Stout et al v. Long et al
Filing
166
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 160 Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge NMD Gregory Wormuth on 3/14/2018. (KS)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LANCE STOUT, individually and as guardian
of C.S., a minor child, and as personal representative
of the Estate of Stacey Michelle Stout, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civ. No. 15‐379 WPJ
DANNY LONG, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL
This matter comes before the Court on the Individual Defendants’ Motion Under
Rule 37 to Compel Disclosure with Brief in Support. Doc. 160. In their Motion, the
Individual Defendants request that the Court compel Plaintiffs to fully respond to their
Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 14 prior to depositions. Id. at 11. The Court held a hearing
on the Motion on February 1, 2018. Doc. 161. At the close of the hearing, the Court
issued an oral ruling granting in part and denying in part the relief requested in the
Motion. Id. at 13‐14. This Order memorializes that ruling and gives the factual and
legal basis therefor.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case and the related case 14‐cv‐427 WPJ/GBW arise from a common nexus of
facts related to the fatal shooting of Stacey and Christopher Stout by law enforcement
officers on April 9, 2013. Doc. 45 at 5‐7. Plaintiffs are the Administrators of the Estate of
Stacey Stout and guardians of Stacey and Christopher Stout’s minor child, C.S. The
plaintiff in the related case is the mother and Personal Representative of the Estate of
Christopher Stout. Plaintiffs and the plaintiff in the related case have brought § 1983
and Bivens claims against Defendants based on the following common factual
allegations.
On April 9, 2013, the Individual Defendants (Danny Long, Oklahoma Highway
Patrol Trooper; James Leone, Agent of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs; Chad Pope, Pottawatomie County Deputy Sheriff; Ed Grimes,
Canadian County Deputy; Kevin Johnson, Oklahoma City Police Sergeant; and Callen
Stephens and Taran Groom, Deputy U.S. Marshals) were attempting to serve an arrest
warrant on Christopher Stout arising from a burglary charge in Payne County,
Oklahoma. Doc. 45 at 6. The Individual Defendants attempted to serve the warrant on
Christopher Stout as he and Stacey began driving out of the parking lot of a Motel 6 in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Id. at 5‐6. As Mr. Stout drove away from the motel parking
lot, the Individual Defendants performed a tactical vehicle intervention maneuver in
order to prevent his flight. Id. at 6. According to the Second Amended Complaint, the
officers then surrounded Mr. Stout’s car with their own vehicles. Inside the car, the
Stouts raised their hands with open palms facing the windshield. Id. At that point, the
Individual Defendants exited their vehicles, took up shooting positions around the
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Stout vehicle, and fired at least 75 bullets into the car, killing both Stacey and
Christopher. Id. at 6‐7.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motions to Compel
“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The Court has the authority “to order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action for good
cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), Advisory Committee Note to 2000 Amendments.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) permits a party to file a motion to compel
responses to properly propounded discovery after a good faith attempt at conferral
with the opposing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1), (a)(3)(B). The Court is required to
limit discovery if it determines that the discovery sought is outside the scope permitted
by Rule 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
B. Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine was first recognized by the Supreme Court in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The purpose of the doctrine is to “shelter[] the
mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can
analyze and prepare his client’s case.” United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
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The doctrine applies to “documents and tangible things that are prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). Further, the Court “must protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other
representative concerning the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B).
This latter type of protected information—the mental impressions of the
attorney—constitutes opinion work product, which generally receives greater
protection than ordinary work product—i.e., facts or materials gathered by an attorney
in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., In re Qwest Comm’ns Intern., Inc., 450 F.3d 1179,
1186 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that some courts have held “opinion work product” to
be “absolutely privileged,” while “non‐opinion work product, i.e., fact work product, []
may be discoverable under appropriate circumstances.”). See also Encon Int’l, Inc. v.
Garrahan, 2013 WL 12250907, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 16, 2013) (finding the work product
doctrine barred an interrogatory asking the defendant to “identify the percentage of
fault [the defendant] contends is attributable to [itself] and other persons or entities who
caused or contributed to [the plaintiff’s] damages” because it “does not ask for an
opinion or contention that relates to a fact or an application of law to a fact” but instead
“asks for an opinion regarding what will ultimately be an issue for the jury when it
applies the law to the facts presented at trial.”).
