Phillips v. Hanover Insurance Company

Filing 37

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 26 Motion to Compel, as more fully set out. Signed by Honorable David L. Russell on 4/20/15. (jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ROBERT L. PHILLIPS, D.D.S.,
an individual, and ROBERT L.
PHILLIPS, D.D.S., as TRUSTEE OF
THE ROBERT L. PHILLIPS
REVOCABLE TRUST,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HANOVER INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Case No. CIV-14-871-R

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order Compelling Discovery. Doc. No.
26. Four Interrogatories and nine Requests for Production are in dispute. See Doc. No.
31. Plaintiffs have sued Defendant for breach of contract and breach of its duty of good
faith and fair dealing in denying coverage for damages that resulted when the insured
commercial building was burglarized and vandalized. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9, 1213. According to the Third Amended Complaint, Defendant “denied the claim on the
basis that the terms of the policy excluded coverage for loss or damage resulting from
vandalism, theft or attempted theft when the building had been vacant for more than sixty
(60) consecutive days before the loss or damage occurs.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs allege that the
building was under renovation at the time, and therefore was not “vacant’ under the terms
of the policy. Id. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court grants the motion
in part and denies it in part.

Analysis
A. Relevancy of Premium Payments
In Interrogatory No. 8, Plaintiffs ask Defendant to identify “all payments made by
Plaintiffs to Hanover Insurance Company relating to the insurance policy that is the
subject of this action.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 1, at 6. Defendant argues that this request is not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because the validity
of the insurance contract is not in dispute. Doc. No. 28, at 5-6.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), a party “may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” and
“[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” There is no
requirement that evidence be in dispute in order to be admissible. See Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 649-50 (1997) (“The fact to which the evidence is directed need not
be in dispute. While situations will arise which call for the exclusion of evidence offered
to prove a point conceded by the opponent, the ruling should be made on the basis of
such considerations as waste of time and undue prejudice, rather than any general
requirement that evidence is admissible only if directed to matters in dispute.” (citation
omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note)).
Plaintiffs’ payments on the policy are relevant to their breach of contract claim. To
prevail on this claim, they must prove: “1) formation of a contract; 2) breach of the
contract; and 3) damages as a direct result of the breach.” Digital Design Grp., Inc. v.
Info. Builders, Inc., 24 P.3d 834, 843 (Okla. 2001) (footnote omitted). “An essential
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element of a contract is sufficient consideration.” Thompson v. Bar-S Foods Co., 174
P.3d 567, 574 (Okla. 2007) (footnote omitted) (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2
(West)). Plaintiffs’ policy payments are therefore relevant to their breach of contract
claim. Defendant shall answer Interrogatory No. 8.
B. Publicly Available Evidence and Relevancy of Out-of-State Conduct
In modified Interrogatory No. 4, Plaintiffs ask Defendant to identify and explain
all “lawsuits resulting from denials of commercial property loss claims for damages from
burglary or vandalism based upon the ‘vacancy’ provision of the policies” for the period
beginning one year before the loss at issue in this case and extending to the present date.
Id. at 4; Doc. No. 31, at 1-2. In modified Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 8, Plaintiffs
ask Defendant to produce “all documents relating to market conduct examination and
orders for the type of policy that is the subject of this action” that are “based on the
vacancy provisions of the policies.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 6; Doc. No. 31, at 5.
Defendant objects to both requests on the basis that such information is publicly
available. Doc. No. 28, at 7-9. The Court is aware of no requirement that information be
unavailable to the public in order to be discoverable.1 The undersigned therefore rejects

