Brooks et al v. David et al

Filing 50

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 41 defendant Joe David's Motion to Dismiss (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 1/18/2017. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ANDREW BROOKS, JASON BROOKS,
ANDREA FRAZIER, and PAMELA
WHITE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOE DAVID, in his individual capacity;
DISTRICT ATTORNEY JASON HICKS,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-15-188-M

ORDER
Before the Court is defendant Joe David’s (“David”) Motion to Dismiss, filed September 14,
2016. On October 5, 2016, plaintiffs filed their response, and on October 12, 2016, David filed his
reply.
I.

Introduction1
On February 22, 2013, plaintiffs Andrew Brooks, Jason Brooks, and Andrea Frazier were

traveling eastbound on I-40 in Caddo County, Oklahoma in a 2007 Infiniti FX 35 which was owned
by plaintiff Pamela White, who had allowed plaintiffs to use her vehicle. Plaintiffs allege that
although plaintiff Frazier, who was driving the vehicle, maintained her lane of travel, at all times,
and committed no traffic violations, David and Officer David Conley pulled plaintiffs over for
allegedly drifting slightly onto the shoulder of the highway. David requested permission to search
the vehicle, but plaintiffs denied him permission. David also separately interrogated plaintiffs
Frazier, Andrew Brooks, and Jason Brooks on the side of the road. Plaintiffs allege that even though

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The facts contained in this Introduction are based upon plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint.

they gave David the same answers over and over again, the traffic stop was extended and plaintiffs
were held on the side of the road for one hour and fifteen minutes, while David waited on Officer
Vince Fisher to arrive with his K-9. Plaintiffs further allege that the K-9 made no indication that
it hit on the vehicle, but David, along with Officers Conley and Fisher, proceeded to search the
vehicle, where they found marijuana. Plaintiffs Jason Brooks, Andrew Brooks, and Frazier were
arrested and booked into the Caddo County Jail, and plaintiff White’s vehicle was seized.
On February 20, 2015, plaintiffs filed their Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of their constitutional rights pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. On August 31, 2016, plaintiffs filed their First Amended
Complaint. David now moves this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to
dismiss plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint.
II.

Standard for Dismissal
Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the United
States Supreme Court has held:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that
are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
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misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 679 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pleading that offers labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at
678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A court “must determine whether the complaint
sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief
under the legal theory proposed.” Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Finally, “[a] court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint
presumes all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
III.

Discussion
David asserts that plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful arrest and unlawful vehicle seizure should

be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Specifically, David contends that the discovery of the
marijuana gave probable cause for the arrests. David also contends that the vehicle was lawfully
seized because it was subject to impoundment because the driver was arrested and because it was
subject to seizure under state and federal forfeiture laws. In their response, plaintiffs do not address
David’s contentions regarding the lawfulness of either the arrests or vehicle seizure. Thus, the Court
finds that plaintiffs concede that the discovery of the marijuana gave probable cause for the arrests
and that the vehicle was subject to impoundment and to seizure under state and federal forfeiture
laws. The Court, therefore, finds that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims based upon unlawful arrest and
unlawful vehicle seizure should be dismissed.

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Plaintiffs, however, are also alleging § 1983 claims against David based upon an
unconstitutional traffic stop and an unconstitutional extension of the traffic stop. While David does
not address these claims in his motion to dismiss, he does generally allege that he is entitled to
qualified immunity. Because the subsequent lawful arrest and seizure of the vehicle does not
preclude plaintiffs from maintaining their remaining § 1983 claims, the Court will address whether
David is entitled to qualified immunity in relation to these § 1983 claims.
“When a defendant asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to overcome the asserted immunity.” Ahman v. Furlong, 435 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir.
2006) (citing Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001)). To meet their burden,
plaintiffs must establish: (1) that a constitutional violation occurred; and (2) that the violated right
was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. See Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1166-67
(10th Cir. 2010) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
“[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed
traffic violation or if the police officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or
equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787
(10th Cir. 1995). In their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs specifically allege that plaintiff
Frazier maintained her lane of travel at all times and committed no traffic violations. See First
Amended Complaint at ¶ 19. Having carefully reviewed the First Amended Complaint, and
presuming all of plaintiffs’ factual allegations are true and construing them in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, the Court finds that plaintiffs have set forth sufficient factual allegations
showing that the initial traffic stop was not valid. The Court, thus, finds that plaintiffs have stated
a § 1983 claim for the violation of their Fourth Amendment rights based upon the alleged

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unconstitutional traffic stop. The Court further finds that the violated right was clearly established
at the time of the violation. It has been clearly established since at least 1995 that it is a violation
of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to initiate a traffic stop without reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring. See id.
Further, “during a routine traffic stop, an officer may request a driver’s license and
registration, run requisite computer checks, and issue citations or warnings.” United States v. Pettit,
785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). “An officer may also inquire
about the driver’s travel plans and ask about matters unrelated to the stop.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). Finally, while a lawful traffic stop may not extend beyond the time reasonably required
to effectuate its purpose, the stop may be extended if the encounter becomes consensual or if, during
the initial lawful traffic stop, the officer develops a “reasonable suspicion” that the detained person
is engaged in criminal activity. See id.
Having carefully reviewed the First Amended Complaint, and presuming all of plaintiffs’
factual allegations are true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Court
finds that plaintiffs have set forth sufficient factual allegations showing that the traffic stop was
extended beyond the time reasonably required to effectuate its purpose and that David had no basis
for any reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity. In their First Amended
Complaint, plaintiffs allege that they were detained on the side of the road for one hour and fifteen
minutes and that they repeatedly answered David’s questions and gave consistent answers. The
Court, thus, finds that plaintiffs have stated a § 1983 claim for the violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights based upon the alleged unconstitutional extension of the traffic stop. The Court
further finds that the violated right was clearly established at the time of the violation. It has been

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clearly established since at least 2004 that an officer may only detain a driver beyond the scope of
the traffic stop if, during the stop, the officer develops an objectively reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the detained persons are engaged in some illegal activity or the initial detention
becomes a consensual encounter. See United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir.
2004).
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against David based upon the
alleged unconstitutional traffic stop and the alleged unconstitutional extension of the traffic stop
should not be dismissed based upon qualified immunity.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

David’s Motion to Dismiss [docket no. 41] as follows:
(A)

The Court GRANTS the motion as to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims based upon unlawful
arrest and unlawful vehicle seizure and DISMISSES those claims, and

(B)

The Court DENIES the motion as to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims based upon the alleged
unconstitutional traffic stop and the alleged unconstitutional extension of the traffic
stop.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of January, 2017.

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