The party claiming work product protection bears the burden of establishing that
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the doctrine applies to bar discovery of the disputed material. Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266 (10th Cir. 1995). While the doctrine bars discovery of an
attorney’s “strategies and legal impressions, it does not protect facts concerning the
creation of work product or facts contained within work product.” Id. (citing Feldman v.
Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 86, 89 (W.D. Okla. 1980)). Moreover, “[a] party clearly
cannot refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground that the information sought is
solely within the knowledge of his attorney.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 504. “Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession.” Id. at 507.
C. Contention Interrogatories
Under Rule 33, “[a]n interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for
an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, but the
court may order that the interrogatory need not be answered until designated discovery
is complete, or until a pretrial conference or some other time.” Fed R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2).
Although the Court has the power to delay answers to contention interrogatories
until after designated discovery is complete, a plaintiff is “not entitled to withhold
discovery information until he has obtained to his own satisfaction all discovery from
[the d]efendants.” Johnson v. Kraft Foods. N. Am., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 535, 544 (D. Kan. 2006).
Rather, “[b]ecause of the simplicity of notice pleading, [the p]laintiff should provide as
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much information as possible regarding his claims without delay and as early as
required. Defendants are ‘entitled to know the factual basis of plaintiff’s allegations.’”
Id. (quoting Continental Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682, 684 (D. Kan.
1991)). See also S.E.C. v. Goldstone, Civ. No. 12‐0257 JB/LFG, 2014 WL 4349507, at *30
(D.N.M. Aug. 23, 2014).
“‘Requests for opinions or contentions that call for the application of law to
fact—contention interrogatories—are proper.’” S.E.C. v. Goldstone, 2014 WL 4349507 at
*30 (quoting Kraft Foods, 236 F.R.D. at 544) (internal alterations omitted). See also DʹAlise
v. Basic Dental Implant Sys., Inc., Civ. No. 10‐0016 WJ/DJS, 2010 WL 11552977, at *3
(D.N.M. July 12, 2010) (“The general view is that contention interrogatories are a
perfectly permissible form of discovery, to which a response ordinarily would be
required.”) (quoting Starcher v. Correctional Med. Sys., Inc., 144 F.3d 418, 421 n.2 (6th Cir.
1998), aff’d sub nom. Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198 (1998)). Rule 33 and its
advisory notes “clearly indicate that requests for opinions of contentions that call for
application of the law to fact are proper.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2) and the
Advisory Committee Notes to 1970 Amendments).
Contention interrogatories are useful for the purpose of providing the requesting
party “the opportunity to determine what proof is necessary to effectively refute [the
opposing party’s] position” on the issues in contention. Pouncil v. Branch Law Firm, 277
F.R.D. 642, 650 (D. Kan. 2011). Where an interrogatory cannot be fully answered prior
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to the completion of discovery, it is appropriate to order the party to answer such
interrogatory “as fully as they can, keeping in mind their continuing obligation to
supplement their discovery responses as additional or different information becomes
available.” Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
The Court will discuss both interrogatories at issue together, as the interplay
between Interrogatory No. 5 and Interrogatory No. 14 is fundamental to the parties’
dispute regarding them.
Interrogatory No. 5:
For each individual defendant, separately identify and state in detail the
material facts Plaintiffs rely upon to support the contention that they used
excessive force, including the identification of any documents or witnesses
relied upon.
Doc. 160‐3 at 3.
Plaintiffs’ Response to Interrogatory No. 5:
Discovery is ongoing, the information which Plaintiffs have is that all of
the Individual Defendants fired at Christopher and Stacey Stout on the
evening of April 9, 2013 and did so without any objectively reasonable
basis. One witness, Salter [sic] Priester has given a statement that both
Christopher and Stacey Stout had their hands raised when the shots were
fired. Another witness, Ms. Battershell, has stated in the statement
previously produced that quickly after stopping the vehicle containing the
Stouts the Individual Defendants began firing. Oklahoma City has stated
in its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint that the Task Force
members commenced firing when Christopher Stout began raising his
hands. Oklahoma City Answer to Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. #48
at 3 ¶ 11. All of these facts support the Plaintiffs’ allegation that excessive
force was used. Plaintiffs will supplement this response as appropriate.
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Id. at 3‐4.
Plaintiffs served the response to Interrogatory No. 7 on July 7, 2017. Id. at 8. On
October 19, 2017, the Court held a status conference regarding a pending pretrial
deadline extension request made by Plaintiffs and Defendant Oklahoma City. Doc. 151.
