Edwards v. Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control

Filing 12

ORDER denying 8 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable Robin J. Cauthron on 11/24/15. (lg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CHRIS L. EDWARDS,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel.
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OKLAHOMA BUREAU of NARCOTICS )
and DANGEROUS DRUGS CONTROL, )
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Defendant.
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Case No. CIV-15-791-C

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims (Dkt. No. 8). Plaintiff
responded (Dkt. No. 10) and Defendant filed a reply (Dkt. No. 11). The Motion has been
fully briefed and is at issue.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he was a victim of intentional race discrimination when
Defendant failed to promote him to the position of Special Agent in Charge. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant instead promoted a lesser qualified employee to the position. Defendant
refutes this argument. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendant alleges that Title VII requires a plaintiff to plead that the
employee he was replaced by was a non-minority and Plaintiff has failed to do so. Plaintiff
disagrees.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for consideration of motions to dismiss brought pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and the subsequent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009). In those cases, the Supreme Court made clear that to survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact which, taken as true, “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plaintiffs must
“nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” to survive a motion to
dismiss. Id. Thus, the starting point in resolving Defendant’s Motion is to examine the
factual allegations supporting each claim that Defendant wishes the Court to dismiss.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case because
Plaintiff did not allege in his failure-to-promote claim that he was replaced by a nonminority. The initial burden of establishing a claim under Title VII is retained by the
claimant. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). A plaintiff
alleging a failure-to-promote claim must show: “(1) she was a member of a protected class;
(2) she applied for and was qualified for the position; (3) despite being qualified she was
rejected; and (4) after she was rejected, the position was filled.” Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d
1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2003). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that a
person promoted in place of a claimant need not be a non-minority, noting conclusion to the
contrary is dicta. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999). The court in

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Perry articulated a very important policy argument as to why non-minority replacement is
not required.
The imposition of the inflexible rule advocated by Defendants is
untenable because it could result in the dismissal of meritorious claims.
Defendants’ rule would preclude suits against employers who replace a
terminated employee with an individual who shares her protected attribute
only in an attempt to avert a lawsuit. It would preclude suits by employers
who hire and fire minority employees in an attempt to prevent them from
vesting in employment benefits or developing a track record to qualify for
promotion. It would also preclude a suit against an employer who terminates
a woman it negatively perceives as a “feminist” and replaces her with a woman
who is willing to be subordinate to her male co-workers or replaces an
African-American with an African-American who is perceived to “know his
place.” Although each of these situations involves wrongfully-motived
terminations, under the rule advocated by the Defendants, the terminated
employee would be unable to meet the prima facie burden. Such a result is
unacceptable.
Id. at 1137.
Plaintiff has successfully pleaded a prima facie case of racial discrimination for his
failure-to-promote claim and has provided enough factual allegations to nudge his claim
across the line from conceivable to plausible.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff incorrectly pleaded in his Complaint that he is
entitled to economic damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Plaintiff has conceded that he is
not entitled to such damages under that specific statute. Plaintiff has pleaded in his
Complaint a cause of action that is sufficient for the relief he seeks, as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) authorizes economic damages in Title VII claims. There is no need to file an amended
complaint for this technical error.

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VII. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has successfully stated a claim on all claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of November, 2015.

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