Woodfaulk v. Mercy Hospital Oklahoma City

Filing 23

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion to Quash; as more fully set out. Signed by Honorable David L. Russell on 1/22/16. (jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
SHARON K. WOODFAULK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MERCY HOSPITAL OKLAHOMA
CITY,
Defendant.

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Case No. CIV-15-777-R

ORDER
Before the Court in this disability discrimination and retaliatory constructive discharge
case is Plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoenas issued to one of Plaintiff’s prior employers and
two of Plaintiff’s subsequent employers. See Doc. No. 20. The subpoenas request
production of the following:
application for employment and any related matter, her resume, any offer of
employment letters, acceptance letters, interview notes, all applicable job
descriptions for Woodfaulk’s current or past positions, any performance
evaluations, any documents related to any discipline or corrective action issued
to Woodfaulk, any documents related to any investigations . . . of any
complaints made by or about Woodfaulk, any documents related to
explanations of any fringe benefits available now or in the future to
Woodfaulk, and all of her payroll data from date of hire to the present
including but not limited to, pay stubs, pay and wage information, documents
outlining bonus or other incentive programs and W-2 forms.
Plaintiff contends that the subpoenas are overly broad, seek information that is not relevant
to any claim or defense, seek discovery of evidence inadmissible under F. R. Evid. 404(a)
and are invasive of Plaintiff’s privacy and intended to harass or intimidate the Plaintiff.
Defendant responds that the subpoenas seek information that is relevant or that the subpoenas

are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and argues that the
information sought is routinely deemed discoverable in employment discrimination cases.
Plaintiff has conceded that dates of employment, wage and benefit information and other
claims of discrimination made by Plaintiff are at least arguably relevant. The Court
addresses the possible relevance of the other categories of information sought by subpoenas.
Applications, Employment Offers,
Acceptance Letters, Interview Notes
This information is relevant to whether Plaintiff claimed a disability and as to whether
she asked for some reasonable accommodation.
Job Descriptions
This information is relevant to whether Plaintiff could perform certain jobs, with or
without reasonable accommodation.
Performance Evaluations
Defendant lumps such evaluations with discipline/corrective action, termination
records, and investigative files and asserts that this information could bear on Plaintiff’s
credibility as to her allegations of a disability, alleged damages and Plaintiff’s claim that she
was constructively discharged from her employment at Mercy. The Court disagrees that
performance evaluations are relevant in those regards and finds that performance evaluations
are not remotely relevant to any of the issues in this case.

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Discipline and Corrective Actions
Investigation Documents and Complaints
by or about the Plaintiff
Documents related to discipline amounting to termination, if any, may be relevant to
the credibility of Plaintiff’s complaints that she suffered weight loss and thinning hair a result
of her alleged constructive discharge; in all other respects disciplinary records and documents
showing corrective actions are not relevant to the issues herein. Investigative documents and
complaints by or about the Plaintiff may be relevant to Plaintiff’s relationships with coworkers and as to the credibility of Plaintiff’s claim of disability discrimination.
Benefits and Wage Information
Plaintiff has in essence conceded that this information is relevant.
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court quashes the subpoenas only to the extent
they seek performance evaluations and documents relating to disciplinary or corrective
actions short of employment termination and to such extent Plaintiff’s motion to quash is
GRANTED. In all other respects, Plaintiff’s motion to quash is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 2016.

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