During that conference, Plaintiffs’ counsel represented that Plaintiffs’ case depends
more heavily on the Individual Defendants’ statements which were given during the
investigation following the shooting than on the testimony of unavailable eyewitness
Salters Priester. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that these statements of the
Individual Defendants demonstrated inconsistencies in the officers’ accounts of the
shooting, which prompted defense counsel to include Interrogatory No. 14 in the
Individual Defendants’ Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs (doc. 160‐4), served
later that same day. See doc. 160 at 4‐5.
Interrogatory No. 14:
If you contend that any statement by any particular Individual Defendant
regarding the incident is inconsistent with that individual’s other
statements regarding the incident or inconsistent with the statements of
the other Individual Defendants, identify and explain each alleged
inconsistency.
Doc. 160‐4 at 1‐2.
Plaintiffs’ Response to Interrogatory No. 14:
Plaintiffs object to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it invades the
attorney work product privilege.
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Doc. 160‐5 at 2.
The Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ response to Interrogatory No. 5,
which asks for all material facts, documents, and witnesses on which Plaintiffs rely to
support their contentions, must be incomplete because it contains no mention of any
statement made by any of the Individual Defendants. They contend that that absence is
at odds with the representation made by Plaintiffs’ counsel that Plaintiffs’ case depends
heavily on the Individual Defendants’ statements. See doc. 160 at 4‐9.
Moreover, the Individual Defendants assert that Plaintiffs are operating under a
misinterpretation of the Rules governing discovery in light of the position Plaintiffs’
counsel took during the conferral process prior to the filing of the present motion.
Specifically, Plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to defense counsel in an email dated January 7,
2018:
[Interrogatory No. 14] is clearly improper – seeking the impressions of
counsel and trial strategy. That is classic work product. [O]ur responses
to discovery have given you a firm grasp as to the core of the facts that we
rely upon to prove our claims. The relatively succinct statements of the
individual officers that were present at the shooting which you reference,
together with Mr. Priester’s statement and Ms. Battershell’s statement set
forth the core of the facts that we rely upon to establish that the Individual
Defendants acted with deliberate indifference and used excessive force
when they killed Christopher and Stacey Stout. . . . [W]hat you clearly are
seeking in both [Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 14] is how we will argue at
trial that these facts prove our case. You have the facts, you are not
entitled to be told how we will argue that those facts establish [Plaintiffs’
claims].
Doc. 160‐2 at 2.
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Broadly, the Individual Defendants rely on two primary arguments in support of
their motion to compel responses to Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 14. First, they contend
that Plaintiffs are improperly using the work‐product doctrine as a shield against
discovery of information known only to their attorneys, which is an errant
interpretation of the contours of the doctrine. Doc. 160 at 6‐9. They rely on Hickman and
Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 262 F.R.D. 617, 629 (N.D. Okla. 2009) for the proposition
that an interrogatory is not objectionable because a party’s attorneys know the
information, but the party does not. Id. at 7. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 504 (“A party
clearly cannot refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground that the information
sought is solely within the knowledge of his attorney.”).
Second, the Individual Defendants argue that the work‐product doctrine “does
not provide protection for ‘facts concerning the creation of work product or facts
contained within the work product.’” Doc. 160 at 7‐8 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp., 73
F.3d at 266). In fact, they argue, “Rule 33 expressly permits contention interrogatories
that delve into opinion work product ‘because it asks for an opinion or contention that
relates to fact or the application of law to fact.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Tyson Foods, 262 F.R.D.
at 630 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2)). In other words, contrary to Plaintiffs’ position
outlined above in their counsel’s January 7, 2018 email, the Individual Defendants
assert that they are “entitled to know how Plaintiffs will argue their case at trial.” Doc.
160 at 6 (citing Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682,
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684 (D. Kan. 1991) (“An interrogatory may properly inquire into a party’s contentions in
the case and the factual basis therefor.”)).
The Individual Defendants further note that Plaintiffs did not object to
Interrogatory No. 5 in their initial response, and that they have therefore waived any
work‐product objection to Interrogatory No. 5. Thus, to the extent the information
sought in Interrogatory No. 14 would also be responsive to Interrogatory No. 5, the
Individual Defendants argue Plaintiffs should be compelled to supplement their
response to No. 5 with such information. See doc. 160 at 9‐10.
Finally, the Individual Defendants ask the Court to compel supplementation of
Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 14 before they are deposed, to allow them to fully prepare for
deposition and “to prevent Plaintiffs from taking advantage of their delay in providing
full discovery responses.” Id. at 10.