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Courts consistently hold that parties have an obligation to produce even publicly available information.
See, e.g., Ochoa v. Empresas ICA, S.A.B. de C.V., No. 11-23898-CIV, 2012 WL 3260324, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 8, 2012) (“Whether the documents are available to Plaintiffs through due diligence does not control
whether Topete should be compelled to produce them.”); Morgan v. Safeway Inc., No. WMN-11-1667,
2012 WL 2135601, at *2 (D. Md. June 11, 2012) (“[E]ven publicly available information might properly
be the subject of a valid request for production of documents.”); Pepperwood of Naples Condo. Ass’n,
Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:10-cv-753-FtM-36SPC, 2011 WL 3841557, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 29, 2011) (“Courts have unambiguously stated that this exact objection is insufficient to resist a
discovery request.” (citations omitted)); Pennfield Oil Co. v. Alpharma, Inc., No. 8:09CV345, 2010 WL
2243342, at *3 (D. Neb. June 1, 2010) (“The fact that such documents are available in the public domain
does not necessarily excuse Pennfield of its discovery obligations.”); Interlego A.G. v. F.A.O. Schwartz,
Inc., No. 18835, 1977 WL 22795, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 12, 1977) (“The public availability in the Danish
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this objection as a basis for denying the motion to compel with respect to these two
discovery requests.
Defendant also objects to modified Interrogatory No. 4 and modified RFP No. 8
on the basis that the information sought is not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence because the scope of these requests includes
information not governed by Oklahoma law. Doc. No. 28, at 8. The Court finds
Defendant’s out-of-state conduct relevant to Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages. See
Third Am. Compl. ¶ 20. “Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it
demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action in the State
where it is tortious.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422
(2003); see also Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., 152 P.3d 165, 179 (Okla.
2006) (“With the proper limiting instruction, Campbell allows the jury to consider
evidence of out-of-state conduct in determining a defendant’s ‘deliberateness and
culpability’ and of in-state conduct in punishing a defendant if the conduct has a ‘nexus
to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff.’” (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422-23)).
Accordingly, information sought by RFP No. 8 is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
Finally, Defendant objects to modified Interrogatory No. 4 on the basis that it is
overly burdensome, and to RFP No. 8 on the basis that it is vague. Doc. No. 28, Ex. 1, at
4, Ex. 2, at 6. With respect to vagueness, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34,

Patent Office of some or all of the documents does not foreclose defendant’s request.” (citing Moore’s
Federal Practice, § 26.59 at 26-219 and § 34.12 at 34-92 (1975))).
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Plaintiffs “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to
be inspected.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A). The Court finds that this standard has been
met with regard to modified RFP No. 8, as Defendant notes that the market conduct
examination and orders documents requested “are … available to the parties through an
open records request to the Oklahoma Department of Insurance.” Doc. No. 28, at 9.
As for the burden of answering modified Interrogatory No. 4, Defendant notes that
it “does not categorize or track lawsuits by denial of claims for vacancy,” and that “the
most efficient way to identify responsive lawsuits is legal research into public court
records.” Id. at 8-9. The Court does not find that the burden of this legal research
outweighs the benefit to Plaintiffs considering Defendant’s resources, the importance to
Plaintiffs of establishing a pattern of denial of claims based on the policy’s vacancy
provision to support their bad faith claim, and the importance of their bad faith claim to
their request for punitive damages. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Defendant shall
respond to modified Interrogatory No. 4 and produce documents responsive to modified
RFP No. 8. In its response to modified Interrogatory No. 4, Defendant shall “identify
each lawsuit by case number, plaintiff’s name, plaintiff’s attorney’s name and the forum
where filed.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 1, at 4.
In RFP No. 15, Plaintiffs ask Defendant to produce “the claims files relating to
other denials of claims by Hanover Insurance Company that are identified in [its]
response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 4.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 11. It later limited this
request to “lawsuits resulting from denials of similar claims.” Id. Plaintiffs state that they
seek “the documents that are requested to be identified in Interrogatory No. 4.” Doc. No.
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31, at 7. But the information sought to be identified in modified Interrogatory No. 4 is
“all lawsuits resulting from denials of commercial property loss claims for damages from
burglary or vandalism based on the ‘vacancy’ provision of the policies.” Doc. No. 31, at
2. Because a “lawsuit” does not consist of a particular set of documents, both Defendant
and the undersigned are unclear as to what documents Plaintiffs seek in RFP No. 15. Doc.
No. 28, Ex. 2, at 12. Accordingly, the motion to compel is denied to the extent it seeks
documents pursuant to RFP No. 15.
C. Privilege Log
In Interrogatory No. 9, Plaintiffs ask Defendant to identify “all persons contacted
and/or interviewed by [it] or [its] representatives in connection with this case, regardless
of whether said persons were included in any investigative report or whether said persons
were asked to give a statement.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 1, at 7. One of Defendant’s objections
was that this information constitutes attorney work product. Id. In response, “Plaintiffs’
counsel indicated that Interrogatory No. 9 does not seek attorney work product, but
instead seeks to know whether any interviews were conducted by Hanover.” Id. Given
that clarification, “Hanover asserts no privilege objections regarding contacts and
interviews by Hanover employees regarding this case, save those involving undersigned
counsel,” and Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs can find the rest of the information
requested in the claim file already provided to them. Id. But Plaintiffs maintain that they
are entitled to a privilege log “with regard to all persons contacted and/or interviewed by
Defendant or their representatives, including Defendant’s attorneys.” Doc. No. 31, at 2-3.

