Taua v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The court affirms the Commissioner's decision. (Fully set out in order). Signed by Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell on 4/17/2015. (sr) (Main Document 22 replaced on 4/17/2015) (sr).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LILLY CARRIE TAUA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, acting
Commissioner Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
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Case No. CIV-14-604-SM
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin (Commissioner)
denied Lilly Taua’s (Plaintiff) applications for disability insurance benefits
and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act, and
Plaintiff seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
United States
District Judge Tim Leonard referred this matter for proceedings consistent
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (b)(3) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Doc. 3. The
parties then consented to having the undersigned conduct any and all further
proceedings in the case, including the entry of a final judgment. Doc. 20. The
undersigned has reviewed the pleadings, administrative record (AR), and
parties’ briefs, and affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
I.
Administrative proceedings.
In her applications for benefits, Plaintiff alleged that her impairments
became disabling in August 2010.
AR 124-31.
The Social Security
Administration (SSA) denied Plaintiff’s claims, and at her request, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing. Id. at 30-49. The ALJ
issued an unfavorable April 3, 2013 decision. Id. at 19-27. The SSA Appeals
Council declined Plaintiff’s request for review, id. at 1-5, and Plaintiff now
seeks review in this Court. Doc. 1.
II.
Disability determination.
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner applies a
familiar five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f), 416.920(b)-(f); see also Williams v. Bowen, 844
F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (describing the five steps).
Under this
sequential procedure, Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving she has one
or more severe impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912; Turner v.
Heckler, 754 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1985). If she succeeds, the ALJ will
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conduct a residual functional capacity (RFC)1 assessment at step four to
determine what Plaintiff can still do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(e), 416.945(e); Andrade v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 985
F.2d 1045, 1048 (10th Cir. 1993). Then, if Plaintiff shows she can no longer
engage in prior work activity, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner
to show Plaintiff retains the capacity to perform a different type of work and
that such a specific type of job exists in the national economy. See Turner,
754 F.2d at 328; Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1984).
III.
The ALJ’s findings.
Following the well-established five-step inquiry, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff: (1) meets the insured status requirements through March 31, 2014;
(2) has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 18, 2010; and
(3) has severe degenerative joint disease, arthritis, diabetes, and rheumatoid
arthritis. AR 21. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform
light work with the following limitations:
she can occasionally climb stairs;
she can never climb ladders;
she infrequently can squat, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and
she must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold.
Residual functional capacity “is the most [a claimant] can still do
despite [a claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).
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Id. at 23. Next, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform any past
relevant work.
Id.
at 25.
Finally, based on the vocational expert’s
testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff can perform work as a short
order clerk, laundry folder, or cleaner – all jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. Id. at 26.
IV.
Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s evaluation of her credibility.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination. According to
Plaintiff, the ALJ (1) “made nominal references to the medical record” and
“failed to link the evidence to her findings and explain her conclusions.” Doc.
13, at 14, 17. 2 (2) Plaintiff next complains that the ALJ did not explain why
the medical evidence would support her inability to perform postural
maneuvers, “but had no bearing on [her] ability to walk and stand.” Id. at 16.
Finally, (3) Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly relied on her daily
activities as substantial evidence that she could perform light work. Doc. 13,
at 13-19.
A.
Standard for review.
This Court’s review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s factual findings and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards. See Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010). In
For the parties’ briefs, the undersigned refers to the court’s CM/ECF
pagination.
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reviewing the ALJ’s opinion, “common sense, not technical perfection, is [the
court’s] guide.”
Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir.
2012).
B.
The ALJ’s duty to assess credibility.
This Court grants significant deference to a credibility determination
provided the ALJ explains the basis of her decision. White v. Barnhart, 287
F.3d 903, 910 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that “the ALJ’s credibility findings
warrant particular deference”). Credibility findings “should be closely and
affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the
guise of findings.”
Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted).
An ALJ’s credibility analysis “must contain ‘specific
reasons’ for a credibility finding; the ALJ may not simply ‘recite the factors
that are described in the regulations.’” Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676,
678 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (July 2,
1996)). In reviewing the ALJ’s credibility determination, this Court will not
weigh the evidence – that is primarily the ALJ’s task. Cowen v. Astrue, 552
F.3d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 2008).
C.
The ALJ’s credibility assessment.
In assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ detailed the medical
evidence and documented Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. AR 23-25. Based
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on the foregoing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements “do not
demonstrate a complete inability to perform work functions.” Id. at 24.
1.
