Hogue v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER -- Having reviewed the medical evidence of record, the transcript of the administrative hearing, the decision of the ALJ, and the pleadings and briefs of the parties, the undersigned magistrate judge AFFIRMS the Commissioners decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shon T. Erwin on 1/25/16. (mc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LUCINDA HOGUE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CIV-14-1242-STE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying
Plaintiff’s applications for child disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner has answered and filed a
transcript of the administrative record (hereinafter TR. ____). The parties have
consented to jurisdiction over this matter by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The parties have briefed their positions, and the matter is now at issue. Based on
the Court’s review of the record and the issues presented, the Court AFFIRMS the
Commissioner’s decision.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s applications for child disability insurance benefits and supplemental

security income were denied initially and on reconsideration. Following a hearing, an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision. (TR. 11-26). The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (TR. 1-3). Thus, the decision of the
ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner.
II.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process required by agency

regulations. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520; 416.920. At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since March 18, 2011, the alleged disability onset date.
(TR. 14). At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe impairments of
expressive language disorder, learning disability, and dysthymia. (TR. 14). At step
three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal any of
the presumptively disabling impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (TR. 16).
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (TR. 23). The
ALJ further found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to “[U]nderstand,
remember, and follow simple repetitive instructions for one and two-step tasks, but
[could] not follow written instructions.” (TR. 18).
Based on the finding that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, the ALJ proceeded
to step five. There, he presented the limitations from the RFC to a vocational expert
(VE) to determine whether there were other jobs Plaintiff could perform. (TR. 56-57).
Given the limitations, the VE identified three jobs from the Dictionary of Occupational

2

Titles (DOT). (TR. 57-58). The ALJ adopted the testimony of the VE and concluded that
Ms. Hogue was not disabled based on her ability to perform the identified jobs. (TR. 2526).
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED
On appeal, Plaintiff alleges: (1) a failure to incorporate work-related mental

limitations in the RFC which necessarily impacted the hypothetical question to the VE
and the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony, (2) a lack of substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s decision in light of testimony rendered by the VE and a medical
expert, and (3) a failure to properly evaluate a statement from Ms. Hogue’s mother.
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to determining

whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Poppa v. Astrue, 569
F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760
(10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). A decision is not based on substantial evidence if
other evidence in the record overwhelms the evidence upon which the ALJ relied, or if
there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the decision. Branum v. Barnhart, 385
F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004). The court “meticulously examine[s] the record as a
whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in order

3

to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048,
1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “Evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence in the record.” Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257,
1261-62 (10th Cir. 2005).
While the court considers whether the ALJ followed the applicable rules of law in
weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, the court does not reweigh the
evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Bowman v.

Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted).
V.

NO ERROR IN THE RFC DETERMINATION OR HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION
Plaintiff alleges that the RFC failed to reflect specific work-related mental limitations

which various doctors had found to exist. (ECF No. 14:3-7). As a result, Ms. Hogue also
alleges that the VE’s testimony lacks substantial evidence, as it was based on the allegedly
faulty RFC. The Court rejects these arguments.
A.

ALJ’s Duty in Evaluating Medical Opinions and Assessing the RFC

In evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ must consider the following factors: (1) the
length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature
and extent of the treatment relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind
of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is
supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion and the record as
a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an
opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to

4

support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1527, 416.927. Generally, more
weight is given to a medical source who has examined a claimant over a non-examining
source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1927(c)(1); 416.927(c)(1).
In assessing the RFC, the ALJ has a duty to express the claimant’s mental
limitations in terms of the specific, work-related activities he or she is able to perform. See
Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in
Initial Claims, SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, Westlaw op. at 6-7 (July 2, 1996) (SSR 968p).
B.

Evidence Concerning Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments

Non-examining State Agency consultant Dr. Joy Kelley completed two reports in
her review of Plaintiff’s medical records. In the Psychiatric Review Technique (PRT) form,
Dr. Kelley concluded that Plaintiff was “moderately” limited in the areas of maintaining
social functioning and maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. (TR. 328). In the
Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (MRFCA), Dr. Kelley made three distinct
findings of “marked” work-related limitations. In the area of “Understanding and Memory,”
Dr. Kelley stated that Plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability to understand and
remember detailed instructions. (TR. 332). In the area of “Sustained Concentration and
Persistence,” Dr. Kelley stated that Plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability to carry out
detailed instructions. (TR. 332). Finally, in the area of “Social Interaction,” Dr. Kelley found
a marked limitation in Ms. Hogue’s ability to interact appropriately with the general public.
(TR. 333).