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Plaintiffs are not entitled to a privilege log in reference to Defendant’s response to
Interrogatory No. 9. First, much of the information they seek is in the claim file already
in their possession. Second, the identity of the individuals contacted by Defendant’s
attorneys for interviews in connection with this case is protected work product.
The work product doctrine, even in a diversity action, is governed by federal law.
Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 702 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998). Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), the work product doctrine protects (1)
documents and tangible things, (2) that were prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial,
and (3) that were prepared by or for another party or a party’s representative. “At its core,
the work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a
privileged area within which he[/she] can analyze and prepare his[/her] client’s case.”
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). “[A]n interrogatory asking a party to
identify all persons interviewed would contravene work product….intruding into the
heart of attorney trial preparation.” Lamer v. Williams Commc’ns, LLC, No. 04-CV-847TCK-PJC, 2007 WL 445511, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 6, 2007) (quoting 8 Wright, Miller
& Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2028, p. 415 (1994)). Therefore,
Defendant has satisfied its obligation with regard to Interrogatory No. 9.
D. Reference to Claim File Under Rule 33(d)
In Interrogatory No. 17, Plaintiffs ask Defendant to identify and explain “the
details of any in-person or telephone conversations between Plaintiffs and Hanover
Insurance Company’s representatives, employees or agents regarding the claim that is the
subject of this action, including the names and addresses of persons present or
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participating in such conversations.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 1, at 13. In response, Defendant
states that such information is available in the claim file already provided to Plaintiffs’
counsel. Id. Plaintiffs contend that reference to the claim file is insufficient and the Court
should order Defendant to answer the interrogatory. Doc. No. 31, at 3.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d), “[i]f the answer to an interrogatory
may be determined by examining … a party’s business records…, and if the burden of
deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for either party, the
responding party may answer by … specifying the records that must be reviewed ... and
giving the interrogating party a reasonable opportunity to examine and audit the records.”
The burden of ascertaining the details of any in-person or telephone conversations
between Plaintiffs and Defendant’s representatives regarding the claim at issue by
looking at the claim file is substantially the same for all parties, and Defendant has
satisfied the requirements of Rule 33 by providing the file to Plaintiffs’ counsel. The
Court finds that Defendant has satisfied its obligation with regard to Interrogatory No. 17.
E. Claims Office Manual
In RFP No. 12, Plaintiffs ask for “all documents relating to the complete ‘Claims
Office Manual’ … used by Hanover Insurance Company for the handling of commercial
property loss claims” for 2010-2013. Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 8. Defendant states that it has
a “Property Best Practices” manual, but it “contains nothing regarding vacancy
exclusions or denials related thereto.” Doc. No. 28, at 12. It offers to submit the manual
to the Court for an in camera inspection to determine relevancy. Id.

