Texas Life Insurance Company v. Raper et al
Filing
18
ORDER denying 14 defendant Raper's motion to dismiss...see order for specifics. Signed by Honorable Joe Heaton on 08/24/2015. (lam)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TEXAS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
AMANDA RAPER, f/k/a Amanda R.
)
Nickell, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
NO. CIV-15-0418-HE
ORDER
Plaintiff Texas Life Insurance Company (“Texas Life”) filed this declaratory
judgment action against Amanda Raper a/k/a Amanda R. Nickell and Dana Clifton, as legal
guardian for the Estate of GFN, seeking a declaration regarding the proper beneficiary of a
life insurance policy it issued Christopher Nickell. Texas Life also seeks a declaration that
the Citizen Potawatomi Nation Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it or subject
matter jurisdiction over the dispute between it and defendant Raper. Defendant Raper has
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that a virtually identical action is pending in the
District Court of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation.
Background
The facts underlying the dispute are not contested.1 Christopher Nickell, a non-Indian,
purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy from Texas Life in March 2010, while he was
employed at the Gordon-Cooper Technology Center in Shawnee, Oklahoma. He married
defendant Amanda Raper, a Cherokee Indian, in July 2012. In April 2013, Nickell
1
The facts are taken from the complaint and the parties’ briefs.
designated Ms. Raper as the primary beneficiary of the insurance policy and GFN, his minor
child, as the secondary beneficiary. Ms. Raper and Nickell were divorced on December 31,
2013. The divorce decree was issued by the District Court for the Citizen Potawatomi
Nation.2 Nickell died on April 1, 2014, and both Ms. Raper and defendant Clifton, GFN’s
legal guardian, submitted claims to Texas Life for the policy benefits. On May 28, 2014,
Texas Life tendered $100,000 to Ms. Clifton, as GFN’s guardian, relying on §7.17 of the
policy, which it asserts provides that the insurance contract is governed by Oklahoma law,
and 15 Okla. Stat. § 178, which it asserts provides that Ms. Raper’s designation as the policy
beneficiary was revoked when Nickell died after their divorce. Ms. Raper then sued Texas
Life in the District Court for the Citizen Potawatomi Nation, alleging she is entitled to the
life insurance benefits and seeking judgment in the amount of $100,000. She alleges in her
petition in that case that “nothing in the Potawatomi Nation’s statutes provide for revocation
[upon the insured’s death] of the insurance company contract.” Doc. #1-7, p. 3.
Ms. Raper argues that the “case turns on whether, or not, the Divorce Decree in
Potawatomi Tribal court voided the beneficiary designation by Nickell in the insurance
2
In her motion to dismiss, Ms. Raper states that “utilizing her Cherokee Indian heritage,
[she] filed for divorce in the Citizen Potawatomi Nation Trial Court; Nickell consented to the
jurisdiction of the Potawatomi Nation Tribal Court.” Doc. #14, p. 2. However, Ms. Raper is listed
in the caption as the defendant in the divorce action.” Doc. #1-3, p. 2. The divorce decree states
that it was the defendant, i.e. Ms. Raper, who “submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction through
execution of an Entry of Appearance and Waiver.” Id. See generally Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d
1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court
may look both to the complaint itself and to any documents attached as exhibits to the complaint.”);
see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part
thereof for all purposes”).
2
policy sold to Nickell via solicitation at Gordon Cooper Vo-Tech.” Doc. #14, p. 3. She
contends the Tribal Court can interpret its own decree and determine if it is affected by the
Oklahoma statute. The court does not disagree. However, the question is whether the Tribal
Court has jurisdiction over the dispute and Texas Life and should be given the opportunity
to determine the extent of its jurisdiction as required by the tribal exhaustion rule. Texas Life
claims the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction to resolve the policy dispute because “the Policy
has no relation whatsoever to the tribal sovereignty of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation.” Doc.
#16, p. 4. It argues that none of the parties to this action, and neither party to the insurance
contact – Texas Life or Nickell – are (were) members of the citizen Potawatomi Nation, none
of the conduct pertaining to the policy occurred on tribal property and the contracting parties
agreed that the policy would be governed by Oklahoma law.
Analysis
“The tribal exhaustion rule provides that, absent exceptional circumstances, federal
courts typically ‘should abstain from hearing cases that challenge tribal court jurisdiction
until tribal court remedies, including tribal appellate review, are exhausted.’” Crowe &
Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bank of Okla. v.
