Park v. Trican Well Service LP et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting 15 Trican USA's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Invasion of Privacy Claim; denying 16 Motion to Dismiss Trican Canada for Lack of Jurisdiction, as more fully set out. Signed by Honorable David L. Russell on 8/17/15. (jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
SETH T. PARK,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
TRICAN WELL SERVICE, L.P. and )
TRICAN WELL SERVICE LTD,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CIV-15-515-R

ORDER
Before the Court is Trican USA’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Invasion of
Privacy Claim, Doc. No. 15, and the Motion to Dismiss Trican Canada for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction, Doc. No. 16. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court
grants Trican USA’s motion and denies Trican Canada’s motion.
Background
Defendant Trican Well Service Ltd. (“Trican Canada”) is an international pressure
pumping company that provides “multistage fracturing solutions to the oil and gas
industry.” Pet. ¶ 1. The company is headquartered in Alberta, Canada. Id. Defendant
Trican Well Service, L.P. (“Trican USA”) is a subsidiary of Trican Canada headquartered
in Texas that provides operational support services for the oil and gas industry in
Oklahoma and elsewhere in the United States. Doc. No. 16, Ex. 3, ¶ 4. Plaintiff worked
for Trican USA as an equipment operator from July 2012 to April 2014 in Shawnee,
Oklahoma. Pet. ¶ 13. During that time he worked with Chris Hubley, a Trican Canada
Service Line Manager, for three months. Doc. No. 17, Ex. 1, ¶ 6. Mr. Hubley was at the
Shawnee facility providing training and supervision to Trican USA employees. Pet. ¶ 14.