5

State Agency psychologist Dr. R. Keith Green examined Ms. Hogue and concluded
that she was not limited in her ability to interact with the public. (TR. 346).
C.

No Error in the RFC Assessment or Reliance on VE Testimony

The ALJ discussed Dr. Kelley’s opinion and incorporated a portion of her findings
into the RFC. (TR. 21). The ALJ accepted Dr. Kelley’s opinions concerning Ms. Hogue’s
marked limitations in her abilities to understand, remember, and carry out detailed
instructions. (TR. 18, 21). But the ALJ rejected Dr. Kelley’s opinion concerning Ms. Hogue’s
marked ability to deal with the general public. (TR. 18, 21). Instead, the ALJ adopted Dr.
Green’s opinion which stated that Ms. Hogue had no limitation in her ability to deal with
the general public. (TR. 21, 346). In doing so, the ALJ explained:
The domain area of social interaction reflects no more than mild limitation.
The claimant gets along well with her friends, neighbors, and family. She
had no difficulty with social interaction throughout her high school career.
With the modification of mild social limitation based on the overall
longitudinal record, including a post-hearing mental status examination,
these findings and assessments have been given substantial weight and . . .
have been incorporated into the determination of the claimant’s residual
functional capacity.
(TR. 21).
As stated, the RFC limited Plaintiff to performing jobs with the ability to
“understand, remember, and follow simple, repetitive instructions for one and two-step
tasks,” with no ability to follow written instructions. (TR. 18). The ALJ related this
information in a hypothetical question to the VE and asked him if an individual with those
limitations could perform any work. (TR. 56-57). The VE answered affirmatively and
identified three potential jobs. (TR. 57-58). According to the VE, the Plaintiff could work as

6

a cafeteria attendant, DOT 311.677-010, an office cleaner, DOT 323.687-014, or an usher,
DOT 344.677-014. (TR. 57-58).
Ms. Hogue argues that the RFC did not reflect Dr. Kelley’s findings regarding: (1)
moderate limitations in the areas of “social functioning” and “concentration, persistence,
and pace, (2) marked limitations in the abilities to understand, remember, and carry out
detailed instructions, and (3) marked limitations in the ability to interact appropriately with
the general public. (ECF No. 14:4-7). The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument.
First, Dr. Kelley’s findings that Ms. Hogue was moderately limited in the areas of
“social functioning” and “concentration, persistence, and pace” were opinions expressed
on the PRT form. (TR. 469). The PRT findings are used to assess mental impairments at
steps two and three of the sequential evaluation process. SSR 96-8p, Westlaw op. at 4.
But the PRT is “not an RFC assessment.” Id. Thus, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding the ALJ’s treatment of this portion of Dr. Kelley’s opinion. See Bales v. Colvin,
576 Fed. Appx. 792, 798 (10th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014) (unpublished op.) (“[T]he ALJ’s finding
of a moderate limitation. . . .does not necessarily translate to a work-related functional
limitation for purposes of the RFC assessment. . . .”).
Plaintiff’s remaining argument concerns Dr. Kelley’s findings of marked impairments
in Ms. Hogue’s abilities to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions and
her ability to interact appropriately with the general public. In support, Plaintiff relies
heavily on Jaramillo v. Colvin, 576 Fed. Appx. 870 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2014) (unpublished
op.). But Jamarillo is not applicable here.

7

In Jamarillo, a psychiatrist opined that the plaintiff was moderately limited in his
ability to “carry out instructions.” Id. at 872. The ALJ afforded the psychiatrist’s opinion
“great weight.” Id. at 873. In the RFC, the ALJ stated that the plaintiff was limited to
performing simple, routine, repetitive, and unskilled tasks. Id. at 872. The ALJ then
proffered these RFC limitations in a hypothetical question to a VE, who identified jobs the
plaintiff could perform. Id. at 874.
The plaintiff’s challenge hinged on a distinction between work-related skills and
mental functions. Id. According to the plaintiff, the ALJ had a duty to expressly discuss
work-related skills in the RFC and not simply identify a claimant’s level of mental
functioning. Id. at 874-75. The plaintiff alleged that the ALJ had failed in this regard, and
had instead only identified a level of mental functioning when he limited the plaintiff to
“simple, routine, repetitive, and unskilled tasks.” Id. at 875. The Tenth Circuit agreed.
In doing so, the Court explained that the limitations to “simple, routine, repetitive,
and unskilled tasks” addressed only the plaintiff’s level of mental functioning, but failed to
reflect the actual work-related abilities which had been deemed moderately impaired. The
Court stated:
The limitation to simple, routine, repetitive, and unskilled tasks the ALJ
included in his hypothetical to the VE did not clearly relate the moderate
impairments [the psychiatrist] found. Rather the ALJ was required to
express those impairments in ‘terms of work related functions’. . . As a
result, the ALJ’s reliance on the jobs the VE identified in the response to the
hypothetical was not supported by substantial evidence.