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Whether to review documents in camera is within the discretion of the Court. In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485, 1493 (10th Cir. 1990). But an in camera review
to assess relevancy is appropriate only in “highly unusual circumstances.” In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186, 1205 (10th Cir. 2010). The Court can determine from
the RFP itself that the discovery sought is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. The claims manual is relevant to whether this particular claim
was handled in accordance with Defendant’s policy, and it could reveal Defendant’s
guidelines for interpreting policy language generally, or the vacancy provision in
particular. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 638, 646 (D. Kan.
2007).
Finally, Defendant objects to RFP No. 12 on the basis that it is vague as to the
meaning of “Claims Office Manual.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 8. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 34, Plaintiffs “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or
category of items to be inspected.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A). The Court finds that this
standard has been met with regard to RFP No. 12. This request seeks any document
containing Defendant’s policies, procedures, and/or guidelines for handling commercial
property loss claims from 2010 through 2013. Defendant shall produce documents
responsive to RFP No. 12.
F. Claim and Underwriting Guidelines
In RFP No. 2, Plaintiffs ask Defendant to produce “all documents relating to the
underwriting file for the policy that is the subject of this action.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 1.
Defendant argues that this request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
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admissible evidence. Id. at 1-2. In RFPs No. 3 and No. 4, Plaintiffs ask for “all
documents relating to the claim guidelines for the type of claim that is the subject of this
action” (No. 3) and “all documents relating to underwriting guidelines for the type of
policy that is the subject of this action” (No. 4). Id. at 2-3. Defendant argues that RFPs
No. 3 and No. 4, (1) are vague; (2) ask for information that is not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; (3) ask for trade secrets, (4) are overbroad
as to the timeframe; and (5) are burdensome, and the burden of complying with these
requests outweighs their likely benefit. Id.
1. Request for Production No. 3
In response to Defendant’s objections, Plaintiffs narrowed the timeframe of RFP
No. 3 to one year before the loss at issue in this case to the present date (“modified RFP
No. 3”). Id. at 2. In a supplemental response, Defendant stated that based on
conversations with Plaintiffs’ counsel, it understands this request to be for material
providing “how-to instructions for claims handling by Hanover adjusters,” and that “[n]o
such claims guidelines exist.” Id. at 2-3. In reply, Plaintiffs state that the request is
broader and includes “any type of guidelines relating to claims similar to the type of
claim that is the subject of this action.” Doc. No. 31, at 4. Given Plaintiffs’ narrowing of
the timeframe, the Court considers the objection that RFP No. 3 is overbroad withdrawn.
The undersigned also finds that this request is described with reasonable particularity,
satisfying Rule 34(b)(1)(A), and thus rejects Defendant’s argument based on vagueness.
The undersigned will address each of the remaining three objections in turn.

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a) Relevance
Defendant objects to modified RFP No. 3 on the basis of relevance. Plaintiffs
argue that the guidelines requested are sought to review Defendant’s organizational
practices. Doc. No. 31, at 3-4. Plaintiffs are suing for breach of contract and bad faith
resulting from the denial of coverage when the insured property was burglarized and
vandalized. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that any guidelines that exist with respect to
the type of claim at issue in this action are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence on the issue of whether Defendant acted in bad faith in denying
their claim.
b) Burden
Defendant next argues that “the burden and expense of the requested discovery
outweighs its likely benefit.” Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 2; see FED. R.