On April 8, 2014, Plaintiff gave his two-week notice to Trican USA. Id. ¶ 15. His district
manager told him he could terminate his employment immediately and “still leave on
good terms.” Id. Plaintiff’s last day at Trican USA was April 9, 2014. Id. He was then
hired by Redback Coiling Tubing, LLC, an Oklahoma-based company. Id. ¶ 17.
On April 12, 2014, Mr. Hubley sent a text message to Plaintiff asking if he would
like to work for Trican Canada. Id. ¶ 18. The two exchanged approximately 500 text and
instant messages over the next two months concerning the details of the position. Id. ¶¶ 3,
18. The new job would require Plaintiff to work in Siberia, Russia directly under Mr.
Hubley’s supervision performing duties that he had previously performed for Mr. Hubley
in Oklahoma. Id. ¶ 19. The contract would be for two years, Plaintiff would be paid a
base salary of $120,000 per year, and he would work for thirty-five continuous days and
then be off for thirty-five continuous days. Id. Plaintiff alleges that after a conversation
with Mr. Hubley on April 16, 2014 in which Plaintiff stated in a text message, “Yes I
absolutely want the position,” he entered into an employment contract with Trican
Canada. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Two senior Trican Canada managers, Kevin Young and Mike
Burbell, also confirmed Plaintiff’s employment in subsequent telephone conversations.
Id.
After addressing issues related to Plaintiff’s passport and making arrangements to
move his family from Oklahoma to South Carolina in preparation for the move to Russia,
id. ¶¶ 25-31, Plaintiff spoke with Casey Roberson, an HR representative, on May 14,
2014 about how his income would be taxed. Id. ¶ 33. Ms. Roberson told Plaintiff “Trican
had no information regarding Mr. Park working internationally.” Id. On May 25, Mr.
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Hubley texted Plaintiff “promising that everything was going well with Mr. Park’s
employment.” Id. ¶ 34. But he informed Plaintiff for the first time that day that he had
been placed on a “non-rehirable” list. Id. Mr. Hubley “texted that he was ‘digging’ into
Mr. Park’s personal file to determine who put Mr. Park on the ‘non-rehirable’ list.” Id.
¶ 35. On June 25, Kevin Young “assured Mr. Park that Chris Hubley was traveling to
Trican Canada’s headquarters to resolve the issues with Mr. Park’s employment.” Id.
¶ 37. That was the last communication Plaintiff had with a Trican Canada employee. Id.
Plaintiff has sued Trican Canada for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and
false representation. Id. at 11-14. He has sued Trican USA for false light invasion of
privacy, false representation, and defamation. Id. at 15-19. The Court will first address
Trican USA’s motion to dismiss the invasion of privacy claim, and will then analyze the
issue of personal jurisdiction over Trican Canada.
Invasion of Privacy
A. Standard of Review
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether
the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is
properly granted when the complaint provides mere “labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face” and the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 570 (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). For the purpose of
making the dismissal determination, the Court accepts all the well-pleaded allegations of
the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and construes the allegations in the light
most favorable to the claimant. Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges Trican USA placed him in a false light by disclosing facts in his
personnel file, including the fact that he was put on the “non-rehirable” list, to Chris
Hubley and other Trican Canada employees. Pet. ¶¶ 34-36, 65. Oklahoma has adopted the
four categories of invasion of privacy contained in The Restatement of Torts, Second,
including publicly placing someone in a false light. McCormack v. Oklahoma Publ’g Co.,
613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla. 1980). To succeed on this claim, a plaintiff must show, in
relevant part, that the defendant gave “publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light.” Id.
Trican USA argues Plaintiff’s false light claim fails for lack of publicity.
“‘Publicity’ means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at
large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to
become one of public knowledge.” Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 78 (Okla. 1986) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977)). “The difference is not one of
the means of communication … [but] one of a communication that reaches, or is sure to
reach the public.” Id. (quoting § 652D cmt. a). In Eddy v. Brown, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held when “only a small group of coworkers were made privy to [the
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plaintiff’s] private affairs,” he failed to satisfy the publicity requirement of his false light
claim. Id. The court then distinguished Eddy in Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville,
775 P.2d 766, 781 (Okla. 1989), a case in which “the Elders read scriptures that
implicated [the] Parishioner’s private life to a church congregation comprising five
percent of [the] Parishioner’s hometown population.” The court held that the plaintiff had
satisfied the publicity requirement because that group of people were, “in many respects,
[the] Parishioner’s public.” Id.
Plaintiff argues “it is plausible from [his] allegations that Trican USA released his
personal information to more than just a small group of people.” Doc. No. 18, at 6. He
contends his allegation that Trican USA published this information to “other Trican
Canada employees” could plausibly be read to “include hundreds or thousands of
individuals who do not work for Trican USA.” Id. at 7. In his view, the motion to dismiss
“is premature and should be denied until such time that discovery can establish the
number of individuals who received Trican USA’s published information.” Id.
Plaintiff’s contention that his personal information was revealed to “hundreds or
thousands of individuals” is merely speculative. According to the Petition, on May 25,
2014, Chris Hubley informed Plaintiff that he was on a “non-rehirable” list. Pet. ¶ 34.
That day, Mr. Hubley “was able to access information in Mr. Park’s Trican USA’s
personnel file and ultimately determined who placed Mr. Park on the ‘non-rehirable’ list.”
Id. ¶ 35. On June 25, Kevin Young told Plaintiff that Mr. Hubley was going to Trican
Canada’s headquarters “to resolve the issues with Mr. Park’s employment.” Id.

¶ 37.