The alleged “nominal references to the medical
record” and “failure to link the evidence to her
findings and explain her conclusions.” Doc. 13, at 14,
17.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion otherwise, the ALJ cited specific
medical evidence and explained why it supported her credibility finding. For
example, after acknowledging Plaintiff’s testimony that “she has problems
with her knees,” AR 23, the ALJ noted that:
Plaintiff had surgery to repair her right knee in July 2011,
and her left knee in October 2011 and in April 2012;
Plaintiff reinjured her left knee after a fall and required
“ice and elevation” and “some non-steroid antiinflammatories as needed;”
six days after Plaintiff’s fall, her treating physician
released her, noting no knee brace was necessary and that
Plaintiff could walk and exercise; and
the treating physician who released Plaintiff included no
specific work related limitations.
Id. at 24. Then, after referencing Plaintiff’s testimony that her “ring finger
on each hand becomes stiff and gets stuck,” the ALJ noted that in a May 2011
consultative examination report, Plaintiff exhibited good grip strength and
normal fine manipulation. Id. at 24-25.
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Although referring to these findings as “nominal references to the
medical record,” Doc. 13, at 14, Plaintiff does not cite any medical evidence
that she believes the ALJ ignored. Further, while the ALJ may not have
explicitly tied every conflicting medical record to Plaintiff’s every subjective
statement, she was not required to do so. See Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at
1170. Applying common sense, it is clear which subjective complaints the
ALJ found less than credible, and what medical evidence was linked to her
findings.
2.
The alleged failure to explain postural maneuver
restrictions.
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s imposition of certain postural
limitations without explanation why she did not impose any restrictions on
Plaintiff’s ability to walk and stand. Doc. 13, at 16. Plaintiff contends that
“it is unclear how the lack of additional limitations from Dr. Levings affected
the ALJ’s determination on [Plaintiff’s] ability to stand and walk, but it did
not affect her determination on [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform various
postural maneuvers.” Id.
The ALJ considered the treating physician’s recommendation eight
days after her third surgery, which imposed “[l]imited kneeling, squatting,
and pivoting etc and no ladders.” AR 371. The ALJ recognized that four
months later, the treating physician later released Plaintiff to walk and
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exercise and with no need for a brace. Id. at 24; see id. at 368. And, the state
agency physicians opined that Plaintiff could perform the full range of light
work with no additional limitations. Id. at 289-96, 331. In giving only some
weight to these opinions, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s “history of multiple
surgeries and . . . statements about her activities and limitations.” Id. at 25.
She found it “reasonable to conclude [Plaintiff] could have some additional
postural limitations.” Id; see Doc. 17, at 12.. So, the ALJ included additional
limitations beyond those recommended by the state agency physicians. AR
25. Plaintiff points to no medical record evidence that she is unable to walk
or stand.
The undersigned finds that the ALJ sufficiently explained and
linked the evidence to her credibility findings, satisfying “the essential
function of a credibility analysis.” Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at 1170.
3.
Plaintiff’s daily activities.
In finding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints less than credible, the ALJ
also stated that Plaintiff’s “description of her [daily] activities shows that she
is capable of light and sedentary activities.”
AR 24.
Plaintiff objects on
grounds that “none of [her] activities . . . demonstrates an ability to perform
light work.” Doc. 13, at 18. The undersigned disagrees.
Plaintiff reported that she lives with her daughter and four
grandchildren.
AR 38, 168-69.
She indicated that she helps around the
house by cooking, sweeping, vacuuming, helping take care of various pets,
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and picking up trash with the children in the yard. Id. at 42, 169, 171. In
her function report, she stated that she manages her own personal grooming,
does dishes, laundry, cleans the bathroom, takes out the trash, and grocery
shops with her daughter. Id. at 169-70. She has stiffness in her hands, but
managed to crochet five to six times during the month preceding the hearing
for fifteen minutes at a time. Id. at 39, 42-43. She indicated she can walk
three blocks and then must rest for fifteen minutes. Id. at 173. Plaintiff said
that she can go out alone, and goes outside “at least every hour or 2 hours.”
Id. at 171.
Plaintiff complains that it was improper for the ALJ to rely on
Plaintiff’s statements regarding her activities because she “does not perform
these tasks regularly” and “experiences pain if she does too much.” Doc. 13,
at 18. But based on the medical evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints of pain, evidenced by limitations on her ability to stand
and walk, and an inability to use her hands, were not entirely credible. See
supra § IV(C)(1). And, the ALJ was entitled to consider Plaintiff’s ability to
perform such activities. See, e.g., Kruse v. Astrue, 436 F. App’x 879, 886 (10th
Cir. 2011) (noting that claimant’s daily activities, including cleaning house,
watching children, and shopping were “not minimal” and finding “no error in
the ALJ’s consideration of [claimant’s] [activities of daily living] as one aspect
of his credibility finding”). The ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s allegations
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of pain. There are no grounds for reversal in the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s
daily activities in reaching her decision. The ALJ supported her credibility
findings with substantial evidence.
V.
Conclusion.
The court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
ENTERED this 17th day April, 2015.
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