Texas Life Insurance Company v. Raper et al

Filing 32

ORDER granting 27 plaintiff's motion for judgment on pleadings...see order for specifics. Signed by Honorable Joe Heaton on 01/11/2016. (lam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TEXAS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
AMANDA RAPER, f/k/a Amanda R.
)
Nickell, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

NO. CIV-15-0418-HE

ORDER
Plaintiff Texas Life Insurance Company (“Texas Life”) filed this declaratory
judgment action against Amanda Raper f/k/a Amanda R. Nickell and Dana Clifton, as legal
guardian for the Estate of GFN, seeking a declaration regarding the proper beneficiary of a
life insurance policy it issued Chris Nickell and a declaration that the Citizen Potawatomi
Nation courts do not have personal jurisdiction over it or subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute between it and defendant Raper. Texas Life has moved for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Its motion is not opposed by defendant Clifton,
whose position is aligned with Texas Life, but it is challenged by defendant Raper.
Background1
Chris Nickell purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy from Texas Life on March
1, 2010, through his employer, Gordon Cooper Technology Center, which is located in
Shawnee, Oklahoma. He subsequently married defendant Amanda Raper in July 2012.

1

The facts underlying the dispute are not contested with one exception – the parties dispute
whether the terms of the decree granting Chris Nickell and Ms. Raper a divorce are ambiguous.

After they married, Nickell designated defendant Raper as the primary beneficiary of the
insurance policy and GFN, his minor child, as the secondary beneficiary. Ms. Raper and
Nickell were divorced on December 31, 2013. The District Court for the Citizen Potawatomi
Nation issued the divorce decree.2 Nickell died on April 1, 2014, and both Ms. Raper and
Ms. Clifton, GFN’s legal guardian, submitted claims to Texas Life for the policy benefits.
On May 28, 2014, Texas Life tendered $100,753.59 to Ms. Clifton, as GFN’s legal guardian.
Ms. Raper then sued Texas Life in the District Court for the Citizen Potawatomi Nation on
March 31, 2015, alleging she is entitled to the life insurance benefits and seeking judgment
in the amount of $100,000. Texas Life filed this action on April 20, 2015.
Defendant Raper previously moved to dismiss this lawsuit due to the pending action
in the District Court of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation. The court denied her motion to
dismiss, concluding that the Citizen Potawatomi Nation court lacked personal jurisdiction
over Texas Life and subject matter jurisdiction over the policy dispute.
Analysis
“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when the moving party has clearly
established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Sanders v. Mountain Am. Fed. Credit Union, 689 F.3d 1138,
1141 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The court “accept[s] all facts
2

As jurisdiction is based on diversity, state law applies. In Oklahoma, “the general rule of
law is that the law where the contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature,
validity, and interpretation.” Telex Corp. v. Hamilton, 576 P.2d 767, 768 (Okla. 1978). The policy
was not only entered into in Oklahoma, it provides that shall be governed by Oklahoma law. Doc.
#27-1, pp. 14-15, § 7-17. The parties also agree that Oklahoma law governs the dispute.
2

pleaded by the non-moving party as true and grant[s] all reasonable inferences from the
pleadings in that party's favor.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s task is
to construe the insurance policy between Texas Life and Nickell, applying Oklahoma law.
The parties agree that the dispositive issue is whether defendant Raper’s status as a
beneficiary of the insurance policy was revoked by operation of law pursuant to 15 Okla.
Stat. § 178(A) when Nickell and Defendant Raper divorced.3 Section 178(A) provides in
pertinent part that:
If, after entering into a written contract in which a beneficiary is designated or
provision is made for the payment of any death benefit (including life
insurance contracts . . .), the party to the contract with the power to designate
the beneficiary or to make provision for payment of any death benefit dies
after being divorced from the person designated as the beneficiary . . . all
provisions in the contract in favor of the decedent's former spouse are thereby
revoked. Annulment of the marriage shall have the same effect as a divorce.
In the event of either divorce or annulment, the decedent's former spouse shall
be treated for all purposes under the contract as having predeceased the
decedent.
Texas Life argues that, pursuant to the express terms of § 178(A), upon her divorce from
Nickell, defendant Raper is treated for purposes of the insurance policy “as having
predeceased” her former spouse. All provisions in the policy in Defendant Raper’s favor
were revoked, Texas Life contends, when Nickell died.
Defendant Raper responds that § 178(A) does not apply “[i]f the decree of divorce .
. . contains a provision expressing an intention contrary to subsection A . . . .” 15 Okla. Stat.

3

The court assumes, without deciding, that the underlying divorce decree is valid. No party
has suggested otherwise.
3

§ 178(B)(3). She claims the parties had agreed that the life insurance proceeds would be
available to pay off a joint loan the parties owed on a 2012 Dodge Ram truck and intended
to include such a provision in the Divorce Decree. She argues that, because the “Decree
then was drafted to read that [Nickell] would pay for the 2012 Dodge Ram pickup,” and
“[t]he only way Chris Nickell could pay after his death was with the life insurance proceeds,”
Doc. #30, pp. 4-5, the terms of the Divorce Decree are ambiguous and parol evidence is
admissible to show the parties’ intent.
If the Divorce Decree provided, or could be interpreted as providing, that the life
insurance proceeds would be available to pay off the auto loan and, thus, that Raper remain
the primary beneficiary of the insurance policy, then § 178(B)(3) would operate to prevent
plaintiff’s status as a beneficiary from being revoked. However, the language of the decree
does not support such a conclusion.
The Divorce Decree awarded Chris Nickell the 2012 Dodge Ram 1500 truck as his
“sole and separate property” and the court ordered Nickell to assume responsibility for the
debt for the truck and “obtain financing in his name, removing [defendant Raper’s] name
from the loan as soon as possible.” Doc. #27-3, p. 3. The court could have easily included
a provision in the decree requiring Nickell to retain Ms. Raper as the primary beneficiary of
his life insurance policy until he had obtained refinancing and removed her name from the
prior loan. However, it does not mention the life insurance policy or Raper’s status as a

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beneficiary and its provisions are unambiguous.4 See generally Ryan v. Ryan, 78 P.3d 961,
964-65 (Okla.Civ.App. 2003) (discussing latent ambiguity in divorce decree). Therefore,
when Nickell died, after being divorced from Raper, 15 Okla. Stat. § 178(A) operated to
revoke Raper’s status as a beneficiary of his life insurance policy.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Texas Life’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
[Doc. #27] and declares that defendant Amanda Raper’s status as a beneficiary of the
insurance policy Texas Life issued Chris Nickell was revoked by operation of law and that
defendant Dana Clifton, as legal guardian for the Estate of GFN, is the lawful beneficiary of
the insurance policy. For the reasons stated in the court’s August 24, 2015, Order, the
Citizen Potawatomi Nation courts lack jurisdiction to resolve the dispute as to the proper
beneficiary of the insurance policy.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 11th day of January, 2016.

4

As Texas Life noted, even if the decree was ambiguous, parol evidence would not be
admissible to construe it because, “if a decree suffers ambiguity, then the court may construe it but,
in doing so, the court is limited to the judgment roll.” Ryan v. Ryan, 78 P.3d 961, 964
(Okla.Civ.App. 2003).
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