The only specific individuals Plaintiff alleges knew about information in his personnel
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file were Mr. Hubley and possibly Mr. Young. Although the allegation that Trican USA
shared Plaintiff’s private information with “other Trican Canada employees” is consistent
with the fact that it shared this information with hundreds or thousands of people, that
allegation alone does not satisfy Twombly’s plausibility requirement on this issue. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Even taking the
allegations in the Petition as true, it would not be reasonable to infer that Trican USA
disclosed Plaintiff’s private information to more than just a small group of people.
Therefore, under Eddy, Plaintiff’s claim for false light invasion of privacy is dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
Personal Jurisdiction
A. Standard of Review
When, as in this case, the Court has ordered no evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff need
only make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists over Defendant.
Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000).
In determining the facts necessary to establish personal jurisdiction, the Court accepts as
true the well pled allegations set forth in the Petition, but only “to the extent they are
uncontroverted by defendant’s affidavits.” Id. (quoting Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d
1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995)). If there is conflicting evidence, all factual disputes are
resolved in Plaintiff’s favor. Id.
B. Analysis
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“Whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in
a diversity action is determined by the law of the forum state.” Yarbrough v. Elmer
Bunker & Assocs., 669 F.2d 614, 616 (10th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). “The test for
exercising long-arm jurisdiction in Oklahoma is to determine first whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is authorized by statute and, if so, whether such exercise of jurisdiction is
consistent with constitutional requirements of due process.” Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1385-86 (10th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). Because the
Oklahoma long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by due
process, “this two-part inquiry collapses into a single due process analysis.” Rambo v.
Am. S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1416 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2004(F) (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with
the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.”)).
“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being
subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful
‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72
(1985) (citation and footnote omitted). Accordingly, a court “may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist ‘minimum contacts’
between the defendant and the forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citation omitted). If the minimum contacts test is met, the
Court must determine if the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” or, instead, is
“reasonable.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th
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Cir. 1998) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102,
113 (1987)).
1. Minimum Contacts
The “minimum contacts” test can be satisfied in one of two ways. “First, if a
defendant has ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ with the forum state,
it may be subjected to the general jurisdiction of the forum state’s courts.” Melea, Ltd. v.
Jawer SA, 511 F.3d 1060, 1066 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)). Second, a court may exercise specific
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant has “such minimum contacts
with the forum state ‘that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’”
OMI, 149 F.3d at 1091 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297)). With regard
to specific jurisdiction, “we must determine whether the defendant purposefully directed
its activities at residents of the forum, and whether the plaintiff’s claim arises out of or
results from ‘actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection with the
forum state.’” Id. (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).
“The purpose of this [purposeful availment] requirement is to ‘ensure[] that a defendant
will not be subject to the laws of a jurisdiction solely as the result of random, fortuitous,
or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or third person.’”
Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted). Based on the following analysis, the Court finds specific jurisdiction
exists over Trican Canada, and therefore does not address the issue of general
jurisdiction.
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Plaintiff has brought both contract and tort claims against Trican Canada. “In the
tort context, we often ask whether the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully directed’ its
activities at the forum state; in contract cases, meanwhile, we sometimes ask whether the
defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the privilege of conducting activities or
consummating a transaction in the forum state.” Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine
Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1071 (10th Cir. 2008). Both tests are satisfied here.
“A contract between an out-of-state party and a resident of the forum state cannot,
standing alone, establish sufficient minimum contacts with the forum.” Benton v. Cameco
Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473). “In
order to assess whether minimum contacts occurred in a contract case, we look at prior
negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract
and the parties’ actual course of dealing.” AST Sports Sci., Inc. v. CLF Distrib. Ltd., 514
F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff directs the Court to AST Sports, a case in which the Tenth Circuit held
that non-resident defendants had established minimum contacts in the forum state. 514
F.3d at 1060. The plaintiff, AST, was a Colorado corporation and the defendants were
CLF, a corporation established under the laws of Great Britain, and CLF’s president. Id.
at 1055. Both companies sold health, nutrition, and vitamin products. Id. The Circuit
considered “[e]specially significant” to its analysis the fact that one of the defendants
approached the plaintiff about a business opportunity, “and then formed an ongoing
business relationship to facilitate the same.” Id. at 1059. It noted that “[p]hone calls,
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letters, facsimiles, and emails provide additional evidence that [the foreign defendant]
pursued a continuing business relationship with [the plaintiff].” Id. (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff asserts this case to analogous to AST Sports
in that Trican Canada, through Chris Hubley, approached him about a possible business
opportunity and then followed up with numerous messages to finalize his employment.
Doc. No. 17, at 14-16.
In response, Trican Canada argues AST Sports is distinguishable from the present
facts because in that case, “the plaintiff and defendant had a relationship that preexisted
the events in the suit.” Doc. No. 19, at 3. It points out that in AST Sports, the parties had a
business relationship that lasted for seven years prior to the events giving rise to suit,
which involved the defendant placing orders to the plaintiff that the plaintiff would fill in
Colorado and then ship to England. 514 F.3d at 1059. In contrast, Trican Canada contends
“Park cannot point to an extensive, continuing relationship that predated the events at
issue and involved the defendant’s travel to the forum state.” Doc. No. 19, at 3.
Although the parties in AST Sports certainly had a business relationship lasting
longer than that between Plaintiff and Trican Canada, the negotiation period for
Plaintiff’s position in Russia is not the only link between the parties in this case. The
parties’ “actual course of dealing” includes a three-month period prior to the events
giving rise to this suit in which Plaintiff worked with Mr. Hubley, a Trican Canada
employee, in Oklahoma. Doc. No. 17, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 5-6. Hubley then initiated contact with
Plaintiff in Oklahoma to notify him of a job opportunity with Trican Canada. Id. ¶ 9.
Plaintiff’s claims arise directly from these communications with Mr. Hubley, a
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representative of Trican Canada, and these communications arose directly from Mr.
Hubley’s work with Plaintiff in Oklahoma.1 Trican Canada should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court when one of its employees works for three months in Oklahoma
training and supervising an Oklahoma resident and that employee then initiates a
conversation with the resident, in Oklahoma, about working for Trican Canada. Although
Plaintiff would not have lived in Oklahoma during the duration of the contract term, or,
presumably, performed any of his obligations under the contract in Oklahoma, these facts
are not determinative. Trican Canada purposefully directed its activities at Oklahoma by
sending its employees to train and supervise Trican USA workers, and it used one of
those employees to purposely avail itself of the opportunity to enter into negotiations and
an employment contract with an Oklahoma resident. The minimum contacts test is met in
this case.
2. Reasonableness
Trican Canada now bears the burden of presenting “a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”
Rusakiewicz v. Lowe, 556 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Burger King, 471
U.S. at 477) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Such cases are rare.” Id. To determine if
exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable and would violate “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice,” courts consider five factors: “(1) the burden on the
defendant, (2) the forum state’s interest in resolving the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest
1