CIV. P.

26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Absent more explanation from Defendant as to the extent of the burden,
the Court does not find that the burden of producing any guidelines that exist relating to
the claim at issue outweighs the likely benefit to Plaintiffs in supporting their bad faith
claim. See Morrison v. Chartis Prop. Cas. Co., No. 13-CV-116-JED-PJC, 2014 WL
840597, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 4, 2014) (“Objections to discovery requests must be
stated with specificity. Mere boilerplate objections or the familiar litany of ‘overly broad,
vague or burdensome,’ without more, is not sufficient.’” (citations omitted)); cf. FED. R.
CIV. P. 33(b)(4) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with
specificity.”); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he mere

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statement by a party that the interrogatory was ‘overly broad, burdensome, oppressive
and irrelevant’ is not adequate to voice a successful objection to an interrogatory.”).
c) Trade Secrets
Finally, Defendant asserts that the information requested includes trade secrets.
Consistent with Rule 26(c), Defendant shall respond to RFP No. 3, but if Defendant seeks
to protect any trade secrets contained within the information requested, the parties shall
provide for such protection in a joint proposed protective order filed by April 27, 2015.
Defendant shall respond to modified RFP No. 3 within three days after the protective
order is entered. This same procedure shall apply to any information containing trade
secrets or proprietary information that Defendant seeks to protect from unwarranted
disclosure.
2. Requests for Production No. 2 and No. 4
Defendant contends that the requests for “all documents relating to the
underwriting file for the policy that is the subject of this action” and “all documents
relating to underwriting guidelines for the type of policy that is the subject of this action”
are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because
“Plaintiffs do not allege any wrongdoing by Hanover as to the manner in which
Plaintiffs’ insurance policy was formulated by underwriters.” Doc. No. 28, at 6-7. The
Court agrees. Under Oklahoma law, “the conduct of the insurer and the agent in selling
and issuing the policy, cannot give rise to the tort of bad faith breach of an insurance
contract.” Claborn v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co., 910 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Okla. 1996)

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(citation omitted).2 Underwriting is “[t]he act of assuming a risk by insuring it,” or “the
insurance of life or property,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (West), which
occurs when the insurer sells and issues the policy. Therefore, production of documents
related to Defendant’s underwriting file and guidelines is not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this suit for breach of contract and bad
faith. Defendant need not respond to RFPs No. 2 and No. 4.
G. Training Materials
In modified RFP No. 6, Plaintiffs seek “all documents relating to adjuster training
materials for the type of claim that is the subject of this action,” for “the period of time
starting one year before the loss at issue in this action and extending to the present date.”
Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 4-5. In RFP No. 13, they seek “all documents relating to the
complete ‘Training Manual’ … used by Hanover Insurance Company for the purpose of
training their employees in the handling of commercial property loss claims” for 20102013. Id. at 9. Defendant objects to these requests on the grounds that they are vague,
irrelevant, and overly burdensome. Doc. No. 28, at 9-10. It also objects to RFP No. 6 on
the basis that its timeframe is overbroad. Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 4-5.
1. Vagueness
Defendant objects to these requests first because they are vague. Doc. No. 28, at 910. Given the clarity of the request and the fact that Defendant acknowledges that this
See also Hays v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 583, 590 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The tort of bad faith
breach of an insurance contract must be based upon an insurer’s wrongful denial of a claim; it cannot be
based upon the conduct of the insurer in selling and issuing the policy.” (citing Claborn, 910 P.2d at
1051)); Miller v. Farmers Ins. Grp., No. CIV-10-466-F, 2012 WL 8017244, at *14 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22,
2012) (“There are no Oklahoma cases which have concluded that the tort of bad faith encompasses nonclaims related conduct—sales, pricing and underwriting practices—alleged in this case.”).
2