Plaintiffs filed no response to the present motion. However, during the motion
hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel explained to the Court that counsel had been mistakenly
operating under the impression that this case and the related case, Theresa Stout v.
Danny Long, et al., 14‐cv‐427 WPJ/GBW, were consolidated for purposes of the motion.
See doc. 161 at 2. The plaintiff in the related case did file a response to the substantially
similar motion to compel filed by the individual defendants there. Contrary to
counsel’s understanding, the cases are not formally consolidated and all filings must be
made on the dockets for both cases. Nonetheless, the Court ruled during the hearing
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that it would treat the response in the related case (doc. 198 in 14‐cv‐427 WPJ/GBW) as a
response to both motions, rather than grant the present motion on such a technicality.
The Court cautioned Plaintiffs’ counsel that it would not be so lenient in the future.
In the response filed in the related case (“doc. 198”), Plaintiffs note that the Court
has already ruled that they have alleged sufficient plausible facts in the Second
Amended Complaint to overcome the Individual Defendants’ Second Motion to
Dismiss. Doc. 198 at 1‐2; see also doc. 91. Therefore, Plaintiffs contend that the
Individual Defendants are merely attempting to reassert their already‐rejected
arguments by pressing Plaintiffs to supplement their response to Interrogatory No. 5.1
Doc. 198 at 1‐2. Further, Plaintiffs emphasize that, because Stacey and Christopher Stout
were killed during the shooting giving rise to Plaintiffs’ cause of action, Plaintiffs lack
access to any evidence from eyewitnesses or other persons with direct knowledge of the
events to further support their excessive force claim, and they have thus fully
responded to Interrogatory No. 5. Id. at 2‐3, 5‐6.
As to Interrogatory No. 14, Plaintiffs contend that it “impermissibly inquire[s]
into the mental impressions and trial strategy of Plaintiff[s’] counsel, as its subject
matter is well beyond the ken of a party unlearned in the law, i.e., Plaintiff[s.]” Id. at 3.
Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that asking them to provide arguments that their counsel
Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 14 are numbered, respectively, Interrogatories Nos. 7 and 19 in the related
case. In summarizing Plaintiffs’ positions on the matters at issue, the Court has superficially altered the
numbering contained in the plaintiff’s briefing in Case No. 14‐cv‐427 to avoid confusion.
1
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may make during deposition or trial regarding perceived inconsistencies of the
Individual Defendants’ statements violates the work‐product doctrine. Id. at 3‐4.
Plaintiffs further note that providing their counsel’s assessments of the opposing
parties’ post‐shooting statements will detract from the “honesty and spontaneity” of the
depositions of the Individual Defendants. Id. at 4.
The Court agrees that Interrogatory No. 14 impermissibly seeks insight into
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s trial strategy. Specifically, Rule 33 allows a party to discover the
opposing party’s “opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to
fact[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). As the Advisory Committee has explained, Rule 33’s
authorization of such “contention interrogatories” will necessarily require a party or her
attorney “to disclose, to some extent, mental impressions, opinions or conclusions” in
response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), Advisory Committee Note to 1970 Amendments.
However, as the Court explained during the hearing on the present motion,
Individual Defendants’ Interrogatory No. 14 does not request mere factual contentions,
or legal opinions requiring the application of law to fact. Rather, the Individual
Defendants ask Plaintiffs to reveal their counsel’s perceptions of inconsistencies
between or among the official statements that the officers gave regarding the shooting.
In other words, the interrogatory asks Plaintiffs to explain how their counsel plans to
impeach their party‐opponents.
Importantly, an attacking party cannot use inconsistencies in her party‐
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opponent’s statements as substantive evidence to prove her case, unless such
statements qualify as prior inconsistent statements pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
801(d)(1)(a). Defense counsel acknowledged during the hearing that the statements at
issue do not so qualify, as they were not taken under oath during a legal proceeding.