Plaintiff does not allege when exactly he worked with Mr. Hubley, but he does state he worked for Trican
USA from July 12, 2012 to April 9, 2014, and that Mr. Hubley contacted him on April 12, 2014. Doc. No.
17, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 3, 9.
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in receiving convenient and effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the
several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” OMI, 149 F.3d at
1095 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113).
a) Burden on Trican Canada
Trican Canada presents no argument as to the burden of defending this action in
Oklahoma. The evidence suggests that it sends employees to Oklahoma on a regular
basis. See Doc. No. 17, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 4-7, Ex. 7, ¶¶ 2-4, Ex. 8, ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. 9, ¶¶ 3-4.
Moreover, “[a]s in any case in which the parties reside in different fora, one side must
bear the inconvenience of litigating ‘on the road,’” and Trican Canada has “not indicated
that [its] defense of this case would be hindered by the territorial limits” on this Court’s
subpoena power, or would be “hampered in any other significant way.” See Dudnikov,
514 F.3d at 1081. This factor does not weigh in favor of either party.
b) Oklahoma’s Interest in Resolving the Dispute
Trican Canada argues Oklahoma has little interest in resolving this dispute because the
alleged contract called for Plaintiff to work in Russia, not Oklahoma, and he would not
have resided in Oklahoma at any point during the contract term. Doc. No. 16, at 10. It
ignores the well-established fact that “[s]tates have an important interest in providing a
forum in which their residents can seek redress for injuries caused by out-of-state actors.”
OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483). As a resident of Oklahoma
City, Pet. ¶ 7, this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.
c) Plaintiff’s Interest in Convenient and Effective Relief
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Trican Canada also asserts that if the claims against it were dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff could still obtain relief in a forum that does have personal
jurisdiction over it. Doc. No. 16, at 10-11. It does not suggest any U.S. state in which it
would be subject to personal jurisdiction. As an individual resident of Oklahoma, it would
be much more convenient for Plaintiff to litigate here, in the city of his residence. The
third factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
d) Interest in Obtaining
Controversies2

