Brooks et al v. David et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 29 defendants Hicks and DTF's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Hicks and DTF, and granting plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiffs shall file their amended complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 8/11/2016. (ks)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ANDREW BROOKS, JASON BROOKS,
ANDREA FRAZIER, and PAMELA
WHITE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOE DAVID, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-15-188-M
ORDER
Before the Court is defendants District 6 Drug Task Force (“DTF”) and Jason Hicks
(“Hicks”), individually and in his official capacity’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed
February 2, 2016. On February 23, 2016, plaintiffs filed their response, and on March 4, 2016, DTF
and Hicks filed their reply.
On February 20, 2015, plaintiffs filed their Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of their constitutional rights pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. This action arises out of a traffic stop occurring on Interstate 40
in Caddo County, Oklahoma on February 22, 2013. Hicks, in his official capacity, and DTF now
seek dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Hicks, in his individual capacity, and DTF
also seek judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
II.
Standard of Review
When reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), the court applies
the same standard that applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Park Univ. Enters., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co.
of Reading, PA, 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that
are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 679 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pleading that offers labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at
678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A court “must determine whether the complaint
sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief
under the legal theory proposed.” Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
III.
Discussion
Hicks, in his official capacity, and DTF seek dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment
immunity. In their response, plaintiffs concede that any claims against Hicks, in his official
capacity, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the Court finds that any claims
against Hicks, in his official capacity, should be dismissed. In their response, plaintiffs do not
address DTF’s argument that it has no existence separate from the District Attorney’s Office and
that because it is not a legal entity capable of suing or being sued, plaintiffs’ claims against it must
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be dismissed. Based upon plaintiffs’ lack of response, the Court finds DTF’s argument confessed
and, accordingly, finds that any claims against DTF should be dismissed.
Hicks, in his individual capacity, also seeks judgment on the pleadings. First, Hicks asserts
that plaintiffs fail to state a claim against him because they have not shown that DTF officials
violated their rights during the traffic stop. “[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment
if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United
States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995). Hicks contends that the initiation of the
traffic stop was lawful because it was based on an observed traffic violation – drifting onto the
shoulder of the highway. Hicks further contends that in their Complaint, plaintiffs admit that their
driver, plaintiff Frazier, drifted slightly onto the shoulder of the highway. Upon review of the
Complaint, the Court finds plaintiffs have made no such admission; however, plaintiffs have not
specifically alleged that plaintiff Frazier did not drift onto the shoulder of the highway or otherwise
commit a traffic violation. Additionally, the Court finds that all of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding
the legality of the initial traffic stop are conclusory – plaintiffs simply allege that defendants lacked
probable cause for the stop. The Court, therefore, finds that plaintiffs have not set forth sufficient
factual allegations to plausibly show that the initial traffic stop was unconstitutional.
Further, “during a routine traffic stop, an officer may request a driver’s license and
registration, run requisite computer checks, and issue citations or warnings.” United States v. Pettit,
785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). “An officer may also inquire
about the driver’s travel plans and ask about matters unrelated to the stop.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). Finally, while a lawful traffic stop may not extend beyond the time reasonably required
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to effectuate its purpose, the stop may be extended if the encounter becomes consensual or if, during
the initial lawful traffic stop, the officer develops a “reasonable suspicion” that the detained person
is engaged in criminal activity. See id.
The only factual allegation plaintiffs allege in their Complaint regarding the extension of the
traffic stop is that “[d]uring this traffic stop, Defendant David separately interrogated Plaintiffs
Andrew Brooks, Jason Brooks, and Andrea Frazier and they were held on the side of the road for
approximately one (1) hour and (15) minutes, before Defendant Fisher arrived with his K-9.”
Complaint at ¶ 35. The remainder of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the extension of the stop are
simply conclusory allegations – plaintiffs simply allege that defendants did not have probable cause
to prolong the traffic stop.1 While the Court notes that the length of time the traffic stop was
extended seems excessive, the Court finds, without any further factual allegations, plaintiffs have
not set forth sufficient factual allegations to plausibly show that the extension of the traffic stop was
unconstitutional.
Finally, in their response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs concede that if the initial traffic
stop and the extension of the traffic stop were justified and if the drug dog hit on the vehicle, then
the officers would have had probable cause to search the vehicle and probable cause for the arrest
of plaintiffs and the seizure of plaintiff White’s vehicle. Since the Court has found that plaintiffs
have not set forth sufficient factual allegations to plausible show that the initial traffic stop and/or
the extension of the traffic stop were unconstitutional, the Court finds that plaintiffs have further
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The Court would note that these conclusory allegations do not reference the correct legal
standard of reasonable suspicion.
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failed to state a claim that the search of the vehicle, the arrest of plaintiffs, and the seizure of plaintiff
White’s vehicle were unconstitutional.
Hicks also asserts that he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiffs’ policy and
custom claims and failure to train claims.2 In their Complaint, plaintiffs allege that Hicks
implemented, adopted, or allowed to continue in operation official policies, procedures, and/or
customs of seeking a pretextual reason to stop motor vehicles to justify a search of the vehicle and
seizure of their property in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. However, “pretextual” traffic stops are constitutional. See Botero-Ospina, 71
F.3d at 788 (finding it is irrelevant that officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping
vehicle). Further, regarding plaintiffs’ other policy and custom claims and plaintiffs’ failure to train
claims, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ allegations are nothing more than labels, conclusions, and
formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action without any supporting facts. The Court,
therefore, finds that plaintiffs’ policy and custom claims and failure to train claims should be
dismissed.
Finally, in their response, plaintiffs request leave of Court to amend their Complaint if the
Court determines that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed. Having reviewed the parties’
submissions, the Court finds that plaintiffs should be granted leave to file an amended complaint.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants Hicks and DTF’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings [docket no. 29], DISMISSES plaintiffs’ claims against Hicks and DTF, and GRANTS
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The Court would note that in their response, plaintiffs did not address Hicks’ arguments
regarding plaintiffs’ policy and custom claims and failure to train claims.
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plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiffs shall file their amended complaint within
twenty (20) days of the date of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of August, 2016.
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