Id. at 876 (citation omitted). Jamarillo v. Colvin is not applicable in the instant case.

8

Here, Dr. Kelley found marked difficulties in Ms. Hogue’s ability to understand,
remember, and carry out detailed instructions, and interact appropriately with the general
public. (TR. 332, 333). The ALJ adopted some of Dr. Kelley’s opinions, and assessed an
RFC which stated that Ms. Hogue could “understand, remember, and follow simple
repetitive instructions for one and two-step tasks, but [could] not follow written
instructions.” (TR. 18). Jamarillo is distinguishable from the instant case in two ways.
First, the Court in Jamarillo held that the RFC had merely reflected the claimant’s
mental abilities, without specifying distinct work-related abilities or limitations. Jaramillo

v. Colvin, 576 Fed. Appx. at 875-76. But here, the ALJ’s decision reflected specific workrelated abilities and limitations. The RFC allowed work which required the abilities to
understand remember, and follow simple repetitive instructions for one and two-step
tasks, but prevented work which required written instructions. (TR. 18).
Second the Court in Jamarillo found that the ALJ’s limitation to unskilled work
naturally encompassed the ability to “understand, carry out, and perform simple
instructions,” and that the RFC conflicted with the psychiatrist’s opinion that the plaintiff
was moderately limited in his ability to carry out instructions. But Jamarillo does not
indicate whether the plaintiff was moderately impaired in his ability to perform work
with detailed versus complex instructions, only that the impairment existed.
In the instant case, the distinction exists and is material. Dr. Kelley had opined
that Ms. Hogue was markedly limited in her ability to understand, remember, and carry
out detailed instructions. The ALJ accorded the opinion “substantial weight” and it was

9

adequately reflected in the RFC assessment which limited Plaintiff’s work to duties
involving the ability to understand, remember, and follow simple repetitive instructions
for one and two-step tasks.
The ALJ fulfilled his duty to express the RFC in terms of specific work-related
functions and no conflict existed with Dr. Kelley’s opinion regarding the marked
impairments in the areas of Plaintiff’s abilities to understand, remember, and carry out
detailed instructions. Accordingly, regarding these impairments, the Court rejects
Plaintiff’s reliance on Jamarillo v. Colvin and concludes that the RFC was proper. See

Strobel v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2135560 (W.D. Okla. May 31, 2011) (unpublished op.) (no
error in the RFC assessment limiting plaintiff to “simple and some complex tasks” in
light of opinion that the plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to understand,
remember, and carry out detailed instructions).
The remaining argument concerns Dr. Kelley’s opinion that Ms. Hogue was
markedly limited in her ability to interact appropriately with the general public. The RFC
did not reflect the opinion, but no error exists. The ALJ rejected this portion of Dr.
Kelley’s opinion in favor of a conflicting opinion from Dr. Green who stated that Plaintiff
had no limitation in her ability to interact with the general public. (TR. 21, 346). In
doing so, the ALJ considered the appropriate factors and explained his reasoning. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; (TR. 21). The ALJ simply afforded more weight to Dr.
Green’s opinion, as he was an examining source, while Dr. Kelley was not. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(1), 416.927(c)(1). Accordingly, no error exists in this regard.