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir.1992)). However, because it is “a
prudential rule based on comity, the exhaustion rule is not without exception.” Id. at 1150.
“Relevant here, exhaustion is not required if it is ‘clear that the tribal court lacks
jurisdiction,’ such that ‘the exhaustion requirement would serve no purpose other than
delay.’” Id. (quoting Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir.2006)).
3
Ms. Raper cites the Citizen Potawatomi Nation Code of laws, which provides that its
courts “shall have general civil jurisdiction over all general civil claims which arise within
the tribal jurisdiction.” Doc. #14, p. 2. As Texas Life notes in its response, she appears to
claim that the jurisdiction of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation and its Tribal Courts is
coextensive with the boundaries of Potawatomi County. See id. pp. 2-3; Raper’s Answer,
Doc. #15, pp. 2-3. However, she offers no support for this assertion and ignores the wellestablished limits that have been placed on the ability of Indian tribes to exercise jurisdiction
over nontribal members.
Under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–65 (1981), and its progeny,
“[t]here is a presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.”3 Crowe, 640 F.3d
at 1150. Two exceptions exist to Montana’s general rule against a tribal court exercising
jurisdiction over nontribal members. Id. “[A] tribe may regulate ‘activities of nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other agreements.’” Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
A tribe also may exercise authority over nonmember conduct on Indian land “where ‘the
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe.’” Id. at 1150-51 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566);
3
Courts use the terms non-Indian and non-member interchangeably. “[W]hile the tribes
have authority to exercise civil jurisdiction over their own members, exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent
with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation. Generally, therefore, the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to
the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” Crowe, 640 F.3d at 1150 (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
4
Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, 762 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe
– with two exceptions: the activities of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships
with the tribe and the activities of nonmembers that take place on Indian land. “) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Neither exception applies here. Texas Life sold a life insurance policy to Nickell, who
was not a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation. The policy was solicited and executed
at a state vocational-technical school located in a municipality (the city of Shawnee). A
dispute now exists regarding that contract between nontribal members.4
The first Montana exception does not support the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction
over Texas Life, as it did not enter into a “consensual relationship” with the Citizen
Potawatomi Nation or any tribal member. The second Montana exception, which is
“narrow,” also does not apply. Crowe, 540 F.3d at 1153. “To support jurisdiction under this
exception, the conduct must ‘imperil the subsistence of the tribal community.’” Id. (quoting
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 329–30 (2008)).
Texas Life’s issuance of a life insurance policy to a nonmember and its subsequent payment
of the policy proceeds to one of two policy beneficiaries, neither of whom is a member of the
Citizen Potawatomi Nation, does not threaten the tribe.
The fact that the Tribal Court issued a divorce decree to Nickell, which may affect the
4
Ms. Raper is a member of the Cherokee tribe.
5
interpretation of the insurance policy, also does not give the Tribal Court jurisdiction over
Texas Life in a later policy dispute or over the policy dispute itself. As Texas Life points
out, the entry of a divorce decree by a court does not give it jurisdiction over “all matters
tangentially related” to that decree. Doc. #16, p. 11. The cases plaintiff cites do not counsel
otherwise. One, Thoendel v. Holland, 663 F.Supp. 77 (W.D.Okla. 1987), is inapposite. In
it the court had to determine whether a claim was separate and independent for removal
purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). The other, U. S. ex rel. Rollingson v. Blackfeet Tribal
Court of Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 244 F. Supp. 474 (D. Mont. 1965), is distinguishable.
It involved matters arising out of a lease between a corporation and a tribe and was
concerned with “ internal affairs of the tribe” that could “be determined solely in the tribal
court.” Rollingson, 244 F.Supp. at 478.
Ms. Raper has offered no compelling argument establishing that the Tribal Court has
personal jurisdiction over Texas Life or subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. “Tribal
courts are . . . not courts of general jurisdiction.” Crowe, 640 F.3d at 1150. As the District
Court for the Citizen Potawatomi Nation plainly lacks both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, “the exhaustion requirement would serve no purpose, and there is no need to
require further tribal court litigation before the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case.”
Crowe, 640 F.3d at 1153.
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Accordingly, defendant Raper’s motion to dismiss [Doc. #14] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 24th day of August, 2015.
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