respondents removed the case to this
Court. Petitioner filed a motion to remand seeking to remand this case back to the Oklahoma
County District Court. The Court denied petitioner’s motion. In addition, petitioner filed “a
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Pursuant to Fed Civ Rule 56(B)”, which the Court
denied. On July 02, 2014, respondents filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.
II.

Standard of Review
Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the United States Supreme Court has held:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pleading that

Petitioner also asserts a related violation based on the Oklahoma Department of Corrections’
Notice Register policy, which reflects respondents’ interpretation of SORA.
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offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Id. at 678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A court “must determine
whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish
an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.” Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186
(10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Further, “[a] court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construes
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th
Cir. 1991).

Lastly, the Court construes a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally.

Gaines v.

Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002). However, pro se parties must still “follow the
same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,
425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Further, although
the Court liberally construes pro se filings, the Court does not assume the role of advocate. Yang
v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III.

Discussion
Respondents essentially assert that petitioner’s claims should be dismissed because

petitioner misreads the SORA statute at issue and such misinterpretation is the basis of his
request for an injunction based on alleged violations of his federal and state constitutional
claims. In the Court’s August 6, 2014 Order addressing petitioner’s motion for temporary
restraining order, the Court found that notwithstanding petitioner’s assertion that Okla. Stat. tit.
57, § 584 (J)(2) (Supp. 2006) does not apply to him, the statute applied to petitioner and required
petitioner to register for life as an aggravated sex offender. Further, the Court found that
petitioner’s allegations of violation of numerous provisions of the United States Constitution,
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and corresponding provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution, including the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Ex-Post Facto clause of Article I, section 10 and
Article 1, section 9, clause 3 are without merit. Specifically, the Court found that plaintiff does
not have a substantial likelihood of prevailing on his Equal Protection and Due Process clause
claims because he makes these allegations based on his misinterpretation of § 584 (J)(2). In
addition, the Court found that the notification requirements under SORA do not violate the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the notification requirements are
within “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” and,
thus, do not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Lastly, the Court found that the Ex Post
Facto provisions of the United States and Oklahoma’s Constitutions are not applicable here
because the statute in effect at the time of his conviction, Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 584 (J)(2) (Supp.
2006), required petitioner to register as an aggravated sex offender for life, and thus, there is no
statute being retroactively applied to him. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
August 6, 2014 Order, and in light of petitioner’s failure to file a response to respondents’
Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds that petitioner’s claims should be dismissed.
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS respondents’ Motion to Dismiss [docket no. 9] and

DISMISSES petitioner’s claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of August, 2014.

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