10

Finally, Ms. Hogue argues that the deficiency in the RFC affected the resulting
hypothetical question to the VE. As a result, Ms. Hogue argues there is a lack of
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony regarding the
three jobs. Plaintiff is incorrect.
A hypothetical question need only reflect the impairments borne out by the
record. Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995). As discussed, a portion of
the opinions from Dr. Kelley and Dr. Green were adequately reflected in the RFC, thus
forming a proper basis for the hypothetical question. See Carver v. Colvin, 600 Fed.
Appx. 616, 621 (10th Cir. Jan. 20, 2015) (unpublished op.) (no error in the hypothetical
question to the VE which reflected RFC limitations deemed sufficient).
Assuming, however, that Plaintiff accepted the RFC assessment as sufficient, Ms.
Hogue specifically alleges that the limitations in the RFC do not correlate with the
specific job requirements as set forth in the DOT. The Court agrees regarding the job
listings of cafeteria attendant and usher, but no conflict exists with the office cleaner
position and reliance on that job is sufficient.
The jobs of cafeteria attendant and usher require reasoning level two--the ability
to ”apply common sense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or
oral instructions.” Compare DOT 311.677-010 (cafeteria attendant), DOT 344.677-014
(usher) to DOT Appendix C: Components of the Definition Trailer (definition of
reasoning level two). Reasoning level two conflicts with the RFC which stated that

11

Plaintiff could only “understand, remember, and follow simple repetitive instructions for
one and two-step tasks[.]” (TR. 18).
Regarding the job of office cleaner, Ms. Hogue argues that it “requires the
worker to ‘apply common sense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in
written, oral, and diagrammatic form.’” (ECF No. 14:7). According to the Plaintiff, this
requirement conflicts with the RFC for her inability to follow written instructions. The
reasoning level Ms. Hogue quotes is reasoning level three which does conflict with the
inability to follow written instructions. But the office cleaner job requires only reasoning
level one --the ability to “apply common sense understanding to carry out simple oneor two-step instructions See DOT 323.687-014; DOT Appendix C: Components of the
Definition Trailer. There is no conflict between reasoning level one and Ms. Hogue’s
RFC. Thus, the ALJ’s reliance on the job provides substantial evidence at step five. See

Raymond v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 1269, 1274 (10th Cir. 2009) (a single job which existed in
significant numbers in the national economy provided substantial evidence at step five).
VI.

NO ERROR IN THE CONSIDERATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
At the hearing, the VE and a medical expert (ME) testified. Ms. Hogue alleges

that the ALJ failed to properly credit the testimony which rendered the decision lacking
in substantial evidence. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff focuses on expert testimony concerning whether Ms. Hogue may need a
job coach in the initial phases of any future employment. At the hearing, the ALJ asked
the ME regarding the level of job supervision Plaintiff might require. (TR. 41). The ME

12

replied that initially, Ms. Hogue would need a supportive environment and training and
support, but that later, she might be able to function fairly well independently. (TR. 41).
Plaintiff’s attorney asked whether the ME was referring to the need for a job coach.
(TR. 41-42). The ME affirmed that was the case, “to just learn basic skills, how to ask
questions and assert [her]self, how to do the work task.” (TR. 42).
Next, Plaintiff’s attorney asked the VE what her recommendations would be
regarding the necessity of a job coach for a person with Ms. Hogue’s intellectual
capabilities as outlined in the record and adopted by the ALJ. (TR. 18, 57-63, 314-16).
The VE stated that Ms. Hogue had the “abilities to function in a very simple, repetitive
job where there’s no variability of tasks.” (TR. 61). The VE further stated the jobs she
identified were simple, without complex instructions, that should be able to be
performed by a person with the ability to follow verbal instructions and a short, visual
demonstration of the job. (TR. 62). When Ms. Hogue’s attorney further pressed about
the need for a job coach, the VE stated that that if the hypothetical person could not
maintain the simple, unskilled jobs, she would find out why, and proceed with a job
coach if necessary. (TR. 62-63).
According to Ms. Hogue, the experts testified that she would not be able to
engage in competitive employment based on her need for “supported employment” and
having never been previously employed. The Court rejects the arguments for two
reasons.

13

First, the ALJ acknowledged the ME’s statement that Plaintiff would need
“training and support,” perhaps in the form of a job coach. (TR. 22, 41-42). But the ME
never stated that the need for a job coach would preclude all employment. And the VE
testified that a job coach might be needed if a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s
intellectual abilities were unable to perform the simple, unskilled jobs she had identified.
(TR. 62-63). She did not, however, testify that Ms. Hogue required a job coach or that
such assistance would preclude all employment.
Second, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Hogue’s lack of previous employment would
prevent her from obtaining a job. (ECF No 14:8). Ms. Hogue is incorrect. See generally

Bussell v. Astrue, 463 Fed. Appx 779, 2012 WL 718995 (10th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012)
(unpublished op.); Gallegos v. Barnhart, 99 Fed. Appx 222, 2004 WL 1203031
(affirming ALJ’s reliance on specific jobs identified by a VE despite evidence that the
plaintiff had never worked).
VII.