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request “refers to a plethora of information,” such as training materials for in-person
training, as well as online workshops and webinars, Doc. No. 28, at 10, the Court finds
that this request is not vague and satisfies Rule 34(b)(1)(A)’s requirement that the item
sought be described with reasonable particularity.
2. Burden
Defendant further contends that the training materials requested are “not readily
producible.” Doc. No. 28, at 10. It asserts that “Hanover adjusters are trained both in
person, and through online workshops and webinars, and the adjusters involved in this
case are not repositories of these training materials, nor do they possess them.” Id.
Although the adjusters may not possess the training materials, Hanover Insurance
Company, the party to whom the requests for production are directed, should certainly
have access to such materials. Without a reasonable explanation as to the extent of the
burden in producing these materials for Defendant, the Court cannot find that the burden
outweighs the likely benefit of the materials to Plaintiffs.
3. Relevancy and Timeframe
Defendant next objects that adjuster training materials are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’
claims. Id. Plaintiffs argue that these materials are relevant to their bad faith claim,
because they will help Plaintiffs understand Defendant’s organizational practices. Doc.
No. 31, at 4-7. The Court agrees that this request for training materials is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in support of Plaintiffs’ bad
faith claim. See, e.g., Massey v. Farmers Inc. Grp., 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished) (finding as evidence of bad faith the fact that the insurer acted contrary to
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its training manual by invoking an appraisal process after a fire destroyed the plaintiffs’
home).
However, the undersigned does find that the timeframe of one year before the loss
at issue in this action to the present date is overbroad as applied to modified RFP No. 6.
According to the Third Amended Complaint, the loss occurred between March 18, 2012
and March 31, 2012, and Plaintiffs’ claim was denied by Defendant by a letter dated
February 12, 2013. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 9. Training materials used in 2014 and 2015
are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence on claims
for breach of contract and bad faith for a loss that occurred in 2012 and a claim that was
denied in early 2013. Therefore, Defendant shall produce materials responsive to
modified RFP No. 6 covering the period from one year before the loss at issue in this
action to December 31, 2013. Defendant shall also produce materials responsive to RFP
No. 13.
H. Annual Financial Statements
In RFP No. 11, Plaintiff seeks “all documents relating to the annual financial
statements for Hanover Insurance Company for the five (5) years preceding this request.”
Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 7. The Court rejects Defendant’s objection that these documents
are publicly available. See supra Section B & note 2. Defendant also argues that this
request is burdensome in light of vagueness. Plaintiffs seek this information to support
their bad faith claim, and in particular to support their request of punitive damages. Doc.
No. 31, at 5. Because Defendant states that “this request may also be satisfied by Hanover

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Insurance Group’s Annual Reports produced during the stated time frame, all of which
are available online,” Doc. No. 28, at 11, the Court rejects this objection.
Finally, Defendant contends that the information requested is not relevant to
Plaintiffs’ claims. Doc. No. 28, Ex. 2, at 7. The undersigned disagrees. Plaintiffs seek
punitive damages from Defendant. Third Am. Compl. ¶ 20. In determining the amount of
punitive damages to award, a jury may consider the financial condition of the defendant.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(A)(7) (West). Accordingly, Defendant’s most recent
financial statements are relevant to this request for punitive damages. Defendant shall
produce documents responsive to RFP No. 11.
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order Compelling
Discovery [Doc. No. 26] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant shall
answer modified Interrogatory No. 4 by April 27, 2015. In its response to modified
Interrogatory No. 4, Defendant must identify each lawsuit by case number, plaintiff’s
name, plaintiff’s attorney’s name, and the forum where filed. Defendant shall also answer
Interrogatory No. 8 by April 27. Further, by April 27, Defendant shall produce materials
responsive to RFP No. 3; modified RFP No. 6, covering the period from one year before
the loss at issue in this action to December 31, 2013; modified RFP No. 8; and RFPs No.
11, No. 12, and No. 13.
If Defendant seeks to have information given in any interrogatory or documents
produced in response to any request for production subject to a protective order,
Defendant need not answer such interrogatories or produce such documents by April 27.
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Rather, the parties shall submit to the Court a joint proposed protective order covering
such information by April 27, and Defendant shall respond to any remaining
interrogatories and/or requests for production within three days after the protective order
is entered.
Plaintiffs’ motion is denied in all other respects.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of April, 2015.

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