the

Most

Efficient

Resolution

of

The fourth factor requires the Court to examine whether Oklahoma is the most
efficient state in which to litigate this dispute. “Key to this inquiry are the location of
witnesses, where the wrong underlying the lawsuit occurred, what forum’s substantive
law governs the case, and whether jurisdiction is necessary to prevent piecemeal
litigation.” OMI, 149 F.3d at 1097 (citations omitted).
First, most of the witnesses the Court is aware of reside outside of Oklahoma.
Plaintiff resides in Oklahoma, but to the Court’s knowledge, other witnesses include
Chris Hubley, Casey Roberson, Kevin Young, and Mike Burbell. These individuals
presumably reside either in Canada or Russia. Furthermore, assuming Mr. Hubley had the
authority to make the final decision with regard to Plaintiff’s employment, Pet. ¶ 24,
because Mr. Hubley was in Russia at the time of the negotiations, Doc. No. 17, Ex. 2, at
1, the “wrong underlying the lawsuit” did not occur in this state.
2

Although Plaintiff contends the last two reasonableness factors do not apply to this matter, Doc.
No. 17, at 28, the Tenth Circuit in OMI Holdings addressed these factors when deciding whether
litigating that dispute in Kansas would be more efficient than in Canada or would interfere with
Canada’s sovereignty. 149 F.3d at 1097-98.
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With regard to the substantive law governing the case, although not addressed by the
parties, it appears Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim will be governed by Russian law,
and his false representation claim will be governed by Oklahoma law. See OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 162 (West) (“A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage
of the place where it is to be performed.”); Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d
618, 626-27 (Okla. 2003) (“[W]hen the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the defendant’s
representations in a single state, this state will usually be the state of the applicable law,
with respect to most issues, if … the defendant’s representations were received by the
plaintiff in this state.”); Boyd Rosene & Assocs. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d
1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that federal courts sitting in diversity apply the
substantive law of the forum state, including its choice-of-law principles). Trican Canada
does not argue that any of the claims are governed by Canadian law.
Finally, it appears jurisdiction is necessary to prevent piecemeal litigation in this
case. Plaintiff has also sued Trican USA in this matter, and it is unclear whether a
Canadian court would have jurisdiction over the subsidiary company.
This factor does not favor either party. On one hand, almost all of the witnesses to
the alleged wrong, which occurred outside of Oklahoma, are not located in this state.
Additionally, it appears Russian law would apply to the breach of contract claim. On the
other hand, Oklahoma law likely governs the false representation claim and maintaining
jurisdiction here may be necessary to prevent piecemeal litigation.
e) Interest in Furthering Fundamental Substantive Social Policies

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The last factor to consider is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Trican Canada would affect the substantial social policy interests of Canada. OMI, 149
F.3d at 1097. Facts relevant to this analysis are whether one of the parties is a citizen of
Canada, whether Canadian law governs the dispute, and whether the foreign citizen chose
to conduct business with a resident of Oklahoma. Id. at 1098. “The possible conflict with
a foreign nation’s sovereignty ‘is not dispositive because, if given controlling weight, it
would always prevent suit against a foreign national in a United States court.’” OMI, 149
F.3d at 1097 (quoting Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir.
1984)).
Trican Canada is a resident of Canada, Doc. No. 16, Ex. 3, ¶ 3, but it chose to
conduct business with Plaintiff, a resident of Oklahoma. Furthermore, as noted above, it
appears Plaintiff’s breach of contract and false representation claims will not be governed
by Canadian law. The Court understands that “[g]reat care and reserve should be
exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (citations omitted). But in this case, the Court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Trican Canada would not affect Canada’s policy interests. See
Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distrib., Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Sporoptic
is a French company. However, this dispute is not governed by French law, and Sporoptic
chose to conduct business with Pro Axess, a resident of Utah. Therefore, we find that an
exercise of personal jurisdiction would not affect France’s policy interests.”). This factor
favors Plaintiff.

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Because three of the reasonableness factors favor Plaintiff and two do not favor
either party, the undersigned concludes Trican Canada has not satisfied its burden of
demonstrating that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable and inconsistent with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Trican USA’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Invasion of Privacy Claim, Doc. No. 15, is GRANTED, and the Motion to Dismiss Trican
Canada for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Doc. No. 16, is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of August, 2015.

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