See doc. 161 at 7‐8. Therefore, any such inconsistencies between or among the
statements would not qualify as “facts Plaintiffs rely upon to support the contention
that [the Individual Defendants] used excessive force,” as requested by Interrogatory
No. 5. Instead, such inconsistencies constitute trial‐strategy material that Plaintiffs’
counsel may use to attack the credibility of the Individual Defendants and their version
of events at trial or during their depositions. That type of material is protected by the
work‐product doctrine and is thus not discoverable. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238; In re
Qwest Comm’ns Intern., Inc., 450 F.3d at 1186; cf. Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville/Davidson
Cty., 2008 WL 687516, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2008) (holding that the work‐product
doctrine did not protect against a contention interrogatory that did not ask the plaintiffs
to “assess credibility, or provide the defendant with discrepancies in the defendants’
testimony[,]” but rather merely requested that they “clarify [their] contentions as to
specific defendants and . . . provide the facts that support those contentions.”).
Although the work‐product doctrine protects against the disclosure sought by
Interrogatory No. 14, the Individual Defendants’ Interrogatory No. 5 does not suffer
from the same defect. The information sought in Interrogatory No. 5 is exactly the type
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of information anticipated by Rule 33(a)(2) as discoverable. Specifically, Interrogatory
No. 5 seeks “the material facts” that Plaintiffs rely upon to support their excessive force
claim, “including the identification of any documents or witnesses relied upon.” Doc.
160‐3 at 3. In their response, Plaintiffs identified the statements of two witnesses and a
portion of Defendant Oklahoma City’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint. Id. at 3‐4.
However, at the hearing on the present motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel did not
dispute that Plaintiffs may pursue alternative theories of liability on their excessive
force claim based on, for example, the tactical vehicle intervention method used by the
Individual Defendants, the number of shots taken, and possible violations of the
policies and procedures governing the use of force promulgated by their respective law
enforcement agencies. See doc. 161 at 5‐6, 8‐9. Yet Plaintiffs’ response to the contention
interrogatory lacks any reference to any material fact, document, or witness that could
support these theories. It is therefore deficient. See Kraft Foods, 236 F.R.D. at 544
(requiring the plaintiff to “provide as much information as possible regarding his
claims without delay and as early as required” because the defendants are “entitled to
know the factual basis of plaintiff’s allegations” (quotations omitted)); Anaya v. CBS
Broad. Inc., Civ. No. 06‐0476 JB/KBM, 2007 WL 2219458, at *8 (D.N.M. May 16, 2007)
(valid reasons for compelling answers to contention interrogatories include allowing
defendants to “clarify the issues in the case, narrow the scope of the dispute, [and]
15
decide if early settlement discussions should be entered into or whether there is a
substantial basis for bringing a motion for summary judgment”); see also Hickman, 329
U.S. at 501 (explaining that the discovery process serves “to narrow and clarify the basic
issues between the parties, and [] as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as
to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues”).
Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny the Individual Defendants’ motion
to compel supplementation of Plaintiffs’ response to Interrogatory No. 14, but will grant
the motion to compel supplementation of Plaintiffs’ response to Interrogatory No. 5.
Plaintiffs must identify all material facts and documents that they contend support their
excessive force claim, including of ballistics reports, witness statements, policies and
procedures, and any other evidence contained in the investigative report or elsewhere
that Plaintiffs may use to support the claim.2
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Compel (doc. 160)
is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART as follows.
In their reply filed in the related case (doc. 199 in 14‐cv‐427 WPJ/GBW), the Individual Defendants
belatedly sought additional Rule 37 sanctions against Plaintiffs on the basis of their incomplete response
to Interrogatory No. 5. Specifically, the Individual Defendants asked the Court to order “that Plaintiff[s
are] not allowed to use any material from the Investigative Report or received in response to third‐party
subpoenas on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial” because they failed to identify any such material in
response to this contention interrogatory. Id. at 7; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). This sanctions request is
untimely; further, counsel for the Individual Defendants effectively abandoned it at the hearing by failing
to request such sanctions. The Court therefore denies this request.
2
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The Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to supplement their response to Interrogatory No.
5 by providing a full and complete inventory of all material facts and documentation
that they presently contend are supportive of any potential theory of liability
underlying their excessive force claim against the Individual Defendants.
Due to the prejudice caused by Plaintiffs’ insufficient response to Interrogatory
No. 5, the Court vacated the depositions set for February 2, 2018 and throughout the
week of February 5‐9, 2018. Therefore, it is further ORDERED that those vacated
depositions may not be taken until seven days after the production of Plaintiffs’
amended response to Interrogatory No. 5.
Interrogatory No. 14 impermissibly seeks information protected by the attorney
work‐product doctrine. Accordingly, the Individual Defendants’ motion to compel an
answer thereto is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________
GREGORY B. WORMUTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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