Holt v. Roy Blackwell Enterprises Inc

Filing 45

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion to Strike Certain Affirmative Defenses. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 1/26/2016. (mb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KATHERINE HOLT,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROY BLACKWELL ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendant.

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Case No.: CIV-15-326-D

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Certain Affirmative Defenses [Doc.
No. 13]. Defendant timely responded [Doc. No. 20], and Plaintiff replied [Doc. No. 21].
Thus, the Motion is at issue. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s Motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from approximately January 6, 2014 to August
7, 2014.1 During such time, Plaintiff was the only female employed by Defendant at her
location. Plaintiff alleges she was denied training and overtime work and suffered other
differential treatment due to her gender and a hostile work environment. Plaintiff further
alleges she was the victim of lewd acts and conversation based upon her gender and
symptoms related to her health conditions.

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Plaintiff asserts that she was hired as a “pump mechanic and vibrations specialist in training”
(Comp. [Doc. No. 1] at 2), while Defendant claims Plaintiff was employed solely as an “apprentice pump
mechanic” (Def. Ans. [Doc. No. 9] at 2).

Plaintiff has asserted claims of sexual harassment, a sexually hostile working
environment, retaliation for complaints of harassment and discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Oklahoma’s Anti-Discrimination Act
(“OADA”), and discrimination and retaliation for asserting her rights under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and OADA.
Defendant answered Plaintiff’s Complaint and asserted sixteen affirmative defenses.
Plaintiff challenges the following nine defenses:
2.

All actions of [Defendant] with respect to Plaintiff were
done in good faith, were based on a legitimate business
reason, and were unrelated to her gender, alleged
disability, or retaliation for exercising her rights under
the Title VII, the ADA or OADA;

4.

This Court lacks jurisdiction over any claim brought
pursuant to Title VII, the [ADA] or the [OADA] that was
not the subject of a timely-filed charge with the Office of
Civil Rights Enforcement (“OCRE”) or the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), or
with respect to which the OCRE or EEOC has not
concluded its investigation and conciliation efforts;

5.

Plaintiff’s claims are barred and must be dismissed to the
extent that they are based upon conduct that falls outside
of the applicable statutes of limitations;

6.

Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed insofar as she
unreasonably failed to take advantage of [Defendant’s]
procedures and policies designed to report, correct, and
prevent such alleged conduct, or to otherwise avoid the
alleged harm about which she now complains;

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10.

Without admitting that Plaintiff suffered any damages,
Plaintiff’s claims for alleged damages must be dismissed
or limited to the extent that [Defendant] discovers afteracquired evidence of wrongdoing by Plaintiff for which
she would have been terminated or otherwise disciplined;

13.

Plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive damages
because each of the allegedly retaliatory employment
practices, if they occurred, were contrary to
[Defendant’s] good faith efforts to comply with both
state and federal law, and because [Defendant] did not
act with malice or indifference to Plaintiff’s rights;

14.

The imposition of punitive damages against [Defendant]
under the facts of this case would be unconstitutional and
would violate the rights of [Defendant] under the United
States Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution;

15.

Plaintiff’s claims are barred and must be dismissed to the
extent they fall outside of the applicable statutes of
limitations; and

16.

[Defendant] reserves its right to assert additional
defenses as they become apparent through discovery or
investigation.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff requests that the Court, under authority of Rule 12(f), strike these nine
defenses because they are “either not recognized affirmative defenses or so factually
deficient that they fail to provide notice of the basis for the defense.” Pl. Mot. [Doc. No. 13]
at 1. Plaintiff further contends that a determination of the application of the standards
applied in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. 662 (2009), is unnecessary here. Id. at 3.2 In its Response, Defendant maintains “the
challenged defenses are common defenses pleaded by defendants and allowed by courts that
are sufficient to put Plaintiff on notice” and that Twombly/Iqbal standards do not apply. Def.
Resp. [Doc. No. 20] at 1-2, 5.
Rule 12(f) provides that “[t]he Court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Although motions to strike are disfavored generally, the
decision to grant a motion to strike is within the Court’s discretion. See Sender v. Mann, 423
F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1163 (D. Colo. 2006); Scherer v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 78 Fed. Appx. 687,
689 (10th Cir. 2003). “A defense should not be stricken ‘if there is any real doubt’ about its
validity, and ‘the benefit of any doubt should be given to the pleader.’” Sender v. Mann, 423
F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (quoting Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 734, 736-37
(N.D. Ill. 1982)). Therefore, a court “should decline to [strike a defense] unless the
allegations (1) have no possible relation to the controversy, and (2) may prejudice one of the
parties.” Rubio ex. re. Z. R. v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist. No. 202, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1101
(D. Kan. 2007).
Defendant’s sixteenth defense purports to “reserve[] its right to assert additional
defenses as they become apparent through discovery or investigation.” Def. Ans. [Doc. No.
9] at 10. However, Defendant’s ability to later add defenses through amendment of a

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The Court has previously acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit has yet to address, and the “federal
district courts within the Tenth Circuit have reached diverging views” on “whether the pleading standards
announced in Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses.” Duncan v. M.A.R.S., Inc., No. 14-CV-825D, 2014 WL 5681185, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2014). Thus, there is no controlling authority on point. See
also Henson v. Supplemental Health Care Staffing Specialists, No. CIV-09-397-HE (W.D. Okla. filed July
30, 2009).

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pleading is governed by Rule 15, not by a reservation of rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
Therefore, Defendant’s sixteenth defense is STRICKEN. If leave to amend is requested, the
Court will consider the request according to the standards applicable under Rule 15.
In its Response, Defendant withdraws its fifteenth defense. See Def. Resp. [Doc. No.
20] at 10, n.5. Accordingly, Defendant’s fifteenth defense is STRICKEN as moot.
Defendant’s other challenged defenses contain sufficient detail to indicate the
relationship of the defense to the claims asserted and to avoid undue prejudice to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s Motion will therefore be denied as to Defendant’s additional defenses.3
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Certain Affirmative
Defenses [Doc. No. 13] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Accordingly,
defenses 15 and 16 shall be STRICKEN from Defendant’s Answer. Plaintiff’s Motion is
denied as to all other defenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of January, 2016.

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This Court generally agrees with Judge Heaton’s reasoning in Henson v. Supplemental Health Care
Staffing Specialists, No. CIV-09-397-HE (W.D. Okla. filed July 30, 2009), regarding the applicability of the
Twombly/Iqbal standards to affirmative defenses.

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