NO ERROR IN THE CONSIDERATION OF “OTHER SOURCE” EVIDENCE
Plaintiff alleges error in the evaluation of a third-party statement from her

mother, Debra Hogue. The Court rejects the argument, because the ALJ properly
considered the statement, explained the weight it was given, and provided adequate
reasoning.
A.

ALJ’s Duty to Consider Evidence from “Other Sources”

Tenth Circuit law and Social Security Ruling 06-3p state that the ALJ must
consider evidence from “other sources,” including parents, who do not qualify as

14

“acceptable medical sources.” Blea v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 903, 914-15 (10th Cir. 2006);
Titles II and XVI: Considering Opinions and Other Evidence from Sources Who are not
“Acceptable Medical Sources” in Disability Claims; Considering Decisions on Disability by
Other Governmental and Nongovernmental Agencies, 2006 WL 2329939, Westlaw op at
4, 6 (SSR 06-3p). Information from these sources cannot establish the existence of a
medically determinable impairment, but may provide insight into the severity of an
impairment and how it may affect the individual’s ability to function. SSR-06-3p, 2006
WL 2329939, Westlaw op. at 2.
In evaluating “other source” evidence, the ALJ must consider “the nature and
extent of the relationship, whether the evidence is consistent with other evidence, and
any other factors that tend to support or refute the evidence.” Id., Westlaw op. at 6.
Finally, the ALJ should explain the weight given to the “other source,” or otherwise
ensure that the decision allows a reviewing party to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning.

Id.
B.

No Error in the Consideration of a Statement from Ms. Houge’s
Mother

As part of Plaintiff’s written application for benefits, Ms. Hogue’s mother
submitted a third-party functional report concerning Plaintiff. (TR. 246-53). Under the
“personal care” section of the report, Ms. Hogue stated that she had to comb Plaintiff’s
hair and remind her to take a bath and change her clothes. (TR. 247-48, 253). In the
decision, the ALJ discussed the report at length, stating:

15

The claimant’s mother, Debra Ann Hogue, completed a third party adult
function report date April 8, 2011. This report does not establish that the
claimant is disabled. Since Ms. Hogue is not medically trained to make
exacting observations as to dates, frequencies, types and degrees of
medical signs and symptoms, or the frequency or intensity of unusual
moods or mannerisms, the accuracy of the report is questionable.
Moreover, by virtue of the relationship as the mother of the claimant, she
cannot be considered a disinterested third party whose reporting would
not tend to be colored by affection for the claimant and a natural
tendency to agree with the symptoms and limitations the claimant alleges.
Most importantly, significant weight cannot be given to the report because
it is simply not consistent with the preponderance of the opinions and
observations by medical doctors in this case.
(TR. 23) (internal citation omitted).
Ms. Hogue outlines the factors an ALJ must apply when considering medical
opinion evidence. Compare ECF No. 14:10 to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c); 416.927(c).
Medical opinions are “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable
medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your
impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do
despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(a)(2); 416.927(a)(2). Plaintiff then argues that the ALJ failed to consider “the
degree to which ‘the acceptable medical source’ presents an explanation and relevant
evidence to support an opinion, . . . [h]ow consistent the medical opinion is with the
record as a whole, . . . and [a]ny other factors . . .” (ECF No. 14:10). But the statement
from Ms. Hogue’s mother was not a medical opinion from an acceptable medical source,
thus the factors urged by Ms. Hogue do not apply.

16

Instead, the ALJ must consider the evidence, explain the weight given, and
provide an adequate rationale. The ALJ fulfilled this duty, explaining that he was not
giving the statement significant weight because Plaintiff’s mother was not medically
trained, could not be considered a disinterested party, and the statement was not
consistent with the preponderance of the evidence. (TR. 23). The ALJ fulfilled his duty
in evaluating “other source” evidence and the Court rejects Ms. Hogue’s related claim.

See Croley v. Colvin, 2013 WL 615564, Westlaw op. at 5-8 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013)
(unpublished op.) (affirming ALJ’s giving “little weight” to third party function report
completed by plaintiff’s mother because it was a lay opinion not based on medical
evidence, it was based on family loyalties, and it did not outweigh the other medical
evidence).
ORDER
Having reviewed the medical evidence of record, the transcript of the
administrative hearing, the decision of the ALJ, and the pleadings and briefs of the
parties, the undersigned magistrate judge AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
ENTERED on January 